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Abstract 
The ancient theory of virtue ethics has been rejuvenated in recent years, and many believe 
that this ‘new’ approach to ethical theory might not only revitalise the sometimes stale and 
often intractable nature of contemporary moral debate, but also serve as a viable alternative to 
traditional normative theories. This thesis aimed firstly to test this claim, and secondly, to 
construct a modified version which would not only be useful for the theist, but could also 
serve as a heuristic device for reading the text of the Old Testament. The method employed to 
conduct this investigation was to identify and critique the essential features of a virtue-based 
theory, and then suggest theological interpretations of each based on the text of the OT. 
These interpretations would be subsequently tested through a canonical reading of the Book 
of Amos. It was found that an Aristotelian form of virtue ethics admitted the closest parallels 
with the biblical text, and provided the best framework for the construction of a theistic 
version. But it was also found that virtue ethics, in all its contemporary forms, was unable to 
justify an account of right action, and so explain the source of normativity. We concluded 
that, while a theistic version of virtue ethical theory could indeed provide a useful heuristic 
device for reading the biblical text, virtue ethics alone could not provide a viable alternative 
to traditional normative theories. However, it was suggested that this shortcoming could be 
rectified through a partnership with a modified natural law theory.   
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Introduction 
 
The most conspicuous development in contemporary ethics is the growing interest in 
virtue ethics (VE). While only several years ago it seemed as though VE would not 
manage to get off the ground, it is now recognised almost everywhere as a serious 
rival to traditional theories, utilitarianism and deontology.1 
 
Ethics is an inescapable part of human life in community. We may not all think in terms of 
the often highly abstract and technical arguments which fill contemporary journals of moral 
philosophy, but we do all think about the way we should live our lives. And as rational 
beings, we seek a reasoned explanation of the moral norms by which our community lives. 
Moral theories attempt to formulate such explanations. And the moral theory we ultimately 
endorse must cohere with the worldview which we presuppose and by which we make sense 
of our lives. The study of moral theories is often referred to as normative ethics. Implicit in 
the above quotation is the fact that the theoretical landscape of normative ethics has been 
dominated, since the Enlightenment, by consequentialism, usually some form of 
utilitarianism, and the deontology of Immanuel Kant, the goal of both types of theory being 
to specify moral action as good or bad, right or wrong. However, this domination has been 
challenged in recent decades by the renewed interest in the ancient theory of virtue ethics. For 
the Greeks, the goal of ethics was virtue or virtuous character, and insofar as moral theory 
existed at all, its purpose was to teach us how to be, rather than teach us how to act. The 
phenomenon of contemporary virtue ethics (CVE) continues in this line of thought: virtue 
and matters of character are central and matters of moral action are derivative.2 This thesis 
will test the claims of VE to be an independent normative theory and therefore ‘a serious rival 
to traditional theories’.   
One major advantage of a return to the Greek notion of ethics is the possibility of a solution 
to the intractability of much contemporary moral debate. As Alasdair MacIntyre has 
observed, there is currently no rational way of attaining consensus, not because of a failure in 
the internal logic of the arguments, but because the claims in the starting premises are not of 
                                                 
1 Daniel Statman, “Introduction”, Daniel Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1997), 2. 
2 While it is true that most theories give some place to character, that place is most often a posteriori rather than 
a priori. 
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the same kind, and so there is no way of deciding between them.3 However, through its 
shifting of the focus of ethical reflection from the determination of right action to the 
cultivation of virtuous character, VE can supply the much-needed common ground for 
initiating meaningful debate. Moreover, the idea of the ancients that virtue and integrity were 
essential components of flourishing communities is as true today as it was then. As M. Daniel 
Carroll R points out, the mere changing of political structures does not change a country’s 
‘moral climate’; what this requires is the inculcation of ‘a culture of virtue’.4  From the above 
reasons, an ethical theory based on character and virtue would seem preferable to one based 
on rules or consequences.5 
But, while a return to virtue may be welcome, the question which is of particular interest to 
the current project is whether the ‘new’ theory of virtue ethics is robust enough to provide an 
adequate alternative to deontological or consequentialist theories of moral reasoning. And it 
is this question which provides the starting point for our investigation. But since this thesis is 
a study in theistic ethics, its aim is not only to critique CVE and assess its ability to function 
as an independent normative theory, but also to construct a theistic version, which might be 
capable not only of meeting any objections to which secular versions of CVE are vulnerable, 
but which also is consistent with the biblical text. The end product of that construction phase, 
a specifically theistic version of CVE theory, will therefore be tested through a reading of the 
biblical text. The text chosen for this testing is the book of the prophet Amos. At the heart of 
this project, then, is the initiation of a conversation between the theoretical concerns of the 
philosophers and the textual concerns of the biblical scholars. 
1. Locating the current project in the theoretical landscape  
This thesis begins with the assumption that the phenomenon of CVE is a good thing for 
ethical theory: not only are the virtues made central aspects of the moral life, but it enables a 
broad vision of ethics, one concerned with the whole of life, in contrast to the traditional 
                                                 
3 In the abortion debate, for example, premises involving individual rights and situational factors conflict with 
premises involving universal principles. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2nd ed.; 
London: Duckworth, 1985), 6-8. MacIntyre detects a paradox in contemporary moral debate: the deep human 
need for our ethical reflection to be rational, and our current inability to fulfil this need. Ibid., 9-10. 
4 M. Daniel Carroll R, “Seeking the Virtues among the Prophets: The Book of Amos as a Test Case.” Ex Auditu 
17 (2001): 77-96, 79-80. In a similar plea for a return to virtue, Tom Wright cites the words of a banker in the 
wake of the financial crash of 2008: ‘The system is only really healthy when the people who are running it are 
people you can trust to do the right thing, not because there are rules but because that’s the sort of people they 
are’. Tom Wright, Virtue Reborn (London: SPCK, 2010), 21.   
5 For further discussion about the attractiveness of VE compared to Kantian and utilitarian theories, see Chapter 
One. 
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ethical theories, which are largely preoccupied with the resolving of ethical quandaries.6 But 
while this assumption may well be valid, the claim which rides on its back is that CVE has 
sufficient explanatory power to stand alone as a normative theory, and provide an alternative 
to deontological or consequentialist approaches. When this claim is subject to critical 
analysis, certain difficulties arise. For example, the current CVE movement contains a mix of 
theoretical positions, making it very difficult to define: some of its proponents want to 
distance themselves entirely from the traditional theories, while others come very close to 
them indeed. For the purposes of this thesis, we will be focusing on those theorists, such as 
Rosalind Hursthouse and Michael Slote, whose claims are the most distinct, since it is the 
distinctiveness of VE theory which grounds the claims that it is a viable alternative to the 
dominant theories.  
The primary task of this thesis, then, is to subject CVE theory to critical analysis and assess 
whether it has sufficient explanatory power to function as an independent normative theory, 
and so provide an alternative to deontological or consequentialist approaches. A point which 
should be made clear at the outset, but will be reinforced throughout, is that this project is a 
study of the theory of VE and is not concerned with the place that virtue concepts might have 
in other theories, such as those with roots in Kant for example. The secondary task is to see 
whether VE can be adapted to provide a useful normative theory for theistic ethics, in 
particular where the theos is the God of the Bible. If VE is to help the interpretation of 
biblical ethics, then it must make sense of the biblical text. The current project, therefore, has 
a constructive as well as a critical aspect. It is critical with regard to VE itself, and yet also 
constructive; it aims not only to construct a workable theistic version, but also to construct a 
bridge between contemporary ethical theory and life in ancient Israel.    
While a large body of philosophical literature has built up around CVE over recent years, 
there has been relatively little discussion of its normative sufficiency from theologians. 
Christian ethics from a NT as well as an OT perspective, has, for the most part, been regarded 
as a deontological exercise: that is, it consisted in a duty to obey the Law.7 And so, despite 
                                                 
6
 Another positive benefit to ethical theory is that Kantians and utilitarians have been prompted to reassess their 
own theories to take more account of virtue, a point made by Nafsika Athanassoulis in Virtue Ethics (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013). 
7
 For examples of advocates of this law-based perspective, see Chapter One, n. 15. In recent years this 
monopoly has been challenged not only by utilitarian thinkers such as Joseph Fletcher, but also by theologians 
such as Stanley Hauerwas, who has long advocated the retrieval of the idea of virtue in Christian ethics, 
emphasising the role of communities and their narratives in the formation of character. See, for example, 
Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
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the long history of Christian discussion of the virtues, and of moral character in general, these 
discussions have generally taken place within a deontological framework.8 What is being 
attempted here, by contrast, is not simply a discussion of how an ethics focussed on character 
could enrich Christian ethical discourse, but rather an assessment of the distinctive claims of 
VE in the search for a specifically theistic version. And it is this theoretical focus which has 
arguably been lacking in the theological discussions of virtue and character. The exploratory 
work which has been carried out has most often adopted a largely uncritical stance towards 
the theory, assuming the soundness of its arguments, rather than engaging in their critique.9 
Moreover, those explorations have been largely based on the NT.10 And so, on both these 
counts, the present project has something to offer: it aims not only to critique the theory of 
VE, but also to construct a bridge between the theory and the OT text. Ultimately, we want a 
moral theory which can be put to work. The hope is that we can construct a bridge not only to 
take us, in Christopher Wright’s words, from ‘here to there’, 11 but also to take us back again. 
So, this investigation is not simply a reading of the text in the light of VE, but aims to let the 
text speak to, and assess the normative usefulness of, the theory. It will be argued that the 
bridge is built on a common humanity and a shared conception of God. By this bridge, it 
                                                 
Notre Dame Press, 1983). Hauerwas, however, does not consider himself a virtue ethicist, and indeed is 
uncomfortable with the very classification. Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, Christians among the 
Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1997), ix. 
8
 One might think immediately of Thomas Aquinas and his appropriation of Aristotle’s thought in which virtue 
was fundamental. But although virtue was conceptually central for Aquinas, law was equally central. The 
virtues are linked to actions which are the subject of moral rules. See Jean Porter, “Virtues and Vices”, in Brian 
Davies and Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas (Oxford: OUP, 2012). Bruce Birch 
follows Hauerwas in his interest in character formation, but sees the shaping of the community as the role of the 
law. Bruce C. Birch, Let Justice Roll Down: The Old Testament, Ethics and the Christian Life. (Louisville, Ky: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1991), 192-3, n. 72.   
9
 One might level such a criticism at Joseph J. Kotva’s The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics (Washington, D.C: 
Georgetown University Press, 1996). Carroll R also takes as givens what we are subjecting to critical analysis in 
“Seeking the Virtues”. So too, in large part, does John Barton: his examination of the place of virtue in the Bible 
concludes that the concept is more implicit than explicit, and that while an ethics of virtue may have something 
to contribute to our understanding of OT ethics, such as the provision of ‘a moral vision’, other theoretical 
explanations are needed too. John Barton, “Virtue in the Bible”. An exception is Jonathan Sanford, who does 
critique the theory, concluding ultimately that it cannot work unaided. Jonathan J. Sanford, Before Virtue: 
Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996). 
10 In addition to Kotva’s contribution, which concludes that a VE approach has much to offer Christian ethics, 
see also Tom Wright’s Virtue Reborn, where the author’s aim is to encourage Christians to pursue virtue in its 
“specifically Christian form” (p. xi). The NT focus is perhaps not surprising since it is the Greek language and 
not the Hebrew one which has a word for virtue. 
11 The ‘here’ being our contemporary world, and the ‘there’ the world of ancient Israel. Christopher J. H. 
Wright, Old Testament Ethics for the People of God (Nottingham: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004), 441 ff. 
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should be possible to have a conversation between philosophical ethical theory and the 
biblical text. 
2. Methodology 
Before we can bring the philosophical theory of virtue ethics into conversation with the 
biblical text, two things must be done. Firstly, a point of clarification must be made. And 
secondly, a declaration of presuppositions. 
2.1. A point of clarification  
Prior to proceeding with a critical analysis of the theory, we must specify the parameters of 
our investigation. The more one becomes familiar with the literature surrounding CVE, the 
more one realises that the field is far from homogeneous. In anthologies of VE articles we 
find scholars as diverse as Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, Bernard Williams, 
Annette Baier and Michael Slote, and it is very difficult to summarise or neatly classify in 
any meaningful way the developing thought of a highly original thinker such as a Williams or 
a MacIntyre or a Nussbaum. To say ‘well, they are all interested in virtue ethics,’ begs a very 
important question. What exactly is CVE?12 Seeking a common denominator for these 
thinkers necessarily generates a thin description.13 And as we thicken the description, in 
whatever direction, we will inevitably lose some thinkers along the way. Not all, for example, 
acknowledge Aristotle, or indeed the Stoics, as Kantians and utilitarians might readily 
acknowledge their philosophical forebears.14 And yet the thinner our specifications become, 
the less useful is the concept. Therefore, if we are to assess whether CVE can indeed serve as 
an alternative to consequentialism or deontology, we must dare to fix the parameters for our 
                                                 
12
 An interesting fact is that few of those usually credited with founding CVE, such as G.E.M. Anscombe or 
Philippa Foot, actually claimed to be virtue ethicists. MacIntyre does not consider himself part of the CVE 
movement (see Sanford, Before Virtue, 10, n. 18), and Martha Nussbaum has even argued that the very category 
of ‘virtue ethics’ is a misleading one. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?”. The 
Journal of Ethics 3, no. 3 (1999): 163-201. 
13
 There is lively debate between those who freely confess to be virtue ethicists over such crucial matters as how 
virtues function in the theory, how they are to be grounded, and their relation to practical wisdom. Christine 
Swanton, for example, is an advocate of a particularly wide conception: for her, ‘virtue ethics’ signifies any 
theory which incorporates the idea of virtue. See Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: 
OUP, 2005. As suggested already, this wide conception might be better termed ‘virtue theory’. At the other end 
of the scale, Daniel Russell argues that ‘real virtue ethics’ requires that phronesis be a part of every virtue for 
virtue must involve excellence in deliberation. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 71.  
14
 Even the so-called ‘neo-Aristotelians’ may be more ‘neo’ than Aristotelian, as Peter Simpson has wryly 
commented. While accepting the central idea of eudaimonia, they often ignore his methodology, in particular 
his connecting ethics to politics. Peter Simpson, “Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle.” The Review of 
Metaphysics 45, no. 3 (1992): 503-24, 504. 
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discussion and list the features which would be acceptable to most advocates of CVE. After 
all, we must begin somewhere. And so, we might acknowledge, in the first place, that the 
theory is fundamentally teleological, that is, ‘the good’, the end of all ethical reflection, is 
prior to ‘the right’. Secondly, virtue, however defined, is central to the theory. So too is the 
concept of the virtuous person as moral exemplar, since we do need to know what virtue 
looks like in practice. And lastly, reason surely requires that our ethical theory is consistent 
with an account of the source of normativity. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn in 
the chapters to follow, and an attempt made to give each one a theological interpretation in 
order to provide a framework for the construction of a theistic version of VE.  
2.2. A declaration of presuppositions 
Before proceeding further, we must declare what is being presupposed in this thesis. No one 
has the vantage point of perfect objectivity. Our journeys as rational moral agents have 
already begun: we have our luggage with us. Many of our presuppositions are deeply 
ingrained and have become part of us, bound up with our identity and not so easily laid aside. 
Yet, we should travel as lightly as we possibly can, declare what we need to declare, and 
press on towards our destination. 
This ethical study assumes a theistic story, one based on the biblical record. But our 
presuppositions transcend the acknowledging of this fact; they also determine how we read 
the biblical text, in this case the text of the OT. As Wright has noted, we do not enter the 
terrain of the biblical world as ‘neutral observers’,15 nor do we return from our exploration as 
such. The findings of our exploration and the uses to which we put them are very much 
determined by the ideological convictions which we take with us and the methodologies we 
employ to get there. Furthermore, if our objective is the development of a normative ethics, 
we must explain why the text, or at least certain parts of it,16 should be normative at all: what 
is the source of its authority? Therefore, before we proceed we must be clear about the 
identity of our theos. God is the central character in the Bible, and the text declares him not 
only to exist, but also to be essentially knowable. Character traits are ascribed to him in 
addition to a record of his actions. Moreover, a God who is God in the classical sense, will be 
the foundation as well as the essential explainer of our morality, as he is of everything else 
                                                 
15 Wright, Old Testament Ethics, 441. 
16 The common route for a discussion of normative biblical ethics is to search in the legal sections, primarily of 
course, the Decalogue, from which it is hoped we can extract principles and codes for contemporary moral 
conduct. This primarily deontological approach is to be contrasted with the current project. 
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that exists. And so, the general and special revelation of God are not only two sources of our 
moral knowledge, but also become normative for the people of God. And it is the normative 
rather than the descriptive aspect of theistic ethics which ultimately concerns us if we are 
investigating the usefulness of a moral theory.17 Why and how our ethical theory is normative 
ultimately reduces to a question of authority, a detailed discussion of which is well beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. It must suffice to say that if, as Oliver O’Donovan suggests, 
authority is predicated on reality, and we assume that the ultimate reality is God, then he must 
be the source of authority.18 We are assuming, therefore, that as we read the book of Amos, 
we read it as part of the canon of the church, and therefore as having a legitimate authority 
for our ethics as the people of God today since this authority is predicated on the ultimate 
reality, God himself.19   
In addition to the presupposition that the God we encounter in the pages of scripture is the 
same sovereign God who exists today, and that the Bible as special revelation of this God has 
authority for the church today, there is a further presupposition which we must declare. And 
this is that, due to our being made in the image of this God, there are certain features of our 
nature which are common to all human beings: the world in which we live has been created 
by God and human nature is an empirical fact about the created world. In addition to special 
revelation, our moral knowledge also comes from the world around us, that is, from general 
revelation.  
These two presuppositions, it is suggested, provide our means of bridging the gap between 
the biblical world and the present day. On both sides of the gap we find a common human 
nature and the one God, the God of classical theism.   
3. The structure of the thesis 
This thesis will be divided into two parts. In the first part, Chapters One to Five, we shall 
investigate the key features of the theory of virtue ethics. The philosophical discussion of 
CVE theory is largely secular, but we will offer an alternative OT-based interpretation of 
                                                 
17 Often the ethics of the OT are studied in a descriptive manner: what were the moral codes which the people 
were, or should have been, following? This is a useful enterprise, but is distinct from the normative one pursued 
here.  
18
 Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986), 121-139. 
19 The prophets in general, and Amos in particular, are surely making this point in their frequent use of the 
phrase ‘Thus says the LORD’. 
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each feature as we proceed in order to construct our own theistic version. The second part 
(Chapter Six) will bring the conclusions drawn from the first part into conversation with the 
text of the book of Amos as we test the sufficiency of our theistically modified VE as a 
normative ethical theory. 
Chapter One will present a short overview of virtue ethics theory from its classical roots to its 
contemporary expressions, and a brief survey of its strengths and weaknesses. A working 
definition of CVE theory will be suggested which will enable the subsequent analysis of its 
distinguishing features. 
Since virtue ethics is a teleological theory, our first task is to arrive at an understanding of 
‘the good’ which is the telos (end) of all ethical reflection. For Aristotle, this was eudaimonia 
or happiness. But not all versions of CVE are eudaimonistic. Chapter Two will investigate the 
meaning and uses of ‘good’, survey the principal axiological theories of value and, drawing 
on the ethics of the ancient philosophers, primarily the Stoics and Aristotle, critique 
eudaimonism as a theory of the good. It will be argued that a neo-Aristotelian form of 
eudaimonism provides the most promising way to understand ‘the good’ in a theistic virtue 
ethics, since it admits the closest parallels with the ethics of the biblical text. If God is 
understood to be standing in some relation to the telos, then eudaimonia can be plausibly 
interpreted as relationship with God. 
All types of VE theory must provide an account, not only of virtue in general, but also of why 
the individual virtues are virtues at all. Rather than attempt to list and justify the virtues 
which are arguably found in the biblical text, Chapter Three will consider the concept of 
virtue with reference to the virtue of justice and explore how justice functions in a virtue 
ethical context. Not only does justice feature in most virtue lists, it also played a key role in 
Aristotle’s scheme. Moreover, it is a central theme in Amos. It therefore seems the most 
interesting virtue to explore in detail. The discussion will focus not only on the thought of 
Aristotle, but also on that of David Hume, since most CVE theories have their roots in one or 
other of these thinkers. Finally, the philosophical concerns raised in this discussion will be 
brought into dialogue with biblical notions of justice and righteousness, and it will be argued 
that, rather than follow Humean thinkers and attempt to ground ethics in the virtue of justice, 
a more convincing route is in the Aristotelian direction, which is to regard justice as not only 
constitutive of, but also contributing to, human flourishing.   
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It is essential for any moral theory that it has a reliable epistemology. For virtue ethics theory, 
we need a means of knowing what virtuous activity actually looks like, and how we tell 
virtue from vice. Chapter Four assesses the doctrine of imitatio Dei as a means of 
understanding moral exemplarism along theistic lines. How plausible is it that God be 
considered the supreme moral exemplar? This epistemological question is distinct from the 
metaphysical one which asks the question ‘why should we imitate God?’, and requires an 
account of the source of normativity. This latter question is addressed in the following 
chapter. 
Chapter Five will evaluate the claim that VE has the resources to explain the source of 
normativity, and so justify an account of right action. We conclude that CVE theory has 
insufficient explanatory power to do this and therefore it cannot ultimately function as an 
independent normative ethical theory. However, we argue that a partnership with a modified 
natural law theory can make good that deficit.     
Finally, in Chapter Six, our theistically modified VE theory will be tested by a canonical 
reading of the biblical text. To focus the discussion, the testing ground will be the book of the 
OT prophet Amos. This testing will be a two-way process. Our theistically modified VE 
theory be used as a heuristic device to read the text of Amos; but the text of Amos will at the 
same time be used to validate the theory.   
It will be concluded that virtue ethics has much to offer, not least in its emphasis on good, or 
virtuous, character and on the whole of a person’s life. However, in its contemporary 
expressions it falls short as a complete ethical theory. Its main defect is that in basing ethics 
on character evaluation, it is unable to explain the source of normativity, and so explain why 
one trait is a virtue and another one a vice, and why we should be virtuous at all. If the theory 
is modified to incorporate the idea of God, as the God of biblical theism, then it is certainly 
strengthened; the telos becomes a life of seeking God and virtues have their source and 
example in him. However, even a theistically modified VE cannot answer the normative 
question. We must look elsewhere for help. And so, it will be suggested that a partnership 
with a modified natural law theory could restore explanatory power to virtue ethics while 
retaining a theistic focus.  
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Chapter One 
What is virtue ethics? 
 
‘Virtue ethics’ is a term of art, initially introduced to distinguish an approach in 
normative ethics which emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to an 
approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or one which emphasizes the 
consequences of actions (utilitarianism).20 
 
Before we proceed to an analysis of the key features of virtue ethics theory, we will provide a 
short survey of its historical roots as well as its contemporary expressions and summarise the 
main arguments in favour of as well as against the theory. This chapter will then focus on 
providing a working definition of contemporary virtue ethics (CVE), which will provide the 
framework for the subsequent analysis.  
1. Introduction 
A moral theory might be defined as ‘an abstract structure that aims to simplify, systematise, 
and justify our moral beliefs and practices’.21 Construction of theories about moral practice, 
then, must be an essential part of those practices.22 Since this thesis is aiming to test CVE as a 
normative ethical theory, we first need to have a clear conception of the theory. Indeed, 
without such a conception, it is very hard to see how virtue ethics can ultimately be useful. 
Following a short overview of the philosophical background, this chapter aims to provide a 
description of virtue ethics based on conditions of adequacy which the theory must meet in 
order to be normatively useful. A brief discussion of the most important strengths and 
weaknesses of CVE will conclude the chapter.  
Although the European philosophical tradition was famously described by Alfred North 
Whitehead as ‘a series of footnotes to Plato’,23 the tradition of post-Enlightenment moral 
                                                 
20 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 1. [hereafter OVE] 
21 Linda Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory.” Metaphilosophy 41, no. 1-2 (2010): 42.   
22 Not everyone agrees with this, however. Bernard Williams, for example, doubts the existence of either an 
adequate theory of what morality is, or an empirically informed ethical theory which could yield a decision-
making procedure. Bernard Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), 
ix-x. 
23
 By this he meant that Plato was a uniquely gifted thinker at a unique period in history when formal 
systematising of ideas was unknown, and he refers to his writing as ‘an inexhaustible mine of suggestion’. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 63. 
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philosophy has not reflected this assessment, for, in that domain, Plato’s philosophy has often 
been little more than a footnote.24 In recent times, however, the philosophy of both Plato and 
his most famous student, Aristotle, has re-emerged as a force to be reckoned with. For the 
past two or three centuries until a few decades ago, normative ethics was dominated by two 
major theories - the deontology of Immanuel Kant and the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill.25 Despite their differences, the central moral question for both these 
theories is: ‘What is the right thing to do?’ Yet it was not always this way, for another type of 
question used to form the heart of ethics: for example, ‘What is the right sort of person to 
be?’ or perhaps, ‘What constitutes the good life?’ This latter type of question was the one 
with which the ancient Greeks were familiar, and the ethical theory which seeks to answer 
these very questions is what we now call virtue ethics.  
 
As Christianity gained ground in Western Europe, an ethics of virtue was replaced by an 
ethics of duty. Due to the considerable influence of Augustine’s theology, virtues came to be 
understood in terms of a duty to obey the divine law. For virtues to be true virtues, according 
to Augustine, they had to be underpinned by the love of God, and obedience to God was a 
mark of this love.26 Reason, which had undergirded the ethics of the ancients, was now 
considered suspect if detached from the authority of the Bible:27 and so the virtues were no 
longer expected to bear the weight of normative theory and were now understood in terms of 
the law.28 In the wake of the Renaissance, however, followed by the advances in science, and 
                                                 
24
 For example, J. L. Mackie, in his classic text, devotes less than four pages to classical virtue. He does not 
dismiss it as entirely irrelevant and is clearly drawn to Plato, but he certainly does not see virtue ethics as a 
viable alternative to, Kantianism and consequentialism. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977). 
25 Deontological theories put duty at the centre of morality, whereas in teleological theories this place is held by 
value. Category distinctions, however, are arguably more porous than they are sometimes portrayed to be. Some 
revisionist Kantians deny that Kant was a deontologist and Onora O’Neill has even argued that Kant should be 
reinterpreted as a virtue ethicist. Onora O'Neill, “Kant after Virtue.” Inquiry 26, no. 4 (1983): 387-405. Robert 
Louden advocates a more balanced view, finding ‘the real Kant’ somewhere between the two extremes. Robert 
B. Louden, “Kant's Virtue Ethics.” Philosophy 61, no. 238 (1986): 474. For an interesting collection of thoughts 
on possible links between Kant and ancient Greek thought, see Stephen P. Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting 
(eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty (Cambridge: CUP, 1996). 
26 Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans. (Translated by Henry Bettenson; Penguin 
Classics; London: Penguin, 1984), XIX, 25, 891. See also John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient thought baptised 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 168-185.  
27 Rist, Augustine, 56-8. 
28 The most famous of those who adapted the writings of Aristotle for a Christian context was Thomas Aquinas, 
who added three theological virtues (faith, hope and love) to the ‘cardinal’ virtues of Plato and Aristotle 
(wisdom, courage, temperance and justice): these virtues were an integral part of his natural law theory. For his 
discussion of the virtues see Summa Theologiae II, II. [hereafter ST] 
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the turn towards secularism, reason was once more highly favoured, eventually replacing 
revelation as the basis for a new moral law: questions of duty and notions of rightness and 
obligation were now paramount. The idea of virtue never completely disappeared; indeed, 
some of the Enlightenment thinkers, notably Hume and Kant, made considerable use of the 
concept of virtue in their theories.29 But there was no virtue ethics as we know it today. At 
least not until 1958, when Elizabeth Anscombe published ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’.30 It is 
generally agreed that this landmark paper marked the beginning of CVE, and virtually every 
article published since then has noted the author’s indebtedness to Anscombe.31 She argued 
that the idea of ‘Law’ without a Lawgiver was incoherent and terms such as duty, obligation 
and rightness were now, in a moral sense, meaningless. The way out of this moral impasse, 
she suggested, was to return to Aristotle and to the much-neglected virtues. Alasdair 
MacIntyre was one of the first to pursue these thoughts with any rigour, and his book, After 
Virtue, is rightly viewed as a classic in the field.32 
Subsequently, other philosophers who were discontented with the traditional theories and 
their apparent inability to resolve the moral problems of the day, looked in hope again to the 
virtues. The virtue ethics movement gained momentum, landmark articles were published and 
books were written,33 and the philosophical world witnessed something of a revival of the 
classical theory, albeit in a contemporary form. And this ‘new’ theory has had a considerable 
impact, for it is often now regarded as a viable alternative to utilitarianism or Kantianism,34 
                                                 
29
 For the renewed interest in Kant’s discussion of virtue, see refs at n. 4 above. While Hume’s virtues are 
discussed favourably in the writings of Christine Swanton, Jerome Schneewind regards Hume’s moral 
philosophy, despite its brilliance, as ‘one of virtue’s misfortunes’. Jerome B. Schneewind, “The Misfortunes of 
Virtue”, in Virtue Ethics, eds. Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote, (Oxford Readings in Philosophy; Oxford: 
OUP, 1997), 194.   
30 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-19. 
31
 While not endorsing all her ideas, Athanassoulis heartily recommends the reading of this paper because of ‘its 
veritable revolutionary nature, its passionate and heart-felt arguments against her perception of the status quo in 
moral debates and for sowing some of the seeds that inspired others to revive Aristotelianism ideas that had 
been largely marginalised up until that time’. Athanassoulis, Virtue Ethics, 14. Sanford rather endearingly calls 
Anscombe ‘the movement’s grandmother’. Sanford, Before Virtue, 1. 
32
 After Virtue is currently in its third edition. 
33 In addition to After Virtue, other notable works include Michael A. Slote, From Morality to Virtue (New 
York; OUP, 1995); Idem, Morals from Motives (Oxford: OUP, 2001); Rosalind Hursthouse, OVE; 
Swanton, Virtue Ethics; and most recently Athanassoulis’s Virtue Ethics. For a theological perspective, see 
Kotva, The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics and Sanford, Before Virtue. There are also three good collections to 
date: Daniel C. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics (Cambridge Companions to 
Philosophy; Cambridge: CUP, 2013); Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics; and Crisp and Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics.   
34 This shift can be seen in the changing content of textbooks on ethics and moral philosophy. The Encyclopedia 
of Bioethics provides a good illustration of this. In the first edition (1978) the only mention of virtue was in a 
two-page summary of ‘Virtue theory’ under ‘Theological Ethics’; by 2004, in its third edition, virtue ethics has 
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and many of its proponents are confident that it has the potential to solve the problems of 
modern moral philosophy. However, while the return to an emphasis on virtue and character 
is to be welcomed, if CVE is to live up to these hopes, and yield a viable, independent, 
normative ethical theory, there is still much groundwork to be done. As already mentioned, 
there is currently limited agreement among those working in the field about what exactly 
virtue ethics consists in, how distinctive it is with regard to other normative theories, its 
limitations, and its links to metaethical theory. Yet, if one’s aim is to critique a theory, and 
we observed in the Introduction that the neglect of theoretical critique in certain theological 
applications of VE is a matter of concern, then we must have a clear view of the parameters 
of the theory; only then is it possible to assess just how distinctive and how substantive it 
really is.35 The next section will therefore aim to delineate the fundamental parameters of 
CVE theory and so provide a framework not only for analysis, but also for the construction 
and ultimate testing of a theistic alternative in the chapters to come. 
2. Conditions of adequacy and the search for a definition 
Since this thesis is concerned with the appraisal of virtue ethics as a theory in its own right, 
we need to be clear from the start about terminology: what exactly do we mean by the phrase 
‘virtue ethics’? A most helpful route to clarification of the conceptual distinctiveness of 
virtue ethics is via Julia Driver’s distinction. Virtue ethics, she suggests, is ‘the project of 
basing ethics on virtue evaluation’, whereas virtue theory is an account of ‘what virtues 
are’.36 This is helpful because much of what has passed for virtue ethics in recent years 
would, on Driver’s definition, be more correctly termed virtue theory. That latter, much wider 
                                                 
come of age with a six-page section of its own. See Stephen G. Post, Encyclopedia of Bioethics (3rd ed. 5 vols. 
New York: Macmillan Reference, 2004), 2550-2556. Christian textbooks follow the same pattern with most 
now acknowledging that virtue ethics has a place within normative theory. For example, the third edition of 
Robin Gill’s A Textbook of Christian Ethics, contained its first text on virtue ethics, an extract from Jean 
Porter’s Moral Action and Christian Ethics. Robin Gill, A Textbook of Christian Ethics (3rd ed. Edinburgh: T. 
& T. Clark, 2006). On the other hand, in the second edition of Norman Geisler’s fairly lengthy Christian Ethics, 
there is still no mention of virtue and he states categorically that ‘Christian ethics is deontological’. Norman 
L. Geisler, Christian Ethics (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2010), 17.    
35 Some philosophers, have been particularly aware of the need to address this problem. Gregory Trianosky sees 
his own survey as taking ‘the first steps towards charting this vast and vastly exciting terrain’. Gregory 
Trianosky, “What Is Virtue Ethics All About?”. American Philosophical Quarterly 27, no. 4 (1990): 335. See 
also Slote, Morals from Motives and Christine Swanton, “The definition of virtue ethics”, in Russell (ed.), 
Cambridge Companion, 315-338.    
36 Julia Driver, “The Virtues and Human Nature”, in How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, ed. Roger 
Crisp (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 111. n. 1. As a utilitarian, her own project is one in virtue theory, and in Uneasy 
Virtue, (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy; Cambridge: CUP, 2004), she addresses the question of virtue in a 
consequentialist framework.   
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conception enables Hume and Kant, for example, to be brought under the ‘virtue ethics’ 
umbrella.37 However, as we noted in the Introduction, the wider the specification, the less 
substantive the theory, and the less useful for normative ethics. Since the objective of the 
current enquiry is the appraisal of ‘virtue ethics’ as a self-standing theory, we shall be 
following Driver’s definition of the term. It is this conception which will be tested against the 
claims of theism.     
A snappy definition of virtue ethics may be elusive, but it is possible and certainly beneficial 
to list some of its distinctive elements. The most basic of these is a concern for character and 
those character dispositions which are commonly termed virtues. But opinions diverge on the 
place of virtue in the theory. Often these virtues are construed in an Aristotelian sense where 
excellence of character is the goal and practical wisdom, or phronesis, is necessary for the 
achieving of this goal: development of the virtues is necessary if a person wants to live the 
life of flourishing qua human, a life often referred to by the Greek term eudaimonia.38 Agent-
centred virtue ethics, on the other hand, holds as fundamental either character assessment or 
the motivational component of action, understood as motives, intentions, or emotions.39 
Michael Slote’s ‘agent-based’ theory is an example of the most radical of these latter 
theories; he maintains that the evaluation of action is wholly derivable from the evaluation of 
character, motive, or intention and these categories in turn are wholly reducible to virtue.40 
Common to most CVE theories is the idea that right action is in some sense derivative from 
the virtues or from the character of the virtuous person who possesses and exercises the 
virtues.41 Again it should be emphasised that the project of CVE is distinct from projects 
which simply aim to characterise the virtues and their inter-relationships:42 these latter 
projects are not interested in establishing VE as a normative theory in its own right. But 
                                                 
37 See Swanton, “The definition of virtue ethics”, 319ff., as well as her earlier work. 
38 This eudaimonistic version is endorsed by MacIntyre, Hursthouse, Foot, and Julia Annas among others, and is 
often seen, perhaps unfairly depending on your viewpoint, as the paradigmatic account of virtue ethics. 
39 For Zagzebski, emotion is fundamental, and it is the ‘generally trustworthy’ emotion of admiration, which 
grounds her theory. Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory”, 52.    
40
 Slote, Morals from Motives, 5. 
41 One might think, for example, of Rosalind Hursthouse’s much-quoted definition of right action: ‘An action is 
right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances’. 
Hursthouse, OVE, 28.  
42 For recent examples of this type of work with a focus on the classification of the virtues see Kevin Timpe and 
Craig A. Boyd (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices (Oxford: OUP), 2014. 
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unless we can do so, we do not have a theory which can provide an alternative to Kantianism 
or consequentialism. 
To enable clarification of the distinctive nature of CVE, it may be useful to draw up a list of 
typical Kantian claims and a parallel list from CVE. Followers of Kant generally adhere to 
the following claims: 
A. The central question for morality is: What is the right, or obligatory, thing to do? 
Basic moral judgments are judgments about this rightness of actions. 
B. These basic moral judgments are formulated as rules or principles of right action. 
They are categorical imperatives, universal and impartial. 
C. They are autonomous in the sense that they are not derived from some prior 
account of the human good.  
D. Virtue is validated by its relation to right action, primarily by its role in motivation 
to do what is required by the rules, irrespective of the agent’s desire or emotion. 
Followers of CVE generally adhere to the following claims:     
A' The central question for morality is: What is the right kind of person to be? And 
basic moral judgments are judgments about character, and, specifically, judgments 
about virtue. 
B' These basic moral judgments are formulated as virtues. They are not categorical 
imperatives, nor universal and arguably not impartial. 
C' They are not autonomous for they are derived from some prior account of the 
human good. 
D' Virtues are validated independently of any action.    
This type of analysis is helpful in that it delineates the core areas, or perhaps core features, 
where virtue ethics either stands or falls as a theory. These core features are the conception of 
the human good or telos, the conception of virtue, the idea of the moral exemplar as the 
embodiment of virtue, and the question of the ground of normativity. This provides us with a 
framework for discussion. In the subsequent chapters, each of these will be examined, and 
then the usefulness of virtue ethics as a theory will be tested against a reading of the prophet 
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Amos. Before we turn to this task, however, we will pause to consider some of the arguments 
in favour of a return to the ethics of the ancients.43 
3. Some attractions of virtue ethics as a theory  
What, then, are the arguments which might persuade us that VE provides an attractive and 
viable alternative to Kantianism or consequentialism? The starting point for most of the 
arguments is the premise that character should have priority in ethical theory. Deontological 
and consequentialist theories are often accused of providing an escape route from moral 
responsibility: cultivation of character, by contrast, goes hand in hand with individual 
responsibility.44 For example, an environmental virtue ethicist, rather than question the rights 
and wrongs of particular actions, might ask: ‘What sort of person would destroy the natural 
environment?’ or even, ‘What sort of person would “carve their initials in 100-year-old 
Saguaros”?’45  Virtue ethicists also claim that their approach can accommodate the notion of 
partiality, towards friends and family for example, which our common-sense intuitions 
struggle to deny, but which is ruled out in both utilitarianism and Kantianism.46  
Another argument in favour of virtue ethics is that it provides a better account of moral 
motivation than either Kantianism, where the ground of the motive is duty itself,47 or 
utilitarianism where the motive is to maximize utility. Michael Stocker argues that a good life 
is one which is marked by ‘a harmony between one’s motives and one’s reasons, values, 
justifications’ whereas the absence of this harmony leads to the malady of ‘moral 
schizophrenia’.48 Where values such as love, friendship, and community are incorporated into 
the motives of utilitarian and deontological theories, the result is the negating of those very 
                                                 
43 Limited space unfortunately precludes any real engagement with the arguments for and against virtue ethics, 
but excellent discussions of them can be found in all of the works cited in the notes 11-12. 
44 See Robert C. Solomon, “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics”, 
in Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics, 211-2. Mill to some extent anticipates this charge in his discussion of the 
connection between justice and utility in Chapter 5 of Utilitarianism. John S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays 
(edited and introduction by John Gray; Oxford World’s Classics; Oxford: OUP, 1998), 176-201. 
45 Matt Zwolinski and David Schmidtz, “Environmental virtue ethics: what it is and what it needs to be”, in 
Russell (ed.), Cambridge Companion, 230. 
46
 It should, however, be noted that Kant does allow for partiality with respect to imperfect duties. Immanuel 
Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (trans M. J. Gregor; Cambridge: CUP, 1996).  
47
 Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (trans H. J. Paton; Routledge 
Classics; London: Routledge, 2006), Chapter 1. 
48
 Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." The Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14 
(1976): 453-4.  
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values, in treating the other in effect as a means to the end of doing our duty. As an 
illustration, Stocker offers an example of the friend who visits you in hospital but comments 
that he is just doing his duty. The virtuous agent, on the other hand, acts, necessarily, out of 
the virtue itself, out of friendship, and so is free from the malady. 
Others argue that virtue ethics provides a way to jettison ‘the moral ought’ which, in the 
absence of a Lawgiver, has become ‘free floating and unsubscripted’.49 Crisp and Slote, for 
example, suggest that the reason for not lying is simply because it is dishonest, and there is 
no need to introduce the idea of transgressing a moral law or failing to maximize happiness.50  
Finally, to use a very contemporary term, virtue ethics is sometimes regarded as a ‘holistic’ 
approach to normative ethics. Morality is seen not just as a series of isolated actions based on 
individual value judgments according to an external set of rules, but affects the whole of a 
person, and the whole of that person’s life. As Aristotle said, ‘One swallow does not make a 
summer; neither does one day’.51 The development of ethical character is the task of a 
lifetime.    
4. Some weaknesses of virtue ethics as a theory 
The invocation of the old slogan, ‘“being” rather than “doing”’, summarises the commonest 
objection to virtue ethics. How exactly can a theory built around the evaluation of character 
and virtue offer guidance in real-life dilemmas?52 This objection, of course, rests on the 
presupposition that the task of ethical theory is to provide a code where one or more universal 
principles determine right action. And so, it is argued, virtue ethics cannot give the precision 
needed to count as a normative theory in its own right. At best, it can act as a supplement to 
the other theories, but could not be worthy of consideration as a rival. But if, following 
Aristotle, we imagine ethics as the practical science of how one should live, should we expect 
it to be codifiable? As David Solomon points out, the task of virtue ethics is not to produce a 
determinate action guide or produce a convenient algorithm; the focus is the whole life as the 
                                                 
49 This expression belongs to Philippa Foot: “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”: in Virtues and 
Vices, and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 169, n. 15. This argument, of 
course, was Anscombe’s major thesis. See Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 1.  
50 Crisp and Slote, “Introduction”, Virtue Ethics, 3. This does not seem entirely satisfactory, and the question of 
whether or not virtue alone is capable of supplying the reasons for acting will be further discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
51 NE 1098a19-20    
52 Hursthouse attempts a response to this objection using the case of abortion. Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue 
Theory and Abortion”. Philosophy & Public Affairs 20, no. 3 (1991): 223-46. 
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pursuit of excellence and so bears more of a resemblance to a comprehensive fitness 
programme designed to prepare an athlete for an endurance race.53 
Another objection to virtue ethics has emerged from recent studies in social psychology. 
Gilbert Harman concludes, from a mere two experiments mind you, that ‘there is no 
empirical basis for the existence of character traits’.54 The critique is based on the argument 
that behaviour is due entirely to situational factors, and it is a fallacy to attribute it to certain 
perceived traits. In response to such claims, Nafsika Athanassoulis makes use of Aristotle’s 
distinctions between vice and incontinence, virtue and continence. It is not that character 
traits do not exist; rather it is the case that most people are continent rather than fully 
virtuous, and do not seem to have the strength of character when under pressure to resist an 
immoral authority.55  
5. Conclusion 
From this short discussion of the roots as well as the contemporary expressions of CVE 
theory, we might tentatively suggest a description of virtue ethics which, while falling short 
of a definition, would at least provide a basis for analysis and critique, as well as for 
construction of a theistic version.  
So far, we have specified certain conditions of adequacy which must be met by any proposed 
theory. It must provide a substantive notion of the good, and define its relation to virtue. It 
must also be able to give an account of right action, of moral motivation, and a description of 
the moral exemplar as the embodiment of virtue. And finally, virtue ethics, like any other 
normative theory, must appeal to some external metaethical conception of the source of moral 
norms if it is incapable of locating these within its own resources. These conditions of 
adequacy will be explored in the following four chapters, while also repositioning them in a 
theological framework, one based primarily on the OT. The overarching aim is to assess 
whether CVE theory can stand as a normative theory in its own right, and whether it can be 
                                                 
53 David Solomon, “Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics”, in Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics, 174. 
54 See Gilbert Harman, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental 
Attribution Error”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 316.  
55 ‘Empirical evidence about outward behavior alone is not sufficient in order to draw inferences about the 
precise state of character of the agent; we may confuse the continent agent with the virtuous one or the 
incontinent with the vicious’. Nafsika Athanassoulis, “A Response to Harman: Virtue Ethics and Character 
Traits”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 218. See also NE book VII. 
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strengthened by a theistic formulation, in particular one which appeals to the God of the 
Bible.
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Chapter Two 
The Concept of Good in a Teleological Ethic 
 
Seek good and not evil, 
    that you may live.     
Amos 5:14 (NRSV) 
 
‘Men always love what is good or what they find good; it is in judging what is good 
that they go wrong’.           
Rousseau, The Social Contract1 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we concluded that there were certain conditions of adequacy which a 
theory of virtue ethics must meet in order to be normatively useful. Since virtue ethics is a 
teleological theory,2 the first stage in its critique will be to examine the concept of the telos 
(end) itself, in order to assess firstly how it can function within the theory and secondly, 
whether it can be understood along theistic lines. The telos of all ethical reflection is ‘The 
Good’, and so this chapter will begin by investigating the meaning and uses of ‘good’, and 
how such a concept might underwrite an axiological theory of value, such as an ethics of 
virtue.3 Drawing on the insights of the ancient philosophers it will be shown that 
eudaimonism has much to offer as a teleological theory. And, in particular, it will be argued 
that a neo-Aristotelian form of eudaimonism provides the most promising way to understand 
‘the good’ in a theistic virtue ethics, since it admits the closest parallels with the ethical 
thought in the Bible. Understood as a theistic term, ‘the good’ can be thought of as linked at 
many levels to God himself. Since the remit of this thesis is ethics in the OT, we will be 
working primarily with that part of the canon and seeking to assess whether a teleological 
                                                 
1
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract; and Discourses (Trans G.D.H. Cole; London: Dent, 1913), 293. 
2 It should be noted that in certain (mostly older) textbooks on moral philosophy, teleological theories are 
viewed in the narrow sense of their contrast to deontological ones, and primarily refer to consequentialism in its 
various forms (utilitarianism etc). See for example William Frankena’s Ethics (2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1973).  
3 Axiological theories are those value theories which are concerned with the classification and analysis of things 
which are good, rather than, for example, theories of aesthetic value. They are therefore the very heart of ethics. 
The aim of a theory of moral value is to establish what it is that is held to be intrinsically good, or the ultimate 
good. Instrumental goods are less interesting philosophically speaking since all instrumental or extrinsic goods 
are pursued for the sake of other goods (whether instrumental or intrinsic); only intrinsic goods are pursued for 
their own sake. An ethical theory must therefore have the explanatory power to justify its choice of intrinsic 
good (or goods). 
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conception of ethics can be found there.  In the final chapter, this link will be further explored 
and tested in our reading of the prophet Amos. 
Much hangs on our understanding of the concept of ‘good’. Maybe Bernard Williams is right 
when he comments that ‘it would be a mistake to think that this word, or its approximate 
equivalents in other languages, could possibly bear by itself the weight of the issues’.4 Yet, 
simply because of its centrality, we need to be clear what we mean when we use the word 
‘good’ and how it fits into an ethical theory which, as a whole, just might be weight-bearing. 
Of particular interest to the present enquiry is how ‘the good’ as telos can underpin a theistic 
version of virtue ethics.    
Although most people would likely agree that ‘good’ objects are those worthy of pursuit, they 
would just as likely disagree on the exact content of any list which might be drawn up. We 
find the adjective ‘good’ in all sorts of places, from objects or people to theories. So how can 
one ascription cover such a diverse range of ideas? Aristotle, indeed, doubted that it could.5 
And what is distinct about the predicate ‘good’, and indeed the significance of adding the 
definite article? Aristotle describes ‘the good’ (to agathon) as that which stands behind all 
activity, ‘that for the sake of which everything else is done’:6 for example, health is the good 
or end of medicine, buildings the good or end of architecture. But what is it which unites 
these disparate examples? And, most importantly, how does ‘good’ fit into an ethical theory? 
The objective in this chapter is to address these questions, and in particular to find answers 
consistent with a theistic worldview since our aim is to construct a theistic version of virtue 
ethics. We shall begin by considering what we mean when we call certain things ‘good’.   
2. The meaning and uses of ‘good’ 
What do we mean when we call certain things ‘good’? To claim that something is good 
presupposes a judgment of value and to enable judgment we need to establish criteria of 
value which are capable of justifying our judgments. Before we proceed to consider the 
notion of value in ethical theory, we will first note a couple of distinctions which are relevant 
to this project. The first is the distinction between absolute and relative goodness, and the 
second is whether goodness is a natural or non-natural property.  
                                                 
4 Bernard Williams, Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (Canto edition; Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 38. 
5 NE 1096a23-29. 
6 NE 1097a18. 
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2.1. The ‘good’ and the ‘good for’ or absolute and relative goodness 
The majority of CVE theories are naturalistic and the human good is understood in a relative 
sense; that is, good is what is good for the human qua human. The term ‘good for’ is usually 
thought to have something to do with the welfare or ‘well-being’ of the individual, referring 
to some aspect of a good or flourishing life.7 The good here is relative because its value is 
constituted by its relation to the realisation of that individual’s ends. The charge of relativism 
is one which has plagued VE theorists from MacIntyre onwards.8 If, on the other hand, 
something is thought of as absolutely good, then it is quite simply good, and this idea of 
value is independent of the notion of being good for an individual, or indeed being a good 
thing of its kind.9 
It might be noted that, for the theist, there is no need to discard the notion of relative 
goodness completely in the manner of G.E. Moore.10 Instead she must show that relative 
goodness requires a prior concept of absolute goodness to be understandable at all. Moore 
was no theist. If he had been, he might have considered the statement in Genesis 1:31, where 
God declares his creation to be ‘very good’, to be an affirmation of the existence of absolute 
goodness. The absolute goodness of creation is a rich idea, conveying notions of beauty, 
order, symmetry, completeness. And all of these are aspects of absolute value; their value is 
not constituted by the realisation of anyone’s ends, even though they can also be understood 
as good for the life forms which will benefit from them. 
2.2. Good – natural or non-natural? 
The second distinction to consider is that between ‘natural’ and ‘non-natural’ properties. 
Most theories in CVE are based on philosophical naturalism.11 If goodness is taken to be a 
natural property, then it is identifiable on the basis of certain empirical, or metaphysical 
                                                 
7 Concepts of well-being aim to provide answers to the question of how to live a fulfilled, meaningful and happy 
life, though, to the contemporary mind and in contrast to the ancients, this often has more to do with prudential 
rather than distinctly ethical concerns.    
8 For an excellent response to this charge, see Martha C. Nussbaum, “Non‐Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian 
Approach.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (1988): 32-53. 
9 The fascinating debate surrounding this distinction is beyond the scope of this thesis, but an interested reader 
might consult the work of Richard Kraut, for example, Against Absolute Goodness (New York: OUP, 2011), 
and Michael Campbell’s excellent response to Kraut in Michael Campbell, “Absolute Goodness: In Defence of 
the Useless and Immoral.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 49, no. 1 (2015): 95-112.   
10 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: CUP, 1903), I §59. 
11 Naturalism holds that moral properties are natural properties: that is, they are reducible to nature. 
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characteristics, i.e. by certain factual or conceptual truths. Philippa Foot, often considered one 
of the founders of CVE, provides a contemporary example of philosophical naturalism. What 
is ‘good’ according to Foot is not ‘good’ according to some abstract standard of goodness, or 
even some objectively good state of affairs such as the concept of flourishing, but simply 
what is good ‘naturally’ for that particular thing. For humans, good is possession of the 
virtues, since the virtues are those dispositions necessary for the achievement of the goods 
characteristic of the life of our species.12 Moore, by contrast, argued that moral concepts, 
such as ‘good’, are distinct from natural properties, such as yellowness, which can be 
established by empirical observation; to attempt to define ‘good’ in naturalistic terms is to 
commit an error which he calls ‘the naturalistic fallacy’.13 Though much of Moore’s 
philosophy may be forgotten today, the legacy of the ‘fact-value’ distinction continues to be 
influential. Those who argue for the distinction claim that a factual statement cannot logically 
entail a statement with a normative or evaluative function, i.e. prescribing or commending. 
And so, it is thought that we cannot move from ‘that is a good x’ to ‘you ought to do x’ or ‘x 
is worthy of pursuit’.  
Although the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ presents a serious problem for naturalistic theories of 
morality, it also offers an opportunity for a theistic ethics to provide a solution. The theist can 
argue that while goodness is not reducible to nature, it is evident in nature as a natural fact, 
but at the same time as a theistic fact. For the goodness of created goods is derivative from 
the ultimate good, or source of goodness simpliciter, which is God himself.14 A theistic 
theory, then, can accommodate the idea that goodness is a natural fact about the goodness of 
creation, and also the idea that the ultimate ‘Good’ is a non-natural fact, or more specifically 
a supernatural one. This good, ‘The Good’, can be understood as God Himself. In an attempt 
to provide an explanation of exactly how God, as the ultimate good, can be understood as the 
telos of all ethical reflection, we will shortly consider the concept of eudaimonia or human 
flourishing, and suggest that this route can be profitably adapted to a theistic framework.  
2.3. Concluding thoughts 
                                                 
12 Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). It might be noted that since the virtuous 
for Foot is defined by the natural, she struggles to resist Nietzsche’s argument that human aggression towards 
other humans, an unfortunate yet empirical fact about human life, can be a virtue (pp. 110-113).  
13 Moore, Principia Ethica, I §10. Williams, however, notes that it was presumably by means of empirical 
observation that ‘good’ was ascribed to the object in the first place (Williams, Morality, 38-39). 
14 These issues will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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So far, we can say that ‘the good’ as telos in a theistic VE theory can be conceived of as 
having aspects of both a natural and a non-natural (or more correctly supernatural) property, 
in that the natural supervenes on the supernatural. The theist can also confidently defend the 
concept of absolute goodness, albeit for different reasons to those of Moore, and with 
different results. As an atheist and the inspiration for moral subjectivist theories, Moore 
understood goodness to be not just a non-natural property, but also to be ultimately 
indefinable.15 The theist, on the other hand, can offer a strong definition of goodness. If the 
absolute good is God himself, then he is the source of all relative goods, and the human good 
or telos must be a derivative of this absolute: in some sense, the divine goodness becomes our 
goodness, in that we are partakers of it through our relationship with God himself. Such a 
train of thought can make sense of Augustine’s addressing God as his one and only good.16 
We shall return to this idea of the human telos as relationship with God in the final section of 
this chapter. 
We shall now consider ways in which ‘the good’ can function in a teleological theory, 
beginning with a short critique of examples from modernity, and then turning to the ancient 
theory of eudaimonism, which, it will be argued, provides the best way to construct a theistic 
version of virtue ethics. 
3. Value in the modern period  
As we have already seen, theories of moral value are of two broad types, naturalistic and non-
naturalistic. For naturalistic theories, value is located in the natural world and requires a 
naturalistic metaphysics for its explanation. Foot’s theory of natural normativity is one such 
theory; others include hedonism and Aristotle’s eudaimonism.17 On these accounts, moral 
properties are natural properties. Alternatively, value can be considered a non-natural 
property; moral properties are perhaps believed to supervene on natural properties. These 
theories are metaphysically more complex; value is explained by concepts which go beyond 
the natural world. Theistic theories fall into this category. According to theism, value is 
located in the idea of God and, often, the possibility of an eternal soul.   
                                                 
15 Moore, Principia Ethica, I §10. Moore is using ‘definable’ in the philosophical sense of being analysable.  
16 Augustine, Confessions (trans Henry Chadwick; Oxford: OUP, 1991), 5 [I. 5]. 
17 Though as we shall see, Aristotle’s theory was not entirely naturalistic, but gave some place to the 
supernatural.   
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Philosophers throughout the modern period have endorsed various theories of value. For 
Nietzsche, good is synonymous with power. The judgment ‘good’ he claims comes from ‘the 
“good” themselves’, and these are ‘the noble, the powerful, the superior and the high-minded. 
. .who felt themselves and their actions to be good. . .and posited them as such, in contrast to 
everything low, low-minded, common and plebeian’.18 In contrast to Nietzsche’s naturalism, 
his contemporary, the Idealist Francis Herbert Bradley, believed that the ultimate aim of 
ethics was self-realisation: ‘Morality is the identification of the individual’s will with his own 
idea of perfection’.19 The American philosopher Ralph Barton Perry argued that it was 
positive interest that invests an object with value, where ‘interest’ is understood as a feeling, 
desire or disposition towards that object.20 Another theory which has stood the test of time, 
and still has its adherents today, is hedonism.21 Thinkers from Epicurus to John Stuart Mill 
have held the only intrinsic good to be pleasure (and conversely, the only intrinsically bad 
thing to be pain). All other goods from money to health and friends are pursued for their 
consequences, that they might lead to pleasure; pleasure alone is pursued for its own sake.   
These theories are all monistic; that is, they seek to explain the one ultimate good. But other 
philosophers, such as William D. Ross argued instead for some version of axiological 
pluralism, accepting the existence of several irreducible goods. Ross found four things to be 
intrinsically good: virtue, pleasure, distributive justice (by which pleasure is correctly 
allocated to the virtuous), and knowledge.22 While satisfied that his list corresponds to 
common sense intuition, he admits that these goods are ultimately incommensurable.23 Since 
ethics is fundamentally practical, this would appear to be a serious problem for what is to be 
done when these values conflict? Axiological pluralism, therefore, seems to be defective in 
its action-guiding capacity. Ideally, then, a moral theory should be monistic (unlike Ross’s), 
                                                 
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality (trans C. Diethe; ed. K. Ansell-Pearson; Cambridge: CUP, 
1994), I §2. 
19 F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 382. 
See also Essay II, “Why Should I be Moral?”, of his Ethical Studies, 65 ff., F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (2nd 
ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1927.   
20 Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value: Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of 
Interest (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), 115. Perry was a major influence on C. L. Stevenson 
during the latter’s time at Harvard, and the roots of emotivism are clear in his thought.    
21
  From ἡδονή (pleasure). An interesting contemporary example is the transhumanist who aims for ‘super-
happiness’. See for example David Pearce’s ‘Hedonistic Imperative’, accessed Dec 1, 2017, 
https://www.hedweb.com/hedab.htm. 
22 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1988), 134-141.   
23 Ibid., 154. 
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employ a reasonable metaphysics (unlike Bradley’s), and make sense of our common-sense 
intuitions (unlike Perry’s). It should be noted that virtue is not alien to these theories. Ross 
lists virtue as one of his intrinsic goods, and Nietzsche, as we have seen, has his own ideas of 
virtue, leading to his being looked on by some as a virtue ethicist himself.24 But these are 
exactly the types of theory which we are distinguishing from virtue ethics in this thesis; they 
may feature virtue, but virtue is incidental rather than fundamental to the main argument.25 
Exactly how and why virtue ethics is distinct from such theories, in its understanding of the 
relation of virtue to the good, will be considered in the next section. It is with these 
requirements and thoughts in mind that we now turn to the ancients, the inspiration for many 
of the CVE theorists. 
4. Value in ancient theory 
Ancient moral theory was fundamentally teleological; it was accepted that human life had a 
goal, an end or telos. The ancients were less concerned than we are today about providing 
comprehensive and systematic accounts of morality that explain which actions and reasons 
are right and why. Rather, their aim was to discover what the human telos was and then 
describe how best to pursue it.26 Virtue plays a central role in most ancient theory: the 
pressing issue is exactly what role, and how virtue relates to the good which is at the heart of 
the theory. Often, the final end was held to be ‘happiness’ or eudaimonia, or ‘happiness’, 
although there was considerable variation over its interpretation.27 It will be argued that 
construing the telos as eudaimonia is the most promising route for a theistic virtue ethics 
since it is more compatible with biblical notions of God and the good. 
4.1. Eudaimonism as a theory of the good  
Eudaimonia is usually translated as ‘happiness’, but the problem with this particular 
translation is that, in our contemporary culture, happiness is mostly understood as a mental 
state which is in some respect experientially satisfying. Essentially, happiness is understood 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View.   
25 See the discussion of this point in the Introduction. 
26
 Julia Annas is one of the foremost contemporary advocates of this view: each of us has a final end which, 
when we pause to reflect, makes sense of our lives as a whole. See for example Julia Annas, The Morality of 
Happiness (New York: OUP, 1993) [hereafter MH]; Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: OUP, 2011).    
27 Although certain ancient theories were not eudaimonist, Aristotle considered it somewhat self-evident that 
eudaimonia was the final end (NE 1095a 17-26). It may be worth pointing out that only humans could be 
eudaimon; the root of the word (εὐ + δαίμων) seems to imply favour by the gods, or perhaps fortune, and it 
would have been absurd to the Greek mind that animals could be so favoured.       
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as feeling, and measured by happy feelings. We can think of the happiness surveys which are 
very much in vogue, what type of questions they ask, the happiness indices which are 
produced and the conclusions which are drawn.28 Or of certain psychological theories where 
happiness is measured by some sort of objective list.29 Martin Seligman, who spearheads the 
positive psychology movement, endorses this type of theory. He also claims to follow 
Aristotle, but the Aristotelian parallel seems limited to his acknowledgement that happiness 
consists in activity. The good life, he says, ‘consists in deriving happiness by using your 
signature strengths every day in the main realms of living’.30 However elaborate the means to 
achieving it, and however extensive the description, happiness to the modern mind is often 
little more than a contented state or a feeling.   
To the ancients, however, the situation was very different. Aristotle captures the idea 
conveyed by eudaimonia with his phrase ‘living well and doing well’.31 A characteristic 
feature of eudaimonist theories is their ‘holistic’ nature. The emphasis is not on individual 
actions but on a whole life well-lived, a life lived with happiness as the aim. Sometimes 
writers use ‘flourishing’ or ‘well-being’ to try to capture the essence of the Greek word, but it 
is generally agreed that ‘happiness’ is the best we can do.32 Whatever word we resort to, it 
must be stressed that contemporary understanding of happiness, as referring to a 
psychological state, is not equivalent to the meaning conveyed by the Greek eudaimonia. To 
the ancients, a person may well be considered ‘happy’ or eudaimon, even if he did not ‘feel’ 
                                                 
28
 See, for example, Bank of Scotland, “Fife overtakes Highlands to become Scotland’s happiest region,” 24 
Aug 2016, accessed Dec 1, 2017, http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/Media/Press-Releases/2016-press-
releases/bank-of-scotland/fife-overtakes-highlands-to-become-scotlands-happiest-region/. Meanwhile, the 
London School of Economics, as part of its research into happiness, is offering a free ‘Mappiness’ app which 
beeps you at least once a day to ask how you are feeling. LSE, “Mappiness maps happiness across space in the 
UK,” accessed Dec 1, 2017, http://www.mappiness.org.uk/.  
29
 See, for example, David G. Myers, The Pursuit of Happiness: Discovering the Pathway to Fulfillment, Well-
being, and Enduring Personal Joy (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 205-6. 
30 Martin E. P. Seligman, Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology to Realize Your Potential 
for Deep Fulfillment (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2002), 262. By ‘signature strengths’ he means ‘strengths of 
character that each person self-consciously owns, celebrates, and (if he or she can arrange life successfully) 
exercises every day in work, love, play, and parenting’ (p. 160). He distinguishes these strengths from virtues, 
though his distinction seems less than clear (see pp. 137 ff.). He also seems vague about any overarching telos: 
the ‘meaningful life’ is distinct from the ‘good life’ and the meaningful life where God ‘comes at the end’ is 
distinct again’ (p. 260). 
31
 εὐ ζῆν and εὐ πράττειν. NE 1095a20.   
 
32
 This thesis will follow the example of Nussbaum and John Cooper who simply use the transliteration of 
εὐδαιμονία (eudaimonia). Martha C. Nussbaum The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy 
and Philosophy (Revised ed. New York: CUP, 2001), 6; John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on the Goods of 
Fortune.” The Philosophical Review 94, no. 2 (1985): 173-96.    
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happy on our contemporary understanding of the word. Happiness is an active rather than a 
passive concept; it involves the agent’s activity. It is not something located in circumstances 
or objects, but rather reflects the use to which we put objective goods, and the manner of our 
acting amid the vicissitudes of life. In short, it is linked to character expressed through 
activity.    
However, even with this clarification in mind, an immediate question arises: how do we 
pursue an end so thinly specified? To understand this, we must consult the theories 
themselves. 
5.   Eudaimonism in ancient ethics: the theoretical options 
The human telos was understood in various ways in ancient philosophy; not all ancient 
ethical theory was eudaimonistic. For example, the Cyrenaics, the original egoistic hedonists, 
held the sole value to be pleasure.33 For the Sceptics, the telos of life was ‘freedom from 
disturbance’ (ataraxia), but, even though the aim of tranquillity of mind is shared with the 
Epicureans and Stoics, this concept is quite distinct from eudaimonia.34 A theory based on 
human flourishing would appear to offer a better explanation of human life as a whole than 
these theories can allow. We intuitively feel that we should have higher goals than food, 
safety, survival and reproduction, and even pleasure or contentment. Surely, as Annas says 
repeatedly, it should be the goal of every reflective person to want to flourish. A moral theory 
which we can live by should incorporate our goals and makes sense of the good life. 
Happiness, then, is an inner attitude to one’s life as a whole. Eudaimonism offers not only a 
promising framework for constructing a virtue ethical theory, but also, it will be argued, the 
best explanation of a theistic version of the theory. We shall now consider the ancient 
theoretical options. 
The philosophers who did base their theories on eudaimonia were the Epicureans, the Stoics 
and Aristotle, although they disagreed over the details of exactly what happiness consists in. 
The Stoics and Aristotle believed that human flourishing must include the moral virtues - 
typically justice, courage and moderation. What divides their theories is the place given to 
virtue within them. Epicurus was ambivalent on the status of virtue. At times, he seemed to 
                                                 
33 Annas refers to them as ‘crude empiricists’, and compares them to Jeremy Bentham. MH 230. The value of 
one’s life as a whole, according to these philosophers, is equal to the sum of all pleasures experienced. 
34 The sceptics refused to commit to any set of beliefs at all. Life is constant enquiry, and ultimately what is 
good is unknowable. See A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (Classical Life and 
Letters. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth, 1986), as well as Annas, MH. 
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hold virtue and pleasure as inseparable; at other times, virtue had value only insofar as it 
contributed to pleasure.35 For Epicurus and his followers pleasure was the necessary 
condition of happiness. Ultimately, the eudaimonism of the Epicureans cannot serve as a 
basis for virtue ethics theory on two counts. Firstly, it is fundamentally self-regarding and we 
intuitively feel that an ethics based on virtue should have an other-regarding as well as a self-
regarding focus. Secondly, the final end of ataraxia is an internalised mental state where we 
are detached not only from the idea of the other, but also from the vicissitudes of life. If 
eudaimonia is to be compatible with a theistic version of VE, it must make sense of our lives 
as a whole, not just in their relational aspects, both towards others and towards God, but also 
to the circumstances of our lives as lived under the providence of God.    
Two theories remain, therefore, for us to consider as a framework for a virtue ethics based on 
eudaimonia: we either follow Aristotle or we follow the Stoics. We shall consider each in 
turn, and then consider which is better suited to underpin a theistic version of virtue ethics. 
5.1. On the eudaimonia of the Stoics: the sufficiency of virtue 
In contrast to the Epicureans, the Stoics are clear on the relation of virtue to happiness; on 
their view, virtue is sufficient for happiness. Often, this idea takes the form of an identity 
claim: the good is simply identified with virtue. Arius Didymus writes: 
 
One’s aim, they say, is being happy, for the sake of which everything is done, while it 
is not done for the sake of anything further, and this consists in living according to 
virtue, in living in agreement,36 and further (it is the same thing) in living according to 
nature. Happiness Zeno defined as follows: happiness is a smooth flow of life.37   
 
Happiness for the Stoics, then, is living according to virtue, which meant also conforming our 
human nature to the nature of the universe.38 Virtue is the only thing which is good and so 
only virtue will benefit us. The Stoics claimed that the other things often considered good, 
                                                 
35 Epicurean hedonism is much more nuanced than that of the Cyrenaics, being divided into pleasure at the 
removal of pain (kinetic) and pleasure as the complete absence of pain (the static pleasure of ataraxia) which is 
our final end. See Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, and Annas, MH for excellent discussions of Stoic ethics. 
36 i.e. not living with internal conflict.   
37 Arius 77.16-19. Quoted in Annas MH, 163.   
38 The later Stoics particularly emphasised this latter point. Happiness describes the state where the human will 
is in agreement with the will of ‘the orderer of the universe’ (i.e. Zeus). See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the 
Philosophers II 88. Quoted in Annas MH, 160. 
42 
 
 
 
such as health or wealth, are not in fact good at all, but ‘indifferent’ since they can harm as 
well as benefit.39 These ‘indifferents’ are described by Chrysippus as the mere material of 
virtue, and their value is not so much a lesser value as value of a different kind altogether. 
Cicero provides an insight into how highly exalted the concept of virtue was in Stoic thought. 
In On Final Ends III, Cato declares: 
 
If wisdom [here meaning being virtuous] and health are both worth seeking, then the 
two together are more worth seeking than wisdom alone. But if each commands some 
value, it does not follow that the two together are worth more than wisdom on its own. 
In judging that health deserves a certain value, but not deeming it a good, we thereby 
consider that there is no value great enough to take precedence over virtue. . . It is like 
the light of a lamp eclipsed and obliterated by the rays of the sun; like a drop of honey 
lost in the vastness of the Aegean sea; a penny added to the riches of Croesus, or a 
single step on the road from here to India. Such is the value of bodily goods that is 
unavoidably eclipsed, overwhelmed and destroyed by the splendour and grandeur of 
virtue as the Stoic candidate for the highest good.40     
 
It should be pointed out that no one is able to grasp this fact immediately since the moral life 
is one of progression. Our lives begin with an innate self-concern and the pursuit of natural 
advantages, we later value those natural advantages in a more rational way, and over time we 
come to value rationality itself. At this point, we realise that the only good is the good of the 
soul called virtue. Unlike the Aristotelian conception of moral progress, where becoming 
virtuous is a gradual process, the Stoics attribute moral progress to the preparatory stage 
where one learns to choose and use indifferents. Virtue is not a matter of degree. When the 
distinct value of virtue is grasped, one has moved from one state to another, and become a 
virtuous person, now possessing a steady disposition to perform morally right actions.41 From 
that point on there can be no more progress. But this is surely counter-intuitive. Why should 
there not be an increase (or indeed decrease) in virtue over time? And equally counter-
intuitive is the Stoic denial of the value of external ‘goods’. 
                                                 
39 Ibid., VII 102-103. Quoted in Annas MH, 389. 
40
 Cicero, On Final Ends III 44-45. For the citations from Cicero see Annas’s translation in Voices of Ancient 
Philosophy: An Introductory Reader (New York: OUP, 2001), 328-337. 
41 Cicero uses some colourful analogies to explain this. ‘When submerged in water one can no more breathe just 
below the surface and on the verge of getting out than one can in the depths. A puppy that has almost reached 
the point of opening its eyes can no more see than one newly born’. On Final Ends III 48. 
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When we consider the concept of happiness in ancient moral theory, we notice an implicit 
tension between our intuitions and our desire for an explanatory theory. Annas calls these 
competing factors ‘the intuitive requirement’ and ‘the theoretical pull’.42 We believe 
happiness should involve enjoyment of the good things in life, and so intuitively accept that it 
may be affected by external goods and circumstances. However, we also want happiness to 
embody self-sufficiency and completeness,43 and so are drawn to a theoretical understanding 
of happiness in terms of a whole life lived within a moral framework, one ultimately under 
the agent’s control. For the Stoics, this was ‘living according to virtue’; for Aristotle, it was 
‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’.44 While the Stoic understanding satisfies ‘the 
theoretical pull’ of the idea of completeness and self-sufficiency of the virtuous life, it also 
raises questions about our intuitive understanding of happiness. Aristotle thought it obviously 
absurd to call someone on the rack ‘happy’,45 and our intuitions about the value of external 
goods must somehow be satisfied. This was the problem which faced Stoic theory and 
became the main area of debate between the Stoics and the Peripatetic successors of 
Aristotle. 
5.1.1. Concluding thoughts 
In challenging the view of Aristotle and the later Peripatetics that our common-sense 
intuitions should be the starting point for ethical theory, the Stoics found themselves in a 
counter-intuitive position, since their theory advocates, and indeed requires, substantial 
revision of our intuitions about happiness. But these intuitions cannot be so easily revised. To 
argue that virtue (or indeed vice) cannot be increased runs counter to the intuition that it takes 
more virtue to act well in difficult circumstances or that that there are varying degrees of 
vice. By denying that external ‘goods’ are necessary for happiness, we are forced into 
admitting things which seem absurd; do all external ‘goods’ really exist merely to serve 
virtue.46 And ultimately, in extreme circumstances, when all hope of virtuous living is gone, 
                                                 
42
 Annas, MH, 365ff.  
43 As Aristotle states in NE I, 7, if happiness is to be our final end, it must be chosen for its own sake and be 
self-sufficient, a self-sufficient thing being ‘one which by itself makes life desirable and in no way deficient’ 
(NE 1097b15-16). It is an analytic truth that an end which is complete and self-sufficient has no need of any 
other good. 
44 NE 1098a18 
45 NE 1153b18-20 
46 Annas asks whether one can really believe that losing one’s child affects one’s happiness only to the extent 
that one has lost opportunities to be a virtuous parent. MH, 384.   
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and so there is no possibility of happiness, the only rational option left is suicide.47 It is 
hardly surprising that the Stoic sage, that paradigm figure for moral expertise, who 
exemplified moral consistency and mastery of all passions, was in the end nowhere to be 
found, even from within the ranks of the Stoic philosophers themselves.48  
Although, as we have already noted, some virtue ethical thinkers do follow Stoic philosophy, 
as far as the theist is concerned, the Stoic version of eudaimonia seems to provide less 
conceptual space for a theistic interpretation than that of Aristotle. As we noted in the 
Introduction, one aim of this project is to construct a bridge between the world of the OT and 
the present, and it was proposed that such a bridge can be constructed in part on the 
understanding of a common human nature. Ethical theory must make sense of human nature 
as it is experienced and this includes human intuitions. Stoic theory fails here. Although it has 
an undeniable theoretical pull, it does not do justice to our intuitions and is not empirically 
verifiable. Our proposed conversation between theism and CVE must pursue a different 
route. And so, from the Stoics, we now turn to Aristotle to see whether his theory of 
eudaimonia is better equipped to provide a framework for a theistic virtue ethical theory. 
Certainly, the historical data might give us cause for optimism since Aristotle’s ethical theory 
has been the inspiration for theistic as well as nontheistic accounts of morality.49 Since any 
endorsement of Aristotle’s ethical thought must be based on a reflective assessment of it, it is 
imperative that the would-be neo-Aristotelian be clear about what Aristotle himself actually 
said, what his theory looks like and what problems as well as advantages are associated with 
it. We shall now spend some time, therefore, examining his theory and particularly his 
presentation of eudaimonia and two problems in particular which impact the way his thinking 
can be appropriated by contemporary virtue ethicists, theist and non-theist alike. 
5.2. Aristotle on eudaimonia 
Aristotle shares with the Stoics the idea that virtue is necessary for eudaimonia, but he held 
back on claiming its sufficiency. To Plato the happy soul was the one where the parts were in 
harmony and ruled by justice.50 Aristotle, similarly, relates happiness to virtue within the 
                                                 
47 See for example Clement Stromateis IV 6 (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta III 765), cited in Annas, MH, 409. 
48 See Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 205-9. 
49 Probably the most famous Christian follower of Aristotle was Aquinas while in the world of Muslim thought 
we can think of Maimonides and Averroes. Hursthouse is one example of a nontheistic adherent from the world 
of CVE.  
50 See the Republic. 
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framework of his account of the soul.51 But unlike Plato, Aristotle rejects the idea that there 
are abstract, transcendent, ‘forms’ to appeal to.52 What he seeks to investigate in the Ethics is 
not the Idea of Good, nor the common good, but that good which is the end of man, because 
that good alone is attainable by human action. Ethics to Aristotle was a practical matter, 
grounded in human experience, and he rejected the idea that it was possible, desirable or even 
necessary to search for any universal good.53 Happiness, that good which is the end of man, is 
simply tied to excellent activity of the soul.  
Since, according to Aristotle, rationality is the defining feature (‘form’) of human beings, he 
begins in the Ethics by stating the teleological nature of all rational activity: ‘Every art and 
every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is considered to aim at some 
good’.54 But some ends are clearly subordinate to others. There must be one good, the 
supreme good, which is chosen purely for its own sake and not for the sake of anything 
else,55 and his task is to describe it. He claims that it is generally agreed that this good or end 
is happiness, understood as living well or doing well.56 However, popular opinion varies on 
the nature of happiness: for the ‘masses’ it is pleasure; for those in political life it is honour; 
for the wise it is a life of contemplation.57 He promptly dismisses pleasure and honour but his 
own endorsement of the last option, the contemplative life, is merely implicit in Book I, 7, 
and he intriguingly postpones its discussion.58 What then, is his preliminary account of 
happiness, that one good not chosen for the sake of anything else, and how does he justify it? 
In Chapter 7, Aristotle provides his preliminary definition of happiness, the supreme good, as 
‘the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’, and later justifies it using his argument 
from function. He begins by considering that a good flautist or sculptor is one who is 
                                                 
51 Moral virtue is excellence of the appetitive part; intellectual virtue excellence of the rational part.  
52 ‘Form’ to Aristotle was the inner essence of a thing, that which provided an answer to the question ‘What is 
it?’ The human form is rationality. 
53 NE I, 6. 
54
 NE 1094a1-2.   
55 NE 1097b5-6. Οther objects such as honour, pleasure, intelligence (νοῦς), and all forms of excellence (πασα 
ἀρετή), we choose both for their own sakes but also for the sake of happiness. NE 1097b5-6. 
56 NE 1095a18-20.  
57 See NE I, 5. Aristotle is clearly dismissive of the life of pleasure: ‘The utter servility of the masses comes out 
in their preference for a bovine existence’ and even some of those in power ‘share the tastes of Sardanapalus’ 
(the Assyrian king whose decadent lifestyle was legendary).  NE 1095b20-22. 
58 He says: ‘this we shall examine later’, and it turns out to be much later, in the final book of the Ethics. See NE 
X, chapters 7 and 8.   
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excellent in the performance of his specific function (ergon). By analogy, the supreme good 
for a human being is excellence of the characteristic function, that particular ergon by which 
the excellence of human beings qua human beings can be judged. This function will be 
distinct from the ‘lower’ functions, for example those related to nutrition, health and 
reproduction which, although essential for human life, are shared with animals and even 
some plants. Aristotle concludes that the characteristic function or activity of the human soul 
is reason.59 If the function of man is to exercise reason, then a good man will exercise reason 
well.60 And so Aristotle concludes: ‘the good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance 
with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most 
perfect kind’.61 Eudaimonia, then, consists in activity and not merely the potential for 
function. Moreover, this activity must characterise the whole of a person’s life: ‘One swallow 
does not make a summer; neither does one day. Similarly, neither can one day, or a brief 
space of time, make a man blessed [μακάριον] and happy [εὐδαίμονα]’.62   
Aside from objections to Aristotle’s theory on the grounds of its teleological nature,63 there 
are two main problems with Aristotle’s views on eudaimonia which must be addressed by a 
would-be follower of Aristotle. This first is what eudaimonia consists in. What exactly is the 
characteristic activity of humans which specifies their good? Aristotle seems to provide two 
accounts. And the second problem concerns the relation of eudaimonia to external goods. 
Neo-Aristotelians must try to answer the problems in Aristotle’s theory. And the theist who 
seeks to draw on Aristotle’s theory must hold onto the idea that God is in the picture. 
5.2.1. The nature of eudaimonia   
The first problem we encounter in Aristotle’s theory is his apparent uncertainty over the exact 
nature of the characteristic human activity (ergon). Aristotle has defined eudaimonia as 
‘activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’, but the interpreter of the Ethics must decide 
whether Aristotle offers a single account, or two distinct accounts, for there is an apparent 
disjunction between the descriptions in the first and last books of the Ethics. Can this be 
                                                 
59 NE 1098a7-8. 
60 The ‘continent’ man, by contrast, is obedient to reason but not without some struggle and the ‘incontinent’ 
man (who is guided by the irrational part of the soul) is not.     
61 NE 1098a17-19. At this point, Aristotle has not yet made explicit the nature of this virtue.   
62 NE 1098a20-22.   
63 Crisp, for example, calls Aristotle’s argument from function ‘notorious’. Crisp, “Well-Being”, 15. He also 
objects to the use of the word ‘flourishing’ because of its teleological implications. 
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explained or is it evidence of indecision or even confusion on Aristotle’s part? Since it is the 
characteristic human activity which determines and defines the good we must be clear about 
what Aristotle meant by the activity of the soul. 
Beginning in Book I, 7, and indeed for most of the Ethics, Aristotle seems to hold that 
eudaimonia consists in a life where actions exhibit moral virtue and are guided by practical 
wisdom (phronesis). However, towards the end of the Ethics, Aristotle states: ‘If happiness is 
an activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable to assume that it is in accordance with 
the highest virtue, and this will be the virtue of the best part of us’.64 The best part of us, he 
asserts, is the most divine part, and this is the intellect (nous). The activity of the intellect is 
contemplation (theoria), and the corresponding virtue is sophia. At this point, Aristotle 
appears to be saying that the happiness associated with moral virtue is of a lesser kind: ‘Life 
in conformity with the other kind of virtue will be happy in a secondary degree, because 
activities in accordance with it are human’.65 Why exactly does Aristotle focus on the divine 
element in our nature at the end of NE?66 Is there an inconsistency here? Could it be, as 
Thomas Nagel suggests, that because Aristotle seems uncertain about the relation between 
nous and the rest of the soul, he may be unsure of who we are as human beings, and so unable 
to state unequivocally what exactly eudaimonia consists in?67 The comprehensive account 
would certainly reflect Aristotle’s view of the composite nature of human beings, the 
ensouled human body involving interaction between sense-perception, emotion and reason.  
Opinion is divided over the interpretation of Aristotle’s account. Richard Kraut argues 
strongly for the view that eudaimonia consists in contemplation alone.68 And this certainly 
makes sense of Aristotle’s qualifier to his initial definition, that if there is more than one kind 
of virtue, then the good for man will be activity ‘in accordance with the best and most perfect 
                                                 
64 Book X, 7. Presumably, theoria would have been included in the comprehensive account. 
65 NE 1178a9.   
66 NE 1178b7-33. At the end of the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle also states that contemplation of God is the best 
activity, even though for the most part of this work too, eudaimonia was more comprehensively portrayed: 
‘whatever choice or possession of natural goods – bodily goods, wealth, friends, and the like – will most 
conduce to the contemplation of God is the best; this is the finest criterion. But any choice of living that either 
through excess or through defect hinders the service and contemplation of God is bad. This applies to the soul: 
for the soul the ideal standard is to have the minimum awareness of the irrational part of the soul qua irrational’.   
EE 1249b17-24.  
67 Thomas Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia.” Phronesis 17, no. 3 (1972): 252-59, 253. In the De Anima [DA], 
Aristotle lays out his theory of the human soul (‘soul’ is the form or essence of thing): it comprises a nutritive 
faculty (shared with plants and animals), the faculty of sense-perception (shared with animals), and the intellect. 
68 See Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
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kind’.69 Others such as Annas feel, understandably, that this does not adequately explain the 
substantial discussion of the moral life in the Ethics.70 Eudaimonia must surely consist in 
both moral virtue and contemplation. Gerard Hughes tentatively adopts this solution:  
 
both thēoria and the life of a morally admirable member of the community are 
explained by the fact that a fulfilled life involves using our minds on both levels, so 
far as it is possible, and explains why we value using our minds well to think about 
both practical and theoretical questions.71 
 
How do we resolve this seeming paradox? The ‘both-and’ solution is intuitively plausible but 
theoretically unsatisfying. If the human ergon is a composite, which configuration of parts is 
the ideal? On what basis are we to judge between the exercise of moral virtue and 
contemplation? Or does it vary from one individual to another? We noted earlier that the 
ideal axiological theory is monistic. Is ultimate value or ‘The Good’ pluralistic for Aristotle 
after all? 
Nagel’s proposed resolution of the paradox is to opt for a hierarchical interpretation. 
Eudaimoinia must consist in the excellence of the function of reason. But, while the 
comprehensive account corresponds to the ‘caretaker function’ of the rational faculty which 
is the practical exercise of reason (phronesis) needed for ethics, the intellectualist account of 
Book X corresponds to the supreme function of reason (theoria) which is to enable man to 
concentrate on things higher than himself and so in some way to participate in them. 
 
Human possibilities reveal that reason has a use beyond the ordering of practical life. 
The circle of mutual support between reason, activity, and nutrition is not completely 
closed. In fact, all of it, including the practical employment of reason, serves to 
support the individual for an activity that completely transcends these worldly 
concerns . . . A person should seek to transcend not only his individual practical 
concerns, but also those of society or humanity as a whole.72 
 
                                                 
69 NE 1098a17-19.    
70 See, for example, her comment on NE 1098a16-20. MH, 367, n. 9. 
71 Gerard J. Hughes, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics (London: Routledge, 2001), 50. 
72
 Nagel, “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”, 257. Nagel’s hierarchical conception of the ergon finds a parallel in 
Aristotle’s hierarchical conception of the faculties of the soul. See De Anima II.2-3. 
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On Nagel’s interpretation, the intellectualist account seems to describe a good which, strictly 
speaking, is not really a human good at all. Moreover, he suggests that the comprehensive 
human good should not be the sole goal of living.73 Although Nagel speaks of ‘transcending 
worldly concerns’, and even detecting what are ‘almost Augustinian sentiments’,74 he is not 
specifically appealing to theism. Nevertheless, his suggestion may open a promising route for 
the theist. Rather than see these two interpretations of the human ergon as irreconcilable, the 
biblically minded theist might see them as inter-related in a way which Aristotle could not. 
Perhaps Nagel is right and Aristotle is ultimately unsure about who we are as human beings. 
But the theist can answer that our creation in the image of God declares our identity and 
explains why the contemplation of God might be our chief end, not the God which Aristotle 
did not know but the God who is knowable.  
It will be argued that if the human telos is understood as relationship with God, then the 
virtuous life can be seen as the characteristic activity which initiates and maintains that 
relationship. Moreover, the life of moral virtue enables us to transcend worldly concerns, and 
engage in the higher activity of the contemplation of God, understood by the theist as delight 
in, and worship of, God. In the final section of this chapter, we will consider in more detail 
how the characteristic activity of the human being can be understood, from a theistic 
perspective, as pursuing the good of relationship with God. 
5.2.2. Eudaimonia and external goods 
Our second problem with Aristotle’s position on eudaimonia concerns its relation to external 
goods. In our discussion of the Stoics, we acknowledged the tension between ‘the intuitive 
requirement’ that happiness can be affected by external goods and circumstances, and the ‘the 
theoretical pull’ of the conception of happiness as self-sufficient and complete, and subject to 
the agent’s control. The Stoics, as we have seen, held that virtue was both necessary and 
sufficient for happiness: they were true to ‘the theoretical pull’, but neglected ‘the intuitive 
requirement’. Aristotle, on the other hand, while stating at various points that eudaimonia did 
require a sufficient supply of external goods, was ultimately ambivalent over the exact 
relation between the two, and this ambivalence generated an instability for his theory which 
fuelled the later debate between his theoretical descendants and the Stoics. 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 258. 
74 Ibid., 253. 
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Admittedly, the conclusion of the argument from function yielded the definition that 
eudaimonia consisted in completely virtuous activity over a whole lifetime (NE I, 7).75 This 
definition is in line with the theoretical pull, as is his resistance to the idea that that happiness 
could be the result of chance or a divine gift.76 Yet in the following chapter he adds that 
eudaimonia also needs a supply of external goods.77 In contrast to the Stoics, then, Aristotle 
did acknowledge ‘the intuitive requirement’. He insists that while virtue is necessary for 
happiness, it is not sufficient;78 in fact, such a thesis, he claims, is highly counter-intuitive. In 
addition to seeking virtue for its own sake, we seek it also for the sake of happiness, then 
happiness is conceptually distinct, and so must include other goods, such as pleasure:   
 
everyone assumes that the happy life is a pleasant life, i.e. makes pleasure a 
constituent of happiness – with good reason. For no activity is perfect if it is impeded, 
and happiness is a perfect thing. That is why the happy man needs (beside his other 
qualifications) physical advantages as well as external goods and the gifts of fortune, 
so that he may not be hampered by lack of these things. (Those who maintain that, 
provided he is good, a man is happy on the rack or surrounded by great disasters, are 
talking nonsense, whether intentionally or not.)79   
 
So what was Aristotle’s position on the relation between external goods and happiness? 
There seem to be two ways to interpret his thought. The first is that, although external goods 
may be necessary resources for the production of fine deeds, so that without them virtuous 
activity may be severely hampered if not impossible, their value is merely instrumental. 
Aristotle seems to be of this opinion when he says: ‘it is difficult if not impossible to do fine 
deeds without any resources’.80 If not instrumental through being actual resources, external 
goods may be necessary for the creation of the circumstances where virtuous activity can 
                                                 
75 See also EE II, 1, 1219a35-39. 
76 NE Book I, 9. ‘That the most important and finest thing of all should be left to chance would be a gross 
disharmony’, NE 1099b24. See also Aristotle’s wrestling with the impact of changing fortunes on the virtuous 
man’s happiness (Book I, 10). 
77 NE 1099a31ff. See also NE 1101a14-16 (Book I, 10) where Aristotle includes external goods in a revised 
version of his definition of eudaimonia given in I, 7. External goods are all goods external to the soul, i.e. all 
goods other than the moral and intellectual virtues, the innate features of the mind and personality, pleasure and 
knowledge. 
78 He first states the idea that external goods are necessary for happiness in Book I of NE: For a similar 
statement see EE 1215a12-19, and The Politics 1323b24-29. 
79 NE 1153b14-25. 
80 NE 1099a32-33. For example, inherited wealth and well-placed friends would be necessary to enable a 
virtuous life according to Aristotle.   
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occur. In the absence of these circumstances, an individual’s opportunity for the exercise of 
virtue will, conceivably, be restricted.81 Aristotle believes that a person who is very ugly, of 
low birth, or whose friends are worthless, or dead is not a happy person.82 But is this really 
only because he is deprived of the opportunity for virtuous activity?  On this interpretation, 
external goods are merely means to the intrinsic good of virtue. And this does seem a 
reasonable interpretation of Aristotle’s comment that happiness ‘is a kind of virtuous activity 
of soul . . . whereas all the other goods either are necessary preconditions of happiness or 
naturally contribute to it and serve as its instruments’.83   
According to Cooper, who endorses this instrumental view, the reason why Aristotle includes 
the external goods as ‘a second component’ of eudaimonia is ‘only because of the effect they 
have in enabling the virtuous person to live, and go on living, a fully virtuous life’.84 The 
virtuous person, therefore, will not be motivated to pursue them for their own sake, but 
merely for their value to the furthering of virtue. But surely there are situations where a virtue 
is exercised simply because the good is sought?  How could we even make sense of 
temperance if one of our ends is not the pursuit of health? This view is deeply problematic. 
Annas sums up the difficulty:  
 
If only virtuous activity has intrinsic value for the virtuous person, and she is 
concerned with external goods merely as means to this, it looks as though the virtuous 
person’s activity can never get started. If I act out of temperance, I seem to be aiming 
at health; but on this view, I am really aiming at health in order to have a decent field 
of activity for my exercise of temperance. But the exercise of temperance must aim at 
something beyond itself, or we would never have any independent access to the idea 
of what the temperate person does. Nor would we ever come to see what we 
intuitively assume to be the point of being temperate, rather than self-indulgent.85   
 
And the question of the loss of external goods is even more difficult to resolve on this 
interpretation. Can it really be that the only reason why the virtuous man cannot be happy on 
the rack is because he is deprived of the opportunity for virtuous activity? 
                                                 
81 John Cooper suggests that good looks and good birth, for example, or even having good children, will open 
doors for opportunity for the exercise of virtue. Cooper, “Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune.”, 182-4. 
82 NE 1099b2-7. 
83 NE 1099b26-28. 
84 Cooper, “Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune”, 195-6 [original italics]. 
85 Annas, MH, 379-380. 
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The alternative interpretation is that external goods do have intrinsic value in addition to any 
instrumental value with regard to exercising the virtues. On this interpretation, the lack or 
loss of external goods spoils happiness simply because they are constituent parts of it. But, 
unlike the first interpretation which leaned in the direction of the Stoics, this second one, 
which grants external goods intrinsic value, encounters the challenge of completeness and 
self-sufficiency. Aristotle appears to face a dilemma: either he admits that happiness is not 
complete, since it can be increased by the supply of other goods, or he allows that additional 
goods are necessary for happiness and yet do not increase its value. His ambivalence can be 
seen in the following extract from the Ethics: 
 
when a man bears patiently a number of heavy disasters, not because he does not feel 
them but because he has a high and generous nature, his nobility [kalon] shines 
through. And if, as we said, the quality of a life is determined by its activities, no man 
who is truly happy can become miserable; because he will never do things that are 
hateful and mean. For we believe that the truly good and wise man bears all his 
fortunes with dignity, and always takes the most honourable course that circumstances 
permit; just as a good general uses his available forces in the most militarily effective 
way, and a good shoemaker makes the neatest shoe out of the leather supplied to him, 
and the same with all the other kinds of craftsmen. And if this is so, the happy man 
[eudaimōn] can never become miserable – although he cannot be entirely happy 
[makarios] if he falls in with fortunes like those of Priam.86 
 
Aware of the intuitive idea that happiness is affected in cases of severe loss of external goods, 
is Aristotle being forced to introduce what is essentially a two-tiered structure, where the 
‘lower’ tier is the experience of the eudaimōn, one resistant to the loss of these goods, and the 
‘higher’ one some state which can be affected by loss of goods and which is rendered by 
makarios? Although this was argued by some ancient philosophers, most of Aristotle’s 
modern commentators doubt that this was his intention.87     
Concluding thoughts 
                                                 
86 NE 1100b33-1101a8. 
87 Although this is the line of reasoning adopted by Antiochus, and Arius Didymus, Annas rejects it, claiming 
that the two words have been inserted for stylistic rather than substantive reasons. MH, 383. Nussbaum argues 
that Aristotle makes no significant distinction between the two terms. Nussbaum, Fragility, 330-334. Anthony 
Kenny, however, upholds the distinction, claiming that Aristotle seems reluctant to use the word makarios to 
refer to human happiness since it would be ‘presumptuous’ to use the same word which is usually reserved for 
the happiness of the immortal gods. EE 1215 a 9-10.  (EE Notes, 50).       
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We have seen how there are problems for Aristotle’s conception of eudaimonia as the good 
or telos for human beings. The first is his apparent offering of two distinct views of the 
human function. And the second is his ambivalence over the nature of the relation of 
eudaimonia to external goods. Although his theory is preferable to that of the Stoics, 
Aristotle’s attempt to satisfy the intuitive requirement, while also retaining the theoretical 
pull is ultimately unsatisfactory and the inherent tension is left unresolved.88 In addition, and 
particularly to modern mind, his theory appears elitist, and too narrow; neither the masses nor 
those engaged in public life, nor women nor slaves can ever achieve eudaimonia since they 
can never be truly virtuous. However, in the final section of this chapter, we will suggest that 
the problems inherent in Aristotle’s theory of eudaimonia might be answerable through the 
adoption of a theistic perspective, one where God is at the centre. 
5.2.3. Aristotle and the kalon 
However, before we leave Aristotle’s thought on the telos of human beings, there is one final 
concept to consider which may strengthen the argument that a teleological reasoning belongs 
in the OT, and this is the concept of the kalon.89 According to Aristotle there are three 
categories of value which form the basis of choice; the fine (kalon),90 the advantageous 
(sumpheron), and the pleasant (hēdu). The good man will choose well, and the bad man 
badly, especially regarding pleasure.91 The virtuous person pursues virtue not only for its own 
sake, rather than out of benefit or whim or even duty, but also for the sake of the kalon.92 
There is therefore what we might call an internal dimension to virtuous choice. So, while 
each of the virtues is an end, intrinsically valuable in itself, and at the same time a means to 
the virtuous activity which is constitutive of eudaimonia, the virtuous person must not only 
possess all the virtues, but also characteristically pursue virtuous acts for the sake of the 
kalon. It is with this aim that the virtuous person will pursue courage, for example, even in 
the face of wounds or death.93  
                                                 
88
 Aristotle’s ‘Peripatetic’ successors inherit the problem and are forced into sharpening their arguments in the 
face of the attack from Stoic theory.  
89 We have already met this word in the last quotation from Aristotle. 
90 Since the primary meaning of καλόν seems to be aesthetic, it is often simply translated ‘beautiful’. Other 
translations are required to capture the moral sense. Some translations of Aristotle use ‘fine’ or ‘honourable’, 
(e.g. J. A K. Thomson, NE); others use ‘noble’ (e.g. H. Rackham, NE, EE; Anthony Kenny, EE.) 
91 While, for Aristotle, what is fine is also pleasant, the reverse is not always true. NE 1104b30-1105a1. 
92 ‘Virtuous actions are fine and are done for a fine end’. NE 1120a23. See also EE 1248b34-37.   
93 NE 1117b7-9. 
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The courageous man, however, is undaunted, so far as is humanly possible; he will 
fear what it is natural for man to fear, but he will face it in the right way and as 
principle directs, for the sake of what is right and honourable [τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα]; for 
this is the end of virtue [τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς].94 
 
There is an essential difference, then, between what is good (ἀγαθόν), and what is fine or 
noble (καλόν). For goods to be kalon they must be praiseworthy as well as valuable for their 
own sake.95 And even those goods which are kalon can be pursued in the wrong way; if a 
person seeks to acquire virtue, but only for the sake of natural goods, then that person may be 
good, but he is not kalon.96 “Nobility [καλοκἀγαθία], then, is complete virtue”.97 And so 
there cannot be eudaimonia (a life of virtuous activity) unless virtue is pursued for the sake of 
the kalon.    
 
But what exactly is signified by the term kalon? The primary meaning of the adjective is 
beautiful, but in addition to the aesthetic, it can also designate excellence of function. And so, 
in Aristotle, kalon can refer to what is appropriate or useful for things in the natural world,98 
the order and symmetry which abstract objects display,99 or the appropriate size for an 
ordered city.100 Kalon, then, refers to a cluster of concepts which include order (τάξις), 
proportion or symmetry (συμμετρία), equilibrium (ἠρεμία), what is fitting (πρέπον), and what 
is not subject to chance (μὴ τυχόντως). Terence Irwin argues that, in his ethical works, 
Aristotle makes a conceptual distinction between moral rightness and beauty on the basis of 
the notion of praiseworthiness; praise (and blame), after all, can only be apportioned where 
there is the possibility of voluntary action and corresponding responsibility, and the ethical 
                                                 
94 NE 1115b11-13. See also NE 1116a11. 
95 EE 1248b17-25. Health and strength, although goods, are not praiseworthy. EE 1248b22-25. In fact, they can 
be harmful if possessed by a vicious person. EE 1248b30-31. 
96 Aristotle mentions the Spartans as an example of such men. EE 1248b38-39. To the noble person even the 
useful will be noble since he will have the correct motivation.  
97 EE 1249a16. 
98 For examples see T. H. Irwin, “The Sense and Reference of Kalon in Aristotle.” Classical Philology 105, no. 
4 (2010): 381-96, 386-88.  
99 In the Metaphysics XII, Aristotle comments that the mathematical sciences provide evidence of the greatest 
(μέγιστα) forms of the kalon, and Rackham has no difficulty in translating kalon as beautiful here: ‘the main 
species of beauty are orderly arrangement [τάξις], proportion [συμμετρία] and definiteness’ [ὡρισμένον] 
(1078a31-b2). 
100 Politics 1326a33. 
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καλόν fits this criterion.101 Kelly Rogers, on the other hand, believes that, where virtue is 
concerned, the aesthetic and the functional are not separable metaphysically. In fact, she finds 
that the qualities of order and equilibrium which underlie the notion of the kalon, are the 
source of beauty as well as excellence of function.102 This seems the more plausible idea in 
view of the prominence of the aesthetic use of kalon in the literature from Homer onwards. 
Whether Aristotle sees beauty in virtue or not, he is clear that a moral exemplar is one who 
acts not only rightly (ὀρθῶς) but also nobly (καλῶς).103 His life will then display excellence 
of function,104 and appropriate and fitting actions with regard to the mean,105 all the while 
guided by fine ideals, heeding the voice of reason (logos),106 and acting from fine motives.107 
Ultimately, virtue is kalon because it reflects order and harmony (or equilibrium) in the 
soul.108     
So, if the kalon is such a crucial concept in Aristotle’s discussion of virtue, in that it provides 
a standard for virtuous activity, (virtuous acts are only virtuous if done for the sake of the 
kalon) what is its metaphysical explanation? Aristotle accepted that people struggle to be 
virtuous (it is much easier to miss the mean than to hit it),109 but the best human life will be 
one lived in the ‘service and contemplation’ of God, and especially in contemplation, since 
that best imitates the activity of God.110 The ultimate standard for the kalon, then, and its 
metaphysical explanation, according to Aristotle, was God ‘himself’. However, here we 
encounter a difficulty. The temptation for the theist is to read into Aristotle ideas which were 
                                                 
101
 NE 1109b31; EE 1223a9-15. The virtuous person acts for the sake of the καλόν, not for the sake of beauty, 
though Irwin does concede that certain virtues, e.g. magnificence which aims at the common good, may require 
an eye for beauty. Irwin, “Sense and Reference”, 392. Essentially, Irwin argues for the existence of two 
homonyms.  
102 Kelly Rogers, “Aristotle’s Conception of Τὸ Καλόν”, Ancient Philosophy, 13 (1993): 355-71, 358. Virtue is 
functional excellence to Aristotle as we have seen, and the mark of virtue is to have the right feelings at the right 
times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way, by conforming to a 
mean between excess and deficiency. See NE 1106b21-23. 
103 NE 1179a29. 
104 NE 1106a16-24. 
105 Cf NE 1119a18, 1122b23-30; EE 1249a9. 
106 NE 1180a11-12. 
107 NE 1122b6-7. 
108 Cf. Plato’s idea that virtue is beauty (κάλλος) of the soul (Rep. 444e). 
109 E.g. NE 1106b29-35. 
110
 EE 1249b21. It is hard to know what Aristotle meant here by serving God. Kenny suggests that serving 
(θεραπεύειν) God is the work of the virtue of φρόησις, while the contemplation (θεωρία) of God is the work of 
the virtue of (σοφία). Notes to EE, n. 20, p. 188. 
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foreign to his thought. Aristotle’s God is not the Judeo-Christian God. He is neither personal 
nor a creator.111 The prime mover is the source of all change and process in the universe, but 
cannot be subject to process himself. He is pure actuality, and therefore cannot be an efficient 
cause (which requires potentiality). He is cause only in the sense of final cause and causes 
process by being an object of desire, or an ‘intentional object’ to use today’s terminology. If 
the divine life is supremely desirable it must be the best possible life, and since the only 
activity of the prime mover is thinking about his own thinking, then the best activity for 
human beings will be contemplation, and in particular contemplation of the divine.112  
Aristotle clearly did have a conception of some ultimate reality beyond the human soul, and 
so of some good beyond the human good. But, although he points to God as the ultimate 
standard for the kalon, what can this mean, not just for metaphysics, but also for ethics? How 
does the kalon possess a moral significance? Aristotle’s God does not act in the world nor 
possess any character attributes which might enable imitation.  
We shall return to these questions in the next section which considers Aristotle’s thoughts on 
telos from an OT perspective, and argue that the God of the OT can shed light on these 
difficulties in Aristotle’s theory. 
 
6. Eudaimonia in the OT? 
Having argued for an Aristotelian understanding of the telos, where eudaimonia is the good 
which is the end of all ethical reflection, the next stage in this investigation is to see whether 
it is possible to interpret Aristotle’s views along theistic lines. In particular, can we see a 
proto-Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia in the OT texts, or does the happiness we find there 
resonate more with contemporary understandings of happiness as a mental state, closer 
perhaps to hedonism?  Can the accusations of ambivalence in Aristotle’s theory over the 
exact nature of the human ergon (a life of contemplation or a life of moral virtue?) be 
resolved by appealing to the OT texts and the God whom they reveal? And how does a 
theistic worldview shed light on the relationship between eudaimonia and external goods? 
We must always keep in mind that the OT does not naturally lend itself to systematic 
understanding of either theology or ethics, and that this type of enquiry is always in danger of 
                                                 
111 Clearly, there are problems using the pronoun ‘he’ for Aristotle’s God, but ‘it’ doesn’t seem quite right 
either. 
112 For the primary discussion of Aristotle’s theology see Book XII, 7 of the Metaphysics, (1072b14-21) where 
Aristotle seeks to find the source of all substance. 
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reading in what we desire to find. Hebrew has no direct semantic equivalent to eudaimonia, 
and the word does not appear in the Septuagint, nor indeed is there a Hebrew word for virtue. 
If we are to make progress, we must search for an OT idea of telos in its own terms. 
We might expect to find help through exploring the vocabulary of the OT, beginning, 
perhaps, with the word commonly translated ‘happiness’ (ʾašrê). In the Psalms, for example, 
we find that the happy person is the one who do not follow the advice of the wicked (Ps 1:1), 
whose transgression is forgiven (Ps 32:1), who makes the LORD his trust (Ps 40:4), whose 
way is blameless and who walks in the law of the LORD (Ps 119:1). Happiness, then, is 
found in following Yahweh, obeying his commandments, and experiencing his forgiveness 
following transgression of those commands and this picture of Torah obedience as the happy 
life certainly has a moral aspect. We shall return to this idea later. But the root ʾšr only 
appears twice in the Pentateuch,113 and a mere five times in the whole prophetic corpus. The 
investigation could be widened to include other words in the semantic field which evoke 
displays of happiness, such as rejoicing and delighting, as Jaqueline Lapsley has done in her 
study of happiness in Isaiah.114 But these are in large part mere expressions of a mental state 
and do not convey what Aristotle meant by eudaimonia. Even if we accept that word studies 
have their limitations, and that the lack of a specific word does not necessarily mean the lack 
of the underlying concept, we get no further unless we are clear about what it is we are 
searching for. Terence Fretheim, for example, suggests we search for OT accounts of 
experiences of joy, but here again we see a departure from Aristotle.115 Experiences are short 
lived, and rejoicing is short lived; even the rejoicing over the deliverance from Egypt was 
quickly followed by grumbling.116 Happiness to Aristotle, we might remember, was an 
activity and concerned the whole of a life.   
Often scholars writing on the good or the flourishing life in the OT merely list the things 
which might be thought to make the people’s lives happy (in the contemporary sense).117 For 
                                                 
113 Gen 30:13; Deut 33:29. 
114
 In addition to ’šr, Lapsley examines other roots such as śmḥ, ṭwb, šlm, ḥpṣ, rnn. Jacqueline Lapsley, “A 
Happy Blend: Isaiah’s Vision of Happiness” in Brent A. Strawn (ed.), The Bible and the Pursuit of Happiness: 
What the Old and New Testaments Teach Us About the Good Life. Oxford: OUP, 2012.   
115 Terence E. Fretheim, “God, Creation, and the Pursuit of Happiness” in Strawn (ed.), The Bible and the 
Pursuit of Happiness. 
116 See Exod 15. 
117 Very often, of course, the OT text presents the opposite picture and attributes the people’s unhappy lives to 
their breaking of God’s commands. For example, God’s withholding the good of rain leads to poverty and 
famine. 
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example, Norman Whybray suggests that the good life in Israel, is a life of ‘entire 
contentment with things as they are’,118 and comprises twelve features: security, land, power, 
food, longevity, wealth, family, justice, laws, wisdom, pleasure and trust in God. However, 
since he is not relating these features to a theory of value, we cannot say whether he regards 
these as instrumental or intrinsic goods, or whether he is advocating some form of axiological 
pluralism. This type of description of the good life is more Martin Seligman than Aristotle, 
and little more than a thick account of what the latter would term ‘external goods’.119 For 
Aristotle, it was virtue which was primary, and the goods in some sense secondary: the very 
definition of eudaimonia was framed in terms of virtue. In many discussions of happiness in 
the OT, virtue does not even get a mention, and where it does it is not central enough to 
correspond to Aristotle’s idea. Nathan MacDonald, for example, does acknowledge the 
significance of virtue, but places it alongside other goods, such as wealth, friendships, (good) 
children, honour and good luck, which he calls ‘constituent parts’ of happiness. When 
combined, these goods provide ‘a rich vision of the happy life’.120 However, as we have seen, 
it is not perfectly clear how Aristotle envisaged the relation between external goods and 
eudaimonia, and a ‘parts’ conception of eudaimonia is only one interpretation.121 In any case, 
MacDonald does not specify that virtue is a necessary constituent, but merely one constituent 
alongside others. Ultimately, MacDonald’s claim for a parallel between eudaimonia as 
construed by Aristotle, and the Torah goods of wealth, children, property, and land is more 
optimistic than substantive. 
Lapsley also argues for a parallel between Aristotelian eudaimonia and the OT. She believes 
the Isaianic vision of happiness to be ‘fundamentally eudaimonic’, since it portrays happiness 
as a life of virtuous activity, even though there is an essential difference in the details of that 
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 R. N. Whybray, The Good Life in the Old Testament (London: T. & T. Clark, 2002), 4.  
119 The good life for Seligman contains ‘positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning and 
accomplishment’ [PERMA]. Martin E. P. Seligman, Flourish: A New Understanding of Happiness and Well-
Being - and How to Achieve Them (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2011). See n. 38 above. 
120 Nathan MacDonald, “Is There Happiness in the Torah?” in Strawn (ed.), The Bible and the Pursuit of 
Happiness, 59, 67.   
121 MacDonald’s description of eudaimonia is taken not from Aristotle’s ethical works but from the Rhetoric 
(I.5, 1360b). But, since the Rhetoric was written as a manual for training public speakers, and not as a course on 
ethics, it ignores the complexity as well as the ambivalence of Aristotle’s thought on virtue and the good life. 
Moreover, since this description is given during Aristotle’s discussion of the endoxa (the prevailing popular 
opinion), it is not necessarily a reliable source for Aristotle’s ethical thought. Rogers cautions against this 
assumption: “Τὸ Καλόν”, 362.   
59 
 
 
 
activity.122 However, she also finds what she terms ‘hedonic’ elements in the text: ‘for Isaiah, 
true human flourishing is not possible without the consistent pleasure of a good meal and a 
fine glass of wine’.123 Such an assessment of eudaimonia leans more towards Epicurus than 
Aristotle.     
The studies mentioned so far are certainly useful to the general discussion of happiness as an 
OT concept. But because they are, to a greater or lesser degree, importing our contemporary 
notions of happiness as a mental state, and because the happy life is not identified with the 
moral life (that is, a life lived according to virtue), they are of limited use to the present 
enquiry.124 Such general and pluralist conceptions of the good life in the OT cannot further 
our search for the telos which could undergird a theistic virtue ethics understood along 
Aristotelian lines. 
6.1. Virtue as Torah obedience? Answering the deontological objection 
How then do we proceed? One plausible route might be to construe virtue as obedience to 
Torah, however understood. Although we have noted that MacDonald’s understanding of 
eudaimonia was not strictly speaking an Aristotelian one, he does take virtue, construed as 
Torah obedience, to be an important constituent of happiness, and believes that a relationship 
between obedience and happiness is grounded in the covenant: ‘If Israel obeys Torah, it will 
be blessed by YHWH in all it does (Deut 28:1-14). Israel will enjoy agricultural prosperity, 
large families and international repute’.125 However, there seems to be an immediate 
objection to the understanding of virtue as Torah obedience from an Aristotelian perspective. 
This might be called a deontological objection. We shall first deal with this objection and 
then return to the two problems we detected in Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia. It will be 
suggested that a theistic version of telos can provide a solution to these problems.  
If virtue is construed as Torah obedience, it is not clear whether the relationship is between 
virtue and happiness, or between obedience and happiness. The idea that if the people lead 
virtuous lives through Torah obedience then happiness will follow, is not an Aristotelian one. 
                                                 
122 Lapsley, “A Happy Blend”, 77-78. 
123 Ibid., 78. See also p. 84. 
124 That Lapsley does not presume an identity relation between the happy and the moral life is clear from the 
telling remark: ‘Human beings model their happiness on God’s happiness: as in the moral life (e.g. loving the 
stranger, Deut 10:18-19), so also in the happy life, it is a matter of imitatio dei’. Lapsley, “A Happy Blend”, 80. 
125 MacDonald, “Happiness in the Torah”, 71. Lapsley argues that the prophets also construe the virtuous life as 
a life of Torah obedience. Lapsley, “A Happy Blend”, 77. 
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A fundamental criterion of teleological ethics, as we have seen, is that the good is prior to the 
right. On this reading however, the inverse is true: obedience is prior to happiness. This is a 
deontological and not a teleological conception of ethics. As noted in the Introduction, it is 
the deontological conception which has dominated discussion of OT ethics. And much of the 
OT seems most naturally to read that way, even to those outside a theistic worldview. Peace, 
for example, comes to those who heed God’s commandments (Is 48:18); there is, therefore, 
no peace for the wicked (Is 48:22). Isaiah makes the relation between righteousness and 
peace quite clear:  
 
17 The effect of righteousness will be peace, 
    and the result of righteousness, quietness and trust forever. 
18 My people will abide in a peaceful habitation, 
    in secure dwellings, and in quiet resting places. (Is 32:17-18)  
 
Righteousness is the cause of peace. A community characterised by justice and righteousness, 
that is a community living according to Torah, is a happy and peaceful community in the 
prophetic corpus. Although this seems to refer to the external good of peace, the Hebrew 
conception of peace (šālôm) is not delimited by its external aspect. Shalom is much more 
nuanced than that.126 It can convey the idea of flourishing, both at the level of the individual, 
and of the community; where shalom is present, justice and peace will reign and relationships 
will flourish. A people living in accordance with the Torah will maintain a good relationship 
with God, and peace will be an evident effect.  
But this is not necessarily to say that the Torah is prior to ‘the Good’. If it is accepted that a 
life lived according to Torah is a life lived reflecting the character and holiness of God, then 
it is ultimately not the Torah but God who is the ground of ethics. The good life does not flow 
from Torah obedience, and cannot be reduced to it. The good life is a life of virtuous activity, 
and conformity to Torah might be seen as a measure of such a life, rather than the source of 
it. The life of the virtuous person is a life where there is internal harmony between character 
dispositions, motives and actions.  
As we noted at the start, the secondary aim of this chapter, following the analysis of the 
concept of telos, was to see whether a teleological conception of ethics can be found in the 
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 See, for example, Philip J. Nel, “םלשׁ” NIDOTTE, 4:130-5.   
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OT. We therefore need a coherent conception of the telos, of the ultimate good for human 
beings, which could underpin a theological ethic. To this end we shall return to our previous 
discussion of the kalon. According to Aristotle, the life of the good man is a higher life, a life 
where virtue is consistently chosen for the sake of the kalon. Interestingly, the LXX translates 
the multiple occurrences of ṭôb (good) in the creation account of Genesis 1, with kalon rather 
than agathon.127 Kalon, we noted, was linked to order, and the notion of order pervades the 
OT. There was order in the beginning. Torah observance is the right ordering of Israelite life 
and the detailed instructions concerning the construction of the Tabernacle and correct 
worship practice, as well as the day to day life in the community, had the purpose of 
reflecting God’s original design for the world at creation. But this order was not simply a 
cold, abstract idea. Interpreting the kalon in its widest sense, enables one to see, in addition to 
right ordering, the beauty, symmetry, and excellence of function in God’s creative design for 
the world. And looking still further, one might see in the creation and in the instructions for 
its maintenance, a reflection of the character of God himself. When God creates according to 
the kalon, he creates according to his very nature.   
An OT parallel here might run as follows. The theistic equivalent of Aristotle’s kalon, that 
which is most noble and most fine, is God himself. Contrary to the idea that Torah obedience 
leads to, or is a part of, happiness, it is a life according to virtue (as depicted in Torah) which 
is both a means to it, and a necessary constituent of it. The Torah points us to virtue, just as it 
points us to the character of God. But if the aim of virtue, the kalon, is ultimately God 
himself, how can we conceive of the human telos? One plausible suggestion is that the telos 
of all ethical reflection, the good or flourishing human life, is a life in relationship with 
God.128 The concept of relationship is a rich one, taking in the whole of a person, and since 
the well-being of the self is inextricably tied to the well-being of others, a flourishing 
individual life will be a flourishing life in community. A life lived in relationship with God 
will be a life lived according to virtue, and so true to Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia. 
The ultimate telos of the human being, on this understanding, is an unbroken fellowship or 
friendship with God. A teleological conception of ethics remains a viable one. 
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 ‘And God saw that it was good [καλόν]’ appears five times in Genesis 1, and ‘very good’ (καλὰ λίαν) once.    
128 In contrast to what is suggested here, that a close relationship with God is the telos for the people of God, 
Lapsley suggests that it is just one aspect of the happy life, alongside ‘a secure, prosperous, and joyous home 
life, including robust eating and drinking; a peaceful and just community in which to live; and hope for the 
future (preservation in the memory)’. Lapsley, “A Happy Blend”, 79.   
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6.2. Revisiting Aristotle’s eudaimonia 
On function 
The first problem that we noted in Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia concerned the nature of 
the characteristic human function. Was it simply a life of moral virtue combined with 
phronesis, or was it a life of contemplation according to sophia, or was it a combination of 
both? If it is accepted that relationship with God is the human telos understood along theistic 
lines, then that relationship will be constituted and maintained not only by virtuous activity 
but also, supremely, by worshipping and glorifying God through meditation on his person 
and acts, which we could understand as an extension of the Aristotelian idea of 
contemplation. This proposed understanding of the human telos seems to fit best with Nagel’s 
interpretation of Aristotle; excellence of function is a hierarchical concept; moral virtue is 
necessary but of secondary importance to the life of contemplation. We can see how this 
conception of the human telos aligns itself with the answer to the opening question of the 
Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Confession: ‘What is the chief end of man? Man’s 
chief end is to glorify God and enjoy him forever’. Contemplation of God and his acts of 
mercy will lead to praise (Ps 86), and ‘fullness of joy’ (Ps 16:11). 
Theistic parallels with secular philosophers can only ever take us so far. The God revealed in 
the OT is not an unknown, and unknowable prime mover, but a God who can be known. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s theory can provide us with a conceptual framework for 
understanding the human telos as relationship with God, a relationship built and maintained 
not only by the moral virtues, but also by the intellectual virtues of practical and theoretical 
wisdom. The biblical revelation partially tracks, but ultimately surpasses, the thought of 
Aristotle.  
On external goods 
The second problem we encountered in Aristotle’s theory was his ambivalence over the 
relation between eudaimonia and external goods. While he is clear that virtue is central, he is 
less clear about the nature of the value of other goods to human flourishing. Completeness 
and self-sufficiency were the two goals for a concept of eudaimonia. And Aristotle’s initial 
definition of happiness, as an activity of the soul according to virtue, satisfies these 
requirements. However, we also saw that Aristotle acknowledged that our intuitions were not 
satisfied with this, and so he amended his initial definition to include external goods. 
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We have noticed that some OT scholars adhere to the objective list conception of happiness, 
and virtue, if listed at all, is merely one among many parts of happiness. Such a view is a 
clear departure from Aristotle and of no use to the construction of a virtue ethical theory. A 
virtue ethical theory, after all, must be centred on virtue. For Aristotle, virtue was not simply 
one among many goods, but a necessary good, and arguably, the only good of intrinsic value.   
So how might we understand the relation between eudaimonia and external goods from the 
evidence of the OT text? We might think, for example, of the goods of peace and security 
which Whybray and Lapsley cite as constituents of the happy life. On one interpretation of 
Aristotle, the virtuous person could be eudaimon in the absence of such goods; that is, he did 
not consider them to have intrinsic value; their value was instrumental or non-essential. On 
the other interpretation of Aristotle, the virtuous person could only be eudaimon if certain 
conditions obtained, or at least if certain conditions, such as the fortunes of Priam, did not 
obtain. Does the OT lean towards one particular interpretation? Did times of international 
peace and security create the conditions where eudaimonia was more achievable? Or could a 
person flourish even in times of war, or exile, when he was not enjoying the happy life 
described by Whybray and Lapsley?  
At this point we may appeal to Aristotle’s apparent distinction between eudaimon and 
makarios. He seems willing to admit that it was possible for a person to be virtuous even if he 
was not blessed in his circumstances. In the OT, from Abraham onwards, God’s blessings on 
the people (goods as land, security, peace, children etc.) were a sign of his favour. If we call 
the person in receipt of such blessings makarios, the question we must ask is whether that 
person can still be eudaimon if those blessings are withdrawn. Construing eudaimonia as 
relationship with God, as we have done, we might find the answer to be ‘yes’. Job, for 
example, is portrayed as upright and just, even in terrible circumstances, and so can maintain 
his relationship with God. The idea of shalom which is at the heart of the relationship, 
overcomes, in a sense, the lack of external peace and security. We might see a similar story in 
the lives of those prophets of the exile, Daniel or Ezekiel. Moreover, for the people of God, 
there is an additional factor to be considered, that is the future dimension of their existence as 
the people of God.   
6.3. A future aspect to eudaimonia 
One final aspect to this discussion, which Aristotle could not have envisaged, is what we 
might term the ‘future aspect’ to eudaimonia. That the perfection of human flourishing will 
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not be experienced in this life.129 Throughout the OT, a repeated theme is that certain goods 
are always in the future, the subjects of hope. During the wilderness wanderings, hope rested 
in the actual possession of the promised land with its associations of rest and peace and the 
self-identity of a covenant community living in relationship with Yahweh. When the people 
were dispossessed of the land following their breaking of the covenant, they lost not only 
their land and their peace, but also their identity. When the people are urged to ‘seek the Lord 
and live’,130 the prophet is not speaking of the physical death of individuals, but rather the 
spiritual death of the people whose removal from the land meant separation from their 
covenantal life-giving God, and the death of the nation of Israel. Yet even in the shadow of 
imminent judgment, the prophets could still convey a message of hope. They could see a 
future beyond the judgment, not just a hope of a return to the land, with all that entailed, but 
also the hope of a time of future peace not just for mankind, but peace in nature itself.131 The 
psalms also contain visions of a coming age of salvation, characterised not only by the 
fruitfulness of the land but also by steadfast love (ḥesed), faithfulness (ʾemet), righteousness 
(ṣedeq) and peace (šālôm).132 Judgment was not the end of the story. A time of renewal 
would follow: a new covenant would replace the old one,133 a new heart and a new spirit,134 a 
new heavens and new earth,135 and a new temple.136 The prophets and psalmists, then, look 
forward to a future when mankind will truly flourish. The contrast between the future picture 
of renewal and the message of the coming judgment is always stark, perhaps almost 
unbelievable, but nevertheless it is there. 
How might we think of this overarching hope as an aspect of eudaimonia? Because the peace 
which will come is inseparable from righteousness. When the people are living according to 
virtue, the habits of covenant obedience, justice and righteousness will reign, and peace will 
result. But we have suggested that eudaimonia on a theistic conception is not only a life of 
                                                 
129 We might think of Aquinas’s description of the final end of humans, the perfection of happiness, as the 
‘beatific vision’, where there will be perfect union with God and a perfect vision of him. ST Supp to third part. 
Q 94. Or Augustine before him, who thought along similar lines. See City of God, XX11, 29.   
130 Amos 5:6. 
131 Isa 11:6-9; 65:25. 
132 For example, Ps 85:11(10): Steadfast love and faithfulness will meet; righteousness and peace will kiss each 
other (    גְפִנ ת ֶֶ֥מֱאֶו־דֶסֶח׃וּק ָֽׁ  שׁ נ םוֹ֣ל  שְׁו קֶד ֶֶ֖צ וּשׁ  ). See also Micah and Isaiah.                                          
133 Jer 31: 31-33.  
134 Ezek 18:31; 36:26. 
135 Isa 65:17ff. 
136 Ezek 40-43. 
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moral virtue but above all one of relationship with Yahweh, and this would incorporate the 
idea of imitation of God. This future aspect of eudaimonia, then, could be thought of as a life 
of perfect relationship with God, or perfect imitation, manifesting itself in perfected 
relationships with fellow human beings and with nature itself;137 a time when the human good 
or telos is at last fully realised.   
6.4. Concluding thoughts 
We have argued in this section that Aristotle’s teleology can be successfully reworked as a 
theistic ethical theory, where the idea of the OT God replaces Aristotle’s prime mover. The 
ultimate telos or function of human beings can still be conceived of as eudaimonia, but the 
theistic version is best construed as relationship with God. We have also seen that there are 
two aspects to peace, peace as an external good, dependent on circumstances, and peace as an 
internal good, which flows from a relationship with God. This is not peace in the abstract; 
this peace is tangible. The fruit of righteousness is peace. Righteousness leads us to the 
correct relationship with God and righteousness ensures the continuing of that relationship. In 
line with the thought of Aristotle, the virtues of justice and righteousness are therefore both 
the means to and constitutive of eudaimonia. Finally, we have seen that theism allows a 
future aspect to eudaimonia, the perfection of relationships between man and God, between 
human beings themselves, and between human beings and their environment. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter began with a discussion of the good, which, according to Aristotle, is ‘that for 
the sake of which everything else is done’.138 In a teleological ethics, it is the good which 
grounds the theory and forms the basis of moral judgments. Our survey of some examples of 
theories of value in modern philosophy showed them to be deficient in one way or another in 
terms of their ability to provide practical guidance for moral action. Ideally, a moral theory 
should be monistic, reasonable in its metaphysical assumptions, and in line with our common 
sense intuitions. And so, we turned to the ancients and the conception of the good as 
eudaimonia, and we saw that two versions of eudaimonistic virtue ethics have stood the test 
of time: that of the Stoics, and that of Aristotle. Both theories accept that human flourishing 
must include the moral virtues, but they differ in their understanding of the sufficiency of 
                                                 
137 See Job 5:23; Isa 2:4; Hos 2:18. 
138 NE 1097a18. 
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virtue for happiness. While the Stoic claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness is 
theoretically appealing, it fails to satisfy the intuition that external goods are also necessary. 
On the other hand, Aristotle’s attempts to account for the value of external goods generate an 
instability in his theory and are ultimately unsuccessful. Virtue ethical theories based on a 
naturalistic metaphysics seem powerless to resolve the debate over the nature of the final 
telos. Finally, we have argued that if we allow conceptual space for a supernatural 
metaphysics, where God is acknowledged as supreme good, then we can satisfy the criterion 
of absolute value and successfully ground a theological conception of eudaimonia. In our 
discussion of Amos in Chapter 6, these thoughts will be tested against the biblical text.
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Chapter Three 
The virtue of Justice 
 
For I will proclaim the name of the LORD; 
    ascribe greatness to our God! 
The Rock, his work is perfect, 
    and all his ways are just. 
A faithful God, without deceit, 
    just and upright is he; 
Deut 32:3-4 
 
Justice in this sense, then, is complete virtue; virtue, however, not unqualified but in 
relation to someone else. Hence it is often regarded as the sovereign virtue, and 
‘neither evening nor morning star is such a wonder’. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics1  
 
I take it as obvious that justice is a personal virtue, and am happy to use it as an 
occasional illustration, but I usually find any of the other virtues more hospitable to the 
detailed elaboration of points. 
Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue 
Ethics2 
  
In the previous chapter we examined the idea of telos, arguing that an Aristotelian conception 
could satisfy that particular condition of adequacy required by a virtue ethical theory and 
could also be successfully adapted to a theistic framework. The next step in our critical 
analysis of the features of CVE theory, will be to examine the fundamental concept of virtue. 
We have already discussed how virtue was regarded by Aristotle as both an end in itself, and 
also as constitutive of eudaimonia. We now need to clarify what we mean by the term virtue 
and how it functions in the theory. Instead of conducting a taxonomic survey of virtues in 
general, it is proposed to restrict the investigation to the virtue of justice. There are three main 
reasons for this. Firstly, the virtue of justice had pride of place in the classical system; to 
Aristotle it was ‘complete virtue’ as the above quotation makes clear. Secondly, and perhaps 
surprisingly in view of the first reason, the virtue of justice is the most troublesome of virtues 
                                                 
1
 NE 1129b26-29. 
2 Hursthouse, OVE, 5. 
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to situate in a virtue ethical theory. And lastly, justice is the primary moral concept in the 
book of Amos, and if it can be shown that justice can be understood as a virtue, and even 
complete virtue, then we may be nearer our ultimate goal which is to argue that it is possible 
to read Amos in the light of virtue ethics. 
This chapter, then, will investigate the concept of justice as a virtue, and assess whether this 
virtue can indeed underpin a theory of virtue ethics as the ancients believed. Since most CVE 
theories have their roots in either Aristotle or Hume, we will first consider how each of these 
thinkers conceived of the virtue of justice. On the basis of this discussion, it will be suggested 
that a theory based on Aristotle’s conception of justice is a more promising route to the 
understanding of justice as a virtue, and to the construction of a theistic virtue ethical theory. 
It will then be argued that an Aristotelian conception of justice is more compatible with the 
concept of justice found in the OT. In the final chapter, these insights will be applied to the 
book of Amos. 
1. Introduction 
Of all the terms in ethics, justice seems one of the most difficult to pin down, and certainly 
one of the most controversial. Justice means different things to different people, and as it 
does in ordinary conversation, so it does in philosophical thought. And these different 
conceptions of justice are most often incompatible.3 Nevertheless, the fundamental idea 
behind justice in all its manifestations is that each person receives what is due to her. Where 
‘justice’ is demanded by campaigners, the underlying complaint is that certain people are not 
receiving what they or others imagine is their due. The presuppositions underlying these 
types of complaint, however, are often more intuitive than cognitive. The fundamental 
questions are: what exactly is due and to whom and why? And, crucially for the present 
inquiry: what is the relation between the concept of justice and the concept of virtue? 
1.1. Justice: Changing conceptions 
In ancient thought justice was understood primarily as a virtue; today, however, it is more 
often understood as a principle, due no doubt in part to the profoundly influential theories of 
Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. For Kant, justice (Recht) was a universal principle based on 
freedom, derived by and grounded in reason alone, and able, therefore, to escape both the 
                                                 
3 For a thorough engagement with this problem, see Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988). 
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tyranny of church or king and also the conflict of contingent interests or feelings.4 Rawls put 
a similar emphasis on rationality, and on the rejection of teleological theories: how could the 
good be prior to the right if people have differing conceptions of the good life?5 Although he 
begins A Theory of Justice with the statement that justice is ‘the first virtue of social 
institutions’, he clearly does not mean to use the term in a virtue-ethical way. Justice, to 
Rawls, was a foundational principle,6 and he argued that the only way to guarantee basic 
rights and liberties, would be for society to formulate the norms of justice from an ‘original 
position’ of equality. Behind their ‘veil of ignorance’, the framers of justice would be free 
from biased presuppositions about the good inherited from their communities as well as from 
the effects of the contingencies of life.7  
1.2. The virtue of justice in ancient theory 
The ancients had a very different conception of justice. It was not just the basis of a legal 
claim in the Kantian sense, or a hypothetical principle abstracted from the realities of life as 
Rawls proposed. It was much more widely conceived. Justice was not just a part of ethics, 
but, in a sense, oversees the whole of it. It was a virtue, and not just any virtue, but the 
overarching virtue.  
This can be seen, for example, in Plato’s Republic. When Thrasymachus suggests that justice 
is simply that which the strong establish by convention to make the weak serve their 
interests,8 Socrates replies with an argument from function: the function of the soul is to live, 
and justice, as the virtue of the soul, enables the soul to perform that function well and so to 
live well. If justice is a soul’s virtue, a just person will live well, and anyone who lives well is 
‘blessed and happy’.9 Here Socrates is making a strong claim, and one which reminds us of 
the Stoic position on virtue which we considered in the previous chapter. The claim is that 
                                                 
4 See Roger J. Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant's Ethics (Cambridge: CUP, 1994). Sullivan advocates 
translating Recht as ‘justice’ which is nearer to Kant’s meaning than contemporary notions of ‘right’: for Kant, 
to possess a Recht meant to possess a legally enforceable civil claim (p. 26, n. 5).      
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Original ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005), 142.ff.; 560. 
6 This seems plain from his analogy with truth: ‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of 
systems of thought’. Ibid., 3. 
7 Ibid., 136ff.  
8 Plato, Republic (translated and introduction by G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve; Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Hackett, 1992), 338d-341a, 343c-344c. 
9 Ibid., 352d-354a. 
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justice, as the overarching virtue of the soul, is both necessary and sufficient for happiness.10 
Justice has intrinsic value, and should be chosen for its own sake. Later, in Book II, Socrates 
shifts the debate from individual justice to political justice. By this move he hopes to show 
that since justice is required for happiness, it is in everyone’s interests, not just those of the 
strong, that the city is just: everyone would be happy in a perfectly just polis. Ethics for Plato 
is inseparable from politics and so he sees justice as the overarching virtue of both state and 
individual: like the individual, the ideal city will be completely just when it is completely 
virtuous.11 
While there are many CVE theorists who follow Aristotle, few of them claim to follow Plato. 
And yet Plato’s theory in some ways would appear to be equally attractive. His ethics is 
grounded in virtue, and the virtuous (or just) person is not the one who conforms to rules or 
laws but rather the person whose soul is guided by the good, and whose life achieves its telos 
of eudaimonia, that state of being ‘blessed and happy’. Indeed, Plato’s concept of individual 
justice might be thought to lead to a purer form of virtue ethics than that of Aristotle.12 The 
harmonious soul is one where reason (or wisdom) governs the passions, and actions are just if 
they maintain this harmony. While this observation is arguably true, in the end it is Aristotle, 
and not Plato, who wrote extensively and specifically on ethics, thinking the subject through 
in a detailed and systematic manner, and leaving behind a theory substantive enough to be 
followed and adapted by subsequent generations of ethical thinkers. Moreover, he was 
practical. We find that, in his ethical writings, Aristotle was not interested primarily in the 
purely theoretical aspects of knowledge; for him the whole point of the human sciences was 
not simply to accumulate knowledge but to benefit human life and action (praxis).13 His 
purpose, well summarised by Michael Sandel, was ‘to form good citizens and cultivate good 
                                                 
10 Plato’s concept of justice is built on his metaphysics: justice was the overarching virtue because it was 
achieved if and only if the rational, spirited and appetitive parts of the soul (or, by extension, the state) existed in 
harmony and functioned as they should, ruled by the corresponding virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance. 
Ibid., 441d-444e. 
11 Building on his argument in Book I (352d-354a), Plato proceeds to construct a picture of this ideal city 
(kallipolis) where justice will reign (Books II-IV). 
12 Michael Slote suggests this because Plato associates justice with a person’s internal state, rather than with 
external situational factors such as rules or good consequences. Michael Slote, “Justice as a Virtue.” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [SEP], 2002, substantive revision 2014. URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/justice-virtue/>, 2. However, he also claims that Plato’s 
virtue ethics is not as pure as his own agent-based version, because for Plato, the evaluation of souls is based on 
the prior concept of the Form of the Good. Slote, Morals from Motives, 7-8. 
13  NE 1179a35-1179b2.   
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character’.14 In this sense, Aristotle was more of a ‘realist’ than Plato. His theory of justice in 
particular was one which, he claimed, could be put into practice. To what extent this is the 
case will be our next area of investigation. We are looking specifically for an account of 
justice which satisfies our second condition of adequacy for a VE theory which is a 
substantive conception of virtue and a plausible explanation of its place in the theory. 
2.  Aristotle’s theory of justice      
Since Aristotle, like Plato, regarded the virtue of justice as central to the moral life, and 
devotes a whole book (Book V) in the Ethics to its discussion, any virtue ethical theory which 
claims to follow Aristotle should surely engage with his ideas on justice.15 So how exactly 
did Aristotle conceive of this, somewhat different, virtue?16 He clearly had no intention of 
producing what we might think of as a systematic theory of justice such as that of Rawls; 
indeed, he would have probably have doubted the wisdom of such a project since he viewed 
ethics as an inexact science.17 However, he certainly gives a very thorough account of what 
justice is and what constitutes just and unjust human behaviour, analysing both the intentions 
behind the actions and the consequences of those actions.  
We should first outline how virtue operated in general in Aristotle’s ethical theory so that the 
distinctive nature of justice, and the problems which it raises, can be understood. Aristotle 
divides the virtues into two classes according to the divisions in the soul: wisdom and 
prudence (or practical rationality) are intellectual virtues and correspond to the rational part, 
while the moral virtues, which include justice, correspond to the nonrational part.18 Justice is 
the last of the moral virtues which Aristotle discusses in the Ethics.19 We have seen that 
                                                 
14 Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do? (London: Penguin, 2010), 193. Jonathan Barnes is 
equally succinct: ‘The Ethics hopes to make us good’. Barnes, “Introduction” to NE, xxv. 
15 A striking feature of the discussion in CVE is that this is rarely the case, even with self-confessed Aristotelian 
thinkers. For example, see the quotation from Hursthouse at the start of this chapter. Slote is a notable 
exception.   
16 Justice is different in the sense that it has a clearly social, as well as individual, dimension.                                 
17 NE 1094b11-16, cf. 1103b26-31. According to Aristotle, things which are conceptually prior and simpler 
allow greater exactness (ἀκριβέια) (Metaphysics ΧΙΙΙ 1078a9-10). While the purely theoretical sciences are in 
this sense exact, ethics and politics are less simple and so less exact since they are concerned with human 
conventions and human nature: exceptions will continually arise at the level of the particular which then 
disprove the universal. 
18 NE 1103a4-7. The nonrational part is subdivided into vegetative and appetitive; only the latter is receptive to 
reason and so can be a part of human goodness. NE1102a27-1103a10. 
19
 Virtues such as courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence (μεγαλοπρεπεία), and magnanimity or 
‘greatness of soul’ (μεγαλοψυχία), have already been discussed in Books III and IV. 
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virtue is valued both for its own sake and for the sake of the telos, which according to 
Aristotle was the flourishing life or eudaimonia, and so when faced with a choice, the 
virtuous person acts for the sake of virtue and for the sake of the good. This is accomplished 
by acting in accordance with a mean which lies between two extremes (or vices). Possession 
of the virtue of practical rationality (phronēsis) is essential to discern the mean in particular 
situations, and this is acquired through education and experience. The practically rational 
person (phrominos) understands the nature of the good (telos) which is the best life for 
human beings and has learned how to identify and order the goods of the good life. When the 
phrominos acts, the partnership of phronēsis and moral virtue (for he is also fully virtuous) 
allows him to discern the relevant aspects of both himself and the particular situation, apply 
the truths about what is good, discern the actions necessary to achieve the desired end, and so 
act well, which means acting according to virtue.   
At first, Aristotle describes justice (dikaiosunē) as a virtue like any other virtue, a character 
disposition which enables us to act well: ‘when people speak of justice we see that they all 
mean that kind of state of character that disposes them to perform just acts, and behave in a 
just manner and wish for what is just’.20 However, Aristotle then proceeds to make a critical 
distinction between its two senses. The first of these senses is the general idea of conformity 
to the law; Aristotle calls this universal justice, and describes it as ‘perfect virtue’,21 or the 
‘chief’ of the virtues.22 ‘It is complete virtue in the fullest sense, because it is the active 
exercise of complete virtue; and it is complete because its possessor can exercise it in relation 
to another person, and not only by himself’.23 Indeed, justice is the only virtue which is 
exercised exclusively for the good of someone else.24 The unjust man according to this sense 
is the one who breaks the law (paranomos). The second and narrower sense is ‘particular 
justice’.25 This virtue is exercised both in the distribution of goods and in the correction 
necessary to restore just order following unjust action. Particular justice, therefore, can be 
either distributive or corrective. The unjust man according to this sense is the one who acts 
                                                 
20 NE 1129a6-9. 
21 τελεία ἀρετή, NE 1129b26. 
22
 κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν, NE 1129b28. 
23 NE 1129b30-32.  
24 NE 1130a3-5.   
25 NE 1130b30 ff. 
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unfairly (anisos) by taking more than his due (pleonektēs).26 Distributive justice is concerned 
with the distribution of political power, honour and wealth among the members of the 
community, according to a rational principle of distribution which determines what is due on 
the basis of virtue and in accordance with a geometric proportion.27 Corrective justice 
concerns voluntary and involuntary transactions, and here the distribution is ‘arithmetic’.28  
2.1. CVE theory and Aristotle’s justice: some problems 
There are a number of problems associated with Aristotle’s conception of the virtue of justice 
which raise important questions for the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist. We shall discuss the 
implications of these problems, and then see whether satisfactory responses can be found. In 
the final section of this chapter we will revisit these problems in the light of the OT view of 
the virtues of justice and righteousness.  
2.1.1. Problem 1: Inherent injustice? 
One of the most obvious difficulties is that Aristotelian justice does not sound particularly 
just to modern ears. The idea of universal justice, where the just is the legal, might be 
reasonably questioned on empirical grounds alone, for the law could conceivably be 
wrongheaded. One can readily think of regimes, both past and present, whose laws do not 
conform to widely held ideas of justice. And concerning particular justice, one might feel less 
than happy with Aristotle’s criterion for just distribution. To Aristotle’s mind, equality of 
justice meant treating like cases alike, but treating unlike cases proportionately according to 
merit. By contrast, the modern mind, conditioned by Rawls and Kant, more often understands 
equality of justice as the equal treatment of all human beings simply because they are human 
beings.29 Indeed, how can Aristotle’s merit-based system be just if there is no universal 
                                                 
26 NE 1129a32-34. Thomson translates πλεονέκτης as ‘one who takes advantage of another’ (p. 113). Another 
option would be ‘grasping’. Since the concept is action-based, ‘greedy’ is not a good translation. See MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice?, 111-2. 
27 NE Book V, iii. Since goods were distributed according to virtue, Aristotle does not envisage equality in 
absolute terms. The principle of distribution will vary from polis to polis, and so justice will be relative to that 
principle. It is only in the best type of polis that the principle of distribution will reflect absolute justice. Politics 
1328b36-39. For the just distribution of political power see also Book III of The Politics, esp. Chapters ix and 
xii. 
28 NE Book V, iv. Involuntary actions are those where one party does not consent, and these include theft 
adultery and murder (1131a6-9). 
29 Rawls did not advocate strict equality since his ‘difference principle’ biased distribution in favour of the least 
advantaged in society. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 266. 
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distribution of the conditions for attaining that merit (virtue)?30 Certainly, the idea of the 
intrinsic worth of each human being was quite simply foreign to Aristotle.31 
In responding to the above problems, Aristotle might well begin by noting that his theory of 
justice is built on the hypothetical idea of the ideal state, whose principles were formulated by 
virtuous individuals and accepted by the people, because the citizens of the state with the 
finest constitution will be people of virtue.32 Even though Aristotle admits that this ideal 
state, and indeed perfect justice, are nowhere to be found, he does believe that a study of what 
is best in existing constitutions, could produce a paradigm example of an ideal state: since 
there are glimpses of perfect justice in every constitution, every effort should be made to 
attempt to reach the ideal.33 A biblical theist might hope to argue that when a state conforms 
its laws to principles of biblical justice, then this problem dissolves. But to track down the 
exact nature of ‘biblical justice’ is far from easy,34 and even if the neo-Aristotelian theist 
were to accept the place of phronēsis and a reasonable interpretation of the law,35 she might 
still wish to distinguish the overarching principles of biblical justice from the details found in 
many OT texts.  
Attempting to address the question of the seeming injustice in Aristotle’s criterion of 
distribution is really a matter for political and economic theory, and well beyond the scope of 
this thesis. It must suffice to say that one can still agree with the underlying principle that the 
virtue of justice is the disposition to think and act justly by giving each his due without 
accepting Aristotle’s details. The idea of the intrinsic worth of each human being was not 
only foreign to Aristotle, but is also problematic for many contemporary secular thinkers who 
may well be attracted to the notion but struggle to justify it.36 Any naturalistic metaphysics 
                                                 
30 William Frankena argues strongly against Aristotelian justice for this very reason. Ethics, 49-50. 
31 For example, Aristotle famously excludes women and slaves from citizenship. 
32 Politics, 1328b33-39. See n. 27. 
33 Aristotle discusses the ideal state in detail in Books VII and VIII of The Politics. Although he begins with a 
philosophical assessment of the best life (as the life which the ideal state would create for its citizens), from VII, 
iv onwards his discussion is extremely practical, and so he clearly envisages the ideal state as a possibility. He 
apparently formed a collection of 158 existing constitutions, although his Constitution of Athens is the only 
survivor. Sinclair, “Translator’s Introduction” to The Politics, 23. 
34 This particular problem will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 6, but for a useful and accessible overview 
see H. G. M. Williamson, He Has Shown You What is Good (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2012). 
35
 The term Aristotle uses for the idea of reasonable interpretation of the law in particular cases is ἐπιείκεια: it is 
sometimes translated ‘equity’, although note MacIntyre’s objection to this translation in Whose Justice?, 119-
20. See NE, V, 10. 
36 One of the reasons why Nussbaum is drawn to the Stoics is Aristotle’s apparent lack of any conception of the 
dignity and equal worth of all human beings. Fragility, xx-xxi. For her argument that social justice can be 
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faces a distinct challenge in explaining value, since it is only where one accepts the existence 
of a creative mind behind nature that the value inherent in nature can be explained. The theist 
might, therefore, make a case for the equal treatment of all human beings on the reasoning 
that their intrinsic worth is grounded in their creation in the image of God, and so replace 
Aristotle’s merit-based criterion for just distribution with the criterion of intrinsic worth. This 
would impact not only particular justice but the idea of universal justice too. 
2.1.2. Problem 2:  Virtue and the state 
Another question which the would-be-neo-Aristotelian encounters with Aristotle’s theory of 
justice is a more fundamental one: should it be a function of the state to legislate on matters 
concerning individual virtue and the common good? Perhaps a reason why justice is so 
seldom discussed in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is because of its communitarian 
implications, especially regarding the role of the state in the life of the individual. While to 
modern ears, the idea of the law as the upholder of morality rather than the preserver of 
individual freedom may sound strange indeed, to Aristotle the purpose of the law was to 
secure the happiness of the political community so that both state and individual might 
benefit. Happiness was a life lived according to virtue, and so the law’s function was both to 
prescribe these virtues through codification so that they became part of the social and 
political system, and also to educate its citizens in virtue.37 And on this point neo-
Aristotelians find themselves divided. Communitarian Aristotelians agree with Aristotle that 
it is indeed a function of the political community to oversee moral education in an effort to 
promote the common good: on this understanding, the virtues necessary for individual 
flourishing are also required for the good of the community.38 However, many, more liberally 
minded, students of Aristotle advocate the neutrality of the state, at least concerning moral 
education.39 In rejecting the relation between the common good and individual flourishing, 
these thinkers divide the virtues into two groups, according to which good they promote: 
                                                 
grounded in the idea of human functioning, see Martha C. Nussbaum, "Human Functioning and Social Justice: 
In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism." Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992): 202-46. 
37 NE 1094a24-b11, 1102a5-13, 1103b2-6. Politics, VII, xiiiff. 
38 See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 195; Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: 
Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999), chapters 9-11. 
39 See, for example, Nussbaum, Fragility, “Preface to the revised edition”, xxi-ii. But see also her comment that 
public education, as well as public debate, is necessary if racial hatred is to be eradicated. Ibid, xviii. And in 
“Human Functioning”, she argues that some form of ‘Aristotelian’ essentialism is still necessary for public 
policy if it is to operate according to a substantive notion of social justice. 
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justice, on this reasoning, since its primary focus is the common good, becomes the 
paradigmatic social virtue, the corresponding vice being selfishness.40   
As with our previous problem of the establishing of a criterion of just distribution, discussion 
of the state’s role in the life of the individual is more properly the terrain of political theory. 
As we noted, opinion in CVE is divided although most lean in a libertarian direction. How 
might the biblically minded theist respond? In support of Aristotle, she might point to many 
texts which encourage the community to teach their young about how to live the good life, a 
life of ‘walking in the ways of the Lord’, which, we are arguing, is a life in relationship with 
God. But the theist whose interest is in VE theory, is immediately aware of a difficulty here. 
Many of these texts are simply presented as rules to be followed,41 and, as we have been 
stressing throughout, when virtue is conceived to be derived from rules, ethics is 
deontological rather than teleological. Even if the theist can argue that scripture confirms 
Aristotle’s requirement that the community must legislate on matters of virtue, and that 
universal justice is law-abidingness, virtue appears, nevertheless, to be reduced to obeying 
the law, even if the motivation to obedience is often expressed in terms of virtue.42   
2.1.3. Problem 3: Self-other tension 
The last point appears to highlight an additional problem. The virtuous person may be caught 
in a conflict of ends in her pursuit of both civic and individual virtue, the other-regarding end 
of the common good being in tension with the self-regarding end of her own perfection in 
virtue.43 For example, particular justice could clash with liberality, or with magnanimity.   
The neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist might attempt to resolve this problem by considering 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s interpretation of Aristotle.44 As the ideal citizen moves from one social 
                                                 
40 For a clear argument why such a separation was not Aristotle’s intention, see David K. O’Connor, “The 
Aetiology of Justice”, in Carnes Lord and David K. O’Connor (eds.), Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian 
Political Science, 136-64 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). O’Connor rejects the idea, prominent 
in much contemporary moral philosophy (he specifically mentions the work of Foot and Williams), that 
Aristotle regarded the vice of injustice as mere selfishness; instead he insists that, like every other Aristotelian 
vice, it is simply a misorientation of the soul’s focus.   
41 For example, Deut 4:9-10, 6:7, 11:19. But cf. Gen 18:19 where ‘the way of the Lord’ is to do righteousness 
and justice.  
42 We can think of the many motive clauses in the OT where the people were reminded of God’s past mercies to 
move them to just actions, encouraging the virtue of gratitude.     
43 See, for example Susan D. Collins, “Moral Virtue and the Limits of the Political Community in Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics.” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 1 (2004): 47-61. 
44 See MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, Chapter VII.  
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role in the polis to the next, from military service to the various public offices, he acquires, 
through training and habit, a whole range of virtues. By the time he becomes a legislator or 
judge, he will (ideally) be a fully virtuous person, possessing all the virtues necessary in order 
to judge justly. Any potential tension can be dissolved through the exercise of the virtue of 
phronesis. Moreover, as we saw in the previous chapter, Aristotle has a higher end in sight 
than moral virtue. And so MacIntyre can write: ‘The virtue with which the good man 
discharges his social roles carries him forward finally to the perfecting of his own soul in 
contemplative activity’.45 At this point, where a higher level of happiness is experienced, the 
goods of moral virtue, including justice, and of phronēsis, appear secondary.46 But how 
useful is this solution for CVE theory? Virtue in general, and justice in particular, are very 
much culturally embedded concepts in Aristotle’s thought. Those individuals whose souls are 
guided by the happy combination of justice and phronesis belong to a very small subset of 
human beings; it is only those of good birth and good fortune who have the chance of 
becoming just persons. Moreover, even from the ranks of these privileged persons, it might 
be wondered if the phronimos was any less rare that he appears to be today. And so, 
MacIntyre’s answer, while no doubt a good interpretation of Aristotle’s own ideas, seems of 
limited appeal to the average neo-Aristotelian of today. The question is: can Aristotle’s 
theoretical framework survive extraction from its cultural embeddedness? We will consider a 
theistic alternative to the Aristotelian phronimos in some detail in the following chapter.   
But there is another way to view this notion of potential conflict. Perhaps any tension is in 
fact illusory. David K. O’Connor has a convincing argument to explain how Aristotle’s 
account of justice is just as concerned with the orientation of the soul as the other moral 
virtues. The key lies in a proper understanding of the relationship between justice and the 
other virtues. In the Ethics, Aristotle describes the difference between complete virtue and 
universal justice: ‘they are the same, except that their essence is not the same; that which, 
considered in relation to someone else [pros heteron], is justice, when considered simply 
[haplōs] as a certain kind of moral state [hexis] is virtue’.47 O’Connor suggests that we think 
of these two aspects of virtue as two different perspectives: ‘the perspective of simple virtue 
                                                 
45 MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 108. 
46 NE 1177b32; 1178a9. 
47 NE 1130a11-13. 
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focusses on what sort of psychic state (hexis) a particular virtue is,48 while the perspective of 
relational virtue focuses on how a given psychic state manifests itself in community life with 
other people’.49 Using a medical analogy, he proposes that the perspective of simple virtue be 
thought of as aetiological, referring to the underlying causes of the illness, whereas the 
perspective of relational virtue is symptomological, referring to its manifestations. A failure 
in particular justice can be viewed from an aetiological perspective where it reveals a 
disordered hexis, a misorientation towards wealth and honour;50 from a symptomological 
perspective, on the other hand, it is manifested in a breach of the community. Just as the vices 
corresponding to each of the individual virtues result in a breach of the community, and 
should therefore be proscribed by the law, so universal justice as law-abidingness can be said 
to be complete virtue because possession of all the simple virtues are necessary for 
flourishing community life. There is therefore no conflict between justice and the other 
virtues: on the contrary, where justice is present, the community remains intact.51 We shall be 
returning to this idea that the flourishing community is a whole whose integrity is maintained 
by justice in the final section of this chapter when we consider a theological interpretation of 
Aristotle’s justice. 
2.1.4. Problem 4: The problem of motive       
Finally, as we noted in the context of our second problem, the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist 
must explain the fact that, in contrast to the other virtues, justice (in both its senses) has all 
the appearance of a rule-bound activity.  In its universal sense, justice is law-abidingness, and 
particular justice is activity according to a principle of just distribution fixed by the state, so 
that the mean in the latter case is only a ‘sort of a mean’.52 If the exercise of the virtue of 
justice is essentially a rule-bound activity, how then can it be situated in a VE theory? In fact, 
is it really a virtue at all in the Aristotelian sense of the term? And if justice is law-
abidingness, and the law is derived from human convention, then how do we make sense of 
moral motivation? If the laws of a state are not accepted as good in themselves, with their 
basis in some form of natural law, for example, or in a transcendent reality such as a divine 
                                                 
48 This is the perspective taken by Aristotle for all the moral virtues discussed in Books III and IV. O’Connor, 
Aetiology, 142. 
49 O’Connor, Aetiology, 138. The law in a good constitution will aim at the common good of the polis. 
50 This can explain why pleonexia appears to derive from multiple motives. 
51 O’Connor, Aetiology, 139-48. 
52 NE 1131a15.  
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being or one of Plato’s forms, why should obedience be choice-worthy at all? How could the 
law move us to action in the moral sense, and not simply through necessity? If Aristotle’s 
justice is to function in a CVE theory, it is essential to formulate some kind of response to 
this most thorny of problems. 
Firstly, we might attempt to understand how Aristotle conceives of the rules of justice. 
Although Aristotle does seem to believe in a natural justice, as the justice which would 
characterise the best kind of polis,53 and that there are certain types of actions which are 
intrinsically bad, and would be prohibited by any virtuous legislator,54 he admits that, in 
practice, there is no universally held formulation.55 Nevertheless, universal justice as 
conformity with the law was complete virtue to Aristotle, and so the problems the neo-
Aristotelian needs to consider are, firstly, how to understand justice as a virtue if it is 
essentially a matter of adhering to rules, and secondly, how such an understanding of justice 
generates moral motivation. 
In an attempt to solve this problem, we might consider what happens if the law produces 
conflict at the level of the particular. At this point we again find that the virtue of phronēsis is 
crucial. Even though the origin of justice is in rules, phronēsis is not a rule-bound activity, 
but depends on an adequate conception of the good, according to which the phrominos will 
act. For example, the just man, who is also a man of practical rationality, will not agree to 
return a weapon to a deranged individual, even though he has a legal right to it.56 This 
decision is not rule-based, but requires both the virtue of justice and of phronēsis, virtues 
which are acquired in parallel over a lifetime, firstly through education, then by habitual 
virtuous activity.57  
                                                 
53
 NE 1134b18-1135a5.   
54 Among his examples are adultery, theft and murder; concerning these a mean does not apply (NE 1107a8-14). 
55 NE 1134b29-30. Since ethics, to Aristotle’s mind, in an inexact science, the fact that universal justice was 
law-abidingness does not mean that we should consider the rules of justice to be universals; as already noted, the 
‘universals’ contained in the theoretical sciences could not be expected in the human sciences (ethics and 
politics). See n. 17. 
56 See Plato, Republic, 331c-332a. 
57 One first learns the rules of distribution, and how to apply them in simple cases, then how to determine what 
is just in more complex situations not covered by the original rules. However, it might be wondered if there is an 
element of circularity here: no one can be practically rational who is not just, since moral virtue is required to set 
the end in the first place. Equally, no one can be just who is not practically rational. So how can the procedure 
get started? Alasdair MacIntyre’s explanation is useful: neither justice nor phronēsis ‘come first’; rather, both 
are acquired together, the virtuous person gradually learning ‘to correct each in the light of the other, moving 
dialectically between them’. Whose Justice?, 118.         
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But is the argument that justice ultimately depends on phronesis rather than on rules 
convincing enough to substantiate its claim to be a virtue which could underpin a CVE 
theory? The neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist might be in a stronger position if she argues that, 
rather than being grounded in the law, justice is grounded in the teleological framework 
which circumscribes the good of the community, and the law simply reflects that framework. 
The good therefore would remain prior to the right, and theory of justice remain compatible 
with virtue ethics. One promising route to the understanding of the nature of such a 
teleological framework is via Aristotle’s discussion of friendship. It is to that discussion that 
we shall now turn and it will be suggested that Aristotle conceived of friendship as the 
ground of the habits and practices required for justice. Moreover, friendship supplies a 
motive to just acts which justice alone cannot, if justice is understood to be derived from 
convention. 
2.1.5.  From justice to friendship: a proposed resolution 
We have seen that for Aristotle, justice is the means by which the political community aims 
at the good of the community. But we also discovered difficulties in the explanation of the 
ground of, and motive to, justice. How might the concept of friendship allow resolution of 
these difficulties?  
In the Ethics Aristotle states: ‘Between friends there is no need for justice, but people who 
are just still need the quality of friendship; and indeed, friendliness is considered to be justice 
in the fullest sense’.58 While it is not entirely clear what Aristotle meant by ‘justice in the 
fullest sense’, one plausible interpretation is that he viewed friendship as the more 
fundamental concept. Friendship is usually considered one of the most necessary of life’s 
goods, for no one, whether rich or poor, old or young, would surely choose to live without 
friends. And the particular conception of friendship which Aristotle had in mind, was not 
only necessary but also a splendid or noble (kalos) thing in itself.59 Although friendly 
relationships can be based on advantage or pleasure, the basis of a perfect friendship is 
admiration of the intrinsic good qualities of the friend. Only friendships based on virtuous 
character will seek the good of the other for the sake of the other, and not for the sake of 
                                                 
58 NE 1155a26-29. Aristotle’s extended discussion of friendship is found in NE Books VIII and IX. The 
corresponding virtue is friendliness. 
59 NE 1155a3-30. 
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some advantage.60 And in such friendships, the friends are not only good in themselves but 
‘wish good for the other qua good’.61 Perfect friendship requires perfect virtue and so perfect 
justice. As such friends are bound together in the common pursuit of the good, so too will the 
citizens of the ideal state, and so Aristotle observes that lawgivers appear to attach more 
importance to friendship than to justice, presenting it as a model to emulate; indeed, 
friendship can be regarded as ‘the bond of the state’.62 To MacIntyre, the reason for this is 
clear: ‘Justice is the virtue of rewarding desert and of repairing failures in rewarding desert 
within an already constituted community; friendship is required for that initial constitution’.63  
Before we can suggest how friendship could ground the habits and practices required for 
justice, we must try to understand how Aristotle conceived of the relation between the two 
concepts. In seeking clarification on this, we will draw on an idea of Delba Winthrop. She 
suggests that while he declares justice to be the overarching virtue, it was Aristotle’s 
intention to present virtuous friendship as the overarching good of his ethical theory. By 
grounding justice in virtuous friendship, Aristotle sought to demonstrate that political 
problems can only be truly solved ‘in the spirit of friendship, trust and goodwill, not in the 
spirit of punitive justice or even impartiality’.64 Rather than simply supplement justice, 
friendship in a sense transcends it and provides a basis to the law.  
So how might an appeal to friendship answer the problems we noted with Aristotle’s theory 
concerning the ground of justice and the lack of a convincing account of moral motivation? If 
justice is simply derived from convention and not from universal pre-existing principles, 
what moves us to choose justice apart from fear of the consequences of acting otherwise, or a 
sense of duty which acknowledges its social necessity? Can friendship supply the missing 
motive? 
As we discussed in the last chapter, Aristotle believed that the human telos was eudaimonia, 
or the flourishing life, and that virtue was both instrumental to it and constitutive of it. If 
                                                 
60 NE 1156b7-36. Aristotle’s term for friendship here is φιλία, but since this term refers to a wide range of 
relationships, it is sometimes better simply translated ‘relationship’. See Hughes, Guidebook to Aristotle, 168.  
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 NE 1156b7-9.   
62 NE 1155a23-26. 
63 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 156. 
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 Delba Winthrop, “Aristotle and Theories of Justice.” The American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978): 
1201-16, 1212. Winthrop believes that Aristotle felt all theories of justice, including his own, to be ultimately 
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friendship, construed as perfect friendship or the friendship of the virtuous, is the overarching 
good for Aristotle, and justice, as the overarching virtue, is required for the constitution and 
maintenance of this good, then we have a relation which not only fits in with Aristotle’s 
conception of the telos, but we may also have an answer to the question of motivation. As a 
realisation of the overarching human good, perfect friendship provides a picture of the 
flourishing life. Human flourishing requires relationships which not only provide pleasure, 
but also the opportunity for mutual dependence. Moreover, as we saw previously, a virtuous 
person will not simply aim to be just for the sake of justice alone, but will aim to be just for 
the sake of the kalon. If, following Winthrop, we conceive of the kalon as friendship, then 
justice will aim at friendship. And if, as we are arguing, we conceive of friendship as a 
picture of the flourishing life, we see that justice as law-abidingness becomes not only 
instrumental to and constitutive of friendship, but also finds its justification there. This 
conception of ethics is teleological because the good of friendship is prior to any right 
stipulated by the rules of justice. There are no rules for friendship. And the motive to be just 
does not come from justice alone, but from the transcending good of friendship, within which 
there is a natural motive to seek the good of the other and so act rightly (or justly) towards 
that other. And so, we have a resolution to the problem of both the ground of and the 
motivation to justice. The virtue of justice flows from the good of friendship, and so is 
consistent with how virtue is understood in a virtue ethical theory. Understanding justice 
along these lines not only allows it to be accepted as a virtue according to CVE theory, but 
also is substantive enough to satisfy our second condition of adequacy in our critique of CVE. 
Although this might seem to be a theoretically satisfying destination, one difficulty remains. 
While Aristotle does believe perfect friendship to be a real possibility, and not simply a 
utopian ideal, he also admits that, although one can be friendly towards fellow citizens in 
general, perfect friendship is rare; it is simply not feasible to be on intimate terms with a large 
number of people.65 And since perfect justice is only manifested in perfect friendship, perfect 
justice is also rare. Where does this leave the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist who is now 
hoping that friendship could ground her theory? Is she in a better position than the Platonist 
who is searching for the Forms?   
2.2. Concluding thoughts  
                                                 
65 NE Book IX, x. 
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The aim of this chapter was to arrive at a conception of the virtue of justice which is 
substantive enough to be put to use in a VE theory. Noting that there were two theoretical 
options on the CVE table, we began with a study of Aristotle. We found that most of the 
problems inherent in his theory could be answered without damaging the usefulness of his 
framework for the would-be neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist. But there was one which was 
less easy to solve. And that was the difficulty in accounting for the ground of justice and the 
motivation to justice. Although help was found in the concept of friendship, it was observed 
that even this answer was not completely satisfactory, since perfect friendship was as rare as 
perfect justice. To base a theory on such an elusive good seems to contradict Aristotle’s own 
insistence that ethics be practical, and cast doubts on the sufficiency of a neo-Aristotelian VE 
theory.  
Perhaps we should be unsurprised by this. If ethics and politics are limited by imperfect 
human nature, then any normative theory based in philosophical naturalism seems bound to 
be inadequate. We shall return to these thoughts in the final section of this chapter, when we 
consider how Aristotelian ideas of justice and friendship align with theistic conceptions. But 
we shall now turn from Aristotle to the second theoretical option on the table, to the thought 
of David Hume, for doubts about the success of Aristotle’s theory of justice have led certain 
CVE thinkers to turn in Hume’s direction for theoretical insight.66 Our next step, therefore, is 
to assess Hume’s attempt to resolve the difficulties inherent in the conception of justice as a 
virtue. 
3. David Hume  
David Hume’s moral philosophy was considerably influenced by the moral sentimentalism of 
Francis Hutcheson. Like Hutcheson, Hume believed that moral judgements are not formed by 
reason, as had been argued by Thomas Hobbes for example. On the contrary, reason is, to 
borrow Alasdair MacIntyre’s phrase, ‘practically inert’,67 and as such it is neither capable of 
generating moral ideas nor of providing the motivational force which morality requires.68 
                                                 
66 The most prominent contemporary virtue ethicist who follows Humean sentimentalism is Michael Slote. But 
see also the work of Annette Baier.    
67 MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 285. 
68 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects; and, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (eds. Thomas H. Green, and 
Thomas H. Grose; 2 vols.; London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1874 [hereafter T]), 3.1.1, 233-246. See also 
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (ed. Peter 
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Since Hume believes that it is only feeling or sentiment which can move us to action, he 
famously declares that reason ‘is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions’.69 According 
to Hume, people are born with a moral sense which both motivates them to benevolent action 
and also approves of such actions; in this way, morality is grounded in human nature.70 Hume 
was less of an optimist about human nature than Hutcheson, for whom the supreme virtue 
was universal benevolence.71 But, like Hutcheson, he rejected Hobbes’s claim that every 
action was performed out of self-interest.72 It cannot be disputed, he says,  
 
that there is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of 
friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along 
with the elements of the wolf and the serpent.73   
 
 
Hume describes virtue as that quality of an agent’s action or character which ‘gives to a 
spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation’.74 When one person is affected by a passion, 
say pain or pleasure, an observer can also be affected by the same passion. This transference 
of sentiment operates through the mechanism of sympathy, and is made possible because of a 
shared human nature. And so, for Hume the ground of the virtues, and by extension of 
morality itself, lies in the transference of the sentiment of approbation. And, crucially, this 
transferal of sentiment supplies moral motivation, so that the merit of a virtuous action lies 
solely in its virtuous motives.75 It is this aspect of Hume’s theory which leads to his being 
                                                 
H. Nidditch, from the Lewis A. Selby-Bigge edition; 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [hereafter EPM]), 
Appx.1, 285-6. 
69 T 2.3.3, 195. Hume did, however, accept that reason had an instrumental use in the guiding of our desires 
towards their proper goals and in setting those goals in the first place (T 3.1.1, 237).   
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  T 2.1.7, 93.  For a similar statement from Hutcheson, see Francis Hutcheson, Treatise IV. “Illustrations of the 
Moral Sense”, in Francis Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings (ed. R. S. Downie; Everyman's Library; London: 
Dent, 1994), Section IV, 131 [original italics].   
71 Hutcheson, “Illustrations”, 144: ‘the most perfect virtue consists in the calm, unpassionate benevolence, rather 
than in particular affection’. [Original italics] 
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 EPM 5, 1-2, 215-19. 
73 EPM 9.1, 271. 
74
 EPM Appx I. 289 [original italics]. Vice has the contrary effect on the same sensibility; the response is the 
sentiment of disapprobation. Note that approbation is always ‘suitably qualified by considerations of 
impartiality, generality, and distance in time and place’. David Fate Norton, “Hume, human nature, and the 
foundations of morality”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy; 
Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 165. See T 3.3.1. 
75 T 3.2.1, 252-3. See T 2.1.1 for Hume’s description of the mechanism of sympathy. 
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described as a virtue ethicist.76 But our particular interest just now is how justice fits into 
Hume’s scheme: how can he account for justice’s status as a virtue if virtuous activity is 
evaluated on the basis of motives? 
3.1. Hume’s distinction 
In Book III of the Treatise, Hume draws a distinction between natural and artificial virtues. It 
is the expression of the natural virtues which give rise to the moral sentiments such as 
approbation which, as we have seen, Hume holds to be the primary moral judgments. Hume 
believes that these virtues are innate, and gives examples of love for one’s children, 
meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation.77 The artificial virtues, on 
the other hand, lead to judgments which are secondary in the sense that they are derived both 
from primary moral judgments as well as reasoning about matters of fact. These virtues are 
not innate. Justice according to Hume, belongs to this latter category.78 Many have argued 
against Hume’s distinction, not least because justice does not seem to be a virtue at all, even 
in Hume’s own terms.    
By ‘artificial’, Hume does not mean that he believed justice to be essentially ‘unnatural’, 
since he held that the human conventions or rules which give rise to it have their foundations 
in nature, and are in that sense discoverable and ‘natural’. Rules of justice had not been 
required when society was composed of simpler family units, but as society became more 
complex, it became necessary to formulate conventions in order to oversee the possession of 
external goods and combat man’s naturally selfish condition. The idea of justice was 
therefore invoked to regulate the disposition of property and address the problems which 
property ownership creates.79 To Hume’s mind, then, the origin of justice can be traced to the 
origin of property, and the rules governing it can be considered natural in the sense that their 
discovery is a function of our human nature.80  
                                                 
76 See, for example, Slote, Morals from Motives, vii-ix, 8, 20. 
77 T 3.3.1, 338. 
78 T 3.2.1, 252. Other examples are fidelity to promises, chastity, modesty and allegiance to one’s government. 
79 Hume defines these problems as ‘selfishness and limited generosity’ along with a scarcity of goods in 
comparison to the desires of men. T 3.2.2, 266-7. 
80 On this point see John P. Wright, Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature": An Introduction (Cambridge 
Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts; Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 265. 
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Hume’s difficulties with the concept of justice as a virtue now become apparent. Central to 
his theory, as we have already pointed out, is the idea that the moral character of an action is 
dependent on the motive. And yet the motive behind the establishment of the conventions of 
justice was self-interest. How, then, can justice be a virtue according to Hume’s own 
requirements? He must prove that justice has a moral significance; that is, that the ground of 
justice lies in sentiment and not in reason. To this end, he argues that over time people came 
to appreciate the other-regarding aspect of justice and saw that the rules of justice were good 
for human society just as infringements of the rules were detrimental. In time, sentiments 
were influenced accordingly and the rules are approved of, even when contrary to self-
interest. 
 
‘Tis the voluntary convention and artifice of men, which makes the first interest take 
place; and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be consider’d as artificial. After 
that interest is once establish’d and acknowledg’d, the sense of morality in the 
observance of these rules follows naturally, and of itself.81    
 
Although birthed in pragmatism, justice emerges later as a fully-fledged virtue. Hume 
believes that sympathy is capable of overriding our selfish interests, which were the original 
motives for the establishing of justice, causing us to feel approbation towards those actions 
which are in the public interest just because they maintain the system of justice.82 
Nevertheless, he does admit that there may be occasions when individual acts of justice may 
be contrary to the public good and it is only the scheme as a whole which must be considered 
to be advantageous.83 
The question which interests the virtue ethicist is whether moral sentimentalism has the 
necessary explanatory power to account for the uniqueness of justice as a virtue. If not, Hume 
cannot truly be considered the virtue ethicist which Slote, for example, would have him be. 
So, can his distinction stand? Perhaps the reason why Hume begins his discussion of the 
virtues with a lengthy account of the artificial ones is an indication that he was aware of the 
difficulties of situating justice in his sympathy-based account.84 He admits that we are more 
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likely to feel pain rather than pleasure if we witness someone repaying a loan to a ‘miser and 
seditious bigot’, and yet, though contrary to the public interest, we call such an act just, and 
acknowledge the importance of justice in our morality.85 Are problematic cases such as these 
convincingly answered by Hume, or must we abandon the idea that the virtue of justice can 
be explained and justified by Hume’s moral sentimentalism? 
3.1.1. Can Hume’s distinction stand? 
Ken O’Day believes that Hume’s distinction can stand if it is correctly interpreted and that 
there are two ways to interpret Hume. Either the conventions influence the evaluating 
sentiments or they influence the motives. Since the former interpretation cannot account for 
the opposing sentiments which create the problematic cases, O’Day argues that Hume 
intended that his distinction be understood in terms of motives:86 it is the motives associated 
with the artificial virtues, and not the sentiments, which are derived from convention. Justice 
is not a virtue because it promotes self-interest, as Hobbes believed. Justice is a virtue 
because a virtuous person will sympathise with the public interest, and so will be motivated 
to act in accordance with it. These motives will override any opposing sentiments, such as 
those which appear in the problematic cases. Justice is a virtue because the motive to perform 
just acts is virtuous, even though, in contradistinction to the natural virtues, there may be no 
sympathy with the results of every individual act. 
But, even if we accept that this ‘motive’ interpretation of Hume is helpful in explaining the 
origin of the motive to justice, does Hume’s sentimentalist account of virtue possess 
sufficient explanatory power to account for the motive behind justice? Slote is less than 
convinced; he asks how sentiment alone can produce the sense of duty or obligation or 
conscience which is usually deemed necessary for the working of justice?87 Moreover, while 
sympathy may seem a plausible mechanism for the operation of the natural virtues, it is less 
clear how it operates through the artificial virtues where the persons involved are unlikely to 
be known to us personally. So, while Slote approves of Hume’s position on the primacy of 
motive in the determining of the moral status of an action, he questions whether this is 
sufficient to explain the artificial virtues where the good motive appears to originate in a 
                                                 
85 T 3.2.2, 269. 
86 O'Day, “Hume's Distinction”, 132. 
87 For example, he asks what stops the person from stealing if he has stronger reasons or motives to steal than 
not to steal if not a sense of duty or conscience? Slote, “Justice as a Virtue”, 3. 
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conscientious desire to do what is right in terms of duty or obligation. Slote summarises the 
problem: 
 
According to Hume, if I return what I owe to the seditious bigot, my only just motive 
is the desire to do what is right or obligatory, but, in that case the morally good 
motive that is supposed (according to Hume’s virtue ethics) to explain the rightness or 
goodness of returning what I owe to the seditious bigot, already makes essential 
reference to the rightness or goodness or obligatoriness of doing so.88 
 
And this seems hopelessly circular: the motive needs an account of rightness but the account 
of rightness is supposed to be grounded in the motive. In attempt to rescue moral 
sentimentalism’s justification of justice as a virtue, Slote turns to the ethics of care. The next 
stage of our investigation, then, is to follow Slote down this new route and assess whether his 
novel combination of virtue and care does enough work to rescue sentimentalist accounts of 
VE.  
3.2.  The virtue of justice and an ethics of care 
Slote believes that if an ethic of caring, conceived in terms of motivation, is paired with an 
agent-based virtue-ethical approach,89 it has sufficient resources not only to explain how 
justice can be understood as a virtue, but also to provide an account of social justice. When 
the notion of care is taken to be the standard of moral goodness, the ‘fundamental, intuitive 
judgment from which other moral judgments derive’,90 it is conceptually prior to any deontic 
notion such as rightness or wrongness, and so becomes compatible with virtue ethics. Care, 
by definition, seeks to promote the well-being of the other, and few would deny that the act 
of caring is an admirable act. But Slote is making a much stronger assertion. He claims that 
the intentionality intrinsic to care overrides any requirement to appeal to ‘high-falutin 
ethical/metaphysical assumptions about whether or when an increase in people’s well-being 
is a good thing from the standpoint of the universe’.91   
                                                 
88 Slote, “Justice as a Virtue”, 5 [original italics]. For the problems facing virtue ethics theory over the 
justification of right action, see Chapter 5. 
89 An agent-based approach to VE views the moral status of acts as ‘entirely derivative from independent and 
fundamental aretaic (as opposed to deontic) ethical characterizations of motives, character traits, or individuals’. 
Slote, Morals from Motives, 5. 
90 Michael Slote, “The Justice of Caring.” Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no. 01 (1998): 171-95, 173. 
91 Ibid., 173-4. Slote clearly wishes to maintain his distance from Aristotelian, as well as utilitarian, theories. 
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Slote draws on the work of Nel Noddings who first began to develop the concept of caring as 
a normative theory in its own right.92 Arguing against both the deontologist and the 
consequentialist, she asserts that: ‘an ethic of caring locates morality primarily in the pre-act 
consciousness of the one caring’.93 It is the motive which is all-important for Noddings, and 
not just any motive, but motive which is grounded in care. However, an obvious objection is 
that, on such a basis, an act might be deemed morally ‘right’ if the motives are good, and it is 
surely possible to think of cases where harm may result from misguided ‘good’ motives. A 
moral framework detached from reason, or at least from phronesis, as an ethics of care aims 
to be, appears to struggle to provide an account of virtue or motives substantive enough to 
ground a moral theory.94 Slote admits these problems and proposes that a solution can be 
found in the combining of an ethic of caring with his own agent-based virtue-ethics.  
In his most recent work, Slote maintains his connection with Hume by basing his moral 
theory on the sentiment of approval, transferred by the mechanism of empathy (his 
replacement term for Hume’s ‘sympathy’).95 It is the empathetic experience of warmth or 
coldness which ‘fixes’ moral terms a priori.96 We approve of ‘fully kind actions’ and so 
‘fully kind actions are right or good’,97 whereas injustice is a result of lack of empathy. Slote 
claims that even utilitarianism yields intuitively to sentimentalism in certain situations: ‘we 
tend to feel more empathy and empathetic concern for those whose situation or condition is 
bad than for those whose situation or condition is merely not wonderful’.98 And so, even on a 
utilitarian calculus where more good might be done by helping the latter, we prefer to help 
the former. What is more, he claims that a sentimentalist account of social justice can be 
understood in agent-based terms; when individual, moral agents in a society are acting justly, 
                                                 
92 Carol Gilligan, however, is often credited with being the originator of the idea of an ethics of care. See Carol 
Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1982).   
93 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics & Moral Education (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 24, 28. 
94 Hume, as we saw, did not entirely reject reason, but assigned it an instrumental role. See n. 69. 
95 Michael A. Slote, Moral Sentimentalism (New York: OUP, 2009), 4. Unfortunately his notion of empathy 
seems rather loose, fluctuating between the idea of an involuntary mechanism, as in Hume, and an act of the 
will. Ibid., 15-17. 
96 Ibid., vii. And see chapter 4. He describes his reference‐fixing account of moral terminology as ‘semi‐
Kripkean’.    
97 Slote, Moral Sentimentalism, 75. 
98 Slote, Moral Sentimentalism, 131. It might be noted, however, that Slote also suggests that marginal utility 
could be invoked to justify progressive taxation within a care-ethical theory. Ibid., 129. 
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that is, grounded in and guided by an ethic of caring, then the ‘ethical soul’ of that society as 
a whole will be just.99 And so Slote concludes that, assuming the legislators follow suit, a 
society operating according to an ethics of care would exhibit a higher degree of social justice 
than utilitarianism could ever hope to produce. 
3.3.  Concluding thoughts 
Slote turned to the ethics of care in the hope of finding an answer to the problems in Hume’s 
sentimentalist account of the virtue of justice. He is optimistic that an ethics of care, 
combined with his own agent-based virtue ethics, can not only ground social justice, but also 
provide an account of motivation to justice. While one could be convinced by intuition alone 
that care has a priority over justice in the family situation, it is less obvious that an ethics 
based on care alone has adequate theoretical resources for grounding a normative theory.100 
In the end it is doubtful that Slote’s sentimentalist account of the virtue of justice is any better 
than Hume’s own. His ‘semi‐Kripkean’ reference‐fixing account of moral terminology via 
the mechanism of empathy, insofar as it relates to justice, seems merely to land him back in 
the ‘Humean circle’ from which he was originally trying to break free.101 He admits that it is 
easier to empathise with those ‘near and dear to us’, and due to perceptual immediacy, the 
victim suffering abuse on our doorstep might arouse more empathy than the starving child on 
the other side of the world, but he offers no solution to this most pressing question of 
impartiality.102 His theory relies on a highly optimistic view of human nature, leaning more 
towards Hutcheson than Hume. And lastly, he seems unsure about the exact relation between 
justice and care; the virtue of justice seems somehow to emerge spontaneously from caring. It 
is therefore doubtful that Slote’s sentimentalist account does enough work to explain why 
caring can ground a normative virtue ethical theory. A more reasonable conclusion, and 
perhaps more sustainable position, would seem to be to accept care as a background value 
within a wider theoretical framework of justice. In the end it seems that Aristotle’s robust 
                                                 
99 Slote, “The Justice of Caring”, 193. 
100 For an attempt to advocate the priority of caring without the support of VE theory, see Virginia Held, The 
Ethics of Care Personal, Political, and Global (New York: OUP, 2005).   
101
 As we saw the circularity arises because the motive needs an account of rightness but the account of 
rightness is supposed to be grounded in the motive. 
102 Slote, “Justice as a Virtue”, 9; Moral Sentimentalism, 133. It might be noted that television appeals have 
been hugely successful in closing the gap of perceptual immediacy. 
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account of friendship does considerably more explanatory work than the rather nebulous 
notion of care.  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the secular teleological theories which have 
been examined struggle to generate a substantive account of either the ground of, or the 
motive behind, the virtue of justice. And so, we will turn now to theological conceptions of 
justice to see if they might shed light on the place of the virtue of justice in a virtue ethical 
theory. Can we explain the virtue of justice and its relation to the telos within the framework 
of a theistic virtue ethics? 
4.  The virtue of justice and theism 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
Since the aim of this thesis is not simply to conduct a critical analysis of CVE, but also to 
attempt the construction of a theistic version of VE theory, the objective of this next section 
will be to bring some theological and biblical reflection to bear on the preceding analysis. 
How can justice be understood as a virtue theologically speaking? And how might a 
theological conception of justice be situated in a theistic virtue ethics? We have seen that the 
idea of justice as a virtue has a long history which can be traced back to Plato’s Republic and 
Aristotle’s Ethics. This notion of justice as the fixed disposition to render to each his due not 
only became a core feature of Roman Law,103 but was also accepted by the medieval 
theologians.104 But it has also become clear from the preceding discussion that CVE theories, 
whether they follow Aristotle or Hume, have difficulties explaining not only the foundation 
of justice, but also how its apparently rule-bound character allows it to be seen as a virtue at 
all. In the light of our overall aim, then, we shall now consider whether a theological 
conception of justice, and in particular one consistent with the text of the OT, can address 
these difficulties. It will be argued that there is a way of interpreting the OT concept of justice 
alongside the associated concept of righteousness which can do just that, and which offers 
hope that a theistic VE theory can be successfully constructed on an Aristotelian framework. 
As with the results from the previous chapter, the theistic version of the virtue of justice will 
be ultimately tested against the book of Amos in the concluding chapter. 
                                                 
103 See for example the Digest and Institutes of Justinian.  
104 Aquinas, for example, defines justice as ‘a habit (habitus), whereby a man renders to each one his due (jus 
suum) with constant and perpetual will’. ST II-II, 58, 1. 
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4.2.  Justice in the OT 
What can we understand about the virtue of justice from the OT texts? At first blush, the OT 
portrayal of justice might seem incompatible with CVE theory. More often than not the term 
justice appears to refer to a principle or norm of conduct, and not specifically to a virtue.105 It 
is worth repeating that according to the conditions of adequacy of a VE theory which we laid 
out in Chapter 1, the good must be prior to the right, and so morality thus understood is not 
grounded in rules but in a concept of the good. We have therefore been calling those theories 
which understand virtues in terms of rules ‘virtue theory’, to distinguish them from the 
present project which concerns virtue ethics. The challenge before the biblical theist who is 
drawn to virtue ethics is to explain how biblical justice fits into the teleological framework 
which we investigated in the previous chapter, and on that basis to decide whether it might 
still be possible to construct a theistic version of virtue ethics which could stand as an 
adequate normative theory in its own right.106 
If we remember our conclusion from the previous chapter that the human telos can be 
understood from a theistic perspective as relationship with God, and that the virtues are both 
instrumental to and constitutive of that relationship, then we have a framework for 
understanding the relation between telos and virtue. But does this theistic framework work 
for justice? Rather than abandon the idea of perfect justice, as Aristotle arguably seems to do, 
the theist can look expectantly to the character of her God, whose justice, according to 
classical theism, is perfect. In the light of perfect justice, human justice can only ever be a 
pale reflection, but it does have a standard at which to aim.107 Moreover, if we follow 
Aristotle’s conception of friendship as ‘justice in the fullest sense’, then we may have a way 
of understanding justice, as the OT describes it, in a virtue ethical way. For if it can be argued 
that friendship understood as a relationship with God is more fundamental than the concept of 
justice, then the theist may have a way to address Aristotle’s problems concerning the ground 
of, and motive to, the virtue of justice. 
                                                 
105 In fact, there is no equivalent to the English word ‘virtue’ or to the Greek aretē in the OT.       
106 Whether any virtue ethics, secular or theological, can in fact ‘go it alone’ without recourse to principles of 
conduct is a moot point to which we will return in Chapter Five. 
107 We shall consider more fully the character of God as it is portrayed in the OT, and the issues it raises in the 
following chapter. 
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The OT texts reveal God as not only Lord of creation and Lord of history, but also as one 
who has entered a covenant relationship with his people. Within this relationship, he is 
described as faithful, just and righteous.108 And if the theist has good reason to view justice, 
not simply as one among many of God’s virtues, but as his ‘chief attribute’,109 then she might 
plausibly consider God’s justice in Aristotelian terms. Moreover, not only do the Psalms 
attest to the fact that God both loves110 and does justice,111 but they also declare justice to be 
the foundation of his very throne.112 And so, if we think of the statement, ‘God is just’, not 
simply as a description of his character, or even the fact that justice is rooted in that character, 
but also that justice is the very ground of God’s sovereign reign over his creation, we have 
the beginnings of a substantive enough conception of the virtue of justice to put to work in an 
ethical theory. However, we still need an explanation of what justice actually is, and why it is 
choice-worthy for human beings to be just. Why should one move from the descriptive ‘God 
is just’ to the normative ‘human beings ought to be just’,113 and why are we motivated to be 
just and act justly? To investigate this further, our next step will be to consider the relevant 
Hebrew terms. We shall begin with the word which is usually rendered by ‘justice’, and then 
consider the related term ‘righteousness’.  
4.2.1. Root špṭ    
The standard Hebrew noun for ‘justice’ is mišpāṭ.114 The root špṭ signifies judicial activity of 
all types, from law-making to arbitration to the pronouncement and execution of sentence. 
The idea underlying all these activities is to put right what has gone wrong, and so the mišpāṭ 
of the orphan and the widow is both their rightful case against oppression, and the judgment 
                                                 
108 In Chapter 6 we shall contemplate more fully the idea that Yahweh can be considered a God of justice. But 
we should note here that the very idea that there may be ‘a biblical conception’ of justice relies on the 
presupposition that scripture embodies unifying themes. See the Introduction for a statement of methodology for 
reading and interpreting the biblical text.     
109 Stephen Charles Mott, Biblical Ethics and Social Change (New York: OUP, 1982), 60. 
110 Ps 33:5; Is. 61:8; cf. Ps 11:7. 
111 Ps 103:6.   
112 Ps 97:1, 2 cf. 89:14 
113 The question of the relation between the justice of God and human justice will be examined in greater detail 
in the following chapter where we consider the idea of imitation. 
114 For a useful survey of mišpāṭ in the Hebrew Bible, see Bo Johnson, “ט  פְשִׁמ” TDOT, IX:86-98. See also Peter 
Enns, “ט  פְשִׁמ” NIDOTTE, 2:1142-44. 
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given in their favour.115 In its theological use, mišpāṭ can refer to the process of settling a 
dispute between God and the people, and also to the final judgment where God acts as šōpēṭ 
(judge).116 
The idea that mišpāṭ is an active concept is often reinforced by the use of metaphors, some of 
which are very vivid.117 The Hebrew concept is therefore quite distinct from the notion of an 
abstract principle which is often associated with the English word ‘justice’. And as Bo 
Johnson notes, even when mišpāṭ does refer to a general sense of what is right, the verbs and 
metaphors used to express it imply activity.118 The activity of mišpāṭ is connected to the 
related concept of ‘righteousness’: ‘righteousness’, as we shall see shortly, refers to activity 
or behaviour conforming to a standard, and mišpāṭ refers to the action which is called for in 
order to restore righteousness in the wake of unrighteous action. mišpāṭ functions much like 
the retributive sense of Aristotle’s particular justice, and, like Aristotle’s justice, it implies 
and relies on a pre-existing standard. 
4.2.2. Root ṣdq          
‘Justice’ and ‘righteousness’ in Hebrew refer to related ideas, and are often used in 
parallel,119 but the terms are not synonymous. In contrast to the activity inherent in mišpāṭ, 
the Hebrew word for ‘righteousness’ (ṣedeq or ṣedāqâ)120, refers to a more static concept. It is 
a term which is much used but less easy to define. Where the root is found in Ancient Near 
Eastern writings, it lacks the forensic sense associated with špṭ, and simply conveys the idea 
of behaviour, action or character in conformity with some standard. This same sense is found 
in the Hebrew Bible: the ṣaddîq is the person who is righteous or who acts righteously. 
                                                 
115 In the plural, it can refer to a body of case law, and so The Book of the Covenant (Exod 21-23) is often 
referred to in Judaism as the mišpāṭîm. 
116 It might be noted that the OT judges (such as Samuel) were not just legal or religious figures but also military 
leaders, since putting right what had gone wrong was often thought to be achieved through battle. 
117 An excellent example of this is Amos 5:24. See also Isa 58; Jer 21:12, 22:3.  
118 Johnson, “ט  פְשִׁמ”, 93. 
119 When these two terms are found together, they form a hendiadys, and so have a single meaning. The usual 
translation of mišpāṭ ûṣedāqâ is ‘social justice’. 
120
 Although some scholars have attempted to make a semantic distinction between the two forms of this noun 
in the OT, David Reimer feels that any proposed distinction should derive from context rather than morphology, 
and that the terms are essentially interchangeable. For example, parallel passages in Ps 18 and 2 Sam 22 use 
different terms. David Reimer, “קדצ” NIDOTTE, 3:744-69, 746. However, a semantic distinction can be found 
in the Dead Sea Scrolls where ṣedeq refers to human activity, and ṣedāqâ to God’s saving acts. Ibid., 767. See 
also Wright, Old Testament Ethics, 255-6. 
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The nature of the standard or norm to which ṣdq must conform is rarely specified in the OT. 
Although there are occasions when the standard of righteousness is declared to be the law or 
commandments of Yahweh,121 more often it is merely implied and so can perhaps be 
understood as some type of natural law.122 Noah was described as a righteous man (ʾîš 
ṣaddîq), and blameless (tāmîm), long before the existence of any law or covenant.123 When 
Judah declared that Tamar was ‘more righteous’ than he was, he must have been appealing to 
some common standard of righteousness, albeit implied.124 Even in the ‘legal’ passages, there 
is not always a mention of explicit norms.125 
When the OT speaks of human ṣdq, then, it refers to character or behaviour which is ‘right’ 
according to some standard set by the community, and so this character or behaviour is that 
which conforms to the norms inherent in any given relationship. The relationship could be the 
one between the people of God, when ṣdq will most likely refer to social justice, or it could 
be between the people and God.126 When ṣdq is ascribed to God, ‘vindication’ or ‘salvation’ 
is often a better translation, since, in a theological frame of reference, ṣidqôt are the saving 
deeds or victories of Yahweh on behalf of an oppressed people with whom he is in a 
covenant relationship.127 When Yahweh acts in righteousness, he is not acting in conformity 
with some standard; his actions as righteous judge are simply a reflection of his just and 
righteous character. Thus, commenting on Ps 40:9-10, Hans-Joachim Kraus observes that 
Yahweh’s righteousness was ‘no norm, no principle of justice, but deed, bestowal of 
salvation, proof of his faithfulness of promise and partnership’.128 It should be noted that the 
                                                 
121 See, for example 2 Sam 22:21-25. 
122 Reimer, “קדצ”, 746, 750. 
123 Gen 6:9. 
124 Gen 38:26. See also 1 Sam 24:17. 
125
 For example, the prohibitions in Deut 16:19 against judges’ perverting of justice, showing partiality or 
taking bribes are stated as ‘simple moral principles that everyone should know’. Dale Patrick, Old Testament 
Law (London: SCM Press, 1986), 117. 
126 Amos, for example, uses ṣdq in the former sense, while Hosea leans more towards the latter. See Reimer, 
“קדצ”, 763. 
127 It is in this basis that the Psalmist pleads. e.g. 31:1, 5:8. See also Ps 24:5, 103:6.  
128
 Hans-Joachim Kraus, Psalms 1-59: A Commentary (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Publishing House, 
1988), 427. 
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OT does not portray human ṣdq as detached from divine ṣdq. The people will only know 
šālôm when human ṣdq is a reflection of divine ṣdq.129 
It is clear, then, that whether referring to the human or the divine, the idea behind ṣdq is a 
relational one, where ṣdq is fundamental to the maintenance of the relationship. But we are 
still faced with the Aristotelian problem that the virtues of justice and righteousness are 
essentially rule-bound notions, for even if we accept that these virtues are relational terms, it 
is norms which define the relationship, and how do norms supply a moral motive? Again, it is 
helpful to reiterate that this problem would not arise if we were not attempting to construct a 
virtue ethical theory; those (virtue) theories in which virtue is incidental to, rather than 
foundational to, the theory can happily accommodate the relation of virtues to rules. 
4.3.  OT justice and VE theory: a potential resolution 
In an attempt to resolve this, we shall now turn to the thought of Johannes Pedersen, whose 
discussion of righteousness and justice in the OT evokes surprising parallels with the thought 
of Plato and Aristotle.130 Pedersen understands ṣdq as a description of a healthy soul, 
meaning one which is in harmony and at peace. The righteous soul is therefore often referred 
to as tāmîm (‘whole’ or ‘blameless’),131 as well as yāšār or nākōaḥ (‘straight’ or ‘right’). 
Actions which proceed from such a soul will be righteous, for, as Pedersen explains: ‘to act 
rightly is not to act according to rules which are forced upon the man from without. The good 
man acts rightly because he acts in accordance with the nature of his soul’.132 Such a 
description might well appeal to a CVE theorist, even if the underlying covenant-based 
theology may not. Pedersen is committed to the concept of covenant, and he sees all 
relationships, whether within the family or community, or between God and human beings, as 
examples of covenant.133 The life of the soul is only possible within the covenant, within 
which it forms a link, and that link can only be maintained if the soul acts according to its 
nature. In words which sound distinctly Aristotelian, Pedersen writes: 
                                                 
129 We might think of the texts in Isaiah which emphasise the relation between ṣdq and šālôm; for example, Isa 
9:2-7[1-6]; 32:17-18; 48:18; 60:17. 
130 Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture I-II (London: OUP, 1926). 
131 Since the root tmm connotes wholeness or integrity, righteousness can be thought of as signifying a pure or 
‘undivided’ heart, with a single will; that is, a heart free from the ‘contaminating influence’ of conflicting wills. 
Ibid., 336-7.  
132 Ibid., 337-8. 
133 Ibid., 285 ff.1. 
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The common, as well as the individual soul, is a firmly constructed organism, where 
everyone holds his place. He holds his place according to the honour his soul 
acquires; and honour is identical with his ability to give and take. Justice consists in 
maintaining one’s own honour and that of others in giving and taking in accordance 
with the position occupied within the covenant. . . it gives every man his due and 
exactly as much as he can receive.134 
 
 
The individual soul maintains its integrity, or righteousness, by maintaining its link in the 
covenant. Justice is the mental disposition by which the peace of both the individual soul and 
the soul of the community is maintained. On the other hand, the perversion of justice, the 
bending of mišpāṭ, severs relationships thus disrupting the harmony on which the covenant 
depends, threatening both righteousness and peace and therefore the very life of the soul 
itself.135 Justice can therefore be seen as generating both a privilege and a claim; the weaker 
will have a claim against the stronger, whose position of privilege (and power) enables him to 
meet that claim. And so it can be seen that in a monarchy the righteousness and peace of the 
whole community depends on the righteousness of the king and his acting according to 
mišpāṭ. 
With Pedersen’s thought on biblical justice and righteousness in mind, we can return to the 
problems we discussed concerning Aristotle’s theory of justice to see whether a theistic 
perspective can clarify the notion of justice as a virtue within a VE theory. One problem we 
noted was that of self-other conflict. The non-communitarian Aristotelian might point to a 
possible tension between the civic virtue of justice and other, self-regarding, virtues. But, if 
the individual soul is linked to the covenant community, as Pedersen suggests, then justice 
maintains the self and the covenant simultaneously: ‘He who maintains the covenant 
maintains himself, because he forms a spiritual totality with those with whom he has a 
covenant’.136 This is essentially a theistic version of O’Connor’s argument that justice is a 
relational virtue which links the individual to the whole community and that injustice, as a 
misorientation of the soul, causes a breach in the community. 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 342-3. 
135 See, for example, 1 Sam 8:3 where Samuel’s sons perverted justice, and also Exod 23:6; Deut 16:19; 24:17; 
27:19. 
136 Ibid., 342. 
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A second problem was that justice had the appearance of being a rule-bound activity. But this 
problem is solved if we consider justice as action or character in accordance with the nature 
of a righteous soul, and the good of the righteous soul as the prior notion. We can also see 
parallels between Aristotle’s two senses of justice and that which we find in the OT. 
Particular justice finds a natural parallel in the concept of social justice (mišpāṭ ûṣedāqâ), 
while the idea that the role of mišpāṭ is to maintain the integrity of the community is reflected 
in Aristotle’s notion that universal justice is complete virtue. 
And lastly, this line of thinking may enable us to understand moral motivation. At this point it 
is useful to remember Aristotle’s conception of the relation between friendship and justice. 
While we argued that Aristotle sought to ground the (overarching) virtue of justice in the 
overarching good of friendship, we also saw that he acknowledged that perfect friendship was 
rare. Aristotle intended his ethical theory to be practical, and yet there appears to be a tension 
between his idea that friendship, conceived as ‘justice in the fullest sense’, is the overarching 
good in his ethical theory, and the empirical data that this good is rarely obtainable. Aristotle 
faces the problem common to any normative theory based in philosophical naturalism: ethics 
and politics are limited by imperfect human nature. However, if the theist can substitute the 
OT conception of the covenant relationship for Aristotle’s conception of friendship, it could 
be argued that the covenant relationship is more fundamental than the concept of justice, and 
indeed is ‘justice in the fullest sense’; the theist may then have a way to address Aristotle’s 
problem of the motive behind the virtue of justice.137  
We concluded in the last chapter that the human telos, or eudaimonia, could be understood 
from a theistic point of view as a relationship with God. We now question whether it is 
possible to substitute the Aristotelian conception of perfect friendship with the idea of 
relationship with God as the OT reveals him. A virtue ethicist might point out that the 
motivation to virtuous action in Aristotelian friendship can be explained by the fact that the 
friend will naturally seek the good of the other, and so will act rightly (or justly) towards that 
                                                 
137 Admittedly, the substitution does not involve equivalent ideas, for the covenant relationship between God 
and his people is conceived in the OT as one between Lord and vassal and therefore is fundamentally 
hierarchical: Aristotle’s idea of friendship, on the other hand, is a relationship between two perfectly virtuous 
persons, between two equals. Although Abraham is described twice in the OT as God’s friend (Isa 41:8; 2 
Chron 20:7), any human ‘friendship’ with God is clearly not a relationship between equals, nor a mutual 
dependence, for the perfect virtue and perfect justice in this relationship flows in one direction only. However, 
this admission does not seem to damage the metaethical argument that, in a theistic VE theory, justice can be 
grounded in the covenant relationship with God in a way which is similar to Aristotle’s apparent grounding of 
justice in perfect friendship. 
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other: such friendship has no place for rules. However, in a covenant relationship with God, 
we encounter norms and covenant obligations, so has moral motivation been reduced to 
obedience to those rules and obligations? A biblically minded virtue ethicist might then reply 
that if human justice is conceived of as a reflection of the justice of God, it is not just 
instrumental for the covenant relationship, but is also integral to it. The motive to pursue 
justice and righteousness is not a motive to obey the rules or norms of the covenant 
relationship, but the motive to maintain its harmony. The internal aim of the virtue of justice 
is not the kalon of Aristotelian friendship, but the kalon of the harmony of the covenant 
relationship, and it is this good which does the work of motivation. On this understanding, the 
place of the virtue of justice in a teleological ethical framework can be preserved.  
The notion of the covenant relationship with God also provides us with a model to follow, for 
even though our human friendships are less than perfect, if we base our friendships on the 
relationship which the biblical God has for his people, a relationship based on the bonds of 
chesed, then our friendships will be of the right type, reflecting the perfectly just and 
perfectly virtuous character of God, and not based on advantage, or pleasure.138 Our 
substitution of Aristotle’s conception of friendship with the OT conception of covenant 
relationship provides the theist with a much richer paradigm, not only for relationships 
between the human and God, but also for those between human beings.139 
5. Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter has been to search for an account of justice which can satisfy the 
second of our conditions of adequacy which are required by a VE theory if it to be 
normatively useful, and then to suggest a theistic version which can later be tested against the 
Book of Amos. This condition specifies that the theory must contain a satisfactory conception 
of virtue, its role in the theory, and its relation to the telos. Our discussion focussed on the 
virtue of justice and, since most CVE theories have their roots in either Aristotle or Hume, we 
began by considering how each of these thinkers conceived of this particular virtue.  
We saw how Aristotle discerned that there are two senses according to which we refer to 
justice: particular justice was an individual moral virtue, while universal justice was 
                                                 
138 We shall return to this crucial topic of imitation of God in the next chapter. 
139 It could be argued that the lexical choice in NE and in the LXX is significant. The word Aristotle uses for 
‘friendship’ is φιλία (NE VIII, IX), which is the general term for friendly relationships of all types: the 
associated verb is φιλέω. The Greek verb used in Lev 19:18 (‘Love your neighbour as yourself’), Dt 6:5 and 
Amos 5:15 is ἀγαπάω suggesting a more elevated level of attachment than Aristotle could have conceived of. 
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‘complete’ virtue. We also detected several problems with his account of justice, one of the 
main ones being a difficulty in explaining the ground of, and motivation to, just behaviour. 
While this problem could be alleviated by regarding friendship as the overarching good at 
which justice (as the overarching virtue) aims, we saw that it was not completely resolved by 
Aristotle. 
We subsequently turned to David Hume to see if help could be found in his theory, and 
examined the work of Michael Slote, the most prominent of the CVE thinkers who pursues a 
Humean-inspired approach. But Hume’s dismissal of reason in favour of sentiment as the 
ground of moral evaluation, and his inability to explain moral motivation in the case of 
justice, meant that it was not completely clear how justice could be considered to be a virtue 
at all according to his theory. And Slote’s attempt to combine an ethics of care with his own 
sentimentalist agent-based approach did not seem capable of rescuing Hume’s theory.   
We therefore concluded that, of the two theoretical options available in CVE, Aristotle’s was 
the more promising. Moreover, his distinction between the two senses of justice could be 
understood within a theistic frame of reference, sustaining the hope that an Aristotelian 
framework remains a viable route to the construction of a theistic VE theory. Our study of the 
concepts of justice and righteousness in the OT confirmed this hope, for both these concepts 
are central to the OT understanding of the covenant relationship between the people and God, 
which we argued could be viewed as a theistic replacement of, and improvement on, 
Aristotle’s conception of friendship. Righteousness is a picture of covenant harmony and 
peace; where the integrity of the covenant is breached, threatening righteousness, peace and 
life itself, it is the function of justice to heal the breach and restore the harmony. The person 
possessing the virtue of justice is the one who is motivated to preserve the harmony of the 
covenant relationship which is, as we argued in the previous chapter, the ultimate kalon. 
In the next chapter, we shall consider a further condition of adequacy required by a virtue 
ethical theory if it is to be normatively useful, and this is a satisfactory explanation of the 
concept of the moral exemplar. 
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Chapter Four 
Moral exemplarism as the imitatio Dei 
 
You shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am holy 
      Lev 19:2 
 
I don’t know whether there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that 
neither I nor those about whom I care most are among them. . . I believe that moral 
perfection, in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal 
well-being towards which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a 
human being to strive. 
Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints”1 
 
This chapter continues our critique of the main features of CVE theory, as preparation for the 
construction of a theistic version. So far, we have considered the fundamental concepts of 
telos and virtue, in particular the virtue of justice, and suggested that an Aristotelian 
understanding of these concepts can be successfully adopted into a theistic framework if the 
telos is understood as a covenant relationship with God, and the virtue of justice is 
understood as essential for the maintenance of the relationship. Our next step is to turn to the 
concept of the moral exemplar, for an understanding of exemplarism is crucial if our VE 
theory is to be normatively useful. Exemplarism has both metaphysical and epistemological 
aspects and this chapter will deal with the latter; that is, the moral exemplar as a means of 
knowing what the virtues actually look like.2  
1. Introduction 
Psychologists have long recognised the value of the role model whose perceived success is 
set against one’s own perceived lack of it, and whose existence, it is thought, spurs the 
individual on to greater things. An exemplar approach has been advocated for value 
                                                 
1 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints” in Crisp and Slote, Virtue Ethics, 79. 
2 The metaphysical question, ‘why should we imitate God?’, requires an account of the source of normativity, 
and will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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education,3 witnessed in presidential speeches,4 and suggested as a means to draw more 
women into careers in STEM.5 Interestingly, research has shown that ‘superstar’ exemplars 
do not always motivate, and may actively discourage.6 Our contemporary society is certainly 
full of examples of persons who do not choose their exemplars so wisely: the success may be 
admired while the character is not. And so, one might feel, as indeed Aristotle felt, that 
exemplarism should have a moral dimension.  
So far, this thesis has been advocating an Aristotelian framework for the construction of a 
theistic version of VE, but one might doubt the practical usefulness of his conception of the 
moral exemplar. The phronimos, the person of practical wisdom and moral virtue, was a 
mature, male citizen of Athens who through good fortune, education, and hard work has 
finally become fully virtuous, and who exercises his virtue in leadership of the community. 
He is the portrayal of an ideal, and, even in the Athens of Aristotle’s day, an ideal which was 
on the whole unattainable, except perhaps for the elite few. Therefore, if he exists at all, he 
can only ever be a role model for the few. Moreover, Aristotelian virtue might not command 
universal appeal; what is virtuous in one cultural situation may be vicious in another.7 Some 
have even questioned the very idea of moral exemplarism, believing a life of virtue to be not 
only unappealing but also irrational.8 But if the would-be-neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist 
rejects the Aristotelian picture of embodied virtue because of its highly contextualised basis 
and its practical limitations, then she must devise an alternative. And in doing so, she might 
observe that even the best of human beings is still limited by his humanness, so that the 
character and actions of a person held up as a moral exemplar in one season of his life, could 
conceivably be less than exemplary in another; presumably, the vicissitudes of life present 
                                                 
3 Harry S. Broudy, B. Othanel Smith, and Joe R. Burnett. "The Exemplar Approach." Journal of Aesthetic 
Education 1, no. 1 (1966): 113-21. 
4 Lara M. Brown, ""The Contemporary Presidency": The Greats and the Great Debate: President William J. 
Clinton's Use of Presidential Exemplars." Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2007): 124-38. 
5 Sapna Cheryan et al., "Do Female and Male Role Models Who Embody Stem Stereotypes Hinder Women's 
Anticipated Success in STEM?". Social Psychological and Personality Science 2 (6) (2011): 656-664. This 
research discovered that it was the nonstereotypical role models who were most likely to draw women into the 
field, while gender was largely irrelevant. [STEM = science, technology, engineering and mathematics.] 
6 See Penelope Lockwood and Ziva Kunda. "Superstars and Me: Predicting the Impact of Role Models on the 
Self." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73, no. 1 (1997): 91-103. If the role model was relevant and 
the success seemed attainable, the result could be inspiration; but if the reverse was true, the presence of such an 
‘exemplar’ could in fact lead to demoralisation and self-deflation. See also Amanda L. Morin et al., "The 
Mother Teresa Effect: Counterproductive Effects of Touching an Altruist's Possessions on Charitable 
Giving." Current Psychology 34, no. 4 (2015): 693-701. 
7 For example, is the courage of the freedom fighter in the same moral category as the ‘courage’ of the terrorist?   
8 See, for example, Wolf, “Moral Saints”. 
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any phronimos with a constant challenge.9 The theist, however, has a possible alternative 
available to her. She can look to God as supreme moral exemplar, the perfection of virtue 
personified, for in the transcendent we encounter a being who is beyond culture, beyond 
context and, most importantly, who is standardly conceived to be morally perfect. Although 
the idea of the imitatio Dei has ancient roots, and has been applied to many deities, for the 
purposes of this thesis the referent ‘deus’ is the God of the Bible.10 
The task of this chapter, then, is to fulfil the third condition of adequacy which we argued is 
required for a normatively useful theistic version of VE theory, and this condition is a 
substantive and workable conception of the moral exemplar. We have suggested that, in a 
theistic framework, this exemplar could be God, and so, we will now assess the concept of 
the imitatio Dei in order to determine whether it will serve as a theistic alternative to 
imitation of the Aristotelian phronimos.11 The question before us has two parts: can we, and 
indeed should we, imitate God? Our response shall follow three lines of investigation. We 
shall begin by discussing how the concept of imitatio Dei is understood in Judaism, where it 
is most often understood in terms of holiness, and consider in what sense holiness could be 
imitable: should the imitation of God be restricted to his actions or encompass both his 
actions and character? Secondly, we will consider the philosophically-driven objection from 
negative theology that, since positive attributes cannot be ascribed to God, imitation must be 
restricted to his actions. And lastly, we shall consider the text of the OT itself and review the 
case for and against the idea that the imitatio Dei is a useful normative concept, and that 
Yahweh, as he is portrayed in the OT, is a suitable candidate for imitation. In the light of this 
investigation, it shall be suggested that imitatio Dei, correctly understood, can indeed serve as 
a theistic alternative to imitation of the Aristotelian phronimos, and supply an 
epistemological model of the moral exemplar which could be incorporated into a theistic VE 
theory. 
2. Imitation as holiness: ‘Be holy because I am holy’   
                                                 
9 We might remember from Chapter One that the situationist critique of virtue ethics has cast doubt on the 
stability of character traits and therefore on the possibility of a perfectly virtuous human agent.   
10 For a helpful review of the concept in Greek thought see David S. Shapiro, “The Doctrine of the Image of 
God and Imitatio Dei.” Judaism 12, no. 1 (1963): 57-77, esp. 67-70.  
11 Since this project is concerned with the relation of ethical theory to the OT, there will be no discussion of the 
related but distinct notion of the imitatio Christi. 
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In Judaism, the idea of imitatio Dei is grounded in, and limited by, the doctrine that man was 
created in the image of God. The resemblance between God and man may be no more than a 
shadow,12 but it is because there is some resemblance in the first place that imitation is a 
possibility. Yet, to be like God is not to be as God, for there is a gulf between the creator and 
his creation. God in his essence is distinct from man in his: man, for example, cannot know as 
God knows.13 But in what sense is it possible to imitate a perfect being? God in his essence is 
clearly beyond limitation, but does this mean that imitation should be reduced to God’s 
actions, or should it also extend to his character? In other words, what are the normative 
ethical implications for the doctrine of imitatio Dei? 
Those within Judaism who accept the centrality of the idea of imitatio Dei,14 usually agree 
that it is based on the principle of the holiness of God and the corresponding command that 
the people be holy. However, holiness is difficult to define.15 So what can the imitation of 
holiness mean? In the relevant OT texts, we find that the imperative (‘be holy’) is linked to 
the phrase ‘I am the LORD’, or ‘I am the LORD your God’; the use of the covenant name for 
God emphasises the fact that the God referred to is personal, a being who is in a relationship 
with his people and who acts on their behalf. The people should be holy because their God is 
holy and their holiness should in some way mirror his own. Holiness is often explicitly 
related to consecration and the separation from the customs and practices of the surrounding 
nations.16   
 
44 For I am the LORD your God. Consecrate yourselves therefore, and be holy, for I 
am holy. You shall not defile yourselves with any swarming thing that crawls on the 
ground. 
 45 For I am the LORD who brought you up out of the land of Egypt to be your God. 
You shall therefore be holy, for I am holy.   (Lev. 11:44-45) 
                                                 
12 The Hebrew word םֶלֶצ (‘image’) may be related to לֵצ (‘shadow’). Cf Ps 39:6.  
13 Gen 3:5. 
14 David Shapiro argues strongly that the idea of imitatio Dei is central to Jewish thought; others disagree 
(Shapiro specifically mentions Leon Roth). See David S. Shapiro, “The Doctrine of the Image of God and 
Imitatio Dei.” Judaism 12, no. 1 (1963): 57-77, 66. 
15 To Solomon Schechter, the statement that imitation consists in holiness is simply a tautology: imitatio Dei is 
holiness, and holiness is ‘but another word for imitatio Dei’. Solomon Schechter, Some Aspects of Rabbinic 
Theology (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1909), 199.           
16 The ‘Holiness Code’ (Leviticus 17-27) which describes holy living in every sphere of life is the best example 
of this. Lev 20:26 states clearly that the Lord has separated Israel from the peoples in order that they belong to 
him. 
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Perhaps the best-known holiness command is in Leviticus 19:2, and it is clear from the 
following verse that holiness should lead to action of some sort.    
 
 2 Speak to all the congregation of the people of Israel and say to them, You shall be 
holy, for I the LORD your God am holy. 
 3 Every one of you shall revere his mother and his father, and you shall keep my 
Sabbaths: I am the LORD your God.    (Lev. 19:2-3) 
 
Deuteronomy 10:17-20 provides further details of how this holiness should manifest itself in 
the lives of the people, and what ‘walking in the ways of God’ (v. 12) really means.   
 
17 For the LORD your God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great, the mighty, 
and the awesome God, who is not partial and takes no bribe. 
 18 He executes justice for the fatherless and the widow, and loves the sojourner, 
giving him food and clothing. 
 19 Love the sojourner, therefore, for you were sojourners in the land of Egypt. 
 20 You shall fear the LORD your God. You shall serve him and hold fast to him, and 
by his name you shall swear.    (Deut. 10:17-20) 
 
From these texts it is clear that imitation of God’s holiness is not some abstract idea but is 
tied to practical ethics; it is also clear that this command is inseparable from the narrative of 
the people and their relationship with God. The people are to remember that they were 
strangers in Egypt, and this remembering will provide the necessary motivation to obey the 
command. Just as they received divine compassion and mercy, and witnessed the justice of 
God, so they are to act towards others, both inside and outside their community. The 
requirements of human holiness are therefore premised upon the self-revelation of God’s holy 
character, and the actions which flow from it. He is not partial and will not be bribed; he is 
just, and so executes justice; he is love and so loves the stranger (Deut. 10:17-19). The 
people, therefore, should practice love, justice and mercy.17     
At this point it might be noted that, while the command is premised on the character of God, 
the text does not specify whether imitation is to be restricted to God’s actions, or extended to 
                                                 
17 The statement that the God of the Hebrew Bible is just may be one of the most disputed statements in the 
whole of OT scholarship, and we shall discus this shortly.  
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include character. Rabbinic teaching leans towards the former interpretation: God has 
revealed his ‘ways’ or ‘paths’ in scripture, they can be understood through the midrashim 
and, therefore, they can be imitated; in fact, the recurring imperative to ‘walk in the ways of 
the Lord’, actually commands it. The attributes or qualities of God are certainly discernible 
through his actions, but human holiness is a life of imitation of God’s actions.18   
Following the rabbis, one might accept that it is possible to imitate God’s holiness by 
imitating his actions, albeit within certain fixed parameters,19 while not accepting that 
imitation of God’s holiness was reducible to action(s). While it is true that the texts do not 
contain any explicit command to cultivate a holy character, one might still instinctively feel 
that imitation of a person is not simply a matter of copying their actions: it consists, rather, in 
emulating their character. And, as we have noted from the start, the primary interest of the 
virtue ethicist is character rather than action. And so, even if we cannot ultimately be sure 
that the intention behind the exhortations was the imitation of the holiness of actions alone or 
holiness of actions plus character, the virtue ethicist need not find herself defeated in the 
search for a moral exemplar for her theistic VE theory. For the viability of the concept of 
exemplarism does not rest on the presence of an explicit command. Equally important is a 
description of the character of the exemplar. In any case, while the notion of holiness may be 
a necessary fact about God’s character or essence, in contradistinction to the holiness of 
Israel, it may not be the best concept to ground exemplarism. It could be argued that we need 
a thicker concept. And so, the biblically minded theist in search of a moral exemplar for her 
VE theory might look to other texts which describe the character of God in some detail, even 
though there is no explicit command to imitate, in order to produce a more substantive and 
workable conception of God as moral exemplar which could be put to use in a theistic VE 
theory. In addition, the very idea of basing morality on commands is antithetical to VE theory 
as we have pointed out.20 How, then, is the character of God described in the OT? 
                                                 
18 In the Sotah of the Babylonian Talmud the Amora, Rabbi Hama ben Hanina not only extracts the principle of 
imitatio Dei from Deuteronomy 13:4[5], but also, in a somewhat imaginative use of biblical texts, spells out in 
some detail what he believes this means: clothing the naked, visiting the sick, comforting mourners. B, Seder 
Nashim, Tractate Sotah 14a (trans Rev. Dr. A. Cohen; London: The Socino Press, 1936), 72-3. 
19 Many of the actions which the OT attributes to God are simply not candidates for imitation; they are either 
practically impossible or morally inadvisable for imperfect beings to even attempt to imitate. 
20 Lev 19:2 could be interpreted as an example of deontological ethics. 
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One passage often considered to contain a summary of the character of God, and a basis, 
therefore, for the imitation of God, is Exodus 33-34, where Moses is granted his request to be 
shown ‘the ways of God’:21   
 
6 The LORD passed before him and proclaimed, “The LORD, the LORD, a God 
merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and 
faithfulness, 
 7 keeping steadfast love for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, 
but who will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the 
children and the children's children, to the third and the fourth generation”. 
 8 And Moses quickly bowed his head toward the earth and worshipped. (Ex. 34:6-8)22 
 
 
Although there is no mention of imitation in this passage, it does appear to contain a self-
revelation of the divine character and the divine attributes in addition to a summary of divine 
action. Character, after all, is the prior concept; actions are derivative from it, and reflective 
of it. If imitatio Dei is not to be reduced to imitation of divine action, then such a summary of 
divine attributes could provide for us a description of a moral exemplar, a character defined 
in thick enough terms that imitation is a possibility, thicker than the more generic ‘holiness’. 
However, if one were to use a passage such as this as a basis for imitation, two fundamental 
areas of difficulty emerge. Firstly, we must discern which of the attributes are imitable, and 
which are not. While it is relatively easy to appreciate the possibilities for imitation, however 
incomplete, in the spheres of mercy, grace, love and forgiveness, it is not so easy in the case 
of the justice or judgment of God alluded to in the latter part of verse 7.23 Secondly, and more 
fundamentally, is the question of whether we can speak about ‘essential divine attributes’ at 
all. We are, therefore, still unclear whether the concept of imitatio Dei is substantive enough 
to address the epistemological aspect of moral exemplarism required by a VE theory. 
2.1.  Concluding thoughts 
                                                 
21 See Exod 33:13. It is generally accepted that in the singular, the ‘way of the Lord’ refers to a particular divine 
instruction, whereas the more common plural expression refers to one’s whole way of life. Most translations 
retain the plural form of the expression ( ךֶָכ  רְד־תֶא א נ יִנֵעִדוֹה ). 
22 The partial or complete repetition of this summary of the divine character at multiple points across the OT, 
testifies to its importance to the OT canon, and strengthens the case that it could provide a basis for evaluating 
the notion of imitatio Dei. See Neh. 9:17; Ps. 86:15; 103:8-13; 145:8-9; Joel 2:13; Jon. 4:2; Mic. 7:18; Nah. 1:2-
3; cf. 2 Chron. 30:9; Ps. 111:4. 
23 Shapiro suggests that Ps 103:9 could provide a commentary on this passage since verse 9 reads ‘He will not 
always chide, nor will he keep his anger forever’; but this text seems to simply point out that there is a limit to 
God’s anger rather than make any comment on the concept of generational guilt. Shapiro, “The Doctrine of the 
Image of God”, 72, n. 16. 
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Three main points have emerged from the preceding discussion. Imitation of actions alone is 
inadequate for VE theory, which is grounded in the concept of virtuous character; imitation 
must be extended to character as well. Secondly, holiness not a thick enough concept on 
which to base imitation; a thicker description of God’s character is needed. Thirdly, we need 
to clarify what we mean by ‘essential divine attributes’. This brings us to our second area of 
investigation. For imitation of God to be a normatively useful concept in a VE theory, we 
need a clear picture of the character of this God. But the long-standing apophatic tradition in 
Jewish and Christian thought claims that positive attributes cannot be ascribed to God: any 
imitation, therefore, must be limited to his actions. We now consider whether classical theism 
can overcome the objections to imitatio Dei which are raised by negative theology.  
3. Positive attributes and negative theology: the problems for imitation 
Martin Buber famously called the concept of the imitatio Dei ‘the central paradox of 
Judaism’.24 He asks how it is possible to worship God as he is in himself, and not as he is 
portrayed through the imaginings of man. We need to have an idea of what we are to imitate, 
yet how can we form an idea if God is ‘invisible, incomprehensible, unformed, not to be 
formed’.25 If we do form an idea, and proceed to imitate that idea, we cease to imitate God as 
he is in himself. This is the paradox. Buber has drawn attention to an important objection to 
the concept of imitatio Dei, which is often discussed under the rubric of negative theology: 
since positive attributes cannot be ascribed to God, how is it possible to imitate the character 
of God? It is to this question that we now turn.  
The great Jewish philosopher Maimonides is the key thinker in the Jewish discussion of the 
Imitatio Dei. In his Guide of the Perplexed, he states that since God is the final cause of 
everything, ‘the purpose of all things is to resemble as far as possible His perfection’.26 
Although he does not provide a systematic examination of the topic in the Guide,27 it is clear 
that he doubted the existence of positive divine attributes, and he cautions against reading the 
                                                 
24 Martin Buber, “Imitatio Dei,” in Martin Buber, Mamre: Essays in Religion (trans Greta Hort; Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1946), 37.  
25 Ibid., 38. 
26 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (An Abridged Edition with Introduction and Commentary by Julius 
Guttmann; trans Chaim Rabin; New Introduction by Daniel H. Frank; Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company Inc., 1995), I. 69, 87. [hereafter Guide] 
27 Howard Kreisel notes that, in general, The Guide often appears equivocal because Maimonides was writing in 
the midst of thinking and rethinking his own position on key issues. Howard Kreisel, “Imitatio Dei in 
Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed.” AJS Review 19, no. 2 (1994): 172. See also the Mishneh Torah, in which 
Maimonides cites the imitation of God is eighth in his list of commandments. 
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Bible literally; for example, a literal understanding of anthropomorphic language, where 
metaphor or simile had been intended, can produce confusion.28 Maimonides’ intention was 
to merge Aristotelian philosophy with a traditional Jewish conception of God. He believed 
that without philosophical insight, it was impossible to fulfil the commandment in 
Deuteronomy 6:5 to love God, whereas increasing (philosophical) knowledge led to an 
increased ability to do so. To interpret the Bible literally was, for Maimonides, tantamount to 
idolatry and an impediment to the fulfilling of the command. Although in his rationalist 
approach to scripture, Maimonides leans towards Aristotle more than to Judaism, his thought 
is worth considering, especially in light of the contemporary resurgence of interest in 
negative theology.29 If God can be understood to function as the moral exemplar in a theistic 
VE theory, which claims to be normative, then his character must be knowable.    
While holding that God’s existence is a philosophical necessity, Maimonides believed that 
the fact of his oneness denies the possibility of character dispositions or faculties, for that 
would constitute plurality and imply that God is a composite being.30 He also believed that it 
would be absurd to hold that God could stand in relation to another being, for there has to be 
some similarity of ‘species’ for such a relation to hold. Neither could he, being incorporeal, 
stand in relation to time or place since they both imply measurability and time implies both 
motion and measurability. And it cannot even be said that God has an existence, for existence 
is an accident affecting that which exists, a concept ‘superadded’ to its essence. God exists 
necessarily and perpetually and therefore ‘exists without existence, and similarly lives 
without life, is powerful without power, and knows without knowledge’.31 Therefore, if we 
are to retain the belief in the perfection of God, the only way to describe him is in negative 
terms. ‘By affirming anything of God, you are removed from Him in two respects; first, 
                                                 
28 His reader, the perplexed person, turns out to be a very particular type of person; he is not just the man-in-the-
street or the philosophical novice, but rather ‘the religious man who has arrived at deep-set belief in the truth of 
our faith and who is perfect in the religious and moral sense’.  Maimonides, “Introduction”, Guide, 41. Since the 
average worshipper is incapable of grasping the philosophy which is at the heart of the Bible, the prophets used 
anthropomorphisms and metaphors and similes and wrote in parables to enable the ordinary person to 
understand something of the truth. It is the task of the philosopher in the exegesis of Scripture to uncover the 
true meaning. Jacob’s dream for example, rightly understood, is a picture of the upward path of the philosopher 
as he increases in knowledge of the spheres and awareness of God. Maimonides, Guide, I.15. 
29 One might think of the work of Jean-Luc Marion, Jacques Derrida, John Caputo, and Richard Kearney. For an 
excellent critique of the impact of ‘cultural’ as well as philosophical apophaticism see, Lieven Boeve, “Negative 
Theology and Theological Hermeneutics: The Particularity of Naming God.” Journal of Philosophy and 
Scripture. 3 (2) (2006): 1-13. 
30 An attribute is an accident, a state of the essence of a thing, and not itself essence. See Maimonides, Guide, 
I.51, 67. 
31 Ibid., I.67, 77. 
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whatever you affirm, is only a perfection in relation to us; secondly, He does not possess 
anything superadded to this essence’.32 We can see here the background of Buber’s thought 
that imitatio Dei was ‘the central paradox of Judaism’. 
In an Aristotelian fashion, Maimonides believes that the highest state of perfection is the 
perfection of the intellect, when a man knows all things which are in his power to know.33 
However, unlike Aristotle, Maimonides’ ultimate perfection entailed knowledge of the Lord, 
leading to imitation of his actions of mercy, justice and righteousness.34 And, despite his 
philosophical elitism and supreme confidence in the power of human reason, his philosophy 
is tempered, as Aristotle’s is not, by humility; he was acutely aware of the limits of human 
understanding when faced with the divine.35 
 
Praise be to Him who is such that when our minds try to visualise His essence, their 
power of apprehending becomes imbecility; when they study the connection between 
His works and His will, their knowledge becomes ignorance; and when our tongues 
desire to declare His greatness by descriptive terms, all eloquence becomes impotence 
and imbecility.36 
 
 
Yet in the end, despite his theism, all that Maimonides is able to say by way of affirmation is 
that God exists by necessity and that he is non-composite.37 Every divine attribute is either an 
attribute of action or is expressed as a negation of its own absence (‘God is not powerless’, 
‘God is not ignorant’ etc).38 For example, the thirteen qualities or dispositions revealed to 
Moses in Exodus 34:7,39 were all the results of God’s action in creation, which God describes 
                                                 
32 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (trans M. Friedländer; London: Routledge, 1925), I.59, 84. 
[hereafter Guide (F)] 
33 Maimonides, Guide, III.27, 174. 
34 Maimonides, Guide, III.54, 201. 
35 e.g. Ibid., I.31, 56. 
36 Ibid., I.58, 82. 
37
 Maimonides, Guide, I.58, 80. He is especially impatient with those who, when addressing God in prayer, 
ascribe to him attributes which Maimonides thinks unfitting; he believes this verges on blasphemy and urges 
those people to heed the Psalmist (‘Silence is praise to Thee’), as well as the words of Solomon (‘For God is in 
heaven, and thou upon earth; therefore, let thy words be few’). Maimonides is quoting here from Ps 65:2 and 
Eccl 5:2. See Guide (F) I.59, 85, 87.  
38 See Ch. 58 of Book I.   
39 The Sages use the word middoth, literally ‘measures’, the word also used for moral qualities as in ‘four 
dispositions in those who go to the house of study’ (Aboth 5, 16-17). This is not to say that Maimonides 
attributes moral qualities to God, just that when men act morally they produce actions similar to those of God. 
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as ‘very good’,40 as well as in his governance of the world: Moses was not granted 
knowledge of God’s essence. Imitatio Dei, to Maimonides, means simply the imitation of 
God’s actions.41 
Maimonides’ conception of God and his apophaticism concerning the divine attributes, 
generates great problems for an understanding of imitatio Dei. As Kenneth Seeskin observes:  
 
Maimonides’ philosophy shows us what happens if you remove all anthropomorphic 
content from your conception of God: you remove all content of any kind. In the end, 
you are left with a God whose essence is unknowable and indescribable. Of what 
possible value is such a conception either to philosophy or to religion?42 
 
 
It is clear that if the idea of imitating God is to be of any practical use in a normative ethical 
theory, then we must have access to a knowledge of God which enables us to make some sort 
of affirmative claims about him. The idea of being made in the image of God must have some 
content. Apophatic theology seems to fail on logical as well as semantic grounds: we cannot 
state that a certain object does not possess certain qualities unless we have a rough prior 
notion of what it actually is.43 The negative is to that extent predicated on the positive. 
Maimonides’ argument that only metaphor and analogy are appropriate in speech about God 
also fails because metaphor uses analogy, and for analogy to work it must be possible to 
make affirmative statements about the analogates.44  
It might be noted that negative theology is very much alive and well today.45 But, as we lose 
sight of God as the signifier of ultimate being and first cause, we lose our ontic referent, and 
                                                 
40 Gen 1:31 
41 Maimonides, Guide, I.54, 76-77. At this point Maimonides is in agreement with the rabbis in their comments 
on Leviticus 19:2; he quotes here from the Sifre on Deuteronomy 10:12. ‘As He is gracious, so be thou gracious; 
as He is merciful, so be thou merciful’ (Guide, I.54, 77). 
42 Kenneth Seeskin. “Maimonides”, SEP, 2006, substantive revision 2013. URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/maimonides/>., 17.      
43 Augustine objected to God’s being termed ineffable ‘for when this is said, something is said. And a 
contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable 
which can be called ineffable’. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (translated, with an introduction by D. W. 
Robertson; Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Educational, 1958). Chapter 6, 11. 
44 For more on this thought see, William L. Power, “Imago Dei - Imitatio Dei.” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 42, no. 3 (1997): 131-41, 132-4.  
45 In fact, proponents of apophatic theology, or at least non-foundational theologies, do claim that understanding 
ethics is possible within those frameworks, but such an approach would require a different line of argument to 
the one pursued in this thesis. For a comprehensive introduction to the history of negative theology, including 
further discussion of Maimonides’ writing, see William Franke’s edited anthology of various key texts. William 
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we then lose our capacity to construct a useful and intelligible theistic ethic. If our God is to 
ground a normative ethical theory, he must arguably be a metaphysical reality. We will now 
consider a philosophical and theological response to apophaticism. 
3.1.  Positive attributes and negative theology: answering the objections 
How does the theist answer the objections posed by negative theology? One promising line of 
response is to draw on an argument of William Power, who uses Anselm’s dictum, that God 
is a being greater than which none can be conceived,46 to ground a thoroughly cataphatic 
theology.47  
To be a God who is worthy of admiration and imitation, Power argues that the God of 
Christianity and Judaism should not only be worthy of the highest philosophical speculation, 
but also of the noblest theological reflection. Being eternal, omnipresent, necessarily existent 
and the source of all value he is ontologically perfect, but he is also axiologically perfect, and 
so possesses communicable as well as incommunicable attributes.48 Within an Anselmian 
framework, God can be described as omnipotent because it is ‘metaphysically impossible for 
there to be a being with a greater scope of power’, and he is likewise omniscient because it is 
‘metaphysically impossible for there to be a being with a greater scope of knowledge’. On the 
same reasoning God is omnibenevolent, meaning he possesses limitless love and so he is 
morally perfect, and omniproductive, not only the creator of all concrete beings but also the 
generator of all abstract entities and the metaphysical structure of all possible worlds.49  
Finally, extending the same reasoning to the affections, Power opposes the traditional 
conception of divine impassibility, and argues that God is in fact ‘omnipassable’, meaning 
that he possesses the greatest conceivable scope for pathos.50 A God who is worthy of 
                                                 
Franke, On What Cannot Be Said: Classic Formulations / Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, 
Literature, and the Arts (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007). Also of interest is the 
short discussion of negative theology in the early church in: Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality: A Brief History (2nd 
ed.; Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 29-32. 
 
46 ‘aliquid quo maius nihil cogitare potest’. Anselm, Proslogion. With A Reply on Behalf of the Fool, by 
Gaunilo, and The Author’s Reply to Gaunilo (translated, with introduction and philosophical commentary, by M. 
J. Charlesworth; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), II, 116. 
47  Power, “Imago Dei”. 
48 Imitation is necessarily limited to the communicable attributes; the incommunicable attributes are commonly 
understood to be God’s aseity, immutability, eternity, omnipresence and simplicity. Wayne Grudem, Systematic 
Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Leicester: IVP, 1994), 157. 
49  Ibid., 136-7. See also William Power, “Divine Poiesis and Abstract Entities” Religious Studies, 30, no. 3 
(1994): 335-341. 
50 Ibid., 138. 
113 
 
 
 
worship and fit for imitation must be ‘epistemically, morally, productively, and affectively 
perfect in all possible worlds’.51 Indeed, worship is the only suitable response to such a 
being,52 and the desire to imitate is a natural consequence of the divine-human encounter, 
even though that imitation will necessarily be limited.  
With such a concrete view of God, the theist now has a framework for both the imago Dei 
and the imitatio Dei, the latter being understood as consisting in living in accordance with the 
powers and capacities which reflect the image of God. The human being can seek to gain 
knowledge (logos), to act well (ethos), to produce objects of beauty (poiesis), and develop the 
capacity to care (pathos). And finally, as Power notes, humans have the capacity to 
experience the peace, joy and happiness which results from flourishing relationships with 
God and with fellow human beings.53 
In Power’s argument, and in contradistinction to that of Maimonides, we see a clear departure 
from the God of Aristotle. A merging of the God of the philosophers with the God of the 
bible can only occur following substantial revision of the former notion. The God of 
Christianity and Judaism is not only supreme and perfect being; he also created humankind in 
his own image thus endowing human life with meaning and value.  He is not only the source 
and telos of our capacities; he is also the perfect model for our exercising them. He is not 
only the ultimate reality; he is also a God in a covenant relationship with his people. This 
God is not just a theoretical concept, but a personal God, and the only being whose character 
as well as actions are worthy of imitation. Worship is the point of departure.  
Since imitation should be fundamentally practical, it should, arguably, be less concerned with 
trying to fathom out the unfathomable essence of God, than with discerning the divine 
economy of God’s plans and purposes for human beings. The Church Fathers understood this 
well,54 and in the anonymous Epistle to Diognetus, we find the writer exhorting his readers to 
imitate the kindness of God through acts of kindness to the burdened and the needy.55  
                                                 
51 Ibid., 135. 
52 We might remember that worship was Moses’ immediate response to the divine self-revelation. Ex 34:8. 
53 Power, “Imago Dei”, 139. 
54 We might think of Gregory of Nazianzen, for example, who condemned the Eunomians for their belief that it 
was possible to conceive of God’s essence. See Boniface Ramsey, Beginning to Read the Fathers (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1985), 46. 
55 Anonymous, The Epistle to Diognetus. Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Writings of the 
Fathers, A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (ed.). Vol. I The Apostolic Fathers (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1867), 313-4. 
Less practical, perhaps, was Jerome’s exhortation to a recently bereaved nobleman, that to fulfil the 
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3.2.  Concluding thoughts 
The aim of this thesis is to construct a theistic version of a VE theory, and if that theory is to 
be normatively useful, then it must be capable of practical application. Philosophical insight 
must resonate with human experience, for ethical theory is ultimately the most practical part 
of philosophy. Virtue ethics needs a concept of the moral exemplar, and it has been suggested 
that the exemplar in a theistic theory could be the person of God himself. Imitation is more 
than imitation of actions, but is also imitation of character, since character is the prior notion. 
Imitatio Dei, then, is not simply the imitation of God’s good actions, but also the imitation 
and reflection of God’s character, which is essentially good. 
We noted the effect that negative theology has on the idea of imitating God. While negative 
theology does caution us to avoid idolatry, its denial of positive divine attributes means it is 
of limited use in the construction of a theistic normative ethical theory where the ground of 
that theory, the theos, must be a definable character. In order to be imitable, the character, as 
well as actions, of the moral exemplar must be knowable. If, as is suggested here, the 
supreme exemplar is God, then, if ‘knowledge of God’ is to mean anything at all, God must 
be knowable. It is good to remember the words of Zophar as he speaks to Job: 
 
7 Can you find out the deep things of God? Can you find out the limit of the 
Almighty? 
 8 It is higher than heaven - what can you do? Deeper than Sheol - what can you 
know?    (Job 11:7-8)  
 
 
But it is also beneficial to heed the words of A.W. Pink who, while admitting that attaining 
perfect knowledge of God is impossible, since he is incomprehensible in his being, adds that 
‘it would be folly to say we will therefore make no effort to attain any degree of it’.56 If the 
Bible is held to be a source of information about the working out of the divine nature in the 
created world, then the task of the theologian is to navigate between a biblical literalism 
which seeks to systematise the attributes into a rigid doctrine, and a philosophical speculation 
beyond the textual evidence. Although the human mind fails to adequately capture the notion 
of the essence of God, human language can still convey truths about the divine character and 
                                                 
commandment in Leviticus 19:2, the latter should do more than merely offer financial support to the 
monasteries, but actually go and live as a monk himself. Jerome, Letters. Letter 118 To Julian, accessed Dec 1, 
2017, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3001118.htm. 
56 A. W. Pink, The Attributes of God (2nd ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2006), 113. 
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his attributes, truths that the author of Exodus 34:6-8 surely intended to convey. And so, it is 
presupposed that divine attributes are identifiable from the textual evidence. For most of the 
‘communicable’ attributes the idea of imitation is unproblematic: few would be likely to 
argue that love, goodness, mercy, patience, wisdom or faithfulness are not worthy of 
imitation. Other attributes, however, in particular God’s righteous anger and his justice, are 
more problematic, and we shall return to these questions shortly. 
So far in this chapter we have reflected on the difficulties of understanding imitatio Dei as 
holiness and argued that imitation must refer to character as well as to action. We also noted 
that, if a theistic ethics is to be both intelligible and normatively useful, the theos must not 
only be a metaphysical reality, for the theory requires an ontic referent, but also a reality 
which can be described in positive terms. We then suggested that the objections from 
negative theology could be answered by an appeal to an Anselmian theology.    
We will now turn to our final area of investigation, which is the debate surrounding the 
concept of the imitatio Dei in the text of the OT. What does the text say about the goodness 
of God, and in particular his justice and righteousness, and are there any obstacles to a textual 
justification of Yahweh as supreme moral exemplar? 
4. Imitatio Dei in OT scholarship   
Our final area of investigation is to assess whether any evidence of a doctrine of imitatio Dei 
can be found in the OT text, and if so, whether it is substantive enough to provide a concept 
of moral exemplarism which could be used in a theistic VE theory. In the first place, we need 
to know whether the idea of imitation is made explicit in the texts, or is merely implicit, or 
perhaps even absent altogether. Secondly, we should consider the suggestion that morality is 
in some sense ‘shared’ by God and humanity. Lastly, and most crucially for the prospect of 
imitation, we must ask whether it is possible to interpret the God of the Hebrew Bible as an 
essentially good God. Walter Houston has questioned whether the character of the OT God 
provides an appropriate basis for imitation at all.57 And there are other scholars who see little 
trace of the God of Anselmian theology in the pages of the Old Testament: what they find in 
the texts is a capricious figure who is, in the view of one writer, ‘insecure’, ‘irrational’, 
                                                 
57 Walter J. Houston, “The Character of YHWH and the Ethics of the Old Testament: Is Imitatio Dei 
Appropriate?” JTS 58, no. 1 (2007): 1-25. 
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‘vindictive’ ‘dangerous’, ‘malevolent’ and ‘abusive’.58 If such an assessment is in any way 
accurate representation of the character of Yahweh, there seems little to recommend in the 
idea of Imitatio Yahweh, and little hope that imitatio Dei should it be normative for the 
people of God today. With these questions in mind, we will examine in turn the case for, and 
the case against, the argument that a doctrine of imitatio Dei can be found in the Old 
Testament. If there is enough evidence in its support, we might have an answer to the 
question of the moral exemplar within a theistic virtue ethics theory. 
4.1.  The case for imitatio Dei from an OT perspective 
Some scholars have enthusiastically endorsed the idea that imitatio Dei has a place in Old 
Testament ethics.59 For example, commenting on the Holiness Code, and Leviticus 19 in 
particular, Walther Eichrodt observes that living a life in accordance with the commandments 
of God was to be understood as ‘a forming of human nature after the pattern of the divine’; 
the ‘immaculate purity’ of God’s own nature was to be reflected the holy living of his 
people.60 Imitation of God, then, is the result of obeying the commandments of God. 
Although the virtue ethicist might disagree with Eichrodt’s view that the commandments are 
the primary ethical concept, she can take note of his confidence that the idea of imitation can 
be found in the OT. But what is the basis of this confidence? 
4.1.1. The textual evidence 
As we consider the texts most often cited as evidence that imitatio Dei is a biblical concept, 
we should point out that an advantage of the canonical reading which is advocated in this 
thesis, is that it enables appreciation of the larger, underlying, themes in scripture, such as the 
character of God, which emerge and re-emerge in differing contexts and genres. For example, 
                                                 
58 David Penchansky, What Rough Beast?: Images of God in the Hebrew Bible (Louisville, Ky: Westminster 
John Knox, 1999). 
59 See, for example, Johannes Hempel, Das Ethos Des Alten Testaments (2nd ed. BZAW 67; Berlin: de Gruyter, 
1964); Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament (OTL; 2 vols; London: SCM Press, 1961); Eckart Otto, 
Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994); Eryl W. Davies, “Walking in God’s 
Ways: The Concept of imitatio Dei in the Old Testament”, in E. Ball (ed.), In Search of True Wisdom: Essays in 
Old Testament Interpretation in Honour of Ronald E. Clements (JSOTSup 300; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1999). Other scholars see the concept of imitation as valid, but secondary to divine commands: for 
example, Birch, Let Justice Roll Down, 125. Walter Houston limits imitatio Dei to the two roles of king and 
patron. Houston, “The Character of YHWH”, 1-25. John Barton’s views have ranged from cautious 
endorsement (“Understanding Old Testament Ethics.” JSOT 9 (1978): 44-64, esp. 60-61) to relative enthusiasm 
(“The Basis of Ethics in the Hebrew Bible” Semeia 66 (1994): 11-22), and more recently back to caution 
(“Imitation of God in the Old Testament”, in Robert P. Gordon (ed.), The God of Israel (Cambridge: CUP, 
2007).    
60 Eichrodt, Theology, Vol 2, 373 [original italics]. Eichrodt refers specifically to Leviticus 19:3, 11ff., 15ff.    
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it is possible to gain a more comprehensive appreciation of the holiness of God when this is 
seen as a unique combination of his transcendence (e.g. Isaiah 6:3 and 40:25) and immanence 
(e.g. Hosea 11:9).  
Leviticus 19:2: ‘You shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am holy’. 
As noted earlier, the command to be holy because God is holy is often thought to be the 
clearest and most explicit instance of the principle of imitatio Dei in the Old Testament.61 As 
is clear from the context of the verse, holiness is no abstract thought, nor restricted to ritual 
requirements,62 but is linked to practical ethics; for example, it consists in respect to parents, 
compassion and justice for the poor and the weak, and honesty in business.63 
Deuteronomy 10:17-19  
 
17 For the LORD your God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great God, mighty and 
awesome, who is not partial and takes no bribe, 18 who executes justice for the orphan 
and the widow, and who loves the strangers, providing them food and clothing. 19 You 
shall also love the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt. 
 
Deuteronomy 10:19 is often regarded as an exhortation to imitation since the reason why the 
people were to show love towards the stranger is because God did so first.     
Deuteronomy 5:15 
 
 
15 Remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the LORD your God 
brought you out from there with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm; therefore 
the LORD your God commanded you to keep the sabbath day. 
 
Deuteronomy 15:13-15 
 
13 And when you send a male slave out from you a free person, you shall not send him 
out empty-handed. 14 Provide liberally out of your flock, your threshing floor, and 
                                                 
61 Davies, “Walking”, 101. Walter Kaiser describes this command as ‘the mainspring of Old Testament ethics’, 
and believes that it is holiness, more than any other attribute, which captures the essential nature of God. Walter 
C. Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1983), 143.   
62 E.g. Houston, “The Character of YHWH”, 1-25. 
63 See Lev 19:3, 9-10, 14-15, 35-36.    
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your wine press, thus giving to him some of the bounty with which the LORD your 
God has blessed you. 15 Remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and 
the LORD your God redeemed you; for this reason I lay this command upon you 
today. 
 
These texts can be interpreted as exhortations to imitation. Eryl Davies, for example, sees 
God’s actions in the salvation history of Israel as a ‘blueprint or paradigm’ for the exercise of 
mercy and compassion in human affairs.64 Other scholars view the texts simply as motive 
clauses. The gratitude resulting from the remembrance of God’s acts of deliverance should 
prompt a proper response to God, and just and righteous behaviour to fellow human beings.65 
‘Walking in the ways of the Lord’ 
While it is often thought of simply as a metaphor for the moral life, the phrase, ‘walking in 
the ways of the Lord’, can be plausibly interpreted in terms of imitation. While discussing the 
many occurrences of this phrase in Deuteronomy, Davies comments: ‘Such imagery implies 
that Israel was destined to travel on a journey in which God was to lead the way as a guide 
and example for the people to follow’.66 As the people walk ‘in the ways of God’, the love, 
mercy, compassion and justice which the people have already experienced from God should 
be visible in their lives and visible to the nations.67  
4.2.  The case against imitatio Dei from an OT perspective 
Cyril Rodd denies that the texts which we have just considered are convincing evidence that 
the imitatio Dei is an Old Testament concept, and he has remained the most vociferous critic 
of the idea. We should therefore consider how he presents his case and how robust it is.  
Rodd explicitly denies that Leviticus 19:2 involves imitation: ‘Imitating involves copying an 
action repeating it, reproducing it. This is not what is found in the chapter. Rather what is 
                                                 
64 Davies, “Walking”, 102. See also Barton, “Imitation of God”, 36, and Otto, Theologische Ethik, 185.    
65 See, for example, Cyril S. Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land: Studies in Old Testament Ethics (Old 
Testament Studies; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2001), 33. 
66 Davies, “Walking”, 103.  
67 In “The Basis of Ethics”, Barton notes, somewhat cryptically, that the way leads ‘to a place where it will 
converge with the highway trodden by God’. Barton, “The Basis of Ethics”, 20. Interestingly, Stanley Hauerwas 
seems to equate ‘walking in the way of God’ with imitation, and for him the phrase combines the notions of 
obeying God’s commands, fearing him, and loving him: he cites Deut 8:6; 10:12; 11:22. Hauerwas, The 
Peaceable Kingdom, 77. 
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required of Israel is to be holy (in its own way) because God is holy (in his)’.68 Rodd believes 
that a distinction exists between actual imitation and the idea of being conformed to the 
character of God by following his ethical teaching.69 Deuteronomy 5:15 and 15:15 are 
dismissed as motive clauses, and Barton’s suggestion that gratitude should lead not only to 
obedience to divine commands, but also to imitation of the divine example, is also rejected: 
‘In a sense this can be regarded as the imitation of God, but at some remove, and I wonder 
whether it is not the matter of approaching the text with twentieth-century eyes’.70 Finally, 
Rodd accuses Davies of misunderstanding the phrase ‘walking in the ways of the Lord’, and 
argues that it simply means to obey the commandments, not to ‘follow in Yahweh’s 
footsteps, like King Wenceslas’s page’.71  
The only example of the imitatio Dei which Rodd finds in the biblical text is Deuteronomy 
10:17-19. But even here he is less than enthusiastic, and wonders what the writer could have 
meant in speaking of God’s refusal to be bribed, his providing food for strangers and justice 
to orphans and widows.72 For him, the only explanation is that an ethics required of human 
kings has been applied to God, and then reapplied to humans.73 In other words, the ethics 
moves from humanity to God in the first place. Finally, Rodd brings a charge of extreme 
anthropomorphism against those who advocate a biblical conception of the imitatio Dei: ‘The 
idea of the imitation of God rests ultimately on the belief in a God who has been brought 
down to human level, and this God is never found in the Old Testament’.74  
If Rodd’s arguments have substance, and the purpose of the texts is simply to reinforce the 
exhortation to obey God’s commandments, then there is no convincing textual evidence that 
the imitation of God is an OT ethical concept, and we may have to abandon the hope that 
God could be regarded as the ultimate moral exemplar required by a VE theory, theistically 
understood. But are his arguments in fact as devastating as they sound? 
                                                 
68 Rodd, Glimpses, 69. He adds, by way of explanation, that the phrase is ‘“because (kî) I am holy”, not 
“according to my holiness”’ (n. 16, 69.). 
69 Ibid., 68.  
70 Ibid., 65-6. He is referring to “Understanding Old Testament Ethics”, 61.  
71 Ibid., 70. 
72 Ibid., 66. 
73 For the idea that this passage refers to Yahweh’s kingship, see A. D. H. Mayes, Deuteronomy (New Century 
Bible; London: Oliphants, 1979), 210. 
74 Ibid., 76. Rodd claims that the Decalogue prohibition against making images of God testifies to error in the 
very conception of imitation. 
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4.3.  From image to imitation: a shared ethical perception? 
One way of response to Rodd’s argument that the idea of imitatio Dei entails a view of God 
‘brought down to human level’, is to return to the doctrine of the imago Dei. It is true that 
there is some dispute between the commentators over the exact meaning of the word ‘image’ 
(ṣelem), and, indeed, it is difficult to be sure what the author of Genesis 1:26-27 intended, 
since the Hebrew word is rare and the root has no verbal equivalent.75 The traditional view, 
however, is that ṣelem implies some ontological resemblance; for example, both God and 
man are relational beings, and possess reason and will.76 In this resemblance, then, we have a 
basis for imitation. But does this resemblance extend to a shared ethical perception? 
In support of this idea we might note Hempel’s comment that, as a moral being, Yahweh is 
bound by at least some of the morality he demands of human beings.77 Commenting on 
Hosea 11:1-9, Otto observes that self-mastery in overcoming anger is as necessary for 
humans as it is for God; indeed, it is an important feature of imitatio Dei.78 Barton goes 
further and argues that the whole ‘moral atmosphere’ of the Old Testament is predicated on 
the idea that such a shared conception exists;79 for example, he argues that without it, 
Abraham’s questioning of God’s intention to destroy Sodom makes little sense, since the 
dialogue presumes a shared conception of just action.80 He proposes that, even in the absence 
of an explicit call to imitation, ‘God is not only the commander but also the paradigm of all 
moral conduct’, and this is only possible because an a priori affinity exists between God and 
                                                 
75 Most of its occurrences refer to some physical image (e.g. 1 Sam 6:5; Ezek 16:17; Num 33:52). By contrast, 
the meaning of ‘likeness’ (demût) is far more transparent: the verb dmh means ‘to be like, resemble’. See 
Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15 (Word Biblical Commentary; Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1987), 29.  
76 In the twentieth century, other views appeared which were based more on function rather than ontology. One 
idea is that man was created to be God’s representative on earth, ruling on his behalf, and that this dominion 
defines the image of God in him. Another is that the image is essentially relational, and is manifested both in the 
human-divine relationship and relationships with each other. The former appeals to Gen 1:26b, and the latter to 
Gen 1:27. See C. John Collins, Genesis 1-4: A Linguistic, Literary, and Theological Commentary, (Phillipsburg, 
New Jersey: P&R Publishing Co., 2006), 62-3. These views need not be mutually exclusive, and there may be 
some truth in all of them, so that there may be several aspects to the idea that imitation is based on the image of 
God in human beings.    
77 JHWH lege sich Regel und Richtschnur auf, wie er der Menschen an Regel und Richtschnur binde. (‘Yahweh 
applies a rule and measure to himself, just as he binds human beings to a rule and measure’). Hempel, Das 
Ethos, 202. (Barton’s translation, “The Basis of Ethics”, 18).    
78 In der Selbstüberwindung liegt der Schlüssel zur Aufhebung der Dialektik von Gewalt und Gegengewalt. (‘In 
self-mastery lies the key to the transcendence of the dialectic of violence and counter-violence’). Otto, 
Theologische Ethik, 111. (Houston’s translation, “The Character of YHWH”, 3) 
79 Barton, “Imitation of God”, 38. 
80 Gen 18:25: ‘Far be it from you to do such a thing, to slay the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous 
fare as the wicked! Far be that from you! Shall not the Judge of all the earth do what is just?’   
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man; this affinity not only enables a shared ethical perception, but also makes the human 
being, in the words of Barton, ‘capax Dei’.81 The imitatio Dei concept, then, might be 
thought of as supervening on the doctrine of the imago Dei, thus enabling that shared ethical 
perception. Two points are worth noting here. Firstly, there is something in the notion of a 
shared perception which a biblical theist might find unsettling. Secondly, the word ‘affinity’ 
just seems too vague a term on which to hang such an important statement. What is under 
discussion here is the very nature of morality, conceived along theistic lines. We shall review 
Barton’s argument and its implications for our hope that God could be conceived as supreme 
moral exemplar in a theistic VE theory. 
Barton suggests that the concept of imitation was not as problematic for the people of Israel 
as it often may seem to be to the modern reader.82 He says that the biblical writers ‘were sure 
that God shares our own moral ideals, and hence that in carrying those ideals into action we 
are doing very much what he would do himself, and it still seems reasonable to call that 
“imitation of God”, within the Old Testament’s own terms of reference’.83 The assumption 
that human beings and God share an ethical agenda means, according to Barton, that ‘in 
practice that we attribute to him ethical standards which we ourselves perceive as correct’; 
although it may seem that in doing this we are making God in our own image, it is justified 
on the basis of the ‘affinity’ between ourselves and God. He continues:  
 
if we want to know what it would be like for God to be good, then we look at a good 
human being and extrapolate that person’s moral qualities on to the divine plane. This 
is, as it were, a biblical parallel to the scholastic doctrine of analogy: it says that 
humankind retains traces of its divine origin and therefore can offer some clues, 
however inadequate, to what God is like.84 
 
But one might feel that there is something deeply troubling about the direction of fit in this 
argument. Any extrapolation of even the best of human goodness ‘on to the divine plane’ 
seems misguided at best, and at worst a clear case of man creating God in his own image: any 
                                                 
81 Barton, “Imitation of God”, 38. Further development of the rich Augustinian phrase, ‘capax Dei’, would be 
interesting.  
82  ‘YHWH is a good God, in some sense that is cognate with what people in Israel thought of as good in human 
beings, and it therefore made sense to try to imitate him’. Barton, “Imitation of God”, 38. 
83 Ibid., 41. 
84 Ibid., 40. The phrase ‘divine origin’ presumably refers to human creation in the image of God. 
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‘affinity’ then becomes a posteriori, and not a priori.85 But can such a ‘created’ God bear the 
weight of an ethical theory? This is, after all, what we are investigating here. Such a line of 
thought does not appear to be any more promising than was the search for the Aristotelian 
phronimos. 
Secondly, Barton does not seem to make clear the exact nature and implications of this 
‘affinity’. What can this ‘affinity’ mean if God is only ‘in some very remote sense’ like us? 
Does he mean that the morality is part of human nature just as it is part of God’s nature, a 
result of the image of God on us?86 Or does he mean that there is some common moral 
obligation, binding on both God and man?87 Abraham’s question in Genesis 18:25 may be 
interpreted as evidence for the latter thought. Rodd has taken this idea a stage further, 
suggesting that Abraham sets up his own standard over against God. Against Barton, he 
argues that a divine command perception of ethics is ‘outmoded’ because mankind has 
advanced ethically;88 and denies that God could ever be envisaged as ‘the paradigm of all 
moral conduct’, for ‘the ethics move from humanity to God and not the other way round’.89     
But we do not have to accept the argument concerning a shared ethical perception in order to 
retain a biblical conception of imitatio Dei. Nathan MacDonald has an interesting alternative 
interpretation of Genesis 18:25, and argues that a close study of the text reveals that Abraham 
has in fact misunderstood Yahweh.90 While attention is often drawn to the parallel between 
Genesis 18 and Ezekiel 18,91 Macdonald points out that the parallel with Psalm 103 has been 
                                                 
85 Barton does offer some clarification, but this does not seem entirely satisfactory: ‘in the order of knowing, we 
reason from humans to God, but this is only legitimate because, in the order of being, we derive all our good 
qualities from him in the first place’. Ibid., 40 [original italics]. 
86 He appears to say this at one point: ‘if we attribute our own good qualities to God, that is because God has 
revealed them to us in the first place, as real echoes of his character’ (p. 41). 
87 This clearly has implications for our understanding of the omnipotence of God.   
88 Abraham’s dialogue with Yahweh ‘marks one high point in the ethical thought of the Old Testament’. Cyril S. 
Rodd, “Shall Not the Judge of All the Earth Do What Is Just? (Gen 1825).” The Expository Times 83, no. 5 
(1972): 139. Rodd insists that we also should ‘dare to ask the question’ which Abraham asked.  
89 Rodd, Glimpses, 68. Interestingly, Walter Brueggemann appeals to the tiqqûn sôpĕrîm in v. 22 in support of 
the interpretation that Abraham is in fact Yahweh’s teacher. According to this theory, there was an original 
version which described Yahweh as standing before Abraham, that is, in the position of one being taught; the 
Masoretic scribes thought this unfitting and so amended the text. Walter Brueggemann, Genesis: A Bible 
Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (IBC; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), 168.   
90 Nathan MacDonald, “Listening to Abraham - Listening to Yhwh: Divine Justice and Mercy in Genesis 18:16-
33.” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 66, no. 1 (2004): 37-41. A few verses earlier (18:19), Abraham is informed 
by Yahweh that he is to teach his descendants ‘to keep the way of the LORD by doing righteousness and 
justice’: the way of the Lord is prior to Abraham’s questioning.   
91 A common suggestion is that both texts are evidence that the old notion of corporate responsibility is being 
replaced with one which emphasises the responsibility of the individual. But see Barnabas Lindars for a 
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neglected, and that in fact this psalm is closer to the Genesis text. Like the Ezekiel passage, 
the psalm links ‘the way of Yahweh’ and his ‘doing of righteousness and justice’ with his 
forgiving the sin of the Israelites, but it also, most crucially, links that act of forgiving to the 
intervention of a prophet: ‘Yhwh has decided to examine the conduct of a city with the 
possibility of judging it; and, Abraham, like the prophets, is given insight into the plans of 
Yhwh in order that he might make intercession’.92 Rather than Abraham attempting to teach 
Yahweh, the opposite is true; to be an intercessor, Abraham must first learn about the 
forgiveness and mercy of Yahweh, which turns out to be greater than he expected.93 
Macdonald argues that this text has been misunderstood because it is Abraham’s voice which 
is usually heard, while Yahweh’s voice has been ignored. His interpretation is useful in two 
respects. Firstly, it explains Abraham’s future intercessions.94 And secondly, and crucially for 
the argument here, it affirms the moral character of God. It is to the character of Yahweh as 
portrayed in the OT texts to which we now must turn.  
4.4.  The character of Yahweh and the implications for imitatio Dei 
We have already alluded to the fact that a major difficulty for the person who advocates a 
biblical conception of the imitatio Dei concerns the analysis of the character and actions of 
Yahweh as he is portrayed in the texts. Very often, in the secondary literature, the emphasis is 
on the ‘dark side’ of the deity resulting in an almost Marcionite disdain for the God of the 
Old Testament,95 while the many textual evidences for the more positive side of God’s 
                                                 
considered argument against this simplified observation: he believes the important distinction between criminal 
responsibility (a legal matter) and divine retribution is often ignored in discussions concerning individual 
responsibility. Barnabas Lindars, “Ezekiel and Individual Responsibility” VT 15 (1965): 452-67. See also Joel 
S. Kaminsky, Corporate Responsibility in the Hebrew Bible (JSOTSup 196; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1995). 
92 MacDonald, “Listening”, 39. Even though it takes a different form to later examples, such as Moses (Exod 
32), and Amos (Amos 7:1-6) who ask for forgiveness from Yahweh and are granted a stay of execution, this is 
the first instance in the canonical text of prophetic intercession. Claus Westermann thinks it is not so much 
intercession as ‘question and answer’. Claus Westermann, Genesis 12-36: A Commentary (trans John J. 
Scullion; London: SPCK, 1986), 291.  
93 Rather than act as harsh judge, Yahweh has agreed to Abraham’s every request; it is the patriarch who 
stopped ‘bartering’ at ten righteous people.  
94 Having learnt about the character of God, Abraham could intercede on behalf of Abimelech and his household 
(Gen 20: 17).  
95 See for example James L. Crenshaw, A Whirlpool of Torment: Israelite Traditions of God as an Oppressive 
Presence (OBT; Philadelphia, Pa.: Fortress Press, 1984); R. N. Whybray, “‘Shall Not the Judge of All the Earth 
Do What Is Just?’: God’s Oppression of the Innocent in the Old Testament”, in David Penchansky and Paul L. 
Redditt (eds.), Shall Not the Judge of All the Earth Do What Is Right?: Studies on the Nature of God in Tribute 
to James L. Crenshaw (Winona Lake, IA: Eisenbrauns, 2000). 
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character are ignored.96 It could be argued, perhaps, that such conceptions of God are the 
inevitable result of the atomising effect of historical criticism. The actions of Yahweh are 
often viewed in isolation and often out of context, with little attempt to understand them as a 
part of scripture as a whole or even as part of the particular book as a whole. In fact, an 
unconscious polytheism often creeps in: we find ourselves encountering the God of Isaiah, 
the God of the Exodus, the God of J or the God of P. Such studies certainly militate against 
the concept of imitation as part of a working ethical theory. Again, the advantage of a 
canonical reading of the texts is that any underlying unity behind the final form of the text 
might become visible, and the more problematic texts might be illuminated by reading them 
in the context of the whole.97  
Certainly, to deny or dodge the existence of difficult passages in the OT is naive and at best 
unhelpful, but a concentration on those texts to the exclusion of the rest of the canon is 
disingenuous and cannot lead to balanced answers to the perennial questions concerning the 
nature of God, the nature of man, and the nature of morality. And it is surely a balanced 
reflection which is required if the people of God are to have any confidence in the traditional 
scripture of their faith. There is a practical as well as theoretical aspect to all of this. The 
people of God need to find answers to the genuinely perplexing questions in their sacred 
texts, so that those texts in turn can shed light on how those people are to live morally in their 
own historical contexts. What we can glean, therefore, about the character of God in the Old 
Testament, has obvious and serious implications not only for biblical studies or for the study 
of Old Testament ethics, but for practical theology and ethics in the reader’s own context. 
This point is brought sharply into focus in any discussion of imitatio Dei: if God is to be the 
moral exemplar, and his attributes to form a basis for human virtues, then his character must 
be held to be beyond reproach. The constructive aspect of this thesis, as stated in the 
Introduction, included the construction of a bridge between the ‘there’ of the biblical text and 
                                                 
96 It is interesting that Norman Whybray acknowledges this in the introduction to his article on the immorality of 
God. R. N. Whybray, “The Immorality of God: reflections on some passages in Genesis, Job, Exodus and 
Numbers” JSOT 72 (1996): 89-120. On p. 89 he states: ‘It is important to note that the negative portrayals of 
God in these episodes are far outweighed by the overwhelmingly positive view of him as creator, saviour and 
guide characteristic of these books as a whole’. See Eryl W. Davies The Immoral Bible: Approaches to Biblical 
Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 2010), for a comprehensive and useful survey of different approaches to ethically 
problematic passages of Scripture.   
97 Of course, a devotee of historical criticism, may respond that canonical readings are an example of premodern 
naivety and that there is no evidence from the texts for a unitary conception of Yahweh. 
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the ‘here’ of the contemporary world. And a shared perception, insofar as this is possible, of 
the character of God is a crucial part of this construction. 
4.4.1. Yahweh: God of justice? 
We have already argued that a substantive concept of the virtue of justice is central to the 
production of a VE theory, and so if the theist is hoping to incorporate the idea that God is the 
supreme moral exemplar, she needs to be sure that this God is just. But the very suggestion 
that God is a God of justice, is often subject to the fiercest criticism from OT scholars. 
From his study of Isaiah, Andrew Davies accuses Yahweh of acting in ways which are not 
consistent with the standards he required of his people. For example, his punishments are out 
of proportion to the crimes, he punishes the wrong people, and he demands repentance while 
making it impossible for the people to repent.98 Houston denounces ‘the God of Isaiah’ as 
‘amoral’,99 and although the Exodus account could be understood as an act of justice whereby 
the patron of Israel frees his people from oppression, and therefore a model for the justice 
required of the slave owner in Deuteronomy 15, Houston believes that the account of the 
hardening of Pharaoh’s heart raises questions about the justice of Yahweh as world ruler.100 
Barton is less forthright in his condemnation, but does comment that God emerges from the 
text of Isaiah as ‘a far more inscrutable figure than is compatible with any notion that human 
beings can or should imitate him’.101 Barton also detects an apparent conflict between the 
justice of God and the standard of justice expected of human beings in two texts from the 
same OT book (Deuteronomy).102 However, in an explanation which contains echoes of 
Rodd, he argues that later texts, such as Ezekiel 18, attempt to correct this portrayal of divine 
ethics in order to ‘approximate divine conduct more closely to the model of human 
morality’.103   
Divine inscrutability can cause serious difficulties for an understanding of the question of 
justice, as we will see shortly in our discussion of Amos, and these difficulties in turn impact 
                                                 
98 Andrew Davies, Double Standards in Isaiah: Re-evaluating Prophetic Ethics and Divine Justice (Leiden: 
Brill, 2000), 120-155. 
99 Houston, "The Character of YHWH”, 5. 
100 Ibid., 18-25. 
101 Barton, “Imitation of God”, 44.   
102 Ibid., 44. In Deuteronomy 24:16, the people are told to judge each person according to his own sin; yet in 
Deuteronomy 5:9, God holds the children accountable to the third and fourth generation. Cf. Ex 20:5. 
103 Ibid., 44. 
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any notion of imitation in the realm of justice. We can recall that the Aristotelian virtuous 
agent is the just individual, for justice is complete virtue. And in the OT, a just person is one 
who acts in accordance with righteousness. Doubts therefore about the justice of God, if 
proven, would disqualify him from being the moral exemplar which we seek for our theistic 
virtue ethical theory.   
If we accept, and we surely must, that God’s acts of mišpāṭ are beyond human imitation, and 
even hard to fully comprehend,104 we might consider imitation of the principles of justice 
which lie behind them. If we interpret God’s justice in the light of his love, then perhaps it is 
the love behind the justice which should be the subject of imitation. In his discussion of the 
book of Job, Gustavo Gutiérrez has some insights which may be helpful here. Prior to his 
encounter with God, Job, along with his friends, had equated divine justice with retribution, 
according to which God allocates suffering as punishment for wrongdoing. But in the wake 
of his own suffering, this made no sense to Job, for he knew he was innocent. How, then, was 
he to understand God’s justice? It was only after God spoke for the second time (40:9-14), 
that he finally understood that justice did not delimit God.  
 
What is it that Job has understood? That justice does not reign in the world God has 
created? No. The truth that he has grasped and that has lifted him to the level of 
contemplation is that justice alone does not have the final say about how we are to 
speak about God. Only when we have come to realize that God’s love is freely 
bestowed do we enter fully and definitively into the presence of the God of faith. 
Grace is not opposed to the quest for justice nor does it play it down; on the contrary, 
it gives it its full meaning. God’s love, like all true love, operates on a world not of 
cause and effect but of freedom and gratuitousness.105   
 
 
Although God’s acts of mišpāṭ are beyond human imitation, for we lack his omniscience and 
moral perfection, the principles on which his justice is based may not be. Indeed, the love of 
God, which lies behind his justice, should be the primary object of our imitation. It is God’s 
complete and unconditional love, a love which is free from the pressure of expectation or the 
requirement of due payment, which is the prior concept, and it is this love which makes sense 
of the prophets’ cry for mercy even under the threat of divine judgment. Since it is love that 
                                                 
104 We might think, for example, of the judgment of Korah, Dathan and Abiram (Num 16), or the judgment of 
Achan (Josh 7:10-26). R. E. Clements believes that the only moral lesson which emerges from this narrative is 
the ‘helpful reminder of the dangers of religion’. R. E. Clements, “Achan’s Sin: Warfare and Holiness”, in 
Penchansky and Redditt (eds), Shall Not the Judge of All the Earth Do What Is Right?, 126. 
105 Gustavo Gutiérrez, The God of Life (London: SCM Press, 1991), 162. 
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undergirds God’s justice, love should undergird human justice too. We shall revisit the 
themes of the love and justice of God in our final chapter when we encounter Yahweh in the 
book of Amos. 
4.5.  The OT and imitatio Dei: concluding thoughts 
From our study of the OT texts, we have seen that it can be argued, against Rodd, that the 
idea of imitatio Dei, correctly understood, can be found in the OT. Rather than being an 
attempt to bring God ‘down to human level’, imitation has the aim of lifting the human up to 
the divine. Moral exemplarism is premised on the idea that moral perception is not innate, but 
must be inculcated. The notion of a shared ethical perception based on an ‘affinity’ between 
the human being and God, is therefore not a helpful one. We can surely admit that, as created 
beings, we can only ever partially comprehend the infinite and perfect being whom we call 
God; we have seen, for example, that it is quite conceivable that Abraham misunderstood 
Yahweh in Genesis 18:25. But our lacking a complete comprehension of God does not entail 
that we must find him utterly inscrutable, for we do possess a written revelation. As we have 
already commented, one advantage of a canonical reading of the texts is that any problematic 
texts can be illuminated by reading them in the context of the whole. And so, we can 
appreciate the character of Yahweh as revealed in the canonical text as a whole, 
understanding, for example, his justice in the light of his love. We can conclude, therefore, 
that the character of God, as revealed in the OT as a whole, can be regarded as an example of 
the virtues, and so provide a moral exemplar for a theistic version of VE theory. 
5. Conclusion 
Virtue ethics requires a robust concept of the moral exemplar if the theory is to be 
normatively useful, for the moral agent needs a way of knowing what the virtues actually 
look like. This chapter has considered whether a theistic version of VE theory can regard God 
as the supreme moral exemplar, and embodiment of the virtues, and therefore the answer to 
the epistemological aspect of moral exemplarism. In other words, is the concept of imitatio 
Dei useful to a theistic ethical theory? Can we, and indeed should we, imitate God? 
We began with a discussion of the understanding of the imitatio Dei in Judaism where 
imitation is most often understood in terms of holiness. Holiness in rabbinic thought, we 
discovered, is tied to practical ethics and the narrative of a people in a covenant relationship 
with their God. It was concluded that, if God is to be understood as moral exemplar in a VE 
theory, then imitation of his holiness cannot be reduced to his actions, as the rabbis held, but 
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should be extended to encompass his character as well. Next, we then encountered the 
problem raised by negative theology: since positive attributes cannot be ascribed to God, 
imitation must be restricted to his actions. It was suggested that this objection could be met 
by a cataphatic theology based on the thought of Anselm. Positive statements can be made 
about the character of God in ordinary language, while still declaring him to be greater in 
every category than it is possible for the human being to conceive. And a God who is morally 
perfect is not only worthy of worship but is the perfect moral exemplar.     
Lastly, we turned to the text of the OT to assess how the idea of imitation was addressed by 
OT scholars. We saw that certain scholars, notably Hempel, Otto and Davies, were convinced 
that imitatio Dei was a thoroughly biblical notion. Rodd, however, disagreed, claiming that 
scholars who argue for an OT concept of imitatio Dei are merely reading into the texts their 
own ideas and the virtues which appeal to them; the biblical world is, after all, ‘a foreign 
country on which we gaze’.106 We also noted that, after some earlier enthusiasm, Barton 
ultimately finds the concept of imitatio Dei rather limited, and doubts that the character of 
Yahweh as the OT reveals him, is a suitable candidate for imitation. He suggests that modern 
people who might find the idea of the imitatio Dei appealing ‘do not find God inscrutable 
enough’, and should content themselves with awe.107 Further reflection, however, might 
encourage the theist not to abandon the hope that God could be understood as the moral 
exemplar in a normative ethical theory. The fact that there is much inscrutable about God, 
even following his self-revelation, does not entail abandoning all attempts to know him better 
in order to imitate him better; it is hard to explain away the few but clear commands in the 
OT to do so. Certainly, imitation of Yahweh should always follow careful reflection on his 
character as revealed in scripture as a whole. But imitation of God as the only morally perfect 
being makes perfect sense if the basis of our ethics is a virtuous life, and the ultimate telos of 
that life is, as we are arguing, a flourishing relationship with God. This is consistent with the 
argument so far in this thesis: imitation aims at virtue, and virtue aims at the kalon, which is 
ultimately God himself.  
It is therefore concluded that imitatio Dei, correctly understood and applied with wisdom, is 
not only a biblical notion, but can indeed serve as a theistic alternative to imitation of the 
Aristotelian phronimos, and supply an epistemological model of the moral exemplar which 
                                                 
106 Rodd, Glimpses, 76. 
107 Barton, “Imitation of God”, 42, 45. 
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could be incorporated into a theistic VE theory. In the final chapter, we will re-examine the 
concept of the imitatio Dei in the light of the character of God as we find him portrayed in 
Amos. 
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Chapter Five 
Normativity and the Limits of Virtue Ethics 
 
 
the concepts of obligation, and duty – moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say 
– and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought’, ought to 
be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or 
derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer 
generally survives, and are only harmful without it.   
G.E.M. Anscombe1   
 
So far in this thesis we have discussed three of the four conditions of adequacy which, as we 
argued in Chapter One, a VE theory must satisfy in order to be normatively useful; they were 
the concepts of telos, virtue, and the moral exemplar. We now turn to the fourth and last of 
these conditions, which is an adequate account of normativity. 
1. Introduction 
Normativity seems an inescapable part of human existence, both for the individual and for 
society.2 Whether we are consciously aware of it or not, standards or norms lie behind every 
judgment which we express in the language of good and bad, right and wrong, reasonable and 
unreasonable. If the action being contemplated or observed is in accordance with the 
appropriate norm, we call it good, right, reasonable; otherwise it is bad, wrong, unreasonable. 
This much is verifiable. And a similar reasoning applies to the evaluation of character, for the 
concepts of goodness and virtue imply norms to which a character may or may not conform. 
If this is true, then how do we respond to the challenge Elizabeth Anscombe presents in the 
above quotation? If it indeed seems impossible to endorse her view, and expunge the ‘ought’ 
from our moral vocabulary altogether, lest ‘harm’ be done,3 then the only option is to argue 
for its retention, not only because it might not be ‘psychologically possible’ to get rid of it, 
but also because it does not seem practically possible to do so. Although one of the 
arguments in favour of a VE approach to ethical theory is its perceived freedom from the 
                                                 
1 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 1. 
2 See Onora O'Neill, “Introduction”, Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: CUP, 
1996), xi. 
3 Anscombe’s thesis is premised on the widespread acceptance of the philosophical death of God. The harm 
which might result is presumably due to the lack of subsequent agreement over a replacement concept.    
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moral ought, it is hard in practice to conceive of morality in the complete absence of norms. 
But if we admit the existence of norms, then we must be able to explain how these norms are 
justified and what is the basis of their authority. Do they bind us, as the ‘oughts’ and ‘musts’ 
and ‘shoulds’ of our moral sentences would appear to indicate, and if so how?4 In short: What 
is the source of normativity? This seeking after a justification of the claims which morality 
makes on us is what Christine Korsgaard calls ‘the normative question’.5 
Since the aim of this thesis is to construct a theistic version of VE theory, we are appealing to 
‘an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives’: that is, a conception 
which is grounded in God. In the absence of God, the secular philosopher who advocates the 
retention of the idea of obligation must find an alternative source for the binding power 
implicit in moral sentences:6 Hugo Grotius famously said that obligations ‘would have a 
degree of validity even if we should concede (etiamsi daremus) that which cannot be 
conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are 
of no concern to Him’.7 The theist, on the other hand, has traditionally had two options open 
to her in seeking an explanation of morality’s binding power. One is theological voluntarism, 
and the other is natural law.8 The question before this chapter is whether CVE has the 
theoretical resources to answer the normative question, as many of its proponents claim. And 
                                                 
4 ‘Obligation’ comes from the Latin ligare (‘to bind’). We might note that although normativity stands in a 
relation to obligation, it is not necessarily reducible to it. Obligation is often thought to be confined to the realm 
of moral principles, whereas norms operate in a broader sphere where conformity is often more optional than 
binding.   
5 Korsgaard, Sources, 9-10 [original italics]. 
6 Korsgaard argues that, even if the concept of obligation has lost its theoretical roots and has to be understood 
differently, it is essential to retain it, for, ultimately, it is ‘what makes us human’. Korsgaard, Sources, 5. Her 
own position follows Kant’s ethics of autonomy, as ‘the only one consistent with the metaphysics of the modern 
world’. Voluntarism is another nontheistic option where obligation is understood in terms of commands, or 
laws, issued by some authority figure who has the power of enforcement and sanction (Thomas Hobbes’s theory 
is one example); problems with this theory include arbitrariness and the possibility of infinite regress in 
appealing to higher and higher authorities. Moral realism is another possible route: reasons, values and 
obligations are objective entities in the world and in some sense self-evident. See chapters 1 and 2 of The 
Sources of Normativity for a helpful survey of these theories. 
7 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, (1625), in J. B. Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne 
to Kant: An Anthology (2 vols. Cambridge: CUP, 1990), Vol. 1, “Prolegomena”, 11, 92: ‘etiamsi daremus’ is 
often used as shorthand for this famous thought.   
8 Both these theories can be understood along normative and metaethical lines, but it is the metaethical 
formulations which aim to answer the normative question. Normative theories hold that certain normative states 
of affairs obtain, for example the state of its being obligatory to obey God. Metaethical theories, on the other 
hand, make no assumptions about states of affairs obtaining but aim to explain the nature of, and relations 
between, moral properties or concepts; for example, the relation between states of affairs and the divine will.  
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if the explanatory ambitions of virtue ethics fall short of their goal, we must ask which of the 
alternative theories are best suited to fill the gap and supplement VE theory. 
Our purpose in the current chapter is therefore two-fold: firstly, we shall assess the objections 
to, and responses from, CVE theory with regard to the normative question, and, secondly, we 
shall consider the theoretical options open to the theist who remains drawn to virtue ethics as 
a normative theory but recognises limits in its ability to answer this question. The chapter will 
begin with a discussion of the problems facing virtue ethics in its attempts to explain the 
source of normativity. We shall limit our discussion to the two main theoretical alternatives, 
the neo-Aristotelian or agent-focussed account and the agent-based variety, and concentrate 
on the theories of the main proponents of each, Rosalind Hursthouse and Michael Slote 
respectively. It will be argued that, in whichever direction we go, CVE encounters serious 
objections to its ability to provide an answer to the normative question, and if the ethicist still 
sees value in VE as a normative theory, it must be in a partnership with some other theory 
which does have the required explanatory power. It will be suggested that a satisfactory route 
for the theist is to adopt a modified version of Aquinas’s natural law theory to work in 
parallel with her VE theory.    
2. Normativity and virtue ethics 
Despite the plurality of its forms, a common feature of CVE, in addition to its commitment to 
virtue (however defined), is the idea that the virtuous person is somehow the determiner of 
right action: it is the virtuous person, or more correctly, the virtues, which are understood as 
the source of normativity. Exactly how the relation between the virtues and the standard of 
correctness is conceived varies from theory to theory. Two types of assertion are possible 
with regard to the judgments of the virtuous person: a metaphysical assertion states that these 
judgments constitute the standard of correctness; an epistemological assertion states that 
these judgments enable us to know this standard. Although they are clearly related, it is the 
metaphysical assertion which concerns us here.   
2.1.  The objections 
To be classed as a normative theory, virtue ethics must be able to supply an account of right 
action. But any such account relies on metaethical assumptions about the standard of 
correctness. We shall now consider the objections levelled at CVE theory over its ability to 
provide, and more importantly justify, such a standard: this will enable us to assess the 
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theory’s ability to answer the normative question. Ramon Das provides a clear summary of 
the common objections:   
 
Can virtue ethics provide a distinctive and plausible standard of rightness? There is a 
natural objection that it cannot, which goes roughly like this: evaluating action 
requires attention to worldly consequences external to the agent, whereas virtue ethics 
is primarily, perhaps exclusively, concerned with evaluating an agent’s inner states. 
Call this the insularity objection . . . Insofar as [accounts of right action] meet the 
insularity objection they rely upon putatively virtue-ethical considerations that 
themselves crucially depend upon unexplained judgements of rightness. Such 
accounts thus invite the circularity objection.9  
 
The neo-Aristotelian versions of CVE theory, such as those of Rosalind Hursthouse and 
Linda Zagzebski, are most vulnerable to the circularity objection. The virtuous agent is the 
person who perceives correctly what is good and noble, and then acts on the basis of that 
perception:10 what is good and noble, therefore, appears to be external to the agent. These 
accounts, sometimes described as ‘agent-focussed’, can be contrasted with the more radical 
‘agent-based’ accounts which hold that the good and noble is only good and noble because it 
has been, or will be, chosen by the virtuous agent. This latter version must overcome the 
insularity objection, as well as an objection from common sense. We shall examine both 
types of theory in the light of these objections, beginning with the ‘agent-based’ theory of 
Michael Slote. 
2.2.  Normativity on an agent-based account 
In Chapter Three, we saw that in an agent-based account of VE, virtue is fundamental and 
explanatorily primary. The moral status of acts is ‘entirely derivative from independent and 
fundamental aretaic (as opposed to deontic) ethical characterizations of motives, character 
traits, or individuals’.11 In contrast to other normative theories, an agent’s motivation is 
crucial for moral evaluation.12 Indeed, to Slote an action can be right only if it is done from 
                                                 
9 Ramon Das, “Virtue Ethics and Right Action.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 3 (2003): 324-39, 
324 [original italics]. 
10 See NE II 1105a17ff.  
11 Slote, Morals from Motives, 5.  
12 Cf. utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill, for example, writes: ‘He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does 
what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble’. John Stuart Mill, 
“Utilitarianism”, Chapter 2, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: OUP, 1991), 149.  To Kant, the only morally 
significant motive is duty; indeed, it is required to make an act morally good. Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: 
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (London: Routledge classics, 2006), 68-71 [orig. ed. pp. 8-13].                    
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virtuous motives. However, can a theory which holds that the standard of rightness derives 
from the motives of the virtuous agent answer the normative question? We shall consider the 
answer to this in the light of two strong objections to agent-based VE, an objection from 
common sense and the insularity objection. Since Slote is the most significant advocate for 
agent-based VE, we shall confine ourselves to his work and the comment it generates.13 
2.2.1. The objection from common sense 
Since Slote’s theory makes no appeal to anything outside the agent, it is not vulnerable to the 
circularity objection. But it is open to other objections. One of these we can call ‘the 
objection from common sense’. Slote summarises it as follows:  
 
One thing that seems wrong in principle with any agent-based (or even agent-prior)14 
approach to moral evaluation is that it appears to obliterate the common distinction 
between doing the right thing and doing the right thing for the right reasons.15 
 
If motives are held to be constitutive of the rightness (or wrongness) of an act, then the same 
action might be right when done by one agent, with good motives, and wrong when 
performed by another, with bad ones. In tackling this objection, Slote borrows Henry 
Sidgwick’s well-known example of the malicious prosecutor who performs his duty in 
prosecuting, but whose motivation in doing so is malice rather than a sense of duty.16 An 
agent-based account seems committed to the conclusion that, in performing his duty, the 
prosecutor acted wrongly. So how can one make sense of duty, or obligation, in agent-based 
terms? In his response, Slote considers the situation where the prosecutor, ‘horrified by his 
own malice’, refrains from prosecuting.17 In the failure to perform his duty, or at least to 
recuse himself and allow someone else to prosecute, the prosecutor exhibits bad motives, 
such as a lack of concern for the public good which his job served. Since he again acts from 
bad motives, albeit different ones, once more he can be said to have acted wrongly. With this 
                                                 
13 In addition to Morals from Motives, see Michael Slote, “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 20, no. 1 (1995): 83-101 and idem, From Morality to Virtue. 
14 ‘Agent-prior’ theories are closer to ‘agent-based’ ones than the agent-focussed variety, but do not hold the 
virtues to be theoretically fundamental. Slote cites Plato’s theory as an example of ‘agent-prior’ VE. See Morals 
from Motives, 4-9.  
15 Slote, Morals from Motives, 13. 
16 Ibid., 13-15. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (7th ed. London: Macmillan, 1907), 202-3. Sidgwick in 
his turn borrowed the example from Jeremy Bentham. 
17 Slote, Morals from Motives, 14. 
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move, Slote concludes that agent-based virtue ethics can explain why a prosecutor has a duty 
to prosecute, since a failure to do so is evidence of bad motives; but this duty can be 
performed either for the right reasons (right action) or for the wrong reasons (wrong action).18 
This response is not entirely convincing, however, and a couple of objections can be raised 
immediately. 
Firstly, Slote does not explain the duty of the badly-motivated agent; he has simply defined it 
in terms of the motives exhibited in the event of a failure to do the duty. But the duty cannot 
depend on the status of that agent’s motives in performing it; it must be defined 
independently. Secondly, as Michael Brady has observed, an interesting paradox seems to 
emerge:  
 
if Slote is right, and the prosecutor does indeed have a duty to prosecute, then his 
motives in prosecuting would seem to change what he has a duty to do. Thus if he has 
a duty to prosecute, because a failure to do so would express a bad motive, then his 
doing his duty from a malicious motive means that it would be wrong for him to 
prosecute, and thus means that he doesn’t have a duty to prosecute after all. Instead, 
given his malicious motive, our prosecutor has a duty not to prosecute.19 
 
Liezl van Zyl attempts to rescue agent-based virtue ethics from this common-sense 
objection.20 He suggests that we need not follow Slote in attempting to derive action-guiding 
principles directly from criteria of right action, and offers a revised agent-based account. In 
this, the criterion of action assessment remains tied to the motives of the actual agent, but a 
corresponding principle of action-guidance can be derived from an account of the motives of 
the hypothetical virtuous person.21 The amended propositions might look like this:   
AA: An action is right if and only if it exhibits or expresses a virtuous motive, or at 
least does not exhibit or express a vicious motive 
                                                 
18 Slote, Morals from Motives, 14-15.    
19 Michael S. Brady, “Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.” Philosophical Papers 33, no. 1 (2004): 1-10, 6 
[original italics]. 
20 Liezl van Zyl, “In Defence of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.” Philosophical Papers 34, no. 2 (2005): 273-88. 
For further arguments in support of agent-based theory, see Liezl van Zyl “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the 
Problem of Action Guidance.” Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, no. 1 (2009): 50-69. 
21 In his defence, van Zyl cites Hursthouse, who argues that the notions of action guidance and action 
assessment are separable in some instances. Hursthouse, OVE, 50.   
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AGh: One ought to perform the action that a virtuous person would characteristically 
choose in the circumstances.22     
By this route, van Zyl offers a way of explaining the duty of the badly-motivated agent. 
When the malicious prosecutor prosecutes, he does what he ought to do according to the 
principle of action-guidance (which does not consider actual motives); nevertheless, he acts 
wrongly, according to Slote’s criterion of right action, if he acts from malice, because his 
motives are bad. However, with this move, van Zyl appears to have departed from pure 
agent-based theory. He maintains that his account is agent-based because the moral rightness 
and praiseworthiness of the actions characteristic of the virtuous agent consist in their 
virtuous motivation and not because of any relation to eudaimonia, and he specifically denies 
that his account is any sort of ‘hybrid’.23 But, through his introduction of the notion of the 
hypothetical agent to enable the distinction between doing a right act and doing a well-
motivated act, he appears to be leaning in an Aristotelian direction.24 It seems hard to accept 
his disclaimer that AGh, is simply ‘a practical decision-making tool’ and not in any sense a 
truth maker for rightness. The result is that, despite his protestations, van Zyl appears to 
advocate a hybrid account,25 drawing on Aristotelian ideas when his own fail, while rejecting 
central Aristotelian ideas such as the unity of the virtues, the concept of eudaimonia, and the 
and the ideal of the phronimos. Van Zyl’s rescue seems to be no rescue at all. We shall now 
turn to a second objection, the ‘insularity’ objection, and consider how damaging this is for 
agent-based CVE theory in its ability to answer the normative question. 
2.2.2. The insularity objection 
Das believes that what he calls the insularity objection applies to any theory grounded in the 
agent’s motives, and that all attempts to answer it are met with the circularity objection.26 The 
objection runs as follows: since right action is constituted solely by good motives, then any 
                                                 
22 van Zyl, “In Defence”, 282. Presumably AA = action assessment, and AG = action guidance, the subscript ‘h’ 
standing for ‘hypothetical’? van Zyl does not clarify this. 
23 van Zyl, “In Defence”, 285. 
24 He also claims that his account avoids the perfectionist critique aimed at Aristotelian versions since right 
action requires only that the agent either ‘exhibits or expresses a virtuous motive’ or ‘at least does not exhibit or 
express a vicious motive’. On this account, therefore, a less-than-virtuous agent can still act rightly. van Zyl, “In 
Defence”, 282.   
25 van Zyl, “In Defence”, 285. 
26 Das, “Virtue Ethics”, 328-330.   
137 
 
 
 
action performed with good motives will be right. But since motives are (presumably) not 
completely dependent on a person’s willing them, ‘ought’ no longer ‘implies can’.27  
There are two parts to Slote’s response to this objection. Firstly, he says that to be well 
motivated, for example to exercise benevolence well, one cannot exist in ‘splendid isolation’, 
but must find out the relevant facts about the world.28 But, as Das rightly points out, if an 
agent-based focus is maintained, this line of reasoning leads to circularity: 
 
The value of (the putatively inner state of) benevolence is inextricably bound up with 
the value of certain (knowledge-gathering and/or producing) acts. And it may be 
wondered how these act-evaluations could possibly depend on the evaluations on 
inner states (i.e., benevolence) without the whole account being circular.29 
 
Secondly, Slote claims that it might be possible, on some compatibilist view of free will, to 
choose to act against one’s motives in allowing ‘genuine moral standards’ to govern one’s 
actions, even though those standards ‘operate and bind, so to speak, from within’.30  But this 
argument also seems to run counter to his main thesis that right action is constituted solely by 
good motives. If a badly motivated agent is capable of acting against his bad motives and so 
acts rightly, such right action cannot be explained on the basis of motives alone. However, 
underlying the appeal to some ‘internally’ operating ‘genuine moral standards’, seems to be 
the concept of the hypothetical moral agent who is well motivated; for it is on the basis of this 
hypothetical agent’s dispositions, and not those of the actual agent, that actions are evaluated. 
Slote’s move to attempt to accommodate the ‘ought implies can’ maxim has again introduced 
circularity.  
Concluding thoughts  
As agent-based theories attempt to explain the basis of right action, and so answer the 
normative question, they face the objections from common sense and insularity; in the 
attempt to respond to these objections, they tend to lean in an Aristotelian direction, and in so 
doing become vulnerable to the charge of circularity. It seems that agent-based CVE theory 
fails to give a satisfactory account of normativity. We shall now consider the agent-focussed 
                                                 
27 The maxim ‘ought implies can’ is usually held to be a staple of moral theory. 
28 Slote, Morals from Motives, 17-18. 
29 Das, “Virtue Ethics”, 328. 
30 Slote, Morals from Motives, 17 [original italics]. 
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account of Rosalind Hursthouse to see whether her theory has the explanatory power to 
overcome the objections. 
2.3.  Normativity on a neo-Aristotelian account 
Hursthouse’s theory is often taken to be the paradigmatic example of the type of account 
where the justification of right action appeals to the character of a hypothetical virtuous 
agent.31  She formulates right action as follows: 
 
P.1. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the 
circumstances.32   
 
But, as it stands, P.1. could equally satisfy the utilitarian and the Kantian, and so Hursthouse 
adds a subsidiary premise (P.1a) which defines the virtuous agent in terms of the virtues. 
 
P.1a. A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits, namely, 
the virtues. 
P.2. A virtue is a character trait that . . .33    
  
Hursthouse notes that P2 might be completed by providing a list or partial list of virtues, or a 
Humean description of the character trait as useful or agreeable to the agent or to others, or, 
following Aristotle, that it is required for eudaimonia.34  
2.3.1. The circularity objection 
Hursthouse is not unaware of the circularity which threatens her agent-focussed account, but 
rejects the idea that it is ‘trivially circular’, as if right action was being specified in terms of 
the virtuous agent, who in turn specifies right action.35 Such a statement, she says, is only a 
truism to those deontologists and utilitarians who import their own notions of right action into 
                                                 
31 The qualifier ‘hypothetical’ is often used to distinguish such accounts from the agent-based variety where 
rightness is grounded in the motives of an ‘actual’ agent. 
32  Hursthouse, OVE, 28. In an earlier paper Hursthouse used a simpler formulation of P.1. which omitted the 
modifier ‘characteristically’. Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, 225.  
33 Hursthouse, OVE, 29.  
34 Ibid., 29. 
35 Hursthouse, “Abortion”, 226; OVE, 30-31. 
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P.1., and then use these to define the virtuous agent. She claims that the circularity objection 
can be answered by the addition of premises P.1a and P.2. which include substantive 
accounts of virtue. The accounts are not given in terms of dispositions to right action, which 
would invite circularity; instead, the accounts of virtue are given in some other terms such as 
the dispositions required for eudaimonia.36 
By this reasoning, Hursthouse may well escape ‘the trivial circle’, but a larger circle 
threatens, which she acknowledges in a footnote in her earlier paper.37 In this paper, P.2. 
specifically mentions that the virtues were required for eudaimonia. The difficulty now is 
how to conceive of eudaimonia without relying on the concept of right action. This threat of 
circularity may explain why Hursthouse dropped eudaimonia from her revised version of 
P.2.38 In her discussion of irresolvable cases and tragic dilemmas, she admits that P.1 
struggles as a criterion of right action.39 In such situations, the virtuous agent will not emerge 
having acted well and the ‘right’ decision in that particular situation is not what the virtuous 
agent would characteristically do, since that decision may involve breaking a promise, 
betraying a trust or even letting someone die. In the end, Hursthouse struggles to maintain the 
notion of the primacy of the virtuous person which drives P.1., and in the following passage 
we see her in something of a retreat, accepting that the v-rules can be understood 
independently of the notion of the virtuous person:40 
 
I am happy to say that the notion of ‘v-acts’ is, in some way, ‘secondary to and 
dependent upon the notion of’ a virtuous person. But I construe ‘secondary to and 
dependent upon’ as something more complicated than ‘only to be defined or 
understood at all in terms of’. The v-adjectives applied to actions have a certain 
amount of independence . . . which is encapsulated in dictionary entries and mother’s-
knee rules. The notion of the virtuous person - the courageous, or honest, or loyal one 
- is ‘primary’ in the sense that it is needed to go beyond these and provide the fine 
tuning.41 
                                                 
36 Hursthouse, “Abortion”, 226; OVE, 29. 
37 Hursthouse, “Abortion”, 226, n. 2. Intriguingly, she fails to follow up this question in OVE. 
38 In the earlier paper, eudaimonia was included in the specification of virtue in P.2. Ibid., 226. 
39 Hursthouse in fact amends her original formulation of P.1.to allow for the possibility of tragic dilemmas. 
OVE, 79. 
40 The v-rules are ‘rules’ incorporating virtues such as ‘do what is honest/ courageous/ loyal’ etc. Hursthouse, 
OVE, 37-39.     
41 Hursthouse. OVE, 80-81. In this passage, she is quoting from, and responding to, Stephen D Hudson, Human 
Character and Morality: Reflections from the History of Ideas. Boston; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1986, 42-3. She agrees with Hudson for the most part, but rejects his strong thesis that we can only understand 
what a virtue is when we track down a perfect exemplar of that virtue. 
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But if the v-adjectives such as ‘courageous’, ‘just’, etc have ‘a certain amount of 
independence’ from the notion of the virtuous person, then they must rely to some extent on a 
further, unexplained, concept, and that makes P.1 circular.42  
Although Hursthouse admits that virtue ethics may be ‘committed to some sort of 
reductionism of the concept of the Right’, she does not accept any commitment to reductive 
definitions of other moral concepts.43 On the contrary, she is clear that VE theory needs 
concepts such as the good, the advantageous and the pleasant. 
 
What constitutes the (true) good of others, and when life is and is not a good, are 
amongst the things that the virtuous person knows and can recognize, but they are not 
so because she recognizes them but because of facts about human nature.44 
 
Hursthouse remains firm in her commitment to neo-Aristotelianism, and so she still faces the 
challenge, alongside every other VE theorist who is committed to an Aristotelian 
eudaimonism, of providing an account of eudaimonia which does not rely on the concept of 
right action, and so escapes the charge of circularity.  
2.4.  Concluding thoughts  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the CVE theories examined do not have the 
explanatory power to provide an answer to the normative question on their own. It has been 
shown that agent-based accounts fall prey to and struggle to overcome the insularity and 
common-sense objections, while neo-Aristotelian or agent-focussed accounts struggle with 
the circularity objection. The only way out of this impasse seems to abandon the hope in 
CVE’s metaethical self-sufficiency, and search out some other theory capable of doing the 
                                                 
42 Das, R. “Virtue Ethics”, 333. Das is not alone in perceiving the seriousness of these objections for the future 
of CVE. See also Frans Svensson, “Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action.” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 13, no. 3 (2010): 255-71. Svensson also believes that CVE fails to supply a 
convincing answer to the objection that less-than-virtuous people could act rightly without doing what the 
virtuous person would characteristically do in the circumstances. For an optimistic response to this objection see 
Liezl van Zyl, “Right Action and the Non‐Virtuous Agent.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2011): 80-
92. 
43 Hursthouse. OVE, 82. 
44 Ibid., 82. 
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explanatory work. In the next section we will consider the possible alternatives for theistic 
ethical theory.   
The secular CVE theories which we have considered so far face epistemological problems in 
addition to the objections which we have discussed. As we have seen, they all rely to some 
extent on the concept of the virtuous agent, but where can such an agent be found, and how 
do we know when we find one? Basing a theory on motives is problematic for we usually 
have no access to a person’s motives, a point which Slote notes in passing.45 Retreating from 
the consideration of an actual agent to a hypothetical one achieves little, for how do we form 
our template for the hypothetical character? A deeper, metaphysical, danger is that through 
our reasoning about the exemplar-candidate before us, and in the absence of some external 
point of reference, it is we who become the truth-makers. However much we have been 
conditioned by existentialist thinking, the day must and will come when our internal world of 
endless choosing and becoming collides with the need to appeal for justice in the face of 
perceived wrong. Without some objective standards ‘the virtuous agent’ is in danger of 
becoming a shifting construct of our own imaginations, or worse, a hazy reflection of 
ourselves.46  
What are the implications of this discussion for the theistic version of VE which we are 
proposing in this thesis? We have argued that neo-Aristotelianism provides the best 
framework for the construction of a theistic VE. Now we have discovered that these theories 
are prone to the circularity objection. In theistic terms, this objection might run as follows: if 
right action is what the perfect virtuous agent (God) would characteristically do, and the 
virtuous agent (God) is one who acts rightly, then the argument is circular. Even if the divine 
virtues are described in a substantive way, we still face the task of explaining how and why 
these virtues are normative. Following Aristotle, we have argued that the virtues are both 
instrumental to and constitutive of eudaimonia. But if the virtues are the ground of 
normativity, and eudaimonia is defined in terms of the virtues, we have no non-circular 
account of the human good, and so no satisfactory answer to the normative question. There 
seems no way to break free of the circle, and so the only alternative remaining to the theist 
                                                 
45 Slote, Morals from Motives, 19. 
46 One thinks of Iris Murdoch’s wonderful description of the Kantian man and his ‘glorious incarnation’ in the 
existentialist and analytic philosophy of her day. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good. Routledge Classics. 
London: Routledge, 2001, 78. 
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who is attracted to VE theory, is to supplement it with some other theory which has the 
necessary explanatory power.  
We now turn to theistic accounts of ethics to see how the role of God as fundamental 
explainer of the moral law has been construed, and which theory best provides an answer to 
the normative question and perhaps supplies what has been found to be lacking in a virtue 
ethics approach. 
3. Theological answers to the normative question 
Traditionally, there are two routes to the explanation of God’s role in the grounding of 
morality. These are theological voluntarism and natural law. We shall briefly mention the 
former and subsequently argue that a partnership of VE with natural law theory can supply an 
answer to the normative question. 
3.1.  Theological voluntarism 
Theological voluntarism is the term often used to denote those theories which hold that God’s 
will is central in the determining of moral status.47 Philip Quinn expresses the relation as 
follows: 
Moral status M stands in dependency relation D to divine act A48 
Different species of theological voluntarism differ in their conception of each of the three 
factors in the above relation. That is, they vary in the range of M,49 in exact nature of the 
                                                 
47 Use of the generic term ‘theological voluntarism’ instead of the more usual ‘divine command theory’ would 
appear to be a better way to contrast the two methods since the idea of commanding seems to restrict the source 
of moral obligation to the commands themselves, rather than to God’s will in general. On this point see: Mark 
C. Murphy, God and Moral Law. On the Theistic Explanation of Morality (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 100. [hereafter 
GML] 
48 Philip L. Quinn, “Divine Command Theory” in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 53.   
49 Recent theories have reduced this range to deontic moral statuses, such as the status of being morally 
obligatory, in an attempt to defend the theory against the standard objections; the more broad-based the theory, 
the harder it is to defend. See below.    
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relation D,50 and in the particular form of the act of divine willing (A).51 An important point, 
to which we will return later, is that, however construed, the dependency relation D is 
understood to be complete and therefore unmediated.52 
Theological voluntarism is prone to two powerful objections. The first is that morality 
appears to be fundamentally arbitrary; since morality depends on God’s willing, there can be 
no justification for God’s acting in one way rather than another.53 A counter argument might 
be that God wills necessarily. But then, as Mark Murphy notes, this seems ‘either to 
understate the divine freedom or to overstate the determination of God’s commands by 
reasons’, and perhaps the appeal to necessity might simply be a way to dodge the need for an 
explanation.54 This first objection does seem to have some force. 
The second objection is that if morality is grounded in the will of God, then how can a 
substantive claim be made that God is good? Yet God must be good, that is morally good, for 
theological voluntarism to be plausible at all. One route out of this objection is to restrict the 
range of normative properties for which the theory must account. Robert Adams argues that 
speaking of God as good is still meaningful on a voluntarist view because the virtues of 
benevolence and justice are not derived from divine commands. ‘God is supremely 
knowledgeable and wise – indeed, omniscient. On the view advocated here, indeed, God is 
the Good itself, supremely beautiful and rich in nonmoral as well as moral perfection’.55 We 
might agree with Adams’s thoughts here, but still doubt that he supplies a satisfactory route 
out of the objection. We still have to find an explanation of the binding power of virtue, and 
if the theory cannot provide this, then the theory would appear to fail. Theological 
                                                 
50  For example, Quinn defends a strong form where not only are divine commands coextensive with moral 
requirements, but they are also ‘necessary and sufficient causal conditions’ for moral requirements. Quinn, 
“Divine Command Theory”, 54. The view defended by Robert Adams begins with a description of moral 
obligation which is fundamentally rational and so open to theist and nontheist, and then argues that the best 
explanation of deontic moral facts is provided by a divine command theory. Robert M. Adams, Finite and 
Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: OUP, 1999), 232-8; 252-8.  
51 For example, some hold the act to be an expressed command and others that it is a mental state, such as 
choosing or intending. 
52 See Murphy, GML, 100. 
53 The objection has less force when M embraces fewer properties; for example, if nonmoral properties are not 
included, then God might conceivably have recourse to nonmoral reasons for willing. 
54 Mark Murphy, "Theological Voluntarism", SEP, 2002, substantive revision 2012. URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/voluntarism-theological/>, 19. Murphy’s article provides a 
useful and up-to-date overview of the current theories of theological voluntarism, and the objections and 
responses. See also Murphy, GML, Chapter 4. 
55 Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 253. 
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voluntarism seems to be ultimately unhelpful in our attempt to find a solution to the 
normative question and its relation to virtue ethics.  
3.2.  Natural law theory 
An alternative way to explain the role of God in moral theory is to appeal to the natural law. 
The aim of this section is to examine the extent to which embracing natural law theory might 
give explanatory power to virtue within a VE theory, enabling it to answer the normative 
question as well as make sense of the idea of a universal morality given by God but 
constituted by, and accessible by means of, practical rationality. Thomas Aquinas, whose 
theory is usually taken to be the standard or paradigmatic version, did not see natural law and 
virtue as opposing concepts, but rather as complementary. Indeed, we find that the virtues are 
integral to his moral theory. 
In this section, we shall review the paradigmatic natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas, and 
argue that it forms a natural partnership with VE. We shall consider how natural law 
functions as a theory of practical rationality, how we determine the basic goods and how 
these goods do the work of moral necessitation. Finally, we will see how the moral ought 
might function in natural law theory, and how the natural law might answer the normative 
question. 
3.2.1. Introduction 
Some years ago, Noberto Bobbio commented, wryly but no doubt with some accuracy, that 
natural law is neither ‘natural’ to philosophers nor ‘law’ to lawyers.56 The term has certainly 
been construed so widely that attempting a definition is a tricky business. Natural law 
theories appear in jurisprudence and political philosophy as well as in moral theory. Natural 
law may even be implied in the work of Sophocles.57 And we certainly see its discussion in 
the Stoics and in Cicero, in early Christian writing (particularly in Romans 2:14-15 and in 
commentaries on the passage), in the Roman jurists, supremely in the great scholastic 
                                                 
56 Noberto Bobbio, ‘Quelques arguments contre le droit naturel’ in Le droit naturel, annals de philosophie 
politique, III, Paris, 1959, 175. Cited in Michael Bertram Crowe, “Natural Law Theory Today: Some Materials 
for the Re-assessment.” The Irish Ecclesiastical Record Fifth Series vol. CIX, (1968): 353-383, 353. 
57 For example, when Antigone disputes the validity of Creon’s decree that the body of Polynices should lie 
unburied, she appeals to ‘the unwritten and unfailing ordinances of the gods [which] have life, not simply today 
and yesterday but for ever, and no one knows how long ago they were revealed’. Sophocles, Antigone. The 
Women of Trachis. Philoctetus. Oedipus at Colonus (Edited and translated by Hugh Lloyd-Jones; LCL; 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1994), 454-457. 
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theologians of the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries,58 and finally in the secular natural 
lawyers who followed Grotius. Even within the sphere of moral theory, the conception varies 
from the recognisably Aristotelian to almost any version of moral realism. And so, when we 
consider natural law we are certainly not looking at a unified theory. Jonathan Sanford 
correctly warns us to take care when we attempt to trace any history of ‘the natural law’:  
 
Straw-man depictions of the theory abound in contemporary ethical handbooks, with 
ideas from Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and out-of-context notions from Aquinas often 
found mashed together into a supposedly representative theory called the natural 
law.59   
 
It is also interesting to note that, against much popular opinion, natural law theory was not 
confined to the Catholic Church after the Reformation, but was a perfectly ‘natural’ part of 
the theology of several of the reformers, only disappearing from Protestant theology in the 
late eighteenth century.60 Despite persistent attack on various fronts,61 natural law theory has 
shown itself to be decidedly tenacious, and continues to command considerable support 
today.62    
3.2.2. Do the virtues need the natural law? 
Can an ethics of virtue be accommodated within a natural law framework? And can natural 
law theory supply what virtue ethics appears to lack? Virtue and the natural law do seem to 
                                                 
58 One thinks primarily of Aquinas in the thirteenth century and then, after a period of decline due to the 
influence of the nominalism and voluntarism of John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, of the scholastic 
revival in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez. 
59 Sanford, Before Virtue, 230-1.  
60 For an interesting and thorough survey of the Protestant natural law tradition, and a discussion of the 
influence of the theology of Karl Barth, see Stephen J. Grabill, Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed 
Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2006). For a recent analysis from a lawyer’s 
perspective, see Jonathan Stonebraker and Sarah Irving, “Natural Law and Protestantism: A Historical 
Reassessment and its contemporary Significance”, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 2015, 4, 421-441. Also 
of interest is Jean Porter’s argument that, to the scholastics, natural law was a soundly scriptural doctrine. Jean 
Porter, “Natural Law as a Scriptural Concept: Theological Reflections on a Medieval Theme”, Theology 
Today 59, no. 2 (2002): 226-243.   
61 Crowe suggests several reasons for the ‘bad press’ of natural law theory: criticisms from existentialism and 
logical positivism concerning the concept of human nature, the undeniable existence of cultural moral variation 
and the over enthusiasm for deductive reasoning that he sees as a legacy of Grotius and the ‘Age of Reason’, 
rather than a legacy of ‘the genuine natural law’ of the scholastics. Crowe, “Natural Law Theory Today”, 357. 
62 For an interesting attempt to use natural law theory to ground the concept of human obligation in the context 
of environmental ethics, see Scott A. Davison, “A Natural Law Based Environmental Ethic.” Ethics and the 
Environment 14, no. 1 (2009): 1-13.  
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be rather natural partners, and the neo-Aristotelian CVE theories share a common teleological 
framework with natural law. Sanford argues that if practical rationality is to be of any 
practical use, and indeed intelligible at all, it must be grounded in some objective notion of 
normativity, and the best such notion is found within natural law theory. He visualises 
practical rationality and natural law as ‘branches sharing the same Aristotelian trunk’, and 
that in Aquinas, they are most clearly seen to be ‘intertwining’: 
 
Making sense of the virtue of practical wisdom requires a fairly robust account of the 
foundations of moral principles. Making sense of the role and scope of the natural law 
requires a robust account of the virtues.63   
 
 
So, despite the fact that for the most part these branches no longer intertwine,64 is it true, as 
Sanford insists, that they still need each other? We first need to consider what natural law has 
to offer. 
3.2.3. Thomas Aquinas: a paradigmatic account of natural law theory  
It is commonly agreed that Aquinas provides what is still taken to be the paradigmatic 
account of natural law theory; his is the standard against which all other theories are tested.65 
But as is often the case for any great thinker who has written so extensively, representatives 
from many different and often opposing camps claim him as their philosophical predecessor. 
Some have described him as ‘the greatest of all natural law theorists’,66 while others have 
claimed that the natural law element of his thinking was very much secondary.67 It is 
                                                 
63 Sanford, Before Virtue, 227. 
64 Sanford uses a couple of colourful metaphors to suggest reasons for this situation: natural lawyers, he 
suggests, have viewed contemporary virtue ethics as ‘a sort of younger sibling who has yet to become very 
interesting’, while contemporary virtue ethics has viewed natural law theory as ‘an overbearing and oppressive 
father’ the casting off of whose authority has been a matter for rejoicing. Sanford, Before Virtue, 220. Divisions 
occur not only along liberal/conservative lines, but also along theistic/nontheistic ones. Most contemporary 
natural law theorists are theists (with a few exceptions such as Philippa Foot and Michael Moore), while most 
contemporary virtue ethicists, however much their theories lack unity, are secular and liberal. 
65 This is the method which Mark Murphy adopts in his helpful and informative article on contemporary natural 
law theory, and he highlights the points of departure from the paradigmatic account in the work of other natural 
law theorists such as John Duns Scotus and John Locke. Mark Murphy, “The Natural Law Tradition in 
Ethics”, SEP, 2002, substantive revision 2011. URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-law-ethics/>.    
66 Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality. Cambridge: CUP. 2001, 212. [hereafter NLPR] 
67 For example, E. A. Goerner believes that Aquinas did not advocate a natural law teaching, and that his view 
of right action should be understood from a virtue perspective. E. A. Goerner. “Thomistic Natural Right: The 
Good Man's View of Thomistic Natural Law.” Political Theory 11, no. 3 (1983): 393-418. 
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intriguing that he commands the interest of many secular theorists,68 when from the very 
beginning of the Summa Theologiae he lays his theistic cards on the table, assuming the 
existence of God and the necessity of divine revelation in addition to human reason for 
knowledge of salvation.69 The concept of God, as the giver of the natural law is central to his 
moral theory.70 And for the same reason it is equally intriguing to see Aquinas interpreted as 
a virtue ethicist in the thoroughly modern sense of the term, since, in the decades following 
Anscombe, virtue ethics has become predominantly a theory of secular liberalism.71 What, 
then, are the central features of Aquinas’s paradigmatic account? 
3.2.4. Practical rationality and the basic goods 
Aquinas, following Aristotle, believed that it was their rational capacity which sets humans 
apart from other animals.72 Natural law theory, as a theory of practical rationality,73 evaluates 
actions in terms of intelligibility and reasonableness; it draws on this human rational capacity 
to discern between good and evil, and is based on the belief that humans by nature pursue the 
good and avoid evil. It therefore aims both to characterise reasons for action, and also explain 
the rational basis for choices between actions. Fundamentally teleological, a natural law 
theory of practical rationality achieves this by identifying certain basic goods which are 
grounded in human nature and which provide the fundamental reasons for action, and by 
subsequently demonstrating how the principles of practical reasonableness are justified by 
certain features of these goods. A natural law theory of normativity must explain not only 
which things are goods and what the appropriate response to them is (that is, how they result 
                                                 
68 We might think, for example, of Philippa Foot and Michael Moore.  
69 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, 1. [hereafter ST.] See also the Summa contra Gentiles [SCG] which is 
essentially a work of apologetics, defending the Christian worldview against the ‘gentiles’, while at the same 
time arguing that the pagan philosophers can ‘direct us towards the truths of the Christian revelation’. Alasdair 
MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities. A Selective History of the Catholic Philosophical Tradition (London: 
Continuum. 2009), 74. 
70 ST I, II, 91, 2. See n. 38.   
71 A notable exception is Alasdair MacIntyre. But, despite his constant opposition to secular liberalism, and his 
self-identity as an ‘Augustinian Christian’ (Whose Justice?, 12), he is never overtly theistic.  
72 Aquinas, De Veritate, 24, 2. Here Aquinas supports the idea that animals cannot reflect on their own 
judgments and so do not have free choice because this requires reason: ‘Reason is found fully and perfectly only 
in man’. (Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine). According to Aristotle, it is man’s ability to 
perceive what is good and evil, just and unjust, which sets him apart from the other animals. Politics I, 2, 
1253a7-18. In Book VI of the Ethics he does describe some animals as possessing phronēsis when they store up 
food, but this is quite distinct from wisdom (sophia). NE 1141a22-28. Alasdair MacIntyre distinguishes the 
‘reasons’ for the action of animals from the power to reflect on those reasons, which is a strictly human 
capacity. Dependent Rational Animals, 53-61.   
73 Utilitarianism and Kantianism, although very different in structure, are also theories of practical rationality. 
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in right actions), but also why those things are goods in the first place. And this latter 
explanation is linked to the normative question. As Murphy writes: ‘natural law theory 
explains how it is reasonable to deliberate in cases of practically significant choice by 
appealing to principles that have their warrant from the nature of the fundamental reasons for 
action themselves’.74 It might be noted that, although Aquinas states that certain things are 
good for humans and worthy of pursuit,75 if these goods are pursued in the wrong way, that 
act is defective or flawed.76 An act can be intrinsically flawed in terms of its object, 
circumstances or end,77 and all this is determined by the nature of the goods themselves. As 
Murphy says, ‘it is the goods for persons that call the shots’.78    
3.2.5. Determining the basic goods 
Following Aristotle, Aquinas holds that the good of a thing is determined by its form, that is, 
by the kind of thing it is.79 When each thing attains virtue, it is perfect, and so it is good: 
‘That is why each thing seeks its perfection as the good belonging to it’.80 And all this is a 
matter of natural facts. We have met this essentially Aristotelian idea before, and the basic 
idea of happiness as flourishing or proper functioning does seem inherently plausible; when 
life is shortened or impaired or even threatened, that living thing is no longer thought of as 
flourishing.81 The details of the goods might vary from species to species, and, as might be 
expected, suggestions for the list of basic human goods varies from person to person.82 But 
the concept of flourishing remains the same. 
                                                 
74 Murphy, NLPR, 3. 
75 ST I, II, 94, 2; 94, 3. 
76 ST I, II, 18, 1. 
77 ST I, II, 18, 2-4. An act can therefore be flawed in terms of its overarching end being defective, its object (i.e. 
its immediate aim) being incorrectly aligned with its end, or due to the circumstances making that act defective 
at that particular point. Philippa Foot endorses this account in her own discussion of the goodness or badness of 
actions. Natural Goodness, 72-77. 
78 Murphy, GML, 71.   
79 ST I 5,5. 
80 SCG I, 37. 
81 As Alasdair MacIntyre observes, when we speak of a flourishing dolphin, gorilla, or human, we use 
‘flourishing’ in the same sense. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 64. That the concept of flourishing is a 
generic concept is an advantage, in that it does not present the same conceptual difficulties which arise in 
speaking of animals having reasons to act in pursuit of certain goods. 
82 For example, Aquinas speaks of life itself, procreation, life in society and knowledge, including knowledge of 
the truth about God (ST I,II 94, 2) (also see n. 33 below). John Finnis’s list includes play and aesthetic 
experience (Natural Law and Natural Rights. Clarendon Law Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 85-90). 
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3.2.6. From goods to precepts 
In his response to the question: ‘Whether the natural law contains several precepts or only 
one?’, Aquinas replies: 
 
Now as “being” is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so “good” 
is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is 
directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. 
Consequently, the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of 
good, viz. that “good is that which all things seek after.” Hence this is the 
first precept of law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” 
All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the 
practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to 
the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.83   
 
Aquinas assumes firstly that humans have a natural inclination to pursue the good.84 And then 
he explains that because of that first principle of practical reason, the precepts of the natural 
law are self-evident. The natural law is ‘natural’ because the basic principles of practical 
rationality are constituted by nature and by human reason we can move from ‘general and 
indemonstrable principles . . .  to the more particular determination of certain matters’.85   
An epistemological concern immediately comes into focus here: the paradigmatic account 
assumes that the basic principles of the natural law are universally knowable. But how 
exactly? Murphy explains that the way to this knowledge can be understood in two distinct, 
but not necessarily exclusive, ways. The first, which he calls ‘derivationism’, denies that 
these practical judgments are self-evident; rather, they ‘must be derived from theoretical 
judgments regarding human nature’.86 Aristotle’s function argument might be thought of in 
this way. By contrast ‘inclinationism’, as the name suggests, holds that inclination is 
sufficient; the goods are, as John Finnis claims, not derived from anything but ‘per se nota 
                                                 
Murphy adds ‘excellence in work and play’ and ‘excellence in agency’ alongside the rather more modern-
sounding ‘inner peace’ (NLPR, 100-135). 
83 ST I-II, 94, 2. see also ST I, 5 on goodness and being.  
84 According to Aquinas, there are three aspects to this good: some inclinations, such as preservation of self, 
man shares with all living things; others he shares with other animals (‘sexual intercourse, education of 
offspring’); and lastly, due to reason, man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in 
society, and so according to the natural law, he should ‘shun ignorance’ and ‘avoid offending those among 
whom one has to live’. (ST I-II, 94, 2.). 
85 ST I-II, 91, 3. 
86 Murphy, NLPR, 6. 
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(self-evident) and indemonstrable’.87 While this interpretation succeeds in retaining an 
important place for reasoning, the adopting of a derivationist model seems to deny universal 
knowability: only the theoretically adept might hope to attain the requisite knowledge. 
Inclinationism is intuitively more plausible, but we can surely agree with Murphy that natural 
human inclinations are ‘not always a lovely thing’.88   
3.2.7. Summary: key features of the natural law 
On the standard interpretation of Aquinas’s natural law theory, then, several key features can 
be identified. Firstly, it is a theory given by God.89 Secondly, the good is prior to the right: 
our common human nature determines what is good for us, so right action is action which 
responds appropriately to the good. Thirdly, it claims a universal application; that is, it is 
universally binding and universally knowable: somehow, we, as humans, have an intrinsic 
inner-directedness towards the good and the various goods. It is these goods which constitute 
the source of normativity as the universally binding principles of the natural law. 
This last point needs clarification. In ST I-II 94, 4, Aquinas makes a clear distinction between 
the general principles of practical reason and the detail of the proper conclusions. While both 
the universal principles and the proper conclusions of speculative reason are necessary truths, 
and so the same for all men, it is only the universal principles of practical reason which are 
necessary truths; practical reason concerns contingent matters, and ‘the more we descend to 
matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects’. Therefore,  
 
In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of 
detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in 
matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.90  
                                                 
87 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 33-34. See also Germain Grisez’s commentary on ST I-II, 94, 2. 
Germain G. Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 
Question 94, Article 2.” Natural Law Forum 10 (1965): 168-201.  
88 Murphy, “The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics”, 7. Murphy notes that power and prestige do not appear in 
contemporary lists of the basic goods, even though Aristotle acknowledged something like them. For more on 
derivationism and inclinationism, see Murphy, NLPR, 6-17. And for his own attempt to resolve the dilemma 
using his ‘real identity thesis’, see NLPR, 17-21; 40-45. 
89 In his defence of the existence of a natural law Aquinas says in ST I-II, 91, 2: ‘all things subject to Divine 
providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law’ but man, as a rational creature is unique since a rational 
creature ‘is provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it 
has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature 
is called the natural law’. Human reason, which is employed in the discerning between good and evil, is ‘an 
imprint on us of the Divine light’. 
90 ST, I-II, 94, 4. 
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In Article six of the same question, Aquinas, following Augustine, maintains that the natural 
law is written on men’s hearts and cannot be blotted out. But again, he is referring to the 
general principles of the natural law. At the level of application of the principle, that is at the 
level of secondary precepts, this is not the case. 
 
The natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, 
just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by 
vicious customs or corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural 
vices, as the Apostle states (Romans 1), were not esteemed sinful.91 
 
Therefore, according to Aquinas, when we speak of normativity of the natural law, we must 
be careful to restrict the notion of universal obligation to its general principles.  
3.2.8. Moral obligation in natural law theory   
Having completed the groundwork, we can now proceed to examine the concept of moral 
obligation within a natural law view of morality.92 On the basis of this theory, how is ‘the 
moral ought’ generated and understood? From what has been said above, we might simply 
say that the objective facts about the natural goods which fulfil our natures determine the 
status of the correct response to such goods, and this is the source of the normativity 
according to the natural law. All natural law explanations of moral law, in Murphy’s words, 
‘function by showing that an act-type bears on a human good in a certain way; the character 
of the good does the work of seeing to it that various properties applying to act-types morally 
select various responses’.93 If life is a good, then certain actions, such as assault or murder, 
are clearly defective responses to that good, and so should not be performed;94 if knowledge 
is a good, then the act of lying is a defective response and so should not be performed and so 
                                                 
91 ST, I-II, 94, 6. 
92 The paradigmatic account of natural law theory will be assumed from now on to allow clarity of thought.  
93 Murphy, GML, 73. 
94 This is, admittedly, a highly simplified statement. See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 281-283 for a 
useful discussion of the deriving of a positive law against murder from the natural law. For an extended 
discussion of the good of life in all its aspects, see Germain Grisez, “Why Should Human Life Always Be 
Treated With Reverence?”, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Volume II: “Living a Christian Life” (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1993). 8, A, 1-4.    
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forth. Once more, the explanation begins with the nature of the good and culminates in the 
evaluation of correct or incorrect responses: the good is prior to the right. 
3.2.8.1. Normativity and the case of lying   
From the practical to the moral   
However, we seem to have a problem here. How do we move from that fundamental practical 
sense of ‘ought’ which is bound up, on the natural law view, with acting well, to a ‘moral 
ought’? How do we explain, for instance, the widespread assumption that X ought not to lie 
to Y? For an answer, we will review Murphy’s helpful, if somewhat technical, analysis of the 
problem.  
Murphy defines ‘acting well’ as ‘instantiating in the good of excellence of agency’,95 that is 
acting with one’s practical reason free from error. He begins by suggesting that a proposition 
concerning ‘ought’ judgments might be formulated as follows: ‘A ought to φ if and only if A, 
whose practical reason is functioning without error, decides to φ’.96 Such a formulation 
successfully conveys the agent-relative nature of practical reason, and also the fact that 
ought-judgments are connected to agents’ decisions. But as Murphy himself admits, the 
emphasis on the agent’s decision leaves it open to the charge of subjectivism. And more work 
needs to be done to be able to provide an answer to the one who seeks to know why X ought 
not to lie to Y, beyond the fact that X simply decides not to lie. At this point we cannot 
condemn X’s decision to lie to Y any more strongly than by observing that it is not the case 
that X is doing what he ought to do. In short, we need an account of ‘the moral ought’ which 
is independent of subjective factors yet still consistent with natural law theory’s 
understanding of the fundamental practical ought. 
Murphy suggests an amended proposition: ‘A morally ought to φ if and only if it is not 
possible that A, whose practical reason is functioning without error, decide to ψ, where ψ-ing 
and φ-ing are incompatible.’97 Now we have a description of the moral ought which is free 
from subjective factors such as the agent’s decision. Whether or not, or how, the agent 
decides is now a contingent matter while the ‘ought’ judgment, based as it is on the 
decision’s being free from error, is not. X ought not to lie to Y because X cannot lie to Y 
                                                 
95 Murphy, NLPR, 220. The good of ‘excellence of agency’ is one of his fundamental reasons for action (NLPR, 
114-118). 
96 Murphy, NLPR, 221. 
97 Murphy, NLPR, 222, 230. 
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without an error in practical reasoning. X’s act would reflect a deficiency, a falling short of 
full participation in the good of excellence in agency. This, Murphy suggests, is now 
substantive enough: 
 
If we say that in lying, John is doing something that is not something he ought to do, 
we are not expressing that his act is merely indifferent; we are expressing that John’s 
actions lack some goodness that they are capable of having. For a type of action to be 
morally wrong is to guarantee that any action of such a type will be deficient in this 
way.98   
 
From the abstract to the concrete 
Murphy’s formula, he admits, is constructed in terms of the ‘highly abstract’ principles of 
practical reasonableness. And yet, he attempts to demonstrate that it is possible to move from 
the abstract to a statement of action-guiding moral requirement. To follow Murphy’s 
argument here is useful for our consideration of the normative question in a natural law 
context, because there are few natural law thinkers who give close attention to the source of 
‘the moral ought’. To demonstrate the move from the abstract to the concrete, Murphy takes 
the example of lying and he begins with the principle of practical reasonableness, often called 
‘the Pauline principle’, which rules out ‘intentional, instrumental destruction of an instance of 
a basic good’.99  
Lying has traditionally been understood along the following lines: ‘For A to lie to B is for A 
to assert a proposition to B believed by A to be false with the intention to deceive B’.100 
Finnis provides a fairly standard normative explanation: to lie is to act against the basic good 
of knowledge and acting against any basic good is contrary to ‘the Pauline principle’. He 
                                                 
98 Murphy, NLPR, 224. Murphy makes a useful distinction here between moral absolutes and necessary truth: 
accepting the analytic truth that every true moral ought-judgment is necessarily true does not commit one to 
accepting that that every moral truth is a moral absolute, where a moral absolute refers to an act which is 
‘exceptionlessly prohibited’. It may be that while a moral judgment such as ‘X ought not to lie to Y’ may be a 
necessary condition for the moral absolute ‘Lying is always wrong’, it is not a sufficient condition because the 
circumstances of the action should also be considered. Murphy, NLPR, 222-3.   
99 Murphy, NLPR, 204-7. 
100 Murphy, NLPR, 234. For a solid defence of Aquinas’s thesis (ST II-II, 110) that lying is always wrong, see 
Grisez, “Living a Christian Life” 7, B, 6. (pp. 405-12).  
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expresses this principle as ‘do not choose directly against any basic human good’ or ‘do not 
do evil, even for the sake of good’.101 
While accepting the basic argument, Murphy suggests an improvement. He says that lying is 
not typically an act against the good of knowledge alone, but rather against the good of 
excellence in agency: since these goods are claimed to be the basis of all moral requirements, 
we have to be clear which goods are at stake before attempting to apply the Pauline principle. 
He makes a distinction between the intrinsic good of knowledge as possessed, and knowledge 
as an object of pursuit which can be pursued either ‘qua intrinsic or qua instrumental good’:   
 
And it seems that when the liar intends to cause the deceived to believe that which is 
false, he or she attempts to damage the good of knowledge precisely insofar as it is an 
instrument to the good of excellence in agency, at least in paradigm cases of lying: for 
the liar typically aims at getting the deceived to act or feel in a certain way by 
manipulating the process of practical reasoning, by attempting to assert a false 
premise upon which the deceived will rely in making his or her assessment regarding 
how to act or feel.102  
 
Therefore, although two goods are threatened, it is the good of excellence in agency which 
has explanatory priority in the lying case, since the false information will introduce error into 
the practical reasoning of the agent.   
3.2.9. Concluding thoughts: natural law and the normative question 
Not only does natural law theory offer an internally consistent and robust explanation of the 
moral law, it also has the resources necessary to answer the normative question. It is certain 
basic goods, grounded in human nature, which embody the universally binding principles of 
the natural law and so constitute the source of normativity. Its teleological framework seems 
an ideal partner for a theory based on virtue, as indeed Aquinas had argued so many centuries 
ago. But one niggling thought remains, and this will be discussed in the next section.   
                                                 
101 John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 75, 111. This principle is one of 
Finnis’s ‘basic requirements of practical reasonableness’, and is called ‘Pauline’ because of the statements in 
Romans 3:8, 6:1, 15. Interestingly, Finnis sees Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative as ‘the 
philosophical translation’ of this principle. Fundamentals, 121. An exception to this rule will occur when a 
person is deprived of basic goods because of the punishment required by justice. But rather than accept that this 
is ‘doing evil that good may come’, Finnis argues instead that this deprivation is ‘intended precisely as itself a 
good, a restoration that cannot (logically cannot) consist in anything other than such an act of deprivation’. 
Fundamentals, 129-130. For further, useful discussion of the Pauline principle, see Alan Donagan, The Theory 
of Morality. University of Chicago Press, 1977, 149-164.   
102 Murphy, NLPR, 235. 
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3.3.  Moral concurrentism: a third way? 
We have seen how adopting a natural law theory as a conceptual framework could supply 
virtue ethics with an explanation of the source of normativity. But one thought remains which 
might be troubling for the theist. Whereas theological voluntarism is unquestionably 
theocentric, the paradigm natural law theory which we have been discussing is not overtly so. 
It is not that God is entirely absent, for he is evident through his creation. But his role in the 
explanation of the moral law is a limited one. This is troubling for a theist who accepts not 
only the centrality of the ‘good’ in a theory of ethics, but also the existence of an infinite and 
transcendent Good; if this Good is identifiable as God,103 then we might expect God to have a 
more immediate role in the explanation of the moral law than he has on a natural law account. 
After all, as Murphy comments, ‘theism seems committed to the view that God is at the 
centre of the normative world, not just one object of love among others, but the object of, and 
standard for, admiration’.104 It is this worry which Mark Murphy seeks to address in his 
closing chapter of God and the Moral Law. His solution is ‘moral concurrentism’, so called 
because it is a moral version of the metaphysical theory.105           
Murphy’s theory is promising. It retains the basic structure of natural law in which the goods 
do the moral necessitating, but it adds a strongly theocentric dimension, arguably more 
attractive to the theist, which says that these goods which do the moral necessitating are 
theistic facts, and not just facts about the created order. The theory has the advantage of 
satisfying the requirement of theistic immediacy.106 ‘The basic idea of moral concurrentism is 
that moral necessitation, and thus moral law, is immediately explained both by God and by 
                                                 
103 See, for example, Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 3, and passim. 
104 Murphy, GML, 160. 
105 Natural concurrentism provides a way to account for God’s role as efficient cause in the natural order, and 
also the role of creaturely natures by advocating a cooperation between the two. It provides a way through the 
horns of occasionalism, which holds God’s role is immediate in that the divine will is the active cause of every 
event in the natural order, and ‘mere conservationism’ which sees God’s role in creaturely transactions as 
mediated. The parallel is limited however. Concerning events in the natural order, God is free to withhold his 
concurrence, such as in the situation of miracles. In the moral order, he is not free, since here the question 
concerns final and not efficient causation. As Murphy says,’ God has no choice about whether God is the 
ultimate end of all things; God’s nature sets, of necessity, the measure of goodness, and it is not up to divine 
discretion whether God contributes to the being good of some particular being (so long as that being exists and 
bears that nature)’. GML, 176. For an overview of natural concurrentism, see GML, 134-9. 
106 The theory also provides a response to what Murphy calls ‘the objection from divided loyalty’. A theist who 
holds that loyalties should not be divided between God and something else might struggle to accept that there 
may exist a variety of goods which are not immediately explained by God, leading, perhaps to a conflict of 
loyalties to the goods on the one hand, and to God on the other. GML, 165.  
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creaturely natures. This is not overdetermination, but cooperation; they somehow jointly 
necessitate’.107     
How, then, does this joint necessitation function? Murphy begins with Adams’s account of 
the good. The concept of a transcendent good supplies a criterion by which experienced 
goods can be judged.108 If God is the supreme Good, then the most plausible account of the 
relation of experienced goods to the supreme Good is one of resemblance: ‘other things are 
excellent insofar as they resemble or imitate God’;109 perfect goodness can never be 
completely captured by natural properties, and so the resemblance is always imperfect.  
Murphy believes that Adams’s view could be improved by becoming more Aristotelian and 
less Platonic. He agrees with Adams that no created thing is simply good; only God is simply 
good, for ‘nothing is good except God alone’. But, rather than arguing that a thing’s 
excellence is determined solely by its resemblance to God, he suggests that it may also be 
determined by the kind to which that thing belongs. ‘So while we can truly say that God is 
simply good, for anything distinct from God its goodness will consist in its resembling God 
in a way that belongs to its kind’,110 the excellence of the resemblance receives its context 
from the kind. This ‘ought of kind-membership’ is left hanging in nontheistic Aristotelianism. 
Why is it that certain properties are considered excellences of that kind? Who says? 
Murphy’s modified Adamsian view has the advantage of explaining the limited range of 
excellent properties for each member of a kind.  
Murphy’s summary is useful:   
   
The moral concurrentist claims that moral necessitation, whether in particular 
transactions or in moral laws, is immediately explained by both God and creaturely 
natures. . . if nothing is good but God alone, if God is alone good without 
qualification, we can see all of the distinct and incommensurable goods that demand a 
response as participations in the divine goodness; indeed, they demand a response – 
they morally necessitate our action – just because they are participations in the divine 
goodness. What makes them distinct is the particular nature of that good. Just as on 
natural concurrentism all natural necessitation is the push of divine power specified 
by the nature of the creaturely causal agent,111 on moral concurrentism all moral 
                                                 
107 GML, 148. 
108 Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 77-82.  
109 Ibid., 28-9. 
110 Murphy, GML, 159. 
111 See, for example, Aquinas SCG, III, 66. And ST I, II, 1, 8. 
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necessity is the pull of divine goodness specified by the nature of the creatures 
involved.112 
 
3.3.1. Concluding thoughts 
Murphy’s theory of moral concurrentism, then, endorses the natural law’s value-based 
account of moral norms while also maintaining that the goodness that morally necessitates is 
in fact a theistic property; it therefore has the advantage over standard natural law theory in 
that it creates space for theistic immediacy, without resorting to the divine will: the goods 
which morally necessitate participate in the divine goodness. But the fact that this immediacy 
is located in the divine goodness rather than in the divine will, means that the theory does not 
succumb to the objections which assail theological voluntarism. To adopt moral 
concurrentism in parallel with a neo-Aristotelian version of VE theory, would therefore seem 
to be an excellent solution for the theist who is drawn to the idea of an ethics based on virtue, 
but recognises the limits of the theory, in particular with regard to answering the normative 
question. 
4. Conclusion 
Beginning this chapter with Anscombe’s challenge that contemporary moral philosophy 
should jettison ‘the moral ought’ in the philosophical absence of a moral lawgiver, we saw 
how such a concept was not only inescapable, but also indispensable to moral theory. The 
claims which morality makes on us require justification, and it is this seeking after a 
justification which we have been calling ‘the normative question’. Finding an answer to this 
question is important because any practically useful normative theory, CVE included, must 
be able, not only to provide an account of right action, but also to justify that account. This 
can be done by appealing to some distinct higher order or ‘metaethical’ theory, or by drawing 
on its own resources. Because the explanatory ambitions of CVE theory often aim beyond the 
level of purely normative theory, we began by investigating the ability of current VE theories 
to answer this question. 
We discovered that whichever theoretical route we followed, whether agent-focussed or 
agent-based, CVE theory encounters serious objections. Agent-based accounts are vulnerable 
to the insularity and common-sense objections, while neo-Aristotelian or agent-focussed 
                                                 
112 Murphy, GML, 162. 
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accounts struggle to overcome the circularity objection. It therefore appeared that virtue 
ethics alone does not possess the power to explain the source of normativity. The only 
alternative for the VE theorist was to search out some other theory capable of doing the 
explanatory work. 
Since the version of VE being pursued in this thesis is a theistic one, we subsequently 
considered the standard metaethical theories open to the theist, theological voluntarism and 
natural law, and concluded that while theological voluntarism is substantially weakened by 
powerful objections, natural law theory can not only supply a convincing explanation for the 
source of the moral law, but forms an ideal partner for an ethics based on virtue. Both 
theories are teleological, the good being prior to the right, and both recognise that the goods 
which ground morality are somehow facts about human nature. We therefore advocated an 
appeal to the paradigmatic natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas, in order to supply what 
was lacking in a pure VE. According to this theory, it is the goods which are grounded in 
human nature which provide the fundamental reasons for action, and so constitute the source 
of normativity. Using the example of lying, it was shown that it is possible to move from the 
abstract principles to the concrete level of action-guidance. 
Finally, it was suggested that the troubling thought which might linger in the mind of the 
theist, that God had no immediate role in the explanation of moral law, could be removed by 
adopting the moral concurrentist idea of Mark Murphy, whereby the goods which do the 
moral necessitating are theistic facts. The theist who adopts a VE theory in tandem with 
moral concurrentism can, therefore, respond confidently to Anscombe’s challenge: there is no 
need to jettison ‘the moral ought’, for the moral lawgiver is alive and well and the normative 
question at last has a satisfactory answer. 
We shall see how the partnership of VE and natural law is helpful for our understanding of 
the normative question in Amos as we test our theistic VE theory in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Six 
Amos and Virtue Ethics 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this investigation has been to critique the theory of virtue ethics with a view to the 
construction of a theistic version which can be subsequently tested against the text of the OT. 
Following an introduction to CVE theory in Chapter One, the following three chapters 
examined the concepts of telos, virtue, and the moral exemplar respectively, all essential 
components for any normative ethical theory based on virtue. It was suggested that an 
Aristotelian version of VE theory is compatible with a theistic framework, if the telos of all 
ethical reflection is understood as a relationship with God, with the overarching virtue of 
justice being necessary for the maintenance of that relationship, and the character of God 
himself as the supreme moral exemplar. In Chapter 5, however, we encountered a problem 
for CVE theory: considered alone, it does not appear to have the explanatory power needed to 
answer the normative question. And so it was suggested that a potential resolution is 
available to the theist by partnering VE with a modified natural law theory. On the basis of 
this discussion, it was concluded that VE, supplemented in this way, has much to offer the 
theist in search of a normative ethical theory. Having reached our primary goal of critique 
and construction, the present chapter is devoted to testing our theistic revision of VE theory 
against the text of the OT. As stated in the Introduction, our testing ground will be the book 
of the prophet Amos. Our final challenge, then, is to assess whether a bridge can be built, not 
only between the ethical thought of Aristotle and the ethical thought of an eighth century 
prophet, but also between the world of Amos and the context of contemporary ethical theory.1 
In other words, is the theory a useful heuristic device by which to investigate the ethics of the 
OT, as well as make the text normatively useful to the contemporary theological ethicist?   
We will begin with some reasons for choosing Amos as our testing ground, then present a 
short survey of the content and context of the book, noting some of the most important 
critical questions which it raises and which impact the subsequent discussion. The chapter 
                                                 
1 It is not being suggested by using the phrase, ‘the ethical thought of an eighth century prophet’, that the Book 
of Amos, as we now possess it, goes back in its entirety to the eighth century. Rather, it reflects and 
acknowledges the authority of the canonical text and its function as a shared platform for a discussion of 
normative ethics. For problems with a parallel phrase, ‘the theology of the book of Amos’, see John Barton, The 
Theology of the Book of Amos. Cambridge: CUP, 2012, 1. [hereafter TBA]. For a short discussion of historical 
biblical criticism see section 1.2.3. below. 
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will subsequently be divided into four parts, each addressing one of the key features of VE 
theory considered in the previous chapters. We will first consider the idea that the ethics of 
Amos is fundamentally teleological, and is compatible with an Aristotelian framework in 
which the human good is conceived of as eudaimonia, which, to Aristotle, was a life of 
activity according to virtue. Particular attention will be given to the exhortations in chapter 5 
to ‘Seek Yahweh’ and ‘Seek the good’, and we shall also follow up the idea, which we 
proposed in Chapter Two, that a theistic conception of eudaimonia based on the OT has both 
present and future aspects. It will be argued that both of these are visible in the text of Amos. 
In the second part, we will consider the nature of the widespread injustice reported by the 
prophet, and argue that Amos’s conception of the virtue of justice can be understood along 
Aristotelian lines. Behind his condemnation of the violence, oppression and enforced poverty 
which corresponded to an absence of ‘particular justice’, is the idea that it was an absence of 
what Aristotle termed ‘universal justice’ which was responsible for the breakdown in 
covenant relationships, which in turn threatened the righteousness, peace and very life of the 
covenant community. The third part revisits the concept of imitatio Dei, and investigates 
whether attention to the text can sharpen our reflections about Yahweh as supreme moral 
exemplar. We will consider in turn the love, mercy and justice of God as he is revealed in the 
text and the implications for exemplarism. In the final part, we will return to the question of 
the source of normativity, consider how the prophet might have understood the normative 
question, and whether our suggestion of a partnership of VE with natural law theory can both 
make sense of the text and also confirm that a suitably modified VE is a normatively useful 
VE theory. 
1.1.  Why Amos? 
Almost a century ago Richard Cripps wrote: ‘Amos is one of the most important Prophets, if 
not the most important, of the Old Testament’.2 And judging by the vast amount of secondary 
literature which this relatively small book has generated since then, this assessment may still 
be widely held.3 A. G. Auld summarises the book’s popularity, observing that its ‘tones of 
                                                 
2 Richard S. Cripps, A Critical & Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Amos (2nd ed. London: SPCK, 1955), 
Preface to the First Edition [1929], xi. 
3 Back in 1959, James. L. Mays could write: ‘Amos-studies are already on the way to becoming a small library 
on their own’. J. L. Mays, “Words about the Words of Amos: Recent Study of the Book of 
Amos.” Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology 13, no. 3 (1959): 259. For a most useful and 
comprehensive survey of this literature see M. Daniel Carroll R, Amos - the Prophet and His Oracles: Research 
on the Book of Amos (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox, 2002). 
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social protest, religious critique, and universalism are immediately perceived and enjoy 
perennial appeal’.4 
Certainly, Amos is a joy to study. It is a manageable size, yet its nine chapters are rich in 
theology and replete with drama. It is a skilful piece of writing, rhetorically a masterpiece,5 
and above all possesses a sharp focus and an undeniably clear message: Israel’s shortcomings 
with regard to justice have not gone unnoticed by Yahweh and judgment was coming. The 
book has been studied from every conceivable angle, from traditional source and form-
critical perspectives to the more recent literary ones, and its text, which is blessed by a 
relative absence of exegetical problems, analysed in minute detail. No stone has been left 
unturned. There is therefore plenty of material at the researcher’s disposal.  
As one of the earliest, if not the earliest of the so-called ‘writing prophets’,6 we can see Amos 
as a forerunner of the later and ‘greater’ prophets, dealing in miniature as it were, with the 
same concerns, issuing the same kind of oracles.7 Amos is significant, according to James L. 
Mays, because in his oracles we have ‘the earliest direct evidence for what a prophet said, so 
that those who preceded him must be seen somewhat in the light of the given of his book, and 
his successors in the prophetic calling are approached with the knowledge that he has already 
been in the field’.8 As we noted in the Introduction, the prophetic literature has long been 
considered a source of ethical teaching, in Jewish as well as Christian circles, but the 
generally accepted claim that Amos was the first of the ‘writing prophets’ leads some 
scholars to make much more substantial claims for him. John Barton, for example, standing 
in a distinguished line of thought going back to Julius Wellhausen, sees the prophet as a 
highly significant innovator, the source of a tradition of ethical reflection, and so, in a sense, a 
Socrates-type figure.9 Barton refers to him as ‘Israel’s first theologian’;10 he might indeed 
                                                 
4
 A. Graeme Auld, Amos (Old Testament Guides; Sheffield: Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1986), 9. 
5 We might think of the many uses of assonance which the prophet employs to reinforce his point, and the 
oracles are delivered for maximum effect through use of well-known forms and themes which the prophet so 
often overturns in dramatic paradox. 
6 This term distinguishes these prophets as those whose teaching has been preserved in separate books; it does 
not necessarily imply that the prophets themselves wrote the books as we possess them now. 
7  Amos is distinct from the majority of the prophets in one important way: he says very little about idolatry.   
8 Mays, “Words”, 259. 
9 John Barton, Ethics in Ancient Israel (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 32. 
10 Barton, TBA, xvii, 52, 183. 
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have added ‘first theological ethicist’. For all these reasons, Amos seems an excellent book 
against which to test an ethical theory. 
1.2.  Amos: content and criticism 
Amos is not the happiest of books. Often thought of as ‘the prophet of doom’, much of the 
book which bears his name bears out that epithet. His announcement of the darkness of the 
coming judgment all but extinguishes hope. But not quite. We certainly are faced here with 
the ‘dark side’ of the deity, and yet, even here, there are glimmers of light and glimpses of 
hope. Even in the bleakest of circumstances, it seems that there is still hope for the one who 
seeks the Lord. Moreover, it is no local deity whom we see portrayed here, but the God who 
is not only Israel’s ‘helper’, to use Wellhausen’s term, but also the Lord God of Hosts, 
sovereign not only over the history of the nations, but also over the creation itself. And the 
hope which is so hard to detect is no less real for that, because it is founded on the words of 
Yahweh who, the texts asserts, not only sees and takes note of every act of injustice and 
every individual burden of oppression, but has the power to act in judgment to restore justice. 
According to the superscription, Amos came from Tekoa in the southern kingdom of Judah, 
but the whole of his, apparently short,11 prophetic ministry seems to have been in the northern 
kingdom of Israel. The majority of the book comprises oracles (1:3-6:14; 9:11-15). Verses 
1:3-2:3 are oracles against neighbouring nations, the last of which is the kingdom of Judah; 
the remaining oracles are directed against Israel. There are five vision reports concerning the 
coming judgment (7:1-9:10), and a short section of third person narrative (7:10-17). The book 
also contains three doxologies (4:13; 5:8-9; 9:5-6), interspersed at key points among the 
oracles and visions. 
1.3.  The historical setting 
The prophecy of Amos is set sometime during the reigns of Jeroboam II, King of Israel (789-
748) and Uzziah, King of Judah (785-733).12 Shalom Paul describes this period as ‘The Silver 
Age’ of Israelite history, rivalled only by ‘The Golden Age’ of David and Solomon, when the 
                                                 
11 If we accept as literal the dating comment in the superscription, ‘two years before the earthquake’, Amos’s 
ministry cannot have lasted much more than a year. 
12 Amos 1:1. For details of the reign of Jeroboam II see 2 Kings 14:23-29. The Deuteronomistic historian 
describes him as one of those kings who made Israel to sin, but also comments that by his hand Yahweh saved 
Israel (v. 27).   
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northern kingdom experienced peace, power and economic prosperity.13 Peaceful relations 
existed between Israel and Judah, Assyria was preoccupied with her internal struggles,14 and 
Israel recovered lost territories east of the Jordan.15 Trade flourished, and a new class 
emerged and prospered. Archaeological excavations at Samaria attest to Amos’s descriptions 
of the building programmes and luxurious lifestyles of this new social elite (e.g. 3:15; 5:11; 
6:4-6).16 However, the text reveals that the new rich were not only disinterested in the misery 
of the poor, but also actively exploiting and oppressing them. At the same time the people 
were participating enthusiastically in the elaborate rituals of the cult which had developed at 
the key northern shrines of Bethel and Gilgal (4:4-5; 5:21-23). These people, it seems, took 
their religion seriously. It was into this situation that Amos was sent. 
1.4.  The prophetic response 
Israel’s prosperity was understood by the people to be a sign of God’s favour and 
protection.17 However, as the prophet continually points out, injustice was widespread in the 
land. Israel was guilty of bribery, corruption, and exploitation of the poor and the weak; the 
extravagant lifestyles of the elite were the product of the oppression of the poor. And no 
amount of cultic ritual could obscure the fact that justice and righteousness had been 
abandoned.  
Due to these moral failures and the refusal to heed warnings,18 the people of Israel were about 
to experience the judgment of God. In one of the dramatic reversals which are so 
                                                 
13 Paul gives an excellent overview of the historical situation in his “General Introduction”, Shalom M. Paul, 
Amos: A Commentary on the Book of Amos (ed. Frank M. Cross; Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 1-7. 
For other useful introductions see Francis I. Andersen and David N. Freedman, Amos: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary (AB 24A; New York: Doubleday, 1989), 18-23; Cripps, A Critical & Exegetical 
Commentary, 5-9; M. Daniel Carroll R, Contexts for Amos: Prophetic Poetics in Latin American Perspectives 
(JSOTSup 132; Sheffield: Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 307-11.     
14 During the reign of Jeroboam II, Assyria experienced a series of weak and inept kings following the death of 
Adadnirari III (810-783) who had subdued Damascus. They also faced a threat on their northern border from the 
kingdom of Urartu, especially from the expansionist ambitions of Sardur III (810-743). It was only on the 
ascension of Tiglat-pileser III (745), that Assyria was strong enough again to push westwards towards Israel.   
15 Amos 6:13 mentions Lo-Debar (in the territory of the Ammonites) and Karnaim (in the territory of the 
Arameans). For more on these place names see Paul, Amos, 219. 
16 Mays describes this period as a ‘social revolution’: ‘The older homogenous economic structure of Israel gave 
way to sharp distinctions of wealth and privilege’. Evidence to corroborate this comes from the excavations at 
Tirzah (Tell-el-Farah) which have revealed that large, expensive houses stood alongside ‘small huddled 
structures’. Mays, Amos, 2. 
17 One of the prophet’s rhetorical techniques is to quote the confident words of the people back to them, with the 
sole aim of overturning their thinking. See for example, 2:12; 4:1; 5:14b; 6:13; 7:16; 8:5, 14; 9:10. 
18 A series of catastrophic events had already occurred, for example famine, drought, locusts and plague (Amos 
4:6-11). The prophet is clear that these were intended to bring the people to repentance, but the people had not 
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characteristic of Amos, the prophet announces that the ‘Day of the Lord’ would be one ‘of 
darkness and not light’ (5:18-20). Instead of the anticipated theophany, where Yahweh was 
expected to execute judgment on the enemies of Israel and to bring salvation, the people are 
told that it is they who are the enemies of God, and they who are to be punished.19   
 
1.5.  Critical questions 
The vast amount of literature on Amos reflects the wide range of theological and critical 
positions. For example, opinions vary hugely on how much of the text, if any, goes back to 
the prophet himself, with most commentators opting for a midway position.20 Most of the 
theories about dating involve conjecture to some degree, and the more elaborate the theory 
the more conjecture is involved.21 The historical critical studies have undoubtedly been of 
great benefit to the scholarship, yielding many valuable insights into the ancient Near Eastern 
                                                 
returned. Since all the warnings had been ignored, Amos proceeds to his chilling climax: ‘Prepare to meet your 
God, O Israel!’ (4:12). 
19 There is a debate surrounding the notion of the prophet’s purpose in bringing his message. Some hold that 
their primary aim was to teach the people and bring them to repentance, in the hope of averting the judgment 
which, from their observations of the international situation, they reasoned to be imminent. Eric Heaton, for 
example, describes the prophets as people of ‘moral sensitivity’ and ‘extraordinary courage’. Heaton, The Old 
Testament Prophets (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1977), 57. Others, in the tradition of Wellhausen, 
believed that their function was simply to announce the imminent disaster, which they either foresaw 
supernaturally or predicted rationally from international events, interpreting it as divine judgment on social 
wrongdoing. See Barton, Ethics in Ancient Israel, 33. For a discussion of this debate see, A. Vanlier Hunter, 
Seek the Lord! A Study of the Meaning and Function of the Exhortations in Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, and 
Zephaniah (Baltimore: St. Mary's Seminary & University, 1982). 
20 John Barton provides a helpful and up-to-date overview of the critical positions with regard to the text in his 
recent TBA. He organises the theories of the compositional history of the book into three categories: those who 
believe that most of the book goes back to the prophet, for example Erling Hammershaimb, The Book of Amos: 
A Commentary (trans John Sturdy; Oxford: Blackwell, 1970), 14-15, and Paul, Amos, 5ff. Paul even sees the 
hand of Amos in the final arrangement of the book. At the other end of the spectrum, there are those who 
believe that the whole book is a late composition, and very little can be traced back to the eighth century. 
Reinhard G. Kratz, for example, opts for a pre-exilic composition, while Oswald Loretz, Richard James 
Coggins, James R. Linville argue that it was post-exilic. Most commentators fall somewhere along the spectrum, 
accepting the idea that the majority of the oracles are the ‘authentic’ words of Amos and fit the circumstances of 
the reign of Jeroboam II, but resorting to theories of redaction and/or theories of composition to explain the 
seeming inconsistencies in the text. We will be considering some of these alleged inconsistencies and the impact 
they have on our understanding of the ethics of Amos later on in this chapter. For comprehensive overviews of 
the theories of production of the text see Barton, TBA, 1-51; James Richard Linville, Amos and the Cosmic 
Imagination (Society for Old Testament Study Monographs; Aldershot, Hants.: Ashgate, 2008), 13-37; 
Tchavdar S. Hadjiev, The Composition and Redaction of the Book of Amos (BZAW 393; Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2009). 
21 Some of the more believable theories are the deuteronomistic redaction theory of W. H. Schmidt (1965), and 
the theory of Hans Walter Wolff who finds six independent layers in the text. Hans W. Wolff, Joel and Amos: A 
Commentary on the Books of the Prophets Joel and Amos (trans Waldemar Janzen, S. Dean McBride, Jr., and 
Charles A. Muenchow; ed. S. Dean McBride, Jr.; Philadelphia, Pa: Fortress Press, 1977 [German orig.: 1969]), 
106-13.  Less believable examples include that of Dirk U. Rottzoll who detects twelve layers. See Barton, TBA, 
17.    
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context of the prophet’s ministry, the literary forms available to him and the lexical as well as 
ethical parallels. The traditional approach, following Wellhausen, was built on the 
assumption that the text has gone through a process of redaction; the aim was to attempt the 
recovery of the original words (the ipsissima verba) of the prophet, and then surmise how the 
text has been developed. Some contemporary studies still adopt this historical-critical 
approach,22 but many more now focus on the text in its finished form. John Barton gives a 
cautious endorsement to this new trend in OT scholarship, but he also warns of the side-
effects of abandoning the insights of conventional criticism: since the meaning of the texts as 
we have them is, he argues, dependent on the processes of redaction and compilation which 
produced them, it would seem necessary to understand that process as fully as possible.23  
The text raises several critical issues. One concerns the nature of the relationship between the 
prophet and the cult (this sits in the bigger question of the relation of the canonical prophets 
to the popular religion of the time), and whether Amos stood in a prophetic line of succession 
going back to Moses, and including Elijah and Elisha, as the rabbis thought.24 There is also a 
question about the prophet’s function: was he fundamentally an announcer of doom, or a 
moral instructor, pleading that the people repent and return to Yahweh.25 Whether a covenant 
existed at the time is another matter of debate. And finally, there is the question of the 
character of God himself who stands behind the text: do the people and prophet have a shared 
conception of Yahweh? These questions are not merely academic, for appreciation of the 
context of the prophecy is necessary to determine the relevance of Amos to the context of the 
reader. It might also be noted that the adoption of a canonical reading does not entail neglect 
of these issues, and we will therefore be bearing these critical and contextual points in mind 
in what follows as we put our theistic version of VE to the test, for we need to know not only 
whether our proposed theory is a useful heuristic device for investigating the ethics of the 
OT, but also that it is normatively useful.26 
                                                 
22 For a recent example see Hadjiev, Composition and Redaction.  
23 Barton, TBA, 1-3. 
24 B Aboth I:1. 
25 See n. 19.   
26 There are several advantages of advocating a canonical reading of the text, and Carroll R.’s suggestions are 
persuasive here. Firstly, to base ethics on theories of reconstruction of the text means placing a great deal of 
weight on the correctness of the theory, as well as on the correctness of the interpretation of any supporting 
archaeological data. Moreover, such readings effectively put the ethical use of the Bible out of the reach of most 
‘ordinary’ readers. And most importantly, it is the final form of the OT which, alongside the NT, is accepted as 
the Scripture of the Christian church, and so it is the final form which creates a shared platform for the ethical, 
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The chapter will now be divided into four parts, each revisiting one of the conditions of 
adequacy considered previously and deemed necessary for a normative ethical theory based 
on virtue, but this time reflecting on each in the light of the prophetic text. We begin with the 
concept of telos. 
Part I. Teleology in Amos 
2. Introduction.  
Virtue ethics is a teleological theory, and in Chapter Two it was argued that following an 
Aristotelian conception of telos provided the best route to the construction of a theistic 
version of the theory. To Aristotle, ‘the good’ which was the telos of all ethical reflection, 
was the flourishing human life or eudaimonia which he described as a life of activity 
according to virtue. Any theistic version of VE which claims to follow Aristotle could not 
therefore be based on pluralistic conceptions of the good life, where virtue is one good among 
many. Although Aristotle did, arguably, accept that virtue was the only good with intrinsic 
value, he did not believe that eudaimonia was reducible to virtue, as the Stoics had done, but 
accepted that external goods had some role in the flourishing life, even though he was 
ultimately ambivalent about the exact relation between virtue and other goods. We also noted 
that, in Aristotle’s theory, virtue was pursued for the sake of the kalon, the noble or fine. 
Finally, we argued that a theistic conception of eudaimonia was possible if the telos of all 
ethical reflection was seen as a life in relationship with God, where a life according to virtue 
was both a means to, and a necessary constituent of, the flourishing life, and the ultimate aim 
of virtue, the kalon, was God himself. The aim now is to test these conclusions against the 
Book of Amos to see if we can defend the normative usefulness of our theistic VE theory in a 
reading of the prophetic text. The primary question in this first part of the current chapter, 
then, is whether the text of Amos supports a teleological framework. 
Much of the following discussion will be based on Amos chapter 5, which could rightly be 
considered the core of the book, not only because of its central position, but also because of 
its content. Concentrated in this chapter are discussions of the book’s fundamental themes of 
                                                 
as well as theological, reflection of the whole church community. See M. Daniel Carroll R., “Ethics and Old 
Testament Interpretation”, in Craig G. Bartholomew and David J. H. Beldman (eds), Hearing the Old 
Testament: Listening for God’s Address (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2012), 216-220.   
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death and life, the worship of God, Israel’s relationship with God, and justice.27 But it could 
also be argued that a teleological conception is most clearly seen in this chapter, for the idea 
of telos seems to undergird the exhortations in 5:4, 6, 14: ‘Seek me’, ‘Seek Yahweh’, and 
‘Seek the good’.  
A study of Amos 5 raises some interesting questions for the theist with an interest in VE 
theory. Can we interpret the good, which the prophet exhorts the people to seek, as similar in 
any sense to the philosophical notion of ‘the Good’ which was the starting point for 
Aristotle’s ethical enquiry? There are obvious differences of course: to Aristotle, ethics was 
based on human nature and established by convention, while for Amos it was inseparable 
from God. But is there any conceivable parallel in Amos with the idea of eudaimonism? All 
three exhortations in Chapter 5 are rooted in life itself: while wrong choices and wrong 
behaviour will lead to death, right choices and right behaviour leads to life. But can we think 
of this ‘life’ along Aristotelian lines as ‘the good life’? If so, what can we say about this life 
as good, and how is it related to the seeking of Yahweh? It will be argued that there appear to 
be two levels at which these exhortations can be interpreted. It is clear that the prophet views 
the virtue of justice, which is inseparable from righteousness, as essential for life, and not 
simply life as opposed to the physical death anticipated in the coming judgment. A life lived 
according to justice and righteousness is a life which is constituted by virtue, and so could 
indeed have a parallel with an Aristotelian eudaimonia. When the covenant community is 
living according to justice and righteousness, they maintain their relationship with Yahweh, 
they continue in possession of the land and so experience rest and peace and the preservation 
of their identity. But the text supports an additional understanding of the flourishing life, one 
inconceivable to Aristotle but conceivable to the theist; eudaimonia can have a future aspect. 
The eschatological hope alluded to in the final section of Amos suggests that the perfection of 
human flourishing will not be experienced in this life, but in a future time when the land will 
be forever fruitful and relationships between human beings and between the human and God 
will be perfected, and so characterised by righteousness and therefore also by peace.28 
                                                 
27 Jörg Jeremias, The Book of Amos: A Commentary (trans D. W. Stott; OTL; Louisville, Ky: Westminster John 
Knox, 1998), 84. The terms for justice and righteousness are found only in chapters 5 and 6, although the theme 
of justice underpins the whole of the book. 
28 As we saw in Chapter Two, shalom has connotations of friendship, well-being, health, even salvation, in 
addition to simply meaning ‘peace’. 
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To test the idea that Amos’s conception of the good can be related to the concept of telos in a 
VE theory, we must therefore spend some time studying Amos 5, and in particular vv. 1-17 
which is the section containing the exhortations. We will then turn to the epilogue (9:11-14), 
to see what an actualisation of this good might look like.  
Amos 5:1-17 
1 Hear this word that I take up over you in lamentation, O house of Israel: 
2 Fallen, no more to rise, 
    is maiden Israel; 
forsaken on her land, 
    with no one to raise her up. 
3 For thus says the Lord GOD: 
The city that marched out a thousand 
    shall have a hundred left, 
and that which marched out a hundred 
    shall have ten left.  
4 For thus says the LORD to the house of Israel: 
Seek me and live; 
5     but do not seek Bethel, 
and do not enter into Gilgal 
    or cross over to Beer-sheba; 
for Gilgal shall surely go into exile, 
    and Bethel shall come to nothing. 
6 Seek the LORD and live, 
    or he will break out against the house of Joseph like fire, 
    and it will devour Bethel, with no one to quench it. 
7 Ah, you that turn justice to wormwood, 
    and bring righteousness to the ground! 
8 The one who made the Pleiades and Orion, 
    and turns deep darkness into the morning, 
    and darkens the day into night, 
who calls for the waters of the sea, 
    and pours them out on the surface of the earth, 
the LORD is his name, 
9 who makes destruction flash out against the strong, 
    so that destruction comes upon the fortress. 
10 They hate the one who reproves in the gate, 
    and they abhor the one who speaks the truth. 
11 Therefore because you trample on the poor 
    and take from them levies of grain, 
you have built houses of hewn stone, 
    but you shall not live in them; 
you have planted pleasant vineyards, 
    but you shall not drink their wine. 
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12 For I know how many are your transgressions, 
    and how great are your sins— 
you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, 
    and push aside the needy in the gate. 
13 Therefore the prudent will keep silent in such a time; 
    for it is an evil time. 
14 Seek good and not evil, 
    that you may live; 
and so the LORD, the God of hosts, will be with you, 
    just as you have said. 
15 Hate evil and love good, 
    and establish justice in the gate; 
it may be that the LORD, the God of hosts, 
    will be gracious to the remnant of Joseph. 
16 Therefore thus says the LORD, the God of hosts, the Lord: 
In all the squares there shall be wailing; 
    and in all the streets they shall say, “Alas! alas!” 
They shall call the farmers to mourning, 
    and those skilled in lamentation, to wailing; 
17 in all the vineyards there shall be wailing, 
    for I will pass through the midst of you, 
says the LORD.     (Amos 5:1-17) 
 
Amos 5:1-17 is a carefully composed literary unit with an overall chiastic structure.29 
Although many commentators doubt that the whole section can be traced back to the 
prophet,30 the form as we have it today was clearly constructed as a whole and meant to be 
interpreted as such. The structure can be diagrammatically represented as follows:31  
A (vv.1-3) 
B (vv. 4-6) 
C (v. 7) 
D (v. 8a, b, c) 
E (v. 8d) 
                                                 
29 This was first pointed out by Jan de Waard in “The Chiastic Structure of Amos V 1-17”. VT 27, no. 2 (1977): 
170-77. In fact, De Waard and William A. Smalley not only contend that the entire book of Amos is composed 
of small chiastic structures, but also that the book itself is one giant chiastic unit. Jan De Waard and William A. 
Smalley, A Translator's Handbook on the Book of Amos: Helps for Translators (New York: United Bible 
Societies, 1979), 194-5. Jeremias describes Amos 5:1-17 as a ring composition. Jeremias, Amos, 83.   
30 It has often been held for example that the doxologies were not part of the original oracles because v. 10 
seems to follow on naturally from v. 7. E.g., Mays, Amos, 95. Jeremias believes that vv. 5aβ, 6, 13 cannot be 
considered original either. Jeremias, Amos, 85. For a thorough survey of the discussion surrounding the 
doxologies, see James L. Crenshaw, Hymnic Affirmation of Divine Justice: The Doxologies of Amos and Related 
Texts in the Old Testament (Dissertation Series; Missoula, Mont: Scholars Press, 1975). 
31 The diagram here is adapted from Robert Martin-Achard, A Commentary on the Book of Amos in R. Martin-
Achard and S. Paul Re’mi, God's People in Crisis (ITC; Edinburgh: Handsel Press, 1984), 39. 
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D' (v. 9) 
C' (vv. 10-12 (13)) 
B' (vv. 14 f) 
A' (vv. 16 f) 
 
The structure of the passage reinforces its message. Amos begins and ends with a lament for 
the death of the people (A/A'), but the link from the lament to the woe oracles which contain 
the reason for that lament (C/C'), is twice interrupted by the appeal to seek Yahweh and the 
promise of life (B/B'). The prophet emphasises that seeking God is the only way to break the 
causal connection between the sin of injustice and the penalty of death. And at the centre of 
the chiastic structure, which always bears the emphasis, we find the dramatic exclamation: 
‘The Lord is his name’ (E).32 Yahweh, therefore, is not only the focus of the exhortations in 
5:4 and 5:6, but is made the focus of the whole passage: this God whom Israel claims to 
worship is declared to be sovereign over life and death, not only the pronouncer of judgment, 
but also the giver of life.   
2.1.  The exhortations: 5:4, 6, 14 
The sections which are of the most interest teleologically are 5:4-6 and 5:14, where Israel is 
instructed to seek the Lord and to seek the good. It has been suggested that these exhortations 
take the form of a tōrā, by which the priests would exhort the people to come to the 
sanctuary.33 If so, Amos is essentially usurping this priestly function to create maximum 
impact on his hearers, who apparently assumed that their mere presence at the sanctuary, 
where Yahweh had been worshipped from ancient times, and their performing of the required 
rituals, was sufficient to ensure the blessing of security and prosperity. Amos overturns these 
assumptions, and denounces the people’s version of ‘seeking Yahweh’ as superficial and 
thoroughly instrumental.34 Not only does he not encourage their visits to the sanctuary, but he 
forbids them, warning that the days of these shrines are numbered. His hearers must have 
been astonished. Ritualistic practice could not blind Yahweh to the widespread injustice in 
the land. We can sense the urgency in the prophet’s exhortations: Yahweh, the source of life, 
                                                 
32 D/D'/E are thought to be hymn fragments. 
33 Mays, Amos, 87; Jeremias, Amos, 87-8; Paul, Amos, 162. 
34 The OT seems to describe established procedures for ‘seeking Yahweh’; when help or instruction was needed 
a person would go to a man of God or a prophet. E.g. Gen 25:22; Exod 18:15; I Sam 9:9; I Kgs 14:1ff.; II Kgs 
8:8f.; Jer 21:2; Ezek 20:1 ff. 
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is also the one who will bring about destruction. And the destruction is imminent. Amos 
visualises the nation of Israel as already dead (5:1-2). The danger is real and present, and time 
is short.35 As Mays writes: 
 
the priests in Israel’s shrines were offering ‘life’ through the cult without pointing to 
the kind of living required of those who ‘seek Yahweh’ (Pss. 15; 24). They were 
offering an abbreviated tōrā, instruction concerning the way to ‘cheap grace’; they 
were saying, ‘Come to Bethel, that you may live’ without confronting the worshippers 
with the will of the divine Lord from whom they expected the gift of life.36 
 
Though the divine oracle in 5:4 is repeated from the perspective of the prophet in 5:6, it is not 
until 5:14 that Amos begins to clarify what he means by ‘Seek the Lord’. From the structural 
parallels between 5:4, 6 and 5:14 it is clear that a connection is intended between the Lord 
and the good. On the basis of the text’s content and structure, then, it might be argued that the 
telos (or ‘good’) of human beings, could not only be conceived in some quasi-philosophical 
sense, but also, in some way, as Yahweh himself. The concept of Yahweh as the source of 
life and ultimate telos of it, lies at the very heart of 5:1-17. But can these exhortations bear 
the weight of the argument that a teleological ethics is discernible in Amos? To answer this, 
we shall now focus our thoughts on these crucial verses, and on the key terms drš (‘seek’), 
and ṭôb (‘good’). 
2.1.1. Seeking Yahweh: seeking Bethel (5:4, 6) 
The root drš (‘seek’) appears in Amos 5 three times, and on each occasion, it is linked to ḥyh 
(‘live’). Although it has a literal sense, its use in the prophetic literature is mostly figurative;37 
that is, if its object is not Yahweh, then it is some other-directed abstract notion such as 
good,38 justice,39 even the peace or welfare of Babylon.40 Several aspects of the verb are 
useful for us here. Seeking is firstly a matter of desire. As the faithful shepherd will seek out 
                                                 
35 Judgment by fire is mentioned here, the same judgment predicted for the enemies of Israel (1:4- 2:2). 
36 Mays, Amos, 87. 
37 Siegfried Wagner, “שׁרד”, TDOT, 3:293-307, 295-6; David Denninger, “שׁרד”, NIDOTTE, 1:993-999, 994-5.  
38 Amos 5:14. 
39 Isa 1:17.      
40 Jer 29:7; 38:4. 
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his scattered sheep,41 so we seek what we care about. Therefore, seeking the Lord (5:4, 6) 
should be something that the people of God desire and care about. Next, there is an 
intentional aspect to seeking; it involves an act of will. The anticipated outcome of seeking is 
finding (mṣʾ), and we see elsewhere in scripture that finding is predicated on a whole-hearted 
seeking. For example, the Deuteronomist advises the people: ‘From there you will seek (drš) 
the LORD your God, and you will find (mṣʾ) him if you search after him with all your heart 
and soul’.42 And lastly, seeking is not simply a mental state but also involves activity. For 
example, in Isaiah 1:17, ‘seeking justice’ is equivalent to rescuing the oppressed and 
defending the orphan and widow.43    
Seeking Yahweh might be seen as a privilege of God’s covenant people, but with privilege 
comes responsibility. That this privilege was being abused in the time of Amos is clear from 
the prophet’s warning to stop seeking Bethel, and seek Yahweh instead. Since the people 
were ignoring the responsibilities inherent in the covenant relationship, the relationship itself 
was under threat, and a divine response seemingly inevitable.44 As we have already noted, 
this would have no doubt surprised the people, who appeared to be satisfied that their concept 
of seeking Yahweh’ through the ritual of the cult, was sufficient to guarantee his favour: this 
was surely the whole purpose of the cult. They may well have gone to the sanctuary with a 
devotional attitude, but, according to Amos, there is more to ‘seeking God’ then than merely 
turning up for worship. To seek God is to seek to know God; that is, it is predicated on the 
idea of relationship.  
Seeking Yahweh, then, involves the will as well as the heart, and should lead to activity, and 
not just ritual activity, but also moral activity. In this relationship of seeking and knowing 
there is the promise of life: on the other hand, seeking incorrectly, for example seeking 
Bethel, leads to death. 
                                                 
41 Cf. Ezek 34:6.  
42 Deut 4:29. See also Jer 29:7. In later texts, a king’s seeking, or not seeking, Yahweh became the basis for the 
evaluation of his reign. For example, Jehoshaphat prepared his heart to seek God (2 Chron 19:3); Uzziah 
prospered as long as he sought the Lord (2 Chron 26:5). By the time of the Chronicler, the ‘seeking Yahweh’ 
concept had become complex. For example, in 1 Chronicles 28:9 we find ‘seeking God’, ‘serving God’ (with a 
whole heart) and ‘knowing God’ are considered parallel ideas. Wagner, “שׁרד”, 300; Denninger, “שׁרד”, 997.        
43 Isa 1:17. 
44 For other examples of wrong seeking leading to divine displeasure, see 1 Chron 10:15, 2 Kgs 1, 2 Chron 
16:12.  
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2.1.2. Seeking the good (5:14) 
We must next attempt to clarify the meaning of seeking ‘the good’. The parallels between 
5:4, 6 and 5:14 are clear, but what are we to make of that similarity? Just what is the relation 
between seeking Yahweh and seeking the good? Is the suggestion of an implied identity 
relation a step too far? Just as seeking Yahweh leads to life, we find in the parallel 
exhortation (5:14), that seeking the good also leads to life. A command to seek the good 
presumes that the ones receiving the command know what is being required of them. The 
word used here is the standard Hebrew word for ‘good’ (ṭôb), which is found throughout the 
Old Testament in both early and late texts,45 but what did the prophet mean by using it here? 
One of the uses of ṭôb is for evaluation or assessment of function. This may be part of its 
meaning in Genesis 1, so that ‘ṭôb’ expresses the creator’s satisfaction that his creation 
fulfilled its intended purpose (Gen 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25).46 But we surely also see hints of 
the aesthetic as well as the functional: the world is a place created in good working order, but 
it also possesses beauty.47 Eve’s assessment of the fruit as ‘good for food’ (Gen 2:9; cf. 3:6) 
may contain an element of the functional,48 but there seems no doubt that the sense of ‘good’ 
here includes its desire-making properties.49 ṭôb can also refer to general well-being: for 
example, it was ‘not good’ that man should be alone, because it was not conducive to his 
flourishing as a human being (Gen 2:18). But what is important for our purposes in this 
discussion is the moral sense of ṭôb, for there is no doubt that this is the primary sense 
intended in 5:14. This is evident both from the ethical thrust of the book as a whole, and from 
its immediate context. The call, in 5:15, for justice to be established ‘in the gate’ gives 
substance to the notion of ṭôb, and the juxtaposition of ṭôb and its antonym ra‘ (‘evil’) in 
                                                 
45 For a thorough discussion of בוֹט see Robert P. Gordon, “בוֹט” NIDOTTE, 2:353-7, and I. Höver-Johag, “בוֹט” 
TDOT, 5:296–317.  
46 Claus Westermann, for example, denies that ṭôb implies a judgment given according to some prior objective 
standard; creation, like the ‘good’ work of any other craftsman, simply suited its purpose and achieved its goal. 
Claus Westermann, Creation (trans John J. Scullion; London: SPCK, 1974), 61. 
47 Τhe LXX renders the ṭôb here as καλός which, as we saw in Chapter Two, can convey both notions.  
48 Westermann observes that, in combination with yd‘ (‘know’), the expression ‘good for’ refers to  a ‘functional 
knowledge’ of what is ‘useful’ as opposed to harmful for humans: see also Gen 2:9, 17; 3:5, 22. Claus 
Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary (trans John J. Scullion; London: SPCK, 1984), 241-2.    
49 Höver-Johag, “בוֹט”, 298. 
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5:14-15 is not just formulaic, but refers to situations where choices have a moral 
significance.50 The good referred to here is not reducible to function or to a simple hedonism. 
We might wonder, however, what sort of value ṭôb connotes. Can we attribute the concept of 
absolute value to the prophet or is that stretching our modern categories too far?51 Certainly, 
the common OT expression ‘good in the eyes of’ (ṭôb be‘ênê) sounds subjective, in that 
‘good’ is made relative to the beholder. But, by using the command to seek good and not evil 
in the text here, Amos presumably expects people not only to be able to discern between the 
two categories, but also to discern them according to a shared understanding of them. Moral 
responsibility is predicated on moral knowledge, and so moral knowledge must be accessible. 
Just as ‘seeking Yahweh’ (vv. 4, 6) is not fully explained (the people are simply instructed 
not to seek Bethel or Gilgal), neither is the idea of seeking the good expanded upon; Amos 
does not provide a positive list of good actions or character traits. But neither do we see in 
Amos a deterministic framework, for a clear choice is presented to the people. Therefore, we 
must assume that they have access to the requisite knowledge on which to base their moral 
choice.52 We must therefore suppose that the people had awareness of the obligations 
inherent in the covenant.   
We noted earlier that seeking in the OT is an activity which involves the affections as well as 
the will. By using the language of loving and hating, Amos makes it clear that seeking the 
good and rejecting the evil invokes the strongest possible human emotions too. The appeal 
may be corporately given, but the demand is on the individual; it is personal. The ‘good’ of 
5:14 is more than an abstract philosophical concept; seeking the good, like seeking Yahweh, 
is in fact to seek life itself. As Mays points out: ‘The decision about good and evil is a 
decision for or against Yahweh and therefore an invocation of his blessing or his judgment’.53 
                                                 
50 Most commentators see 5:14-15 as a rhetorical unit. The two verses have a similar structure – 
exhortation/conditional promise – and are linked by a chiasmus (‘Seek good, not evil’/‘hate evil, love good’). 
This paralleling of antithetical concepts (good/evil; love/hate) is also typical of Wisdom sayings and there are 
many examples in Proverbs. See also Ps 34:12-14 and 37:3, 27f.; Is 1:16f. Amos’s rhetoric, therefore, 
apparently not only borrows the priestly forms (e.g. the tōrā), but also the Wisdom writings of the time. Some 
commentators attribute v. 14 to the influence of later wisdom literature where the objects of drš became the 
precepts and commandments of the written Torah and the idea of a personal relationship with God was less 
visible. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 250. Mays, Amos, 100. Cf. Ezra 7:10; 2 Chron 30:19.   
51 Admitting that the ancient Israelites did not apparently reason according our contemporary philosophical 
distinctions does not entail that they were ‘quite incapable of appreciating abstract ideas’ along with ‘most other 
ancient peoples’. Heaton, The Old Testament Prophets, 51.  
52 Cf. Deut 30:15 where the choice set before the people is based on the explicit instructions in the preceding 
chapters: ‘See, I have set before you today life and prosperity (ṭôb), death and adversity (ra‘)’.  
53 Mays, Amos, 100. 
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To Amos, the good is linked to the seeking of Yahweh, who, as we shall see shortly, is not 
only the giver of life, but can also be plausibly understood as the personification of the good 
of 5:14. 
2.2.  From ṭôb to eudaimonia 
Having considered the idea of seeking the good, and suggested that seeking the good is linked 
to the seeking of Yahweh, we can now consider whether an Aristotelian conception of telos 
can be found in the thought of the prophet. Is there anything in the text of Amos which 
parallels Aristotle’s idea that the flourishing life is eudaimonia and substantiates the notion 
that a theistic VE theory can be based on an Aristotelian framework? 
In Chapter Two we argued that eudaimonia, theistically understood, could be construed as a 
life of relationship or fellowship with God, where virtue was both instrumental to, and 
constitutive of, that life. We also argued that, in the OT, such a conception has both present 
and future aspects. It will now be argued that both aspects are visible in the text of Amos. The 
present aspect of eudaimonia can be reconstructed as the antithesis of life in the Israel of 
Jeroboam’s day, and the future aspect presented in the vision in the final section of the book, 
where, in a future Israel, eudaimonia would be perfected. We shall now consider each of 
these aspects in the light of the textual evidence, and conclude with the suggestion that it is 
Yahweh himself who is the ultimate telos. 
2.2.1. Eudaimonia: the present aspect 
2.2.1.1. ṭôb as mišpāṭ   
It is clear from 5:4-6 and 5:14-15 that ‘the good’ with which Amos is concerned is bound up 
primarily with the establishment of justice in the community, and justice will be established 
when the covenant requirements are met. The cult, as practiced in the Israel of Amos’s day, 
was failing in its worship of Yahweh, and so failing to promote the ethics which Yahweh 
required.54 This is not a case of religion versus morality but rather of religion necessitating 
morality, for seeking Yahweh is predicated on seeking justice. Neither is it a reduction of 
ethics to legalism; ṭôb is as inseparable from mišpāṭ as Yahweh is from both. The covenant 
obligations which form the background to the prophetic indictment of Israel are articulations 
                                                 
54 For other examples of prophetic condemnation of the disjunction between the practice of the cult and ethically 
acceptable behaviour see Isa. 1:10-17; 58; Jer. 7:1-15; Mic. 6:1-8.  
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of ṭôb as mišpāṭ and keeping these obligations should be an expression of Israel’s devotion to 
Yahweh. There is a very particular link in the OT between ṭôb and obedience to the 
covenant;55 if Israel practises the good as prescribed by the covenant laws, then the result will 
be good and all will go well.56 Without obedience there will be no good. Amos warns the 
people who confidently say ‘Yahweh is with us’,57 while ignoring the covenant requirement 
of justice, that they were dangerously mistaken; Yahweh is with those who seek and love the 
good. 
It seems difficult to proceed with an ethical discussion of Amos without assuming a covenant 
theology to some extent. As intimated above, we must assume that a real choice has been set 
before the people, that is that the parameters of ṭôb and ra‘ are accessible to them. Accepting 
the existence and availability of covenant stipulations makes sense of Amos’s accusations of 
their violation. While we may assume that the moral responsibilities of the surrounding 
nations are derived from some form of natural law,58 we must also assume that Yahweh has a 
direct involvement in the moral framework of his people, for the basis of that framework is 
the covenant which he formed between himself and them. Injustice is serious because it 
threatens the existence of the covenant.  
The thrust of Amos’s social critique, then, is the identification of ṭôb with mišpāṭ. If we 
accept the argument of Chapter Three, that justice, in conjunction with righteousness, is the 
overarching virtue in the OT, it is possible to understand mišpāṭ as ṭôb in an Aristotelian 
sense, where ṭôb is the flourishing life, and mišpāṭ is constitutive of it. Eudaimonia, then, is 
simply a life lived in relationship with God and so a life lived according to justice, and the 
exercise of the virtue of justice being the means by which the righteousness or integrity of the 
                                                 
55 Interestingly, Höver-Johag points out that there is a related noun in Ugartitic (ṭbn) which can be translated 
‘harmony’, and a related term, ṭābūtu, meaning ‘covenant friendship’, which is found in suzerainty treaties from 
the Old Assyrian period until at least the sixth century. He suggests that ṭābūtu can be used as a synonym for 
‘brotherhood (aḥḥūtu), and in the context of commerce and matrimonial politics, these terms suggest equality or 
near equality. Höver-Johag, “בוֹט”, 298, 301. 
56 Plenty of explicit examples can be seen in the work of the Deuteronomist and the Chronicler, (e.g. Asa did 
‘what was good (ṭôb) and right (yšr) in the eyes of the Lord’ (2 Chron 14:1[2])); indeed, this is necessary for 
continued possession of the land (Deut 6:18). 
57 Amos 5:14. For similar examples of the people’s confidence see, 6:3 and 9:10. Mays notes that the phrase 
‘Yahweh is with is’, is rooted in the idea of election, ‘an affirmation of trust and confidence that belonged to the 
history of Yahwism from the beginning. . . a salvation-word conveying the blessing of Yahweh’. Mays, Amos, 
101. See also Gen 26:3, 24; 28:15; 31:8. Yahweh was thought of as the people’s refuge (Ps 46:7, 11), and the 
one who fought for them (Jdg 6:12f.; cf. Num 14:43). 
58 See Part IV of the current chapter for a discussion of the idea of the natural law in the context of Amos. 
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community is preserved. But does the prophet, like Aristotle, make some conceptual space 
for external goods?  
2.2.1.2. ṭôb as external goods     
In the OT, we not only find declarations that God is good, but also evidence of this goodness 
in the good which he secures for his people when they live in accordance with the covenant 
stipulations. The psalmist looks forward to seeing ‘the goodness of the Lord in the land of the 
living’ (Ps 27:13), and to the ancient Israelite mind, this goodness included possession of a 
fertile land, well-nourished herds and flocks, and most crucially, rain.59 These goods were 
essential for the flourishing of the people, but could be withheld if the people sinned against 
Yahweh; for example, the widespread injustice in the Israel of Amos’s day, has caused a 
series of troubles for the people and their land.60 Not until the final section of Amos do we 
find a positive statement concerning the provision of external goods.       
It is important at this point to remind ourselves that an Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia 
requires that virtue is the only good of intrinsic value, and other goods are instrumental in 
some sense. As we argued in Chapter Two, this means the rejection of pluralistic conceptions 
of the good life in the OT. The external goods of peace and fertility and prosperity are the 
promised result of a community living in righteousness and according to justice, and the good 
life cannot be reduced to these goods. The people of Israel apparently assumed that they were 
experiencing the good life, but, on an Aristotelian reading, they were mistaken, for there is 
more to human flourishing than the external goods of material prosperity and international 
peace. Such goods, in their essence, are ephemeral. Virtue, and in particular the virtue of 
justice, is the only good of intrinsic value.    
2.2.2. Eudaimonia: the future aspect        
In addition to what can be argued to be a present sense of eudaimonia in the prophet’s mind, 
there is also a future aspect to the idea which we find in the closing section of the book. Here 
we find, not only a perfection of external goods, but also a perfection of virtue, and so of the 
human telos itself. It could be argued that the ultimate good which God wishes for his people 
is the perfection of their relationship with him, the fruits of which will be the blessing of 
                                                 
59 E.g. Deut 28:12. Interestingly, by metonymy ṭôb often has the meaning ‘rain’; e.g. in Jer 17:6, 8 the 
parallelism of ḥōm (‘heat’) and ṭôb suggests the good of rain and the evil of drought. Höver-Johag, “בוֹט”, 305. 
For examples of the withholding of the good of rain see 1 Kings 8:35; Jer 3:3; 5:25. 
60 Amos 4:6-11.  
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peace and security for ever, and it is just such an eschatological vision which we find in the 
epilogue at the very end of Amos (9:11-15). Here the prophet narrates a vision which 
corresponds with that of the Psalmist which we considered in Chapter Two. In Ps 85:8-13, we 
are given a picture of a coming age of salvation, characterised not only by the provision of 
rain (ṭôb), and abundance of crops, but also a land where: ‘Steadfast love [ḥesed] and 
faithfulness [ʾemet] will meet; righteousness [ṣedeq] and peace [šālôm] will kiss each 
other’.61 These are covenant terms. The idea that Yahweh will do good (ṭôb) to his people is 
also at the heart of the new or ‘everlasting’ covenant (berît ‘ôlām) which Jeremiah 
announces.62 We see many of these ideas echoed in the closing section of Amos. Most 
commentators assign 9:11-15 to a later date (usually the post-exilic period) because of the 
sharp contrast not only to the previous verse, but also to the tone of the book as a whole. 
Wellhausen famously captured this contrast, describing verses 13-15 as ‘roses and lavender 
instead of blood and iron’:63 in the words of David Allan Hubbard, ‘the sword of judgment 
gives way to the trowel of reconstruction’.64   
Amos 9:10 reads:  
10 All the sinners of my people shall die by the sword, 
   who say, “Evil shall not overtake or meet us.” 
 
But in verse 11, the prophet abruptly changes his tone: 
11 On that day I will raise up 
    the booth of David that is fallen, 
and repair its breaches, 
    and raise up its ruins, 
    and rebuild it as in the days of old; 
12 in order that they may possess the remnant of Edom 
    and all the nations who are called by my name, 
    says the LORD who does this. 
13 The time is surely coming, says the LORD, 
    when the one who ploughs shall overtake the one who reaps, 
    and the treader of grapes the one who sows the seed; 
the mountains shall drip sweet wine, 
                                                 
61 Ps 85:11(10). 
62 Jer 32:40-42. Cf. Jer 33:9, 11, 14. 
63 ‘Rosen und Lavendel statt Blut und Eisen’. Julius Wellhausen, Die Kleinen Propheten übersetzt und erklärt 
(3rd ed.; Berlin: Reimer, 1898), 96.   
64 David Allan Hubbard, Joel and Amos: An Introduction and Commentary (TOTC 25; Nottingham: IVP, 1989), 
250. 
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    and all the hills shall flow with it. 
14 I will restore the fortunes of my people Israel, 
    and they shall rebuild the ruined cities and inhabit them; 
they shall plant vineyards and drink their wine, 
    and they shall make gardens and eat their fruit. 
15 I will plant them upon their land, 
    and they shall never again be plucked up 
    out of the land that I have given them, 
says the LORD your God. (Amos 9:11-15) 
 
Much of the discussion in the commentaries concerns the dissimilarities between the epilogue 
(9:11-15) and the rest of the book. But a canonical reading has a vision of the whole; the 
challenge is to search for the meaning of the epilogue in the light of the whole. The newer 
literary approaches to the text have shown that the epilogue fits well structurally with the rest 
of the book.65 Moreover, there are also important thematic connections which are evidence of 
continuity. In this final section, the same language and themes from the earlier chapters are 
re-introduced and given a new context, in the light of the new revelation. In declaring that he 
will ‘restore the fortunes’ of his people Israel (v. 14), Yahweh announces a reversal of the 
negative effects of his judgment: the terrible ‘day’ of 2:13, 8:3, 9, 13 becomes the glorious 
‘day’ of 9:11, the ‘falling’ of Israel in 5:2 and 8:14 is reversed with the raising up of the 
booth of David (9:11), the breaches in the walls (4:3) will be repaired (9:11), the destruction 
of the gardens and vineyards (4:9) will be contrasted with the planting of new ones (9:14) and 
most important of all, the exile itself will be reversed and the people returned to their land 
(9:15).  
But, and this is crucial, this restoring of fortunes is still in the future. The people must wait. 
This passage is usually understood to emanate from a time when Israel has returned from 
exile but life is still far from perfect, and the only hope seemed to lie in a future realm, a 
radical recreation, a world restored to its ‘factory settings’. The proposal of a post-exilic 
setting, one sandwiched between the misery of the past and the actualization of future hope, 
provides a context for M. Daniel Carroll R.’s analysis of post-war Guatemala where the 
people are literally living ‘between the lines’.66 He argues that employing a literary reading of 
                                                 
65 See the useful discussion in Barton, TBA, 148-55. 
66 That is, between verses 10 and 11. Thirty-six years of armed conflict in Guatemala ended on 29th December 
1996 with the signing of a peace treaty between the government and the guerrilla movement (the URNG), but 
although political progress has been made, Carroll points out that the peace is fragile. The drug trade flourishes 
and gang activity leads to violence of a different sort, no longer for political ends, but for money. Moreover, the 
judicial system is corrupt leaving people seek their own ‘justice’ through lynchings. Political reformation may 
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these verses which is ‘sensitive to the interplay between the imagination and the biblical 
literature’ might offer a means to ‘fund’ the counter-imagination necessary to enable the 
country to move forwards.67 This funding of a counter-perspective was just as necessary in 
the days of Amos as it is today. The ‘dearth of vision’ which Carroll perceived in Latin 
America at the turn of the century is still a description of a humanity today. Eudaimonia is 
more than just external circumstances, it is also an internal state, an inner peace. 
2.3.  ṭôb as Yahweh   
In the light of the previous discussion, we can return to the exhortation in Amos 5:14. 
Although not explicitly stated, the parallel expressions in Amos 5:4, 6 and 4-15 strongly 
imply synonymy, if not identity. Can it therefore be claimed that Yahweh himself is the 
ultimate good which the people are exhorted to seek? 
While the declaration that God is good occurs frequently in the OT, it is equally often met 
with philosophical indignation in the face of that age-old problem of the existence of evil. 
Although the goodness of God inspired the psalmists to praise the Lord and give him 
thanks,68 other psalms seem to cast doubt on that goodness.69 However, the denial of this 
basic fact that God is good has serious implications, not only for the faith of the theist, but 
also for her ethical reflection. If we are to retain a place for God in theistic ethics, then that 
God must be in essence good. Goodness is a very thin ethical concept, and yet the psalmist is 
clear that the primary mark of God’s goodness is that his love (ḥesed) endures forever.70 
Höver-Johag describes this brief hymn (the kî-ṭôḇ) as ‘the central confessional statement of 
the OT, based on Israel’s concept of an historical and personal God’.71  
                                                 
have led to greater strides towards democracy, and absence of war, but violence has re-emerged in different 
forms. As we noted in the Introduction, Carroll R. sees a radical change in ‘the moral climate’ as the only 
solution. M. Daniel Carroll R, “Living between the Lines: Reading Amos 9:11-15 in Post-War 
Guatemala”. Religion and Theology 6, no. 1 (1999): 50-64. See also Carroll R., “Seeking the Virtues”, 79-80. 
67 Carroll R, “Living between the Lines”, 54. Carroll R. appeals to the work of Walter Brueggemann and Martha 
Nussbaum here. Brueggemann believes that the task of the biblical expositor is ‘to fund – to provide the pieces, 
materials, and resources out of which a new world can be imagined’. Walter Brueggemann, The Bible and 
Postmodern Imagination: Texts under Negotiation (London: SCM Press, 1993), 20. Nussbaum argues that the 
imagination must be employed in a critical and evaluative way as it engages with the text; there must therefore 
be dialogue with others. Martha Craven Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life 
(Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1995). 
68 E.g. Ps 106:1; 107:1; 118:1, 29; 136:1, and 1 Chron 16:34 for the same exhortation. 
69 E.g. Ps 22:1: ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me? Why are you so far from helping me?’ 
70 E.g. Ps 106:1: ‘O give thanks to the LORD, for he is good (kî-ṭôḇ); for his steadfast love endures forever’. 
71 Höver-Johag, “בוֹט”, 315. 
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If it is true that the declaration that Yahweh is good is part of ‘the central confessional 
statement’ of the people of Israel, then it is perfectly plausible that the prophet intended an 
identity relation in the exhortations of chapter 5. We can therefore say that Amos envisaged 
Yahweh as the ultimate telos. Interestingly, while we saw in Chapter Two that eudaimonia 
for Aristotle was a life of activity according to virtue, we might also remember that he 
considered the kalon to be the aim of virtue, and also that he regarded the supreme human 
good as contemplation of the divine. In light of these facts, it is interesting that the translators 
of the LXX render the ṭôḇ of 5:14 as kalon, rather than the more generic agathon.  
2.4.  Conclusion 
The aim of this section was to test the idea that Amos’s conception of the good can be related 
to the concept of telos in a neo-Aristotelian VE theory. Concentrating our investigation on 
chapter 5 of Amos, we argued that the exhortations in this chapter did reveal a teleological 
aspect to the prophet’s thought. We saw that for the prophet, seeking Yahweh (5:4, 6) was a 
moral activity which involved both heart and will, and, moreover, was essential for life, as 
was the parallel exhortation to seek the good (5:14). We therefore argued that the telos of all 
ethical reflection could be construed as relating in some sense to Yahweh himself. It was 
further argued that it was possible to read Amos as envisaging a proto-Aristotelian concept of 
eudaimonia. Following on from our argument in Chapter Two, we suggested that in Amos 
eudaimonia could be construed as a life of relationship or fellowship with God, with virtue as 
instrumental to, and also constitutive of, that life. To be sure, that concept of eudaimonia 
would have to be reconstructed as the antithesis of life in the Israel of Amos’s day, but the 
conception is plausible. In addition, the text of Amos supports an understanding of the 
flourishing life which is not limited to the present but has a future dimension. The 
eschatological hope presented in the final section of Amos suggests that the perfection of 
human flourishing will only occur in a future time when Yahweh reverses all the negative 
effects of his judgment, and all human relationships, those between humans and those 
between the human and the divine, will be characterised by righteousness and therefore also 
by peace, and the land will consequently be forever fruitful. 
We can conclude, therefore, that the text of Amos can be convincingly read as supporting a 
teleological, Aristotelian framework. On our interpretation, God can be understood to be not 
only the source of the goods without which eudaimonia is impossible, but also ‘the good’ 
itself; the perfection of mišpāṭ for the virtuous life is one pursued for the sake of the kalon, 
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and ultimately the kalon is Yahweh himself. A flourishing life according to Amos, then, is 
predicated on seeking the good, and seeking the good means correctly seeking Yahweh 
through a relationship with him, a relationship which is in turn maintained by virtuous living, 
and which would be perfected in a future time. This reading coheres with Aristotle’s theory 
where virtue is both instrumental and constitutive of eudaimonia. When the people seek 
Yahweh correctly, they will seek the good, and in seeking the good they will live. 
The theist who is drawn to VE now has a substantive concept of the telos to put to work in 
her theory. We shall next consider how, on the basis of the text, we can integrate the notion 
of the virtue of justice into our VE theory. 
 
Part II. Justice as virtue in Amos 
3. Introduction 
In chapter Three we discussed the second condition of adequacy which we argued was 
necessary if a VE theory was to be normatively useful. This was the concept of virtue, and in 
particular the virtue of justice. But fitting this virtue into a teleological framework presents a 
major challenge to the biblical theist who is drawn to VE. We saw that, to Aristotle, 
possessing this virtue was the defining mark of the virtuous person, since, in addition to its 
more familiar ‘particular’ sense, he conceived of justice as complete virtue. We also noted 
Aristotle’s problems concerning the ground of, and motive to, the virtue of justice. In our 
study of the OT conception of justice, we subsequently argued that there was a way to 
understand the virtue of justice in a theological sense which could not only address 
Aristotle’s problems, but could also fit into a teleological framework and so underpin a 
theistic VE theory. If all human relationships, with God or with each other, are conceived of 
as covenant-based, and righteousness is a picture of a flourishing relationship, then justice is 
the means by which that relationship is maintained. The bending of mišpāṭ, on the other hand, 
severs the relationship and disrupts the harmony on which the covenant depends, so 
threatening both ṣedeq and šālôm and ultimately life itself. The virtue of justice, therefore, is 
not only complete virtue, but is also a necessary constituent of the flourishing life. 
Since we have chosen the Book of Amos as the testing ground for our theistic version of VE 
theory, we shall now turn to the text and attempt to grasp how virtue was understood by the 
prophet, and if we can find evidence that Amos conceived of justice in the Aristotelian sense 
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outlined above. Our discussion of telos in the previous section, revealed that Amos thought of 
the good in terms of justice and righteousness. Just as the distributive sense of justice, where 
each is given her due, was only part of Aristotle’s conception, so it could be argued that 
mišpāṭ ûṣedāqâ was also much more widely conceived in the prophet’s mind.72 
With the aim of assessing how central the virtue of justice was in the prophet’s thinking, and 
to what extent the people have neglected the exercise of this virtue, we shall begin by 
investigating the sociological context of the prophet’s ministry, as far as this is possible, and 
then review the nature of the people’s transgressions and the identity of the oppressed. By 
means of antithesis, then, we will be able to ascertain how this particular virtue should look in 
practice, and the consequences of its neglect.    
3.1.  The centrality of justice in Amos 
But let justice roll down like waters, 
     and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.  (Amos 5:24)73 
 
Unlike the other OT prophets, Amos says almost nothing about the sins of apostasy and 
idolatry, but is entirely focused on the moral question of the breakdown of justice in Israel 
and the reality of the coming judgment. We might recall that, the fact that justice is the 
primary moral concept in the book of Amos was one of the reasons for the discussion of that 
particular virtue. However, justice is conspicuous by its absence in Amos. And so, to 
construct a positive account of this virtue, and understand how it might be a constituent of 
eudaimonia, we must look behind the prophet’s denunciations to see how the virtue of justice 
should have been manifest in the lives of a people who are intent on seeking the good.  
As we attempt to do so, it is important to remind ourselves that the OT prophets were not 
philosophers in either the classical Greek or the modern sense, and we should not expect to 
see analytic or even systematic discussions of concepts. So, while Mays claims that in the 
                                                 
72 The hendiadys is often construed somewhat narrowly as ‘social justice’, and its meaning reduced to the 
combatting of exploitation and oppression. See for example, Walter J. Houston, Contending for Justice: 
Ideologies and Theologies of Social Justice in the Old Testament (London: T. & T. Clark, 2006), 61. 
73 The prophet’s call for justice in Amos 5:24 may be one of the best-known in the Hebrew Bible. For example, 
it was famously quoted by Martin Luther King Jr. in his “Letter from Birmingham City Jail” as he attempted to 
convince the white clergy of the justice of the Civil Rights movement. Martin Luther King, A Testament of 
Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. (ed. James M. Washington; San Francisco: Harper & 
Row, 1986), 297. 
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eighth-century prophets we see the ‘classic expression’ of justice, he also admits that the 
prophets ‘hurl the word out in their messages, as though it were self-evident what it means, 
never lingering to analyse, justify or explain’.74 But a lack of philosophical categories does 
not mean that those early prophets are incapable of making a contribution to the philosophical 
discussion. Their searching questions still resonate today: What are the marks of a just 
society and how was Israel (or Judah) failing? How should the people of God deal with the 
questions of property and poverty? What is the relation between law and morality? Does 
moral character matter? What is the nature of the good life intended by God for his people? 
All these questions are relevant to the theist with an interest in VE theory. 
As we stated in the Introduction, underlying the aim of this thesis is the building of bridges 
between the world of ancient Israel and the present time, so that a reading of the OT text 
would not only be interesting study, but also useful to the construction of a normative ethical 
theory. And so, it is crucial to be as clear as possible about the world we encounter in the 
biblical text. It was suggested that the bridges connecting the two worlds could be understood 
as the nature of man and the character of God. In this part of the current chapter, we will 
focus on the first of these bridges, human nature. According to Aristotle, where human nature 
is in a flourishing state, it is ruled by the virtue of justice. What we find in the text of Amos, 
on the other hand, is a picture of human nature ruled by the vice of injustice. And so, we must 
reconstruct Amos’s idea of the virtue of justice from the textual evidence of its antithesis. In 
order to understand the breakdown of justice in Israelite society, we will attempt to discern 
the social context of the prophet, the source and nature of the unjust practices which the 
prophet denounces, and the identity of the victims about whom he wrote. In doing so, 
however, we should bear in mind that any attempt at sociological reconstruction based on the 
biblical data alone is tentative at best and hazardous at worst, since, when parallels are 
suggested between the social world of the eighth century and the contemporary world, there 
can be a tendency, even with the best of intentions, to use the text to shore up the 
commentator’s own ideology.75 
3.2.  Sociological models 
                                                 
74 James Luther Mays, “Justice: Perspectives from the Prophetic Tradition”. Interpretation 37, no. 1 (1983): 6.  
75 We could think of certain Marxist readings of Amos, such as those of Norman Gottwald or José Porfirio 
Miranda, for example.  
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As Carroll R. rightly points out, any sociological reconstruction of life in ancient Israel is a 
hazardous enterprise.76 Although often presented as fact, proposed theories are often 
hypothetical at best, which is unsurprising given the often rather limited textual information 
and the equally limited data from the surrounding cultures. Nevertheless, they can form a 
useful framework for discussion and interpretation.  
One plausible model for the economic system in Israel at the time of Amos is the ‘rent 
capitalism’ theory of Oswald Loretz and Bernhard Lang. This theory is based on the idea that 
‘the poor’ in the prophetic texts were rural peasants. Certainly, some of the poor in the time 
of Amos must have been members of a farming community to be able to produce grain (5:11) 
and wine (2:8) and participate in the corn trade (8:5). According to Lang, this ‘peasant 
society’ was run by a ruling class who operated a mercantile system under which the peasants 
were ultimately dependent on, and often exploited by, the merchants and urban money-
lenders.77 Where once the ‘peasant’ could provide for his family and produce for the market, 
the changed modes of production demanded by the new market system removed the 
protection against environmental factors such as crop failure; the peasant then got into debt 
and had to sell all or part of his land, so being forced to pay rent on the land which he had 
previously owned.78 Central to Lang’s model is the idea that, under the monarchy, Israel had 
moved from a rural, tribal society to an urban one. He lists some of the evidence he finds for 
rent capitalism in the book of Amos: the rich are often city-dwellers who live a life of ease 
and luxury (3:15; 4:1; 5:11, 22; 6:1,4ff;); tenants are taxed and exploited by landlords (4:1; 
5:11); debtors, at the mercy of their creditors, are exploited and eventually forced into slavery 
(2:6; 8:6).79  
Another model which has been offered to explain the social and economic environment 
behind the prophetic texts is the ‘tributary mode of production’ advocated by Norman 
                                                 
76 Carroll R, Contexts for Amos, 45. 
77 Bernhard Lang, “The Social Organization of Peasant Poverty in Biblical Israel”, in Bernard Lang (ed.), 
Anthropological Approaches to the Old Testament (London: SPCK, 1985). The term ‘rent capitalism’ had been 
used earlier by Oswald Loretz. See Carroll R, Contexts for Amos, 30. Mays favours a similar model and argues 
that the social life in 8th century Israel reflected an ‘early capitalism’. Mays, “Perspectives”, 9. 
78 Lang, “Social Organization”, 86-87. Lang observes that the keeping of a few cattle would have counteracted 
the effect of crop failure. Robert Coote notes that the peasant would also have had to pay rent on water, seed, 
tools, working animals and human labour. Robert B. Coote, Amos among the Prophets: Composition and 
Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 29. 
79  Lang, “Social Organization”, 93-95. Deportation of debtors to foreign countries was common practice in 
Greece and Rome. 
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Gottwald.80 This widely accepted model presupposes the existence of various classes and 
attributes the exploitation and oppressive taxation of the peasants to the state and its agents.81 
Evidence from Amos in support of this theory might include the description of the oppressors 
as coming from Samaria, the place of royal residence (3:9, 12; 4:1; 6:1), the tax on the grain 
harvest (5:11), and the king’s claim to crop production (7:1). However, no one economic 
model seems adequate to explain all the textual details of unfair taxation, corvée labour and 
the abuse of the patronage system which were established facts in the Israel of Jeroboam II.82 
It is to that textual data that we now turn to gain a picture of a society ruled by the vice of 
injustice rather than the virtue of justice.   
3.3.  A picture of an unjust society: the transgressions  
Although precision is sometimes hard to achieve, it is necessary to attempt a description of 
the specific acts of oppression which the prophet condemns so that parallels with 
contemporary contexts can be found. We might note, firstly, that the word usually translated 
‘transgressions’ (peša‘), is used not only in the opening words of the judgment oracles 
against the nations (1:3-2:1), but also in the oracles against Judah (2:4), and Israel (2:6). In 
the prophet’s eyes, Israel’s transgressions are clearly on a par with the war crimes of the 
nations.83 It has been suggested that this word has political connotations implying revolt 
against authority,84 confirmation, perhaps, that the God of Israel is sovereign over the nations 
too.  
3.3.1. Exploitation  
                                                 
80 This theory is essentially the same as Marx’s ‘Asiatic mode of production’. See for example Norman K. 
Gottwald, “Social Class as an Analytic and Hermeneutical Category in Biblical Studies.” Journal of Biblical 
Literature 112, no. 1 (1993): 3-22.   
81 Marvin Chaney follows Gottwald in his study of Micah, arguing that the state (Judah) engaged in a systematic 
programme of agricultural reform to produce goods for export (in particular oil and wine) in order to pay for the 
import of luxury goods desired by the ruling elite. Marvin L. Chaney, “Micah – Models Matter: Political 
Economy and Micah 6:9-15”, in Philip Francis Esler (ed.), Ancient Israel: The Old Testament in Its Social 
Context (London: SCM Press, 2005), 148. For the suggestion of contemporary parallels see Matthew J. M. 
Coomber, “Prophets to Profits: Ancient Judah and Corporate Globalization”, in Matthew J. M. Coomber (ed.), 
Bible and Justice: Ancient Texts, Modern Challenges (London: Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2011). 
82 Houston opts for a synthesis of various models, arguing that rent capitalism did not arrive before the 6 th 
century and that the dominant mode of production in the eighth century was a ‘communitarian’ one which 
remained under the control of rural families. Houston, Contending, 48-51. 
83 The judgment by fire is also shared: 1:4, 7, 10, 12, 14; 2:2. Cf. 2:5; 7:4. 
84 Paul, Amos, 45; Mays, Amos, 28. Jeremias notes that peša‘ is the ‘harshest designation for sin in the OT’. 
Jeremias, Amos, 93.   
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When forced into debt, the people became victims of further exploitation. If unable to repay 
their loans a real possibility was their being sold into slavery: ‘they sell the righteous for 
silver, and the needy for a pair of sandals’ (2:6b).85 They might lose possessions which have 
been taken as a pledge: ‘they lay themselves down beside every altar on garments taken in 
pledge’ (2:8a).86 Houston suggests that ‘the girl’ in 2:7 may be a ‘bondmaid’ who has been 
sexually abused:87 ‘father and son go in to the same girl, so that my holy name is profaned’. 
The ‘taxes’ in 5:11 are clearly linked to oppressive practices and may be the means of 
‘persuading’ farmers to abandon traditional subsistence crops: ‘Therefore because you 
trample on the poor and take from them levies of grain’. And finally, there is evidence of 
fraud and deceit in the corn trade (8:6). 
3.3.2. Violence  
No matter how the opening word in 2:7 is translated, the language is still graphic, and the 
message is the same:88 
 
they who trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth, 
    and push the afflicted out of the way (2:7) 
 
The verb in 4:1 is ץצר (‘to crush’). Whether the violence is physical or not (it may well be 
metaphorical), the message seems to be that at the very least the threat is real from those    
 
who oppress the poor, who crush the needy, 
    who say to their husbands, “Bring something to drink! (4:1) 
 
In 3:10 we find a word which is much less likely to be used metaphorically: ḥāmās 
(‘violence’) always connotes ‘the cold-blooded and unscrupulous infringement of the 
                                                 
85 Cf. Neh 5:5. 
86 The technical term ḥăbūlîm in this verse confirms that a debt is involved. Paul suggests that this term refers to 
distraint, since this notion underlies the meaning of the root verb לבח - the confiscation of property by a creditor 
due to defaulting on a loan. Paul, Amos, 83. 
87 Houston, Contending, 66. 
88 The MT reads haššō’ăpîm (from root ףאש, ‘to pant after, swallow up’). Wolff suggests following the LXX (τὰ 
πατοῦντα), and reading haššāʾpîm from the rarer root ףוש I, which would yield ‘those trampling’, as NRSV. 
Wolff, Joel and Amos, 133. So too Paul, Amos, 79. The same form of participle occurs in 8:4.  
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personal rights of others, motivated by greed and hate and often making use of physical 
violence and brutality’.89   
 
 They do not know how to do right, says the LORD, 
    those who store up violence and robbery in their strongholds. (3:10) 
 
Here, as is often the case, ḥāmās is linked with šōd, which means ‘devastation’, but is usually 
translated in this context as ‘robbery’ or ‘oppression’. The two words often occur together90 
and may form a hendiadys as Houston suggests, which would emphasize the violence and 
ruthlessness of the exploitation.91  
Although the accusations in 3:10 and 4:1 are devoid of specific detail,92 the graphic language 
and severity of the consequent judgments testify to the seriousness of the allegations.       
3.3.3. Corruption of the legal system 
It should be remembered that there was no ‘legal system’ in ancient Israel as we conceive of 
one today. There were no professional lawyers. There was no legislature to enact fair laws of 
taxation (5:11) or a just system of fines (2:8b). And so, justice very much depended on the 
character of those forming the ‘laws’, on the personal integrity of the judge and on the 
testimony of the witnesses. Quite possibly those in charge of securing justice were from the 
section of society condemned by the prophet: 
 
 They hate the one who reproves in the gate, 
    and they abhor the one who speaks the truth. (5:10) 
you who afflict the righteous, who take a bribe, 
    and push aside the needy in the gate. (5:12) 
 
 
In 5:12, we see plain evidence of corruption in the courts.93 It was in the space between the 
inner and outer gates of a city where cases were heard and justice was publicly 
                                                 
89 H. Haag, “סמח” TDOT, IV: 482.  
90 See for example Isa 60:18, Jer 6:7; 20:8; Ezek 45:9; Hab 1:3; 2:17.   
91 Houston, Contending, 68. 
92 The abstract noun nĕkōḥâ (right) in 3:10 is a general term for what is straight or right as well as what is honest 
or just. Mays comments that it is used normatively in trading as well as in the courts. Mays, Amos, 64.   
93 Houston argues that there is no obvious condemnation here of the practice of bribery itself, but only in 
situations where bribery perverts justice: it is, however, hard to see that this thought is justifiable from the 
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administered.94 However, in these verses we find that the môkîaḥ, whose duty was to arbitrate 
and administer justice, had become the object of hate, along with the honest witnesses who 
spoke the truth.95 Instead of seeking and loving justice,96 the people had come to hate it. 
Moreover, the rich and powerful were subverting the system by accepting bribes, bullying the 
innocent, and turning away those who sought help. The shocking nature of this state of affairs 
is emphasised by the chiastic structure of 5:10-12,97 and by the prophet’s use of peša‘.98 
As Mays writes: 
 
The ninth word in the Decalogue (Ex. 20.13) made the prohibition of false witness a 
matter of the very policy of Israel’s divine suzerain, and a number of the stipulations 
in the legal traditions of Israel are concerned with the integrity of courts. Therefore to 
hate the advocate of right and abhor those who speak ‘the whole truth’ is tantamount 
to personal opposition to the essence of the system.99 
 
The people whom Amos condemns here are those who oppose justice, and in doing so oppose 
the very basis of the covenant community. As we saw in Chapter Three, the function of the 
virtue of justice was to restore righteousness to the community maintaining its harmony and 
peace, without which its very life was under threat. Therefore, the intentional perversion of 
justice through the abuse of privilege and power, and consequent breaching of the 
relationships of the community, was the most serious of offences and invited the divine 
judgment.    
3.3.4. The identity of the oppressed 
It is often assumed that ‘the poor’ refers simply to the economically poor, but in the 
understanding of the ANE, poverty had a wider frame of reference. Ownership of land, social 
status and power, as well as economic security, were the defining marks of being rich, and 
                                                 
context. See Houston, Contending, 67. Cf. 2:7 where ‘way’ (derek) may be a synonym for justice. Mays, Amos, 
46.   
94 Jeremias, Amos, 92. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 246. 
95 The expression is dōbar tāmîm, literally, ‘the one speaking with integrity’.  
96 Cf. Amos 5:15. 
97 Paul, Amos, 170. Cf. Jeremias, Amos, 93. 
98 See n. 81 above. 
99 Mays, Amos, 93. Wolff suggests that tāmîm (‘fully’) refers to a character trait of the one speaking, that he is a 
person of truthfulness or integrity. Wolff, Joel and Amos, 246. 
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poverty and wealth should be understood in the context of shame and honour.100 Poverty, 
therefore, was more to do with powerlessness and the shame that accompanied it. As Cyril 
Rodd points out, the resident aliens, widows and orphans whose protection is prescribed so 
often in the OT, are certainly powerless and vulnerable to being denied their legal and social 
rights, but not necessarily economically poor.101 It is also clear from the text of Amos that 
‘the poor’ are not all rural peasants as Lang had argued since some of them at least dwell in 
the cities (e.g. 3:9). 
There are several Hebrew words which can be translated ‘poor’, but Amos uses only three of 
them, ʿānî/ʿānāw,102 dāl, and ʾebyôn.103 Most commentators believe that the various terms 
refer to different groups of people, even when they are used in parallel,104 but some minimize 
any semantic distinctions.105 ʿānî/ʿānāw is used to describe those who have been brought to 
poverty and dependence through affliction or exploitation, for example by rich and corrupt 
merchants (8:4-6). Such people were entitled to special protection when they took out a 
loan.106 For example, garments taken in distraint were to be returned before nightfall, since 
they were required for warmth, a procedure which Amos claims was being ignored (2:7-8).107 
dāl can refer to the weak and socially powerless, but most often it simply means ‘poor’. This 
group too are suffering oppression by the rich and powerful, and being denied their rights 
(2:7, 4:1, 5:11, 8:6): however, they cannot be destitute, since the text presumes they are able 
to pay taxes, however illegal the taxes may be (5:11). It is plausible that they are poor peasant 
                                                 
100 See William Domeris, “ןוֹיְבֶא” NIDOTTE 1, 228-32, 228.   
101 Rodd, Glimpses, 167. 
102 ʿānāw is related to the commoner term ʿānî (humble, poor, needy), although the degree of synonymy is 
debatable. William Dumbrell suggests that there is a distinction, and that ʿānāw is more properly ‘humble 
through affliction’, while ʿānî is ‘afflicted’ or ‘needy’. W.J. Dumbrell, “ ןנע”, NIDOTTE, 3:454-64, 455. 
103 Domeris lists eight terms in the semantic field of ‘poverty’. “ןוֹיְבֶא”, 228-9. See also G.J. Botterweck, “ןוֹיְבֶא”, 
TDOT, I, 29-41. Phyllis Bird observes that none of the words occur in the feminine form in the Hebrew Bible, 
and suggests that this may be because justice is limited to those with rights, and since women in ancient Israel 
had no rights, they cannot be victims of injustice. Phyllis A. Bird, Missing Persons and Mistaken Identities: 
Women and Gender in Ancient Israel (Overtures to Biblical Theology; Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 
1997), 77. 
104 E.g., Wolff, Joel and Amos, 166.   
105 Houston, following Milton Schwantes, argues that Amos uses these terms synonymously to refer to the same 
social-economic condition, since they are often used in parallel to emphasise the message. Houston, Contending, 
62. For example, dāl is used in parallel with ʾebyôn in 2:7; 4:1; 5:11; 8:6, and with both ʾebyôn and ʿānāw in 
2:7.  See also See Rodd, Glimpses, 162-3.  
106 E. Gerstenberger, “הנע” TDOT, XI, 230-52, 243. 
107 See Exod 22:25-6; Deut. 24:17. 
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farmers who have suffered the loss of dignity and honour following the loss of their lands.108 
This group is the focus of the violence mentioned in 2:7a. Finally, the ʾebyôn (needy, poor) 
are people who are effectively destitute, without property and entirely dependent on others 
for their survival.109       
Amos also uses ṣaddîq (‘righteous’) to refer to a victim of oppression (2:6; 5:12). In 2:6 
ʾebyôn is found in parallel with ṣaddîq, and a good translation is ‘righteous poor’.110 It should 
be noted that when a person who has been wronged is referred to as ṣaddîq in the OT, the 
implicit moral judgment concerns the action and not the person.111 The ṣaddîq can be thought 
of not only as the person who is in the right, but also as the one who has rights: the ṣaddîq is 
wronged in 2:6 in that he loses his right to freedom because of the most trivial of debts 
(assuming this is a literal and not metaphorical selling into slavery), and the ṣaddîq is 
wronged in 5:12 in that he loses his right to impartial judgment.112   
Rodd argues strongly that it was not ‘absolute poverty’ as such which the prophets 
condemned, but the changes in the structure in society which favoured the rich and oppressed 
the peasant.113 He denies that any of the Hebrew terms for poverty imply outright destitution, 
since the poor possess a house, cattle and fields.114 The terms ‘poor’ and ‘rich’ do not refer to 
material wealth, in either money or land; what was valued in Israelite society, Rodd argues, 
was rather honour and social status. Moreover, Rodd denies that the Exodus event should be 
regarded as the paradigm case of God’s deliverance of the poor, since the motive clauses in 
Exodus and Deuteronomy were attached primarily to laws concerning strangers (gērîm) and 
slaves, and only later extended to include other vulnerable groups such as widows and 
orphans: the fact that these vulnerable people were also very often poor was not the point. 
The Israelites are never described as ‘poor’ during their time in Egypt but simply as gērîm, 
and so, to Rodd, the Exodus event was never intended to provide a motive for caring for the 
                                                 
108 M.D. Carroll R., “ללד”, NIDOTTE, 1:951-4, 951. 
109 Domeris describes them as ‘day laborers’. “ןוֹיְבֶא”, 228. 
110 Andersen and Freedman, Amos, 310. The terms are ‘complementary’ rather than synonymous. 
111 Ibid., 310-13; Wolff, Joel and Amos, 165. 
112 Houston, Contending, 67.   
113 Rodd, Glimpses, 174. 
114 Rodd observes that the Israelite ‘poor’ are never associated with the ‘ebed, ‘the lowest strata in the 
population’, but rather with the gēr, who are ‘poor’ because of their position in society. Rodd, Glimpses, 162-3. 
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poor as such, and the point of the deliverance was not to end poverty by overturning the 
structural features of an oppressive society.115 
 
In ancient Israel poverty was a misfortune not a problem. No one, not even the 
prophets, thought of it as due to the ‘structures of society’ in any self-conscious way. 
The prophets were essentially conservatives, looking back to an older, stable society 
and condemning those who transgressed against the traditional norms of justice. In the 
same way that war, the position of women, and the treatment of animals were not 
‘problems’ in ancient Israel, neither was the existence of the poor.116   
 
 
Rodd may be correct to deny that ‘the Franciscan ideal of poverty’ can be found in ancient 
Israel.117 However, it is a big leap from that observation to deny that Amos is speaking out on 
behalf of the poor simply because they are poor, and not simply because they are being 
denied justice.   
Against such views, Gustavo Gutiérrez maintains that poverty is a central theme in Scripture. 
Following Albert Gelin’s analysis of the Hebrew terms,118 he observes that the terms 
‘indigent, weak, bent over, wretched . . .  already insinuate a protest. They are not limited to 
description; they take a stand’.119 Poverty is degrading, and because it opposes human 
dignity, scripture condemns it as contrary to the will of God. 
 
To oppress the poor is to offend God; to know God is to work justice among human 
beings . . . the existence of poverty represents a sundering both of solidarity among 
persons and also of communion with God . . . Poverty is an evil, a scandalous 
condition, which in our times has taken on enormous proportions. To eliminate it is to 
bring closer the moment of seeing God face to face, in union with other persons.120 
 
                                                 
115 Ibid., 182-3.  
116 Ibid., 180-181. 
117 Ibid., 168. He points to the strong links in the OT between goodness and prosperity (especially in 
Deuteronomy and the wisdom writings) in support of his case.  
118 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation (trans and edited by Sister 
Caridad Inga and John Eagleson; Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1988), 165. To Arthur Gelin, the terms 
conjure up vivid images of real people; for example, the ʾebyôn is ‘the one who desires, the beggar’; the dāl is 
the weak one, the frail one; the ʿānî is ‘the bent over one, the one labouring under a weight’. Albert Gelin, The 
Poor of Yahweh (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1964), 19. Cited in Gutiérrez, A Theology of 
Liberation, 165.   
119 Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, 165. 
120 Ibid., 168. 
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In the OT, then, poverty is condemned because it opposes human dignity; justice is 
commanded, because justice, as we have argued is essential to restore righteousness, and 
righteousness is essential for the maintenance of the covenant relationship in which human 
dignity is preserved. The group or groups referred to by these Hebrew terms are part of Israel, 
and those who should have protected them have become their oppressors. With the covenant 
blessings came covenant responsibilities. When these are ignored, and the covenant is 
violated, and the poor cry out for justice, it is Yahweh, the covenant God who brought the 
people out of Egypt (2:10; 3:1; 9:7), who must act in justice to restore righteousness, and end 
the injustice of oppression and exploitation which breaches the covenant righteousness. 
Amos is rightly called a prophet of justice, for it is the virtue of justice which is central for 
the maintenance of righteousness upon which the covenant depends.    
3.4.  Conclusion   
The objective in this section was to test our theistic conception of Aristotelian justice against 
the book of Amos to see whether the text can support our idea of the function of the virtue of 
justice in a theistic VE theory. As we noted in Chapter Three, a major challenge before the 
biblical theist who is drawn to virtue ethics is to explain how biblical justice fits into a 
teleological framework. We argued there that Aristotle’s conception of justice as having two 
senses could be successfully reinterpreted along OT lines if ‘particular justice’ was conceived 
of as corresponding to social justice (mišpāṭ ûṣedāqâ), and universal justice was more widely 
conceived as the maintenance of the integrity of the covenant community.  
Following Pedersen’s thought, and understanding ṣdq as a description of a healthy soul, that 
is one in harmony and at peace, we saw that the life of the soul was only possible within the 
covenant. It was the function of mišpāṭ to maintain the peace of both the individual soul and 
the soul of the community. When justice is perverted, relationships are severed, both between 
the people and between God and the people, and the harmony on which the covenant depends 
is disrupted, threatening not only righteousness and peace but also the very life of the soul 
itself. We have seen much evidence of this in our study of Amos. Justice generates both a 
privilege and a claim, the weaker having a claim against the stronger, and the latter is enabled 
to meet that claim by virtue of his position of privilege and power. The one who possesses the 
virtue of justice not only ensures that these claims are met and that each receives her due 
honour and material goods, but also understands that this distribution is essential for the 
individual’s link to the covenant, and so also for the very existence of the covenant itself. The 
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picture of life in Israel which Amos condemns depicts, not only a lack of concern, but also 
the widespread abuse of privilege and power; the claims of justice are turned into wormwood, 
and righteousness brought to the ground.121 The vice of injustice destroys not only the 
relationships between people, but also those between the people and God. This is the force of 
Amos’s words. We can now understand the virtue of justice in an Aristotelian sense. The 
people are exhorted to seek the good, which as we saw means in part to seek justice: but they 
are also exhorted to seek Yahweh, whom we have argued is identified as the good. Justice is 
therefore not a rule-bound concept in Amos, because it can be construed as action or 
character in accordance with the nature of a righteous soul; it is the good of this righteous 
soul, which is the prior notion. The virtue of justice is both instrumental to and constitutive of 
the telos of all ethical reflection, which, we are arguing, is relationship with God and is the 
theological equivalent of Aristotle’s friendship which was ‘justice in the fullest sense’.   
We can therefore conclude that our theistic conception of Aristotelian justice is a successful 
heuristic device for the reading of Amos, and is compatible with our VE theory. 
However, much hangs on the character which one ascribes to God, in particular the assertion 
that he is the ground and perfect exemplar of justice. In the next section, we will return to the 
concept of the imitatio Dei. 
  
Part III. Imitatio Dei and the God of Amos  
4. Introduction 
In Chapter Four we considered the concept of exemplarism, because, for a VE theory to be 
normatively useful, it requires a substantive and workable conception of the moral exemplar. 
We argued that, for the theist, God could be considered the supreme moral exemplar since he 
is standardly conceived to be morally perfect. We also argued that objections from Judaism 
and from negative theology, which found the idea of imitation of God’s character to be 
problematic, could be overcome. Finally, we turned our attention to the text of the OT, and 
argued that imitatio Dei, suitably interpreted, could serve as a theistic alternative to imitation 
of the Aristotelian phronimos, and supply an adequate concept of the moral exemplar for a 
theistic VE theory. We have argued in this thesis for a theistic VE theory which declares the 
                                                 
121 Amos 5:7. 
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ultimate telos of a virtuous life to be a relationship with God, and we have also argued that 
the textual evidence from Amos suggests that God himself is the embodiment of the ṭôḇ or 
the kalon, and so it seems to follow naturally that God should also be the prime moral 
exemplar. In this part of the current chapter, we shall test this idea against the character of 
God as he is portrayed in the Book of Amos.     
As we consider the text of Amos, we find that there are few candidates for the role of moral 
exemplar. The only characters pictured in the short narrative section are Amos and the priest 
Amaziah. The latter is clearly disqualified, for the cult legitimises the unjust practices, and 
little can be gleaned from the text about the character of the prophet apart from his desire for 
justice, his faithfulness to Yahweh and his obvious courage in the face of hostile opposition. 
The other prophets and the Nazirites, in whom we might have expected to see exemplary 
traits, have, it seems, been effectively silenced,122 and we are told nothing about them. All 
other characters are hidden, including the king, who should also have been an exemplar of the 
virtues. Yahweh himself is the sole candidate. 
4.1.  Imitation of the God of Amos: problems and possibilities 
We noted in Chapter Four that there are certain problems associated with the idea of the 
imitation of God. One of these was that imitation of God in his essence is clearly impossible, 
for he is omnipotent and omniscient. The God whom Amos describes is the ‘Lord God of 
Hosts’,123 sovereign over the nations and their history and over creation itself; any person 
attempting to imitate the sovereignty of God, should such a person ever arise, could rightly be 
opposed. Imitation, then, is clearly limited to God’s communicable attributes. However, as 
we shall discover, there is no consensus among the biblical scholars that the text bears 
witness to the existence of these communicable attributes. So, does the self-disclosure of the 
character of God which was revealed to Moses in Exodus 34:6-7 match what we find in the 
text of Amos? Do we have a firm ground on which to stand and defend the character of 
Yahweh as supreme moral exemplar? Before we proceed to the textual evidence, we must 
first consider the question of the identity of Yahweh. 
4.2.  Excursus: who is God? 
                                                 
122 Amos 2:11-12. 
123 Amos 4:13; 5:14, 15, 16, 27; 6:8. 
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It is crucial before we proceed further that the question of the identity of Yahweh be clarified. 
Unless we have some degree of shared conception of who God is, and, in particular, a 
conception of his essential attributes, we will not have a common ground for a specifically 
theological ethical conversation. We might consider the words of Barton: 
 
How far can we say that Amos or the editors of his book believed in the same God 
that modern Jews or Christians worship? To answer this, we would first have to 
decide how the God of Jews and Christians is generally conceived, and we would 
have to allow for difference both between and within these two religious traditions. 
There is no single Jewish or Christian notion of God, and there is no ‘Judaeo-
Christian tradition’ that unites the two religions. Seen from within, moreover, they are 
very different from each other. Yet there are important features that are shared, and 
these certainly include an idea of divine freedom from external constraint that is 
clearly part of the message of Amos, together with a recognition that God’s 
commitment to his people (whoever exactly ‘his people’ is understood to designate, a 
point on which Jews and Christians tend to differ) is not presumed upon or taken for 
granted. For all their diversity, the religious beliefs of Amos, his editors, later Jews, 
and later Christians agree on the dialectical character of the divine-human relationship 
– it is not a relationship that can be relaxed into, as a kind of comfort blanket, but one 
that constantly and consistently challenges human beings. Amos stands at the head of 
the tradition, questioning the complacent religion of his day.124   
 
 
These are indeed extremely challenging ideas and a detailed response is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. However, several thoughts occur which might deserve a mention. 
There seem to be several problems with this thinking, but one in particular is crucial to the 
current discussion. We might agree that Judaism and Christianity are ‘very different from 
each other’, and it may well be that ‘there is no single Jewish or Christian notion of God’ in 
the finer details. But it does not follow from the fact that people differ in their interpretation 
of scripture, for we all ‘see through a glass darkly’, that there is therefore not one being who 
has revealed himself through the scriptures, who is worthy of worship, and whom we call 
God. If we doubt the basic idea that there is one God who stands behind the Old Testament 
scriptures and whose character is revealed throughout the narrative, one God who spoke to 
the patriarchs, judges, kings and prophets (including Amos), the same God who is 
worshipped by Jews and Christians today, and if the only shared features are the notion of 
divine freedom and ‘the dialectical character of the divine-human relationship’, then how can 
we use the Bible to inform our ethical thinking? We may not agree on every detail of 
                                                 
124 Barton, TBA, 186-7. 
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interpretation of the character of God, and indeed, if we did claim total understanding of the 
infinite our judgment might be thought suspect, but if we cannot agree that we are talking 
about the same God, how can a conversation take place at all? And, in the context of the 
current discussion, how can we appeal to God in any meaningful way as the ground of a 
normative ethical theory? We have suggested, after all, that one of our proposed bridges 
between the world of Amos and the present was the unchanging character of God. 
However, the theist might yet take heart, for alongside the problems associated with the idea 
of the imitation of God there are also possibilities, and it is in a search for these possibilities 
that we now turn to the text of Amos. To provide a focus and framework for this discussion, 
we will take Exodus 34:6-7 as our guide to the moral character of God, the passage so central 
to the thinking of Maimonides. The God who speaks to Moses in these verses declares 
himself to be merciful and gracious, loving and faithful, and intrinsically just.  
 
6 The LORD passed before him, and proclaimed, 
“The LORD, the LORD, 
a God merciful and gracious, 
slow to anger, 
and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, 
7 keeping steadfast love for the thousandth generation, 
forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, 
yet by no means clearing the guilty” (Ex 34:6-7)125  
 
Drawing on these verses, we will consider the character of Yahweh as we find him portrayed 
in Amos under three headings: the steadfast love and faithfulness of Yahweh, the mercy of 
Yahweh, and the justice of Yahweh.   
4.3.  The steadfast love and faithfulness of Yahweh: ‘abounding in steadfast love and 
faithfulness’ 
Compared to his contemporary Hosea, for example, whose prophecy contains many examples 
of the steadfast love and faithfulness of Yahweh,126 Amos focusses less on this side of God’s 
character than on his justice. However, we still see enough glimpses of God’s love to remind 
                                                 
125 Commenting on these verses, Gordon notes: ‘It is as if the light of the glory/goodness of God is passed 
through a prism to reveal the variegated attributes of deity’. Gordon, “בוֹט”, 355. See n. 22 p. 107. 
126 For example, in Hosea 11:1-9 the prophet paints a moving picture of Yahweh as the broken-hearted father of 
a wayward child: ‘How can I give you up, Ephraim? . . . My heart recoils within me’ (11:8). 
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us that it is the same God about whom both prophets are writing. The most important of these 
glimpses is found in Amos 3:2: 
 ‘You only have I known [yādaʿtî] of all the families of the earth’. 
       ה   מ  דֲא  ה תוֹ֣חְפְשִׁמ ל ֶ֖ כִמ יִתְע ַ֔ ד י ם ֶ֣כְתֶא ק ַ֚ ר   
 
In this verse, we see an explicit statement of the relationship of Yahweh with his people. 
However, this might appear to be contradicted by the statement in 9:7: 
 
Are you not like the Ethiopians to me, 
    O people of Israel? says the LORD. 
Did I not bring Israel up from the land of Egypt, 
    and the Philistines from Caphtor and the Arameans from Kir?  (Amos 9:7) 
   ֶֶ֥ת  א םי ִִּ֙יִשֻׁכ ֩יֵנְבִכ אוֹ֣לה םִי ַ֔  רְצִמ ץֶר ֶ֣אֵמ ִּ֙יִתי ֵֵ֙לֱעֶה ל ֵֵ֗א  רְשִי־תֶא אוֹ֣לֲה ה  והְי־םֻאְנ ל ֵֶ֖א  רְשִי יֵֶ֥נְב י ִִ֛ל ם
׃רי ִָֽׁקִמ ם ֶ֥  רֲא  ו רוֹ ֶ֖תְפ  כִמ םי ִֶ֥יִתְשִׁלְפוּ 
 
Many have argued that this latter verse quite clearly states that Israel’s relationship with 
Yahweh is no different to his relationship with other nations; even their exodus was not a 
unique event, for Yahweh declares that it was he, himself, who was in charge of the 
‘exoduses’ of the Philistines and Arameans. Is this evidence of tension within the book, or 
perhaps a change of mind of either the prophet or later redactors? Did Yahweh himself 
perhaps change his mind? Can these two verses to be reconciled and if so how? 
The first point to remember here is that there is no evidence in 9:7 that Yahweh had formed 
relationships with the other nations. Secondly, 3:2 suggests that the basis of the relationship 
was the election of Yahweh, and not the Exodus event. The fact that as sovereign over all the 
nations, God has the power to move the nations around, so that Israel’s own ‘exodus’ is in 
that sense nothing special, has no bearing on the continuing relationship of Yahweh with the 
people of Israel. 
4.3.1. Covenant or no covenant? The argument for 
Admittedly, the above line of argument rests on the assumption that a covenant relationship 
existed between Israel and Yahweh. And much hangs on the interpretation of the verb ‘know’ 
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(ydʿ) in 3:2a.127 In arguing for the covenant, Paul suggests that the use of ydʿ here refers to 
the act of selecting or choosing, and so signifies ‘an emotional and experiential relationship’ 
between the people and Yahweh.128 He admits that while the election formula used here is 
distinct from the Deuteronomic one,129 it does share similarities with the patriarchal 
blessings, and since those are the only other places where the expression is found, the 
formula of 3:2 most likely refers to this tradition.130 Another clue to the fact that Israel’s 
relationship with Yahweh is special is highlighted by the emphatic placing of the direct 
object, ‘only you’ (raq ʾetkem), before the verb. Moreover, it is the existence of this covenant 
relationship which is given as the reason for the judgment: ‘therefore I will punish you for all 
your iniquities’.131 The prophet makes a clear logical connection between the punishment and 
the breach of covenant. If there was no relationship, the ‘therefore’ would make little sense.   
Amos clearly views the relation between Israel and Yahweh as one of cause and effect and 
therefore similar to the examples in the following verses.132 This ‘therefore’ clause must have 
come as such a shock to Amos’s hearers who apparently believed in the unconditional 
blessing and protection of Yahweh: the prophet turns the logic, with which his audience were 
apparently familiar, against them, thereby challenging their most fundamental 
presuppositions about their relationship with Yahweh.133 The people did not doubt that such a 
relationship existed; they just seemed to be ignorant of its implications.134      
                                                 
127 Studies on covenantal terminology have shown that cognates of the verb (עדי) in Akkadian and Hittite appear 
in vassal treaties where they have a technical legal meaning conferring ‘mutual legal recognition on the part of 
suzerain and vassal’. Herbert Huffmon suggests that a similar technical usage also occurs in the Bible. Herbert 
B. Huffmon, “The Treaty Background of Hebrew Yāda.” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental 
Research, no. 181 (1966): 34. 
128 Paul, Amos, 101. Paul suggests some other texts where (עדי) could have this meaning: Gen 18:19; Exod 
33:12, 17; Deut 9:24; Jer 1:5; Hos 13:5. 
129 e.g. Deut 10:15 ( םיִמ  ע  ה־ל  כִמ . . ר  חְבִי  ו . .  ק  ר ) 
130 e.g. Gen 12:3: ‘and in you all the families of the earth ( ה  מ  דֲא  ה ת  חְפְשִׁמ ל  כ ) shall be blessed. Cf. Gen 28:14. 
Paul, Amos, 101.      
131 Amos 3:2b. My emphasis. 
132 See Amos 3:3-6. Cf. 3:7-8.   
133 Cf. 5:14. The people were at ease (6:1), confidently believing that the Lord was with them (5:14) and they 
were safe from evil (9:10). After all were they not prospering economically and enjoying military success? (4:1: 
6:4-6; 6:13). For other ‘upsets’ to the popular theology of the day see 5:18-20; 9:7. As Artur Weiser noted a 
century ago, ‘Antithese und Paradoxie sind die Form seiner Gedankenfürung’ (‘Antithesis and paradox are the 
model for his train of thought’). Die Prophetie des Amos (BZAW 53; Giesen:Töpelmann, 1929), 102.   
134 In favour of the covenant argument, Moshe Weinfield notes that the word for ‘iniquities’ in 3:2b (ןוֹ  ע), is 
often used to denote a violation of a treaty. Moshe Weinfield, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic school. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 111, n. 5.   
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4.3.2. Covenant or no covenant? The argument against 
Other commentators dismiss the idea that a covenant relationship was in place at all. Barton, 
for example, while admitting that the story of Moses and the exodus must have been known 
in some form (or the statements in 9:7 would make little sense), and that some idea of some 
sort of relationship was apparently appreciated by the people (or 3:2 would make no sense), 
argues, nevertheless, that substantive ideas about the workings of such a relationship, such as 
those of a ‘covenant’ or ‘election’ were ‘later theological interpretations of what was felt to 
be a purely natural relationship’.135 According to Barton, Israel understood Yahweh to be the 
nation’s protector or ‘helper’, to use Wellhausen’s term, just as the other nations of the ANE 
understood their gods as protectors and helpers. It was this understanding which grounded 
Israel’s confidence that the Lord God of hosts was with them.136  
Moreover, Barton believes, largely, it seems, on the basis of 9:7, that the relationship with 
Yahweh was conditional, and that this notion of conditionality is further evidence that Amos 
was a theological innovator. It is known from archaeological findings that Israel was 
polytheistic at the time of Amos and that Yahweh was worshipped alongside other deities.137 
Barton argues that while in many ways Yahweh was considered to be much like the gods of 
the other ANE nations, in that he was believed to have control over his people and heard their 
prayers, it was his concern for relations between the neighbouring nations which set him 
apart from the rest. Moreover, it is clear from 9:7 that Yahweh is not the God of Israel alone, 
but the God of the whole world, and because of this he is not ‘necessarily benevolent’ to 
Israel:138 he will judge Israel through natural forces or by means of other enemy nations, just 
as he will judge those other nations. Finally, while there is evidence that ANE gods could act 
                                                 
135 Barton, TBA, 54. 
136 Amos 5:14. 
137 Barton suggests that, since Yahweh may have been considered the preferred God or even the chief God, 
‘henotheism’ may be the better description. TBA, 183, n. 1. 
138 A century ago Rudolf Kittel voiced a similar idea: ‘For the prophets the people was no longer the special 
possession of Yahweh in a merely external and natural sense as the majority supposed, but in the sense of 
ethical obligation’. Rudolf Kittel, The Religion of the People of Israel (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925), 
135. 
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against their people,139 it was unheard of for a god to threaten his people with 
‘annihilation’.140   
Is Yahweh faithful then? Barton’s analysis would seem to render the idea redundant and run 
counter to Exodus 34:7. He argues that because of Amos’s innovative ideas, a tension arises 
in the popular conception of Yahweh’s relation to his people. Yahweh could no longer be 
seen as Israel’s ‘helper’ as Wellhausen has asserted: ‘From the time of Amos onwards, the 
YHWH-Israel relationship will never again be simple and reassuring, but always prone to 
dialectic’.141 Amos’s monotheism portrayed a God who was sovereignly free to make and 
break relationships at will, and since there were now no hostile gods to blame for Israel’s 
troubles, the people had to face the fact that those troubles actually came from the one they 
considered their ‘helper’. 
4.3.3. Concluding thoughts: moral exemplarism and the steadfast love of Yahweh 
If we follow Barton’s interpretation, and agree that the relationship between Israel and 
Yahweh has become ‘conflicted’, it is extremely hard to argue for the steadfast love and 
faithfulness of Yahweh. But this is not the only way to read the text. And once more, the 
canonical reading advocated in this thesis can shed light on the difficulties. Such a reading 
enables us to agree with Paul who sees no contradiction between 3:2 and 9:7, because he 
accepts the existence of the covenant. As we noted, it is the covenant, and not the exodus 
referred to in 9:7 which makes the people distinct: ‘the exodus, qua exodus, is not a unique 
event and grants them no special priority or immunity’.142 Moreover, the notion of covenant 
provides a framework for comprehending the coming judgment, for with the covenant comes 
responsibilities, and, where these responsibilities are ignored, punishment is inevitable.143 
                                                 
139 For example, from the Mesha stele we learn that ‘Omri, king of Israel, he humbled Moab many days for 
Chemosh was angry at his land’. ANET, 320. Mesha was the king of Moab (see 2 Kings 3:5). 
140 This is Barton’s choice of words. He sees the text as containing the notion that YHWH ‘is actually going to 
destroy Israel and annul his relationship with his chosen people altogether’. Barton, TBA, 186.   
141 Ibid., 186. 
142 Paul, Amos, 284. Paul suggests that while the exodus motif carried great weight in the north, it was not 
theologically significant in Judah (Amos, 283, n. 17). It is perfectly conceivable that there were more people 
movements which could have been mentioned in 9:7. The selection of Ethiopia might have been due to its 
remoteness in the minds of the people of Israel to impress upon them the fact that even the most inaccessible of 
nations was still under the sovereignty of Yahweh. Ethiopia is mentioned as the farthest reach of the kingdom of 
Ahasuerus, in Esther 1:1 and 8:9 (‘from India to Ethiopia’). Interestingly, Paul notes that Homer refers to the 
Ethiopians in the Odyssey as ἔσχατοι ἀνδρῶν (‘the most remote of mankind’), Amos, 282-3, n. 8. 
143 Of course, as we see from the oracles in the opening chapters (1:3-2:3), the fact that these nations may have 
been delivered by Yahweh in the past did not mean they would be exempt from punishment any more than 
Israel would. Ultimately Yahweh is just. 
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The punishment is therefore a sign that a covenant relationship exists. When the faithfulness 
and love of God is set within the framework of a covenant, we can appreciate God’s justice 
within the sphere of his love, and so we have a sound model for imitation of that love.       
4.4.  The mercy of Yahweh: ‘merciful and gracious, slow to anger’ 
The mercy of Yahweh could arguably be seen at various points throughout the book of Amos. 
For example, we see that the judgment was preceded by repeated warnings, that a remnant 
will be spared, that Yahweh twice responded to the prophet’s intercession, and finally that 
there is hope beyond the judgment.144 We shall now consider the evidence that Yahweh is 
‘merciful and gracious, slow to anger’. 
4.4.1. The repeated warnings 
The first indication in the book that Yahweh is merciful and slow to anger comes in chapter 
2: Yahweh had already sent the prophets, we presume to warn the people, but they were 
forbidden from speaking.145 Then, in chapter 4:6-11 we find a list of the measures which God 
has taken for the purpose of drawing the people back to himself and averting the final 
judgment. The land was first afflicted with famine, drought, blight and mildew and locusts, 
and finally the people themselves suffered from an unspecified plague and some were killed 
in battle. Yahweh’s aim seems clear: he desires that the people seek him again so that they 
might live. Yet after each affliction is recounted, we hear the same refrain:  
“yet you did not return to me”, says the LORD. (Amos 4:6, 8, 9, 10, 11) 
Since the warnings have been ignored, the judgment is imminent:  
“prepare to meet your God, O Israel!” (Amos 4:12) 
                                                 
144 In addition to these four examples of the mercy of Yahweh as he is portrayed in Amos, a further suggestion 
which has not been developed in this thesis but should be noted is that Yahweh’s gracious restraint is not 
reserved for his own people, but can also be seen in the oracles against the nations: judgment does not 
immediately follow the first transgression; on the contrary, three (or four) transgressions are necessary before 
the divine patience is exhausted. See M. Daniel Carroll R., “I Will Send Fire: Reflections on the Violence of 
God in Amos”, in M. Daniel Carroll R. and J. Blair Wilgus (eds), Wrestling with the Violence of God: 
Soundings in the Old Testament (Winona Lake, Indiana; Eisenbrauns, 2015), 128. Carroll R. also suggests that 
the pathos of God is revealed in the lament voiced by the prophet in 5:1-3: Yahweh takes no delight in, and 
indeed is deeply pained by, the effects of the punishment that his justice requires. Ibid., 125-8. See also M. 
Daniel Carroll R., “Seek Yahweh, Establish Justice: Probing Prophetic Ethics. An Orientation from Amos 5:1-
17”, in Cynthia Long Westfall and Bryan R. Dyer (eds), The Bible and Social Justice: Old Testament and New 
Testament Foundations for the Church’s Urgent Call (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick, 2015). 
145 Amos 2:12. 
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The prophet’s mission is certainly to proclaim the coming judgment, but in the very act of 
sending Amos146 with a final warning, Yahweh demonstrates his mercy. 
We can, no doubt, hear the voices of objection. What sort of God would think that these 
actions were a demonstration of mercy? And what sort of a prophet would agree? How can 
such seemingly indiscriminate acts, which presumably affect the righteous as well as the 
unrighteous, be considered fair warnings? As we have already emphasised, we either accept 
that the God of Amos is the same God of whom Moses speaks or he is a different being 
altogether, if indeed a ‘being’ at all, and not simply a figure of popular religious imagination. 
If the jury remains out over the question of the existence of the OT God, where does this 
leave our ethical reflection? Certainly, any thought that Yahweh could be the supreme moral 
exemplar in a normative ethical theory such as the one we are advocating here, is futile. We 
seem to face a choice in these more difficult texts: either we abandon the idea that Yahweh is 
the sort of God we should attempt to imitate, or we try to understand these more difficult 
texts in the light of the canonical books as a whole. This fundamental idea bears repeating; if 
God is to ground our ethical reflection, and God is assumed to be the character revealed in the 
OT, then he must be assumed to be worthy of worship and so essentially good.  
It may help to remind ourselves of the catalogue of injustices which we find in the prophecy, 
and to re-orient our focus from the ‘innocent victims’ of these acts of divine discipline to the 
ones who have suffered oppression from fellow human beings with whom they shared a 
covenant relationship. It may also help to remember that when a child is heading for danger, 
stern warnings are the most loving course of action. If we see in these texts a demonstration 
of mercy prior to judgment, we can see the possibility for imitation of Yahweh in human 
situations of judging. 
4.4.2. The sparing of a remnant? 
If God is merciful, we might expect that he would allow a remnant to escape the judgment, 
for surely there is a righteous remnant of God’s people. The prophecy in its final form does 
seem to suggest this, but is the text really so unequivocal? The idea that a remnant will 
                                                 
146 Amos 7:14-15. 
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survive the judgment is in fact the subject of much debate. How, then, should we understand 
the remnant motif in Amos?147 We need to consider some key texts: 
Amos 5:15 
 
Hate evil and love good, 
    and establish justice in the gate; 
it may be that the LORD, the God of hosts, 
    will be gracious to the remnant of Joseph.  (Amos 5:15) 
 
   ֵָֽׁסוֹי תי ִֶ֥רֵאְשׁ תוֹ ֶ֖א  בְצ־י ֵָֽׁהלֱֹא הֶ֥  והְי ןִַ֛֛  נֱח ֶָֽׁי י ֵ֗ לוּא ט   פְשִׁמ ר  ע ֶ֖  ש  ב וּגי ִֶ֥צ  הְו בוֹ ַ֔ט וּבֱה ֶ֣אְו ִּ֙ע  ר־וּאְנש׃ף 
   
The ‘perhaps’ ( י  לוּא ), or ‘it may be’, here is crucial. There is no guarantee that Yahweh will 
be gracious even to the remnant of Israel. Implicit in the verb ‘to be gracious’ (ḥnn) is the 
notion that someone in a superior position is showing grace and favour to a person in a 
position of dependence.148 Yahweh is under no cultic or legal obligation to be gracious. 
Yahweh is not simply the national god of Israel; he is sovereign over all the nations and will 
be gracious to whom he wills.149 The promise that he will be gracious, even to a remnant, is 
still a sign of his mercy, and slowness to anger, even in the face of the widespread injustice in 
the land.   
Amos 9:8 
In the final judgment oracle, we find words of hope that Yahweh will not utterly destroy the 
“house of Jacob” (9:8b), and yet the previous part of the same verse seems to contradict this 
hope. 150  
    
The eyes of the Lord GOD are upon the sinful kingdom, 
    and I will destroy it from the face of the earth 
    —except that I will not utterly destroy the house of Jacob, 
says the LORD. (Amos 9:8) 
                                                 
147 Although the actual word ‘remnant’ does appear in the text, it only refers to Israel once, in 5:15 (ףֵסוֹי תיִרֵאְשׁ ): 
the other two occasions are the remnants of the Philistines in 1:8 ( םיִתְשִׁלְפ תיִרֵאְשׁ ) and of Edom in 9:12 ( תיִרֵאְשׁ
םוֹדֱא ). But even in the absence of the word itself, the remnant motif is arguably still present. 
148 Paul, Amos, 178. 
149 Cf. Exod 33:19.    
150 It is of course the appearance of stark contradiction within this verse which has understandably led most 
commentators to ascribe the second half of the verse to a later redactor.   
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 ׀יֵ֣ניֵע ה ֵֵּ֞נה די ֵֶ֥מְשׁ  ה א ֣ ל י ִִּ֠כ סֶפ ֵֶ֗א ה   מ  דֲא  ה יֵ֣נְפ ל ֶ֖  עֵמ הּ ַ֔ ת  א י ִ֣תְד  מְשִׁהְו ה ַ֔ א  ט  ח ָֽׁ  ה ִּ֙ה  כ  לְמ  מ  ב ה ִֵ֗והְי י֣  נ  דֲא די ִִ֛מְשׁ  א
׃ה ָֽׁ  והְי־םֻאְנ ב ֶ֖ קֲע י תי ֵֶ֥ב־תֶא 
   
There are other texts too which can be interpreted as a denial of any real hope. In 7:8 and 8:2, 
for example, the judgment seems total: “I will never again pass them by”.  And 9:10 is often 
used to argue against the remnant idea: ‘All the sinners of my people shall die by the sword, 
who say, “Evil shall not overtake or meet us”’.     
Amos is clear that the God of Israel is also sovereign over all nations, and holds them all 
accountable for their ethical behavior. Any nation which breaches his ethical standards, any 
‘sinful kingdom’ ( ה  א  ט  ח  ה ה  כ  לְמ  מ ), faces the threat of utter destruction. And Israel is no 
exception. Is this fact contradicted by the statement that Yahweh will not utterly destroy ‘the 
house of Jacob’ ( ב  קֲע י תיֵב־תֶא )?151 Not necessarily. We might follow Paul’s suggestion and 
read ‘sinful kingdom’ as the political entity of Israel which will cease to exist, and ‘the house 
of Jacob’ as its people, some of whom will survive albeit in exile.152 This seems a reasonable 
way of removing the apparent contradiction and contextually it fits with the next verse: the 
people of Israel will not be ‘utterly destroyed’ (9:8); they will be shaken in a sieve (9:9), but a 
remnant will survive.153 Even in judgment, we see God’s mercy in operation.    
4.4.3. Yahweh relents. Or does he?  
How do we understand God’s mercy in relation to the prophet’s intercession? The final 
chapters of Amos depict five visions of the coming judgment related in the form of a dialogue 
between Amos and Yahweh.154 The emphasis throughout is the absolute sovereignty of 
Yahweh over the natural and the supernatural. The first two visions show terrifying events for 
a community dependent on agriculture, a plague of locusts and then a devastating fire: the 
message is clear. The next two show objects, a plumb-line and a basket of summer fruit; this 
                                                 
151 Most commentators assume such a contradiction, and reason that 9:8b is a later addition. See Mays, Amos, 
157; Cripps, Amos, 265; Wolff, Joel and Amos, 346. 
152 Paul, Amos, 284. 
153 Paul argues from syntax as well as from context, and compares other uses where the statement following the 
rare expression יִכ סֶפֶא, is integral to the whole section. See Num 13:27-28; Deut 15:3-4; Judges 4:9; 2 Sam 
12:13-14. Paul, Amos, 285. 
154 Amos 7:1-3, 4-6, 7-8; 8:1-2; 9:1. These visions are grouped into two pairs and then a final solitary one which 
forms the climax, and correspond to the five warnings in chapter 4.   
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time the message is not so clear and Yahweh gives the interpretation. In the final and 
climactic vision, Amos sees Yahweh himself, ‘standing by the altar’: the sanctuary is to be 
destroyed and all who try to escape will be tracked down. After the first two visions the text 
relates a short dialogue in which Amos successfully appeals to the mercy and compassion of 
Yahweh. Following the next two, Amos says only a word or two, and after the final one the 
prophet is silent.   
The problem challenging interpreters is this: is Yahweh truly merciful if he only relents after 
the first two visions? Was it not his purpose all along to destroy the whole nation? Is it really 
mercy which we are seeing here? To try to address this challenge, we will take a closer look 
at the text of these vision reports. 
Visions 1 and 2: Amos’s successful intercession. 
On seeing the devastation of the locusts Amos cries out  
“O Lord GOD, forgive, I beg you! 
    How can Jacob stand? 
    He is so small!”  (Amos 7:2b) 
  ׃אוּ ָֽׁה ן ֶ֖ ט  ק י ִֶ֥כ ב   קֲע ָֽׁ  י םוּ ֶ֖ק י י ִֶ֥מ א ַ֔ נ־ח ָֽׁ  ל ְָֽׁס ִּ֙הִוהְי יָ֤  נ  דא 
   
Perhaps we can see a parallel here with Abraham’s intercession on behalf of Sodom (Gen 
18:22-33)?155 Some commentators have suggested that Amos is interceding here as covenant-
mediator, and virtually accusing Yahweh of breaking his covenant with Jacob whose 
smallness signified total dependence on Yahweh’s favour.156 Amos does not question Israel’s 
guilt, but his plea is for an unconditional pardon.157 The plea, however, is not met: Yahweh 
does not agree to forgive and his response is merely a stay of execution.   
The LORD relented concerning this; 
  “It shall not be,” said the LORD. (Amos 7:3) 
  158׃ה ָֽׁ  והְי ר ֶ֥  מ  א הֶֶ֖יְהִת א ֶ֥ ל תא   ז־ל  ע הֶ֖  והְי ם ֶ֥  חנ 
                                                 
155 Cf. Gen 20:7 where Abimelech is told to ask Abraham to intercede for him ‘for he is a prophet’. 
156 See W. Brueggemann, “Amos’ Intercessory Formula”, VT 19, (1969): 383-399. On this reading, the next two 
vision reports could be seen as Yahweh’s response to Amos: it was the people and not himself who had broken 
the covenant. 
157 Interestingly, the word ( חלס) is only ever used in connection with Yahweh, and refers to ‘an absolute and 
total pardon of sin’. Paul, Amos, 228. The verb used for forgiveness between humans is לחמ. 
158 The root ( םחנ ) here is in the niphal, and so means ‘to be sorry’. 
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Amos does not repeat this plea. Following the vision of the fire, Amos offers a similar plea, 
but replaces ‘forgive’ ( א נ־ח  לְס ) with ‘cease’ ( א נ־ל  דֲח ): 
“O Lord GOD, cease, I beg you! 
    How can Jacob stand? 
    He is so small!”  (Amos 7:5) 
 ׃אוּ ָֽׁה ן ֶ֖ ט  ק י ִֶ֥כ ב   קֲע י םוּ ֶ֖ק י י ִֶ֥מ א ַ֔ נ־ל  דֲח ִּ֙הִוהְי יָ֤  נ  דֲא ר ֵ֗ מ  או 
 
 
Visions 3 and 4: no intercession 
In these next two visions, there is no plea offered by the prophet. They are quite different in 
form and style: the prophet sees objects, not events, and it is Yahweh who initiates the 
dialogue asking the prophet to describe what he sees and then giving an explanation of the 
symbolism behind the objects. Both these visions are followed by a judgment oracle (7:9, and 
8:4-14) and the final declaration of Yahweh is: ‘I will never again pass them by’. 
“See, I am setting a plumb line159 
    in the midst of my people Israel; 
    I will never again pass them by;  (Amos 7:8) 
 
 ִּ֙בֶר ִֶּ֙קְב ִּ֙ךְ  נֲא ם ָ֤  ש י ִִּ֙נְנִה י ֵ֗ נ  דֲא רֶמא ֣ י  ו ךְַ֛  נֲא ר ֶ֖  מ  א  ו סוֹ ַ֔מ  ע ִּ֙הֶא  ר ה ָ֤  ת  א־ה ָֽׁ  מ י ֵ֗ לֵא ה ָ֜ והְי רֶמא ִּ֙ י  ו־א ָֽׁ ל ל ֵַ֔א  רְשִי י ִ֣מ  ע
׃וֹ ָֽׁל רוֹ ֶ֥בֲע דוֹ ֶ֖ע ףי ִֶ֥סוֹא 
 
“The end has come upon my people Israel;  
    I will never again pass them by.  (Amos 8:2) 
 
   ֵַ֔א  רְשִי י ִ֣מ  ע־לֶא ִּ֙ץֵק  ה א ָ֤  ב י ֵ֗ לֵא ה ָ֜ והְי רֶמא ִּ֙ י  ו ץִי   ק בוּ֣לְכ ר ֶ֖  מ  א  ו סוֹ ַ֔מ  ע ִּ֙הֶא  ר ה ָ֤  ת  א־ה ָֽׁ  מ רֶמא ֵ֗ יו ףי ִֶ֥סוֹא־א ל ל
׃וֹ ָֽׁל רוֹ ֶ֥בֲע דוֹ ֶ֖ע 
                                                 
159 Interpretation of the text of the third vision is complicated by the word often translated ‘plumb-line’ ( ךְ נֲא ), 
which occurs three times in vv. 7-8 and nowhere else in the Hebrew Bible. The usual understanding is that 
Yahweh is measuring Israel according to his standards of righteousness (see also Amos 5:7, 24; 6:12), as he is 
measuring the wall upon which he stands to see if it is in plumb. He finds that it is not, and hence the reason 
why judgment is coming.   
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How, then, do we interpret the change in the prophet’s response to the visions? If we assume 
that the plumb line is a measure of God’s standard of righteousness, then this vision contains 
a graphic representation of the seriousness of Israel’s violation of this standard by the 
people’s wilful disregard for justice (5:7; 6:12).  Did this cause Amos to change his mind 
between the second and third visions? This seems plausible. Although Yahweh had relented 
concerning the locusts and the fire, it seems that only now did Amos realise that the time for 
mercy was past.160 God’s longsuffering towards Israel’s endemic injustice had reached a 
limit. Righteousness had to be restored and Yahweh had to act in justice to restore it.  
4.4.4. Concluding thoughts: moral exemplarism and the mercy of Yahweh   
From the above discussion, it could be argued that the book of Amos does contain evidence 
of the mercy of God in tandem with his acts of judgment. We have noted that the intention 
behind the series of disasters in chapter 4 was to turn the people back to himself, to warn 
them of the seriousness of their predicament before the final judgment took place, giving 
them time to repent. We also saw that, although the nation will perish, the lives of a righteous 
remnant will be spared, even though they will be carried into exile. And Yahweh twice 
withheld his intended judgment in response to Amos’s plea, until the prophet realised that the 
tipping point had been reached. Finally, as we have previously discussed, we see in the 
closing section of Amos the mercy of God in the promise of a future hope beyond the 
judgment, when Yahweh will ‘restore the fortunes’ of his people,161 and reverse the negative 
effects of his judgment.162  
Our final consideration in this section on the character of God as an example to follow is 
whether the text provides evidence that Yahweh is a God of justice.    
4.5.  The justice of Yahweh: ‘yet by no means clears the guilty’ 
In Chapter Four we discussed the idea that God is just, and noted that this is often the most 
fiercely resisted claim regarding the character of God.163 Yet, it is also an essential claim for 
                                                 
160 Hubbard suggests that the first two visions belong to the earliest stages of Amos’s call and his first encounter 
with Yahweh, before he himself appreciated the extent of the sins of Israel. Hubbard, Joel and Amos, 215. 
161 Amos 9:14. 
162 See section 2.2.2. above. 
163 See Chapter 4, section 4.1.1. 
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the theist who seeks to argue that God could be considered the supreme moral exemplar for 
her VE theory. Firstly, the virtue of justice is non-negotiable for a VE theory which follows 
Aristotle in viewing justice as complete virtue. And secondly, the just person in the OT is the 
person who acts in accordance with righteousness. And so, we must be clear that when God 
exercises the virtue of justice, his aim is to restore righteousness to the covenant community, 
and when he does so, his justice is always tempered by his mercy and love. Such a God is not 
only worthy of worship, but is also worthy of imitation. The final question before us in the 
current section, then, is to determine whether Yahweh, as he is portrayed in Amos, is such a 
God.    
The central theme in Amos’s prophecy is the notion that Yahweh is going to act in justice. 
Israel has suffered from a bending of mišpāṭ and a consequent breach of ṣedāqâ. God must 
therefore act to restore righteousness. We might well assume that the ones suffering 
oppression received the news of the coming judgment with relief and rejoiced that Yahweh 
‘by no means clears the guilty’. But in the text the reader encounters a potential problem for 
the idea that God is just, and this problem impacts the notion that Yahweh could be construed 
as moral exemplar. For the text apparently tells us that God judges his people collectively, 
and not according to their individual responsibility. 
4.5.1. Amos and collective responsibility 
Some descriptions of the judgment which Amos declares can be understood as having limited 
applicability. For example, turning feasts into mourning (8:10) would presumably not apply 
to the oppressed poor, and the judgment by sword on the house of Jeroboam (7:9) appears to 
be a straightforward instance of retributive justice towards those guilty of transgression. 
However, other descriptions have an apparently universal application. For example, we can 
presume that the darkness and inescapable terror of the Day of the Lord (5:18-20; 8:9; 9:1-3) 
will affect both the righteous and the unrighteous, as will the period of famine of the words of 
the Lord (8:11). Indeed, the events which are recorded in 4:6-11 must have already caused 
widespread suffering to the people in general. While one can be glad that God ‘by no means 
clears the guilty’, one might also wonder in what sense a whole nation could be guilty, or 
even the entire house of Jeroboam. Is corporate or collective punishment ever just? Can God 
be just if he allows such widespread suffering? Moreover, since it appears that the covenant 
community will shortly cease to exist, even though on certain readings a remnant will escape, 
how can we continue to understand God’s justice in terms of the righteousness of that 
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covenant community? And finally, what are the implications for the role of Yahweh as 
supreme moral exemplar? 
At this point we might note that any theist brave enough to argue that God is just must be 
prepared to face the hostility which may follow. For many voices have criticised Yahweh as a 
vengeful God who condemns the righteous along with the unrighteous. Those who have 
already suffered under oppression, they say, are now going to suffer some more; after all it is 
the whole nation which is heading for exile. David Clines, for example, in his role as 
metacommentator, has harsh words for those who blindly accept what he sees as ‘Amos’s 
simple moral defeatism’: 
 
Not one of them has the courage – or the intellectual capacity – to extract himself 
(they are all males) from the ideology of the text and to pronounce a moral judgment 
upon the prophecy. To be sure, the future was very much as the prophecy says - 
whether it predicted it or wrote it up in hindsight. Things were awful, for rich and 
poor alike. But it is even more awful to ascribe the destruction of a state and the 
forcible deportation of its citizens to an avenging God. If that is how a believer finds 
himself or herself impelled to conclude, that it is a terrible thing to fall into the hands 
of the living God, the metacommentator can respect that. But to affirm it casually, to 
pretend that it is unproblematic – that is not scholarly, it is not even human.164 
 
Most commentators believe that the notion of national collective responsibility evidenced in 
Amos is a mark of his being an innovator. To Barton, for example, the idea that the whole 
nation would perish ‘for the sins of a few’, is one of Amos’s ‘radical’ ideas.165 To imagine, 
therefore, that it was only the wicked who would perish was to indulge in ‘wishful 
thinking’.166 However, this idea was later ‘toned down’ by the book’s editors who introduced 
the concept of divine sieving (9:9), and added that a declaration by Yahweh that [only] ‘the 
sinners’ of his people would die (9:10). Barton claims, therefore, that there are two different 
                                                 
164 David J. A. Clines, ‘Metacommentating Amos’, in Heather A. McKay, David J. A. Clines, and R. N. 
Whybray (eds.), Of Prophets' Visions and the Wisdom of Sages: Essays in Honour of R. Norman Whybray on 
His Seventieth Birthday (JSOTSup 162; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 158-9 [original italics]. 
165 Barton, TBA, 187. Barton partially contributes this radical idea to the fact that Amos was ‘a realist’, and, as 
such, he recognised that ancient warfare was just as indiscriminate a process as earthquakes (TBA, 188). 
166 Barton, TBA, 188. Barton notes that modern scholarship rejects the somewhat simplistic view from the past 
that individualism in religion and ethics was a later development, arising at the time of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, 
and flourishing during the postexilic period. It was in such a culture, so it was thought, that the wisdom 
literature was born. A more common view today is that both individual and collective responsibility were, and 
still are, features of the ‘popular consciousness’, ibid., 187-8. For a classic article on the related concept of 
‘corporate personality’, see J. W. Rogerson, “The Hebrew Conception of Corporate Personality: A Re-
Examination.” JTS 21, no. 1 (1970): 1-16. 
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ideas present in the book. Amos’s view of divine justice is in line with that of the other OT 
prophets who were ‘utterly obsessed’167 with the topic of God’s justice, believing that they 
were called simply to announce the coming judgment and develop a theodicy to justify it 
before the guilty people. But does the text itself justify such a reading? Most commentators 
do believe that the idea of sieving among the nations is later addition.168 However, some 
accept it as ‘authentic’ Amos. Mays, for example, reasons that the agricultural metaphor, the 
idea of the sword as the instrument of punishment, and the use of the people’s own words as 
evidence against them (10b), are all marks of the prophet’s style.169 Moreover, 9:9 does seem 
to follow naturally from 9:8b; the nation will be sieved and not totally destroyed. And, 
finally, the idea that Yahweh is also master of the nations (1:3-2:3; 9:7), as well as Lord of 
Israel (9:9), fits with the prophecy as a whole.170 So was Amos really unconcerned with 
moral exhortations or calls for repentance? 
Firstly, is the judgment really only about ‘the sins of a few’ as Barton claims?171 Or does the 
problem go deeper than the elite minority in Israel? According to Abraham Heschel, the 
prophetic view of collective responsibility is based on the idea that individual crimes are an 
evidence of the general corruption of society.172 It might be helpful to bear in mind that this 
sovereign God who has authority over the nations (9:7), and the created order (8:8, 9; 9:5 6), 
from whose presence flight is impossible (9:2-4), is also the God who searches and knows 
individual hearts and minds,173 and so bases his judgments on perfect knowledge. Secondly, 
the repeated use of the possessive pronoun ‘my’ in the phrase ‘my people Israel’,174 is 
testimony to the compassion of God which we considered earlier. Even in judgment Yahweh 
has not forgotten the special relationship: the people belong to him in their judgment (7:8, 15; 
                                                 
167 Barton, TBA, 189.    
168 E.g. Cripps, Amos, 265, Wolff, Joel and Amos, 348-9.  
169 Mays, Amos, 161-2. See also Paul, Amos, 285-7. 
170 See Paul, Amos, 286, n. 36. 
171 Barton, TBA, 187.    
172 ‘If we admit that the individual is in some measure conditioned or affected by the spirit of society, an 
individual’s crime discloses society’s corruption. In a community not indifferent to suffering, 
uncompromisingly impatient with cruelty and falsehood, continually concerned for God and every man, crime 
would be infrequent rather than common’. Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper & Row, 
1962), 16. 
173 Cf. Ps 139. 
174 Amos (7:8, 15; 8:2; cf. 9:14). This phrase ( לֵא  רְשִי יִמ  ע ) is first used in 1 Samuel 9:16, where Yahweh says to 
Samuel ‘you shall anoint him [Saul] to be ruler over my people Israel’. This phrase is also found in 2 Samuel 
(2x), Kings (4x), Chronicles (4x), Jeremiah (2x), Ezekiel (6x), Daniel (1x) as well as in Amos.     
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8:2) as much as in their restoration (9:14). Thirdly, when our focus is mainly on the 
judgment, it is easy to forget the point of the judgment in the first place, which was the 
injustice suffered by the weak and oppressed in Israel. It is the evident lack of the virtue of 
justice which drives the prophecy after all. 
The benefit of our canonical reading, and the appealing to the final form of the text, is that we 
can accept 9:10 at face value – in his judgment God distinguishes the sinners from the 
righteous – and not get sidetracked by theories of composition. It may well be that the 
prophet had a different perspective to that of later editors, but, as we noted early on in this 
chapter, all redaction theories are just theories in the end, and although they can be hugely 
useful to our understanding of the process of the text’s construction, it is the canonical text 
which gives us a solid foundation on which to base a normative ethical theory. And as we 
read the canonical text, we find evidence for the perfect justice of God, both in his just 
judgments, and also in his tempering of those judgments with mercy. Only the sinners will 
die, the death of the nation of Israel does not entail the death of the individual ‘righteous’.   
When the people of God are suffering oppression, and cry out for deliverance, they need 
assurance that the God whom they worship not only hears them but will ‘by no means clear 
the guilty’. 
4.5.2. Concluding thoughts: moral exemplarism and Yahweh’s justice 
While it is relatively unproblematic to look to the love, faithfulness and mercy of God for 
examples of how humans should behave, it is much less straightforward to do the same for 
God’s justice. Nevertheless, we have found nothing in the text of Amos to make us doubt the 
justice of God, or to reject the idea that his justice provides us with an example to follow. We 
can accept Clines’ point that to be casual in our approach to the human suffering in the wake 
of what is represented as God’s judgment would be evidence of something lacking in our 
humanity. But if we are to understand the prophecy at all, ideology included, we must surely 
attempt to discern the reasons given for that judgment in the light of the character of God as 
he is portrayed in the Old Testament as a whole, and not simply dismiss him as an ‘avenging’ 
deity. If the text is held to have any authority at all, and any meaningful input into theological 
ethics, then the theist must courageously stand her ground against the sort of ideology 
expressed by Clines, and speak out for another view of God, a God, perhaps, whose character 
is less the ‘avenging’ deity and more the ‘glory and goodness’ of Exodus 34:6-7. 
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Divine judgment is indeed the focus of Amos, but justice, understood along Aristotelian lines, 
cannot be reduced to judgment; it has a much wider frame of reference. Just as a God who is 
intrinsically good can only do good, so too a God who is intrinsically just will always act 
with perfect justice and according to the standard of perfect righteousness. Our study of the 
text gives us no good reason to doubt the justice of God, or to reject that the justice which 
drives his actions should be an example for human ethics of the virtue of justice in action.   
4.6.  Conclusion  
In this section, we revisited the suggestion made in Chapter Four that imitatio Dei, suitably 
interpreted, could serve as a theistic alternative to imitation of the Aristotelian phronimos, 
and supply a substantive and workable concept of the moral exemplar for our theistic VE 
theory. In applying this suggestion to the text of Amos, we acknowledged that many 
commentators doubt that the character of God, as he is depicted in the text, is a suitable 
candidate for imitation at all, even if imitation is restricted to his ‘communicable’ attributes. 
However, using God’s self-revelation to Moses in Exodus 34 as a framework, we argued that 
the love, faithfulness and mercy of God can be seen in the text of Amos, even in the shadow 
of his judgment, giving support to the argument that God can be viewed as the supreme moral 
exemplar. Admittedly, the matter of God’s justice was less straightforward. When it comes to 
God’s particular acts of judgment, such as those described in Amos, imitation is clearly 
inappropriate and inadvisable, for God, understood in the classical sense, and distinct from 
humans, not only sees all things and has all knowledge, but is also essentially good and 
capable of perfectly righteous judgements and so perfect justice. However, imitation of God 
is a possibility with regard to the virtue of justice and makes perfect sense on an Aristotelian 
reading. Firstly, the virtue of justice, as we argued above, is essential for the restoration of 
righteousness to the covenant community, and just as this is the aim of God, so too should it 
be the aim of the individual. Secondly, according to Aristotle, the just person is conceived to 
be identical to the virtuous person, possessing all virtues. To possess the virtue of justice 
necessitates the possession of love and compassion too. God’s justice, as we argued in 
Chapter 4,175 should always be seen in the light of his covenant love.  
We noted at the start of this chapter that the reader of Amos encounters, for the most part, the 
dark side of the deity. Yet we have shown that, even from the text of Amos, it can be argued 
that Yahweh, the God of justice, is also clearly portrayed as a God of love and mercy. The 
                                                 
175 See Chapter 4, section 4.4.1. 
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text, therefore, need not cause us to doubt the essential goodness of the character of God and 
his suitability for the role of moral exemplar. Although human beings will never accomplish 
complete imitation of a morally perfect being, they have, in God as embodiment of the kalon, 
a standard at which to aim. We can therefore conclude that, in the character of God, we have 
found a substantive and utilisable conception of the moral exemplar which our VE theory 
requires in order to make it normatively useful. 
 
Part IV. The normative question and Amos 
In Chapter 5 we discussed the inability of CVE theory to answer what we called ‘the 
normative question’, which is the demand for the justification of the claims which morality 
makes on us, and noted that eudaimonia-based theories struggled to overcome the circularity 
objection. We then suggested that a solution could be found in a partnership with 
paradigmatic natural law theory. Furthermore, if this natural law theory is modified according 
to Mark Murphy’s idea of moral concurrentism, whereby the goods which do the moral 
necessitating are theistic facts, then our VE theory and its natural law partner are both 
thoroughly theocentric. 
We have assumed in this thesis the existence of some form of covenant (Amos 3:2), a 
covenant based on righteousness and maintained by justice. This covenant provided the 
framework for our theistic version of VE, where eudaimonia was understood in terms of 
flourishing covenant relationships, which depend ultimately on the relationships between 
human beings and God. But our VE theory is as vulnerable to the circularity objection as its 
secular counterparts. It is interesting, therefore, to consider how the text of Amos can be read 
in the light of a modified natural law theory. 
The adoption of natural law theory provides us with a means of explaining the moral 
responsibility of the other nations, who are not bound by the norms inherent in a covenant 
with Yahweh. At several points in Amos, the prophet points out that Yahweh is sovereign, 
not only over Israel, but over all nations. Moreover, their destinies are bound up with their 
ethical practice, which implies moral accountability to Yahweh.176 We must therefore assume 
they had access to some form of ‘natural law’, whose goods they have violated in various 
                                                 
176 Amos 1:3-2:3; 9:8. 
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ways.177 For example, they have attacked the good of life with a degree of violence which, 
we can assume, transgressed the generally accepted ‘codes’ of warfare (1:3, 11, 13). 
Disrespect for the dead (2:1) could be considered another instance of an attack on a 
fundamental good,178 and finally, we see evidence of violation of the good of friendship or 
brotherhood (1:9). 
And if we accept the theory of moral concurrentism, where the goods which do the work of 
moral necessitation are theistic facts, we can make sense of Amos’s claim that all peoples are 
accountable to Yahweh for any violation of these goods. On this theory, the goods which are 
being violated, both by the nations and by Israel, are theistic facts. That is, their goodness is a 
participation in the divine goodness, but specified in creaturely nature. All the acts of 
injustice in Israel which the prophet condemns are therefore attacks, not only against the 
goods, but also against God himself. This coheres well with the text of Amos: to seek God is 
to seek the good, and to seek the good is to seek life, but, as Gutiérrez writes, ‘oppression in 
any of its forms means death’.179 
We therefore now have a thoroughly theocentric explanation of the moral responsibility of 
the nations, as well as Israel. And we also have a thoroughly theocentric answer to the 
normative question. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we reached the final stage in our investigation, which was to test our theistic 
version of VE theory against the text of the book of Amos. 
The primary aim of this thesis was to construct a specifically theistic version of VE theory. 
We noted at the start that there were four conditions of adequacy which any normative theory 
based on virtue must meet: an adequate concept of telos, as the end of all ethical reflection; a 
substantive notion of virtue, and, since our version could be termed neo-Aristotelian, this 
                                                 
177 Barton sees Amos 1:3-2:5 as a clear OT example of a natural law theory which is based on ‘the common 
moral sense of all right-minded men’, the existence of which the prophet clearly assumed. John Barton, Amos's 
Oracles against the Nations: A Study of Amos 1.3 - 2.5 (SOTSMS 6; Cambridge: CUP, 1980), 44. Moreover, it 
is clear from the three “hymnic” passages in Amos 4:13, 5:8-9 and 9:5-6, that the God who, as ultimate telos, 
stands behind the requirements of the natural law, is not only the creator, but also wields incomparable power 
over the created order: the nations therefore ignore his moral demands at their peril. It is interesting to note that 
5:8-9 is the climax of the chiasm formed by 5:1-17, which we noted was a central passage for an understanding 
of teleology in Amos. See p. 166ff. See also Carroll R., “Seek Yahweh, Establish Justice”, 78-9.  
178 We remember the plea of Antigone. 
179 Gutiérrez, The God of Life, 3. 
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meant primarily the virtue of justice; a workable conception of the moral exemplar; and 
finally, a satisfactory answer to the normative question. Having argued that the first three 
conditions could be met by our proposed theistic version alone, and the fourth if it is 
partnered by a modified natural law theory, the final stage was to test our theory against the 
biblical text. This final chapter, therefore, was devoted to re-examining our theory in the light 
of the text of Amos, dealing in turn with each of our four conditions of adequacy.  
We will now briefly summarise our conclusions.180 In the first part, we concluded that it was 
possible to interpret Amos’s concept of the good as a remarkably similar idea to Aristotle’s 
eudaimonia. Since seeking the good meant correctly seeking Yahweh, we argued that the 
ultimate telos of all ethical reflection was God, and that eudaimonia, or the flourishing life, 
was a life of relationship or fellowship with God. We then argued that the notion of justice 
was more widely conceived by the prophet than simply referring to social justice, for he also 
appears to share the Aristotelian idea that justice was complete virtue. Justice was necessary 
for the maintenance of the covenant relationships and the restoration of righteousness, and 
was therefore both instrumental to, and constitutive of, eudaimonia. In the third part, we 
revisited the idea that God could be considered supreme moral exemplar, and inquired 
whether the character of Yahweh as he is portrayed in the text of Amos, was a suitable 
candidate for imitation. We concluded that the text spoke clearly of the love and mercy of 
God, and that even the justice of God, correctly interpreted, provided a model for imitation. 
There was nothing in the text of Amos which strongly challenged our suggestion that the 
imitatio Dei could serve as a viable theistic alternative to imitation of the Aristotelian 
phronimos. Finally, we argued that a modified natural law theory could provide justification 
of the claims which morality makes, not only on Israel, but also on the surrounding nations. 
On the basis of the findings in this chapter, we can conclude that our theistic version of VE 
theory has passed the test which we set at the start. It is not only a satisfactory heuristic 
device by which to read the ethics of the OT, but has also been proved to be a normatively 
useful ethical theory.  
 
  
                                                 
180 For more detailed summaries, see the conclusions at the end of each part of the current chapter. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has aimed to critique the ancient, but recently rejuvenated, theory of virtue ethics, 
and to construct a theistic version, which would not only be normatively useful, but could 
also serve as a heuristic device for reading the biblical text. We began by noting that, while a 
return to an ethics based on character was welcome, claims by the proponents of VE that it 
can function as an independent normative theory needed to be investigated. The method used 
to conduct this investigation was to identify the essential features of a virtue-based theory 
(Chapter One), subject them to critical analysis, and then suggest theological interpretations 
of each based on the text of the OT. These interpretations would finally be tested by a 
canonical reading of the Book of Amos.  
From our critique of CVE theory, we concluded that a neo-Aristotelian variety not only 
produced the most persuasive and substantive explanation of the relation between telos and 
virtue, but also provided the best framework for the construction of a theistic version. 
According to Aristotle, the good or telos of all ethical reflection was a flourishing life or 
eudaimonia, understood as a life of activity according to virtue. Aristotle’s relation, we 
suggested, could be interpreted along biblical lines if eudaimonia was construed as a 
relationship with God (Chapter Two), and the virtue of justice, the overarching virtue in 
Aristotle’s scheme, as essential for the maintenance of that relationship (Chapter Three). 
Noting the difficulties inherent in the concept of the moral exemplar within naturalistic 
theories such as Aristotle’s, we suggested a theological alternative in the idea of imitatio Dei 
(Chapter Four). With these theological modifications, we were near to achieving our primary 
goal: the construction of a theistic version of VE theory. 
However, in the final stage of our critique of CVE theory (Chapter Five), we encountered a 
major problem for all VE theories, whether theistic or otherwise. This was an inability to 
justify its account of right action and so provide an answer to the normative question. This 
lack of explanatory power, it was argued, was ultimately damaging to the claims of the 
proponents of VE that the theory could function independently. As we looked elsewhere for 
help, we found two alternatives available to the theist: natural law and theological 
voluntarism. We noted that, while VE has an ideal partner in natural law theory, in its 
paradigmatic form natural law theory was insufficiently theocentric to ground a biblically 
based virtue ethics. However, we argued that his problem could be overcome by adopting 
moral concurrentism. And so, it was concluded that VE, supplemented by a suitably modified 
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natural law theory, can serve as a useful normative ethical theory for the biblically minded 
theist.  
The closing phase of our investigation was the testing of our theistic revision of VE theory 
against the text of book of the prophet Amos (Chapter Six). As we stated at the outset, the 
overall aim was to see whether a bridge could be built between the world of Amos and the 
context of contemporary ethical theory. So, is our theistic VE theory a useful heuristic device 
by which to study the ethics of the OT and make the text relevant to the contemporary 
theological ethicist? 
Our reading of the text showed that Amos’s conception of the good was fundamentally 
teleological, and that the parallel exhortations in 5:4, 6 and 5:14 supported the argument that 
the telos of all ethical reflection could be construed as standing in some relation to Yahweh 
himself. To seek the good was to seek Yahweh, and both were necessary for life. Moreover, 
we argued that this life could be understood along Aristotelian lines as eudaimonia. The 
flourishing life, so conspicuous by its absence in Amos’s Israel, could therefore be 
interpreted as a life of relationship with God, and would reach its perfection in a future time. 
On this theistic Aristotelian reading, Yahweh is not only the source of the ‘external’ goods 
without which eudaimonia is impossible, but is, himself, also the good (the kalon). When the 
people seek Yahweh correctly, they are seeking the good, and in seeking the good they will 
live. The virtuous life is thus both instrumental to, and constitutive of, eudaimonia. Thus, the 
theist has a substantive concept of telos to underpin her VE theory. 
We then considered whether the prophet’s idea of justice could be related to an Aristotelian 
conception, where it was understood, not only as one virtue among many, but also as the 
overarching virtue essential for eudaimonia. Through our study of mišpāṭ and ṣdq we found 
that Amos had a view of justice which was wider than its standard distributive sense (mišpāṭ 
ûṣedāqâ), and that the role of mišpāṭ was ultimately to maintain the integrity, or 
righteousness, of the covenant community. The perversion of justice in the Israel of Amos’s 
day threatened the integrity of the community, leading not only to a loss of righteousness and 
peace, but also to the severing of the life-giving covenant relationship between God and the 
people. This conception of justice is virtue ethical because the prior notion is the good of the 
covenant relationship and not any rules inherent in it. The virtue of justice is therefore both 
instrumental to and constitutive of eudaimonia, which we are arguing is relationship with 
God and the theological equivalent of Aristotle’s friendship as ‘justice in the fullest sense’.   
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The third condition of adequacy which we examined in our reading of Amos was the concept 
of the moral exemplar, and our suggestion that Yahweh himself was the best candidate to 
fulfil this role. The success of this argument depends entirely on the interpretation of the 
character of Yahweh as the text reveals him. Taking Yahweh’s self-revelation in Exodus 
34:6-7 as our framework, we argued that Amos portrays a God who is merciful and gracious, 
loving and faithful, but who is also essentially just and therefore must act to judge injustice. 
We acknowledged that, while human imitation of the love, faithfulness and mercy of God 
was conceivable and indeed desirable, imitation of the justice of God was not such a 
straightforward notion. Certainly, any thought of imitation of his specific acts of judgment is 
always inappropriate, for God, as we conceive him in the classical sense, is not only 
omniscient but is also essentially good, meaning that his judgments will always be perfectly 
righteous and just. However, this does not preclude the idea of imitation of the virtue of 
justice which lies behind the judgments, if this virtue is conceived along Aristotelian lines as 
essential for the restoration of righteousness to the covenant community. Moreover, if we 
follow Aristotle and hold that the just person is the virtuous person, then declaring God to be 
just is to also declare him to be in possession of all the virtues. And so, a just God will 
necessarily be loving and compassionate too, his justice always tempered by his covenant 
love. Although humans will never perfectly imitate a morally perfect being, if God is their 
moral exemplar, they do have a standard of excellence at which to aim. And if God is the 
good (ṭôb or kalon) as Amos suggests, and the aim of all virtuous activity is the kalon, as 
Aristotle declares, then, arguably, we have a bridge between an Aristotelian ethics of virtue, 
and the rudiments of a VE theory in the prophet Amos. In our theistic VE theory, 
eudaimonia, the telos of all human virtuous activity, is a relationship with God, who can be 
understood as the embodiment of the kalon, and therefore also as the perfect moral exemplar. 
Lastly, we discussed how we might read Amos in the light of the modified natural law theory 
which we suggested could supplement our neo-Aristotelian VE theory, and so enable it to 
respond to ‘the normative question’. We argued that the moral responsibility of the nations 
can be explained by the concept of natural law theory in which the goods do the work of 
moral necessitation, and ground the claims which morality makes. Further, we argued that, to 
the theist, moral concurrentism was an appealing modification, for, on this account, the goods 
which do the moral necessitating also participate in the divine goodness: that is, they are 
theistic facts. Amos is clear that Yahweh is sovereign over all the nations, and so any 
violation of these goods, whether through Israel’s systemic injustice, or through the war 
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crimes of the nations, is therefore an offence against God who is both the source of good and 
the ultimate good or telos. We therefore have an explanation of the source of normativity 
which applies to Israel as well as the surrounding nations.  
It seems clear from our discussion, that VE theory has much to offer contemporary ethical 
debate. We have also concluded that a neo-Aristotelian type of VE can be plausibly re-
interpreted as a theistic theory if that framework is constructed with theological versions of 
the concepts of telos, virtue and moral exemplar. Although our theistic version suffers from 
the same malady as all CVE theories, in that it is unable to provide an account of the source 
of normativity and so cannot ultimately function as an independent normative ethical theory, 
a partnership with moral concurrentism can make good this lack. The result is a normatively 
useful and thoroughly theocentric version of VE which can be a useful heuristic device for 
reading the biblical text. And lastly, this theistic presentation of VE theory fulfils our 
secondary objective, which was to build a bridge between the Israel of the eighth century and 
the contemporary ethical context, a bridge constructed on the twin presuppositions of a 
common human nature and the reality of the God revealed in the biblical text.   
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